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ABSTRACT 
 
The Kenyan political landscape has, since the 1990‘s, been tumultuous and characterised by 
multiple political and social struggles centred on embedding a new constitutional order. This 
thesis is a qualitative case study of the Ufungamano Initiative, a powerful movement involved in 
these struggles between 1999 and 2005. Emerging in an environment of deep societal divisions 
and multiple sites of struggle, the Ufungamano Initiative is a remarkable story of how and why 
previously disjointed and disparate individuals and groups came together in a ‗movement of 
movements‘ to become a critical contender in Kenyan constitutional reforms. The movement 
utilised direct citizens‘ actions and was directly in competition with the Moi/KANU state for 
control of the Constitution Reform Process. This direct competition and challenge, posed a 
legitimacy crisis on the state led process forcing an autocratic and intolerant regime to capitulate 
and open up space for democratic engagement of citizens in the Constitution Reform Process. 
But the Ufungamano Initiative is also a story of the limits of social movements.  While holding 
so much power and promise, movements are limited in their ability to effect fundamental 
changes in society. Even after substantial gains in challenging the state, the Ufungamano 
Initiative was vulnerable and agreed to enter a ‗coerced‘ merger with the state-led process in 
2001. The merger dissipated the Ufungamano Initiative‘s energy.  
 
This study therefore speaks to the power and limits of social movements in effecting 
fundamental changes in society. Applying a socio-historical approach, the study locates the 
Ufungamano Initiative within the broader social, economic and political struggles to argue that 
contemporary constitutional reform struggles in Kenya were, in Polanyi‘s (1944) terms, double 
movement type of societal counter-movements to protect itself from an avaricious economic and 
political elites. Engaging the political process model, this thesis analyses seventy in-depth 
interviews and secondary data to explain the dynamics in the rise, operations, achievements and 
decline of the Ufungamano Initiative as illustrative of how movements emerge, take on a life of 
their own and sometimes metamorphose into phenomenal forces of change, or just fizzle out.  
 
Keywords: Social Movements. Civil Society. Citizen Participation. Constitutional Reform 
Struggles. Kenya. 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction and Study Background  
 
‘We are never completely contemporaneous with our present. History advances in 
disguise; it appears on stage wearing the mask of the preceding scene, and we tend to 
lose the meaning of the play […]. The blame, of course, is not history’s, but lies in our 
vision, encumbered with memory and images learned in the past. We see the past 
superimposed on the present, even when the present is a revolution’ (Regis Debray, 
1967: 19). 
Introduction 
This thesis is a qualitative case study of the emergence, growth, and decay of the Ufungamano
1
 
Initiative as illustrative of the power and limits of a social movement
2
 engaged in attempts to re-
order the Kenyan state through struggles for constitutional reforms, between 1999 and 2005. It 
utilises the political opportunities model
3
 to analyse the power of citizens‘ actions to challenge 
the state through a social movement. 
 
The contemporary Kenyan political landscape, just like that of many other African countries, has 
not been spared widespread unrests. The most significant of such unrests in Kenya‘s recent 
history was the widespread insurrection arising from the disputed 2007 presidential election. The 
single most driving factor in this conflict was ethnicity
4
 resulting from a distorted competition 
for state power that affords the controllers of the same, the largesse to buy tribal loyalties.  
 
Over the years, the Kenyan socioeconomic and political system has idolised materialism that 
does not interrogate the means used to acquire the same. The system has offered little 
opportunities to majority of citizens while favouring a few economic and political elites. Millions 
have been condemned to perpetual existential misery characterised by neglect, exclusion and 
                                                 
1
 Ufungamano comes from the Kiswahili word fungamana, which means to join together. The Ufungamano 
Initiative was so named after the Ufungamano House, also known as The Christian Students‘ Leadership Centre, 
located in the precincts of the University of Nairobi. It is an ecumenical endeavour between the National Council of 
Churches of Kenya (NCCK) and the Kenya Episcopal Conference (KEC) who jointly own the centre. The centre 
provides a place of worship, pastoral care, guidance and counselling to the students and academic community. 
2
 In this thesis, social movement refers to ‗means through which ordinary people come together to make collective 
claims on others […] through a distinctive combination of campaigns, performances, and displays‘ (Tilly 2004: ix).  
Detailed discussion on the operationalisation of this concept is provided in chapter two of this thesis.  
3
 The political opportunities model has been popular in social movement studies in analysing the degree of 
receptivity or vulnerability of a political system to organised protest groups (Chan, 2009; McAdam, 1982; 1999; 
Tilly, 1978; 1984; Voss and Williams, 2009 [2011]). 
 
 2 
deprivation while a few accumulate obscene wealth riding on a wave of negative ethnicity, 
corruption, nepotism and patronage.  
 
The resultant wealth disparities have in turn, created vast cleavages and sources of conflict in 
Kenyan society. These cleavages have manifested themselves through crime and other forms of 
social contentions. Some Kenyans, feeling left out of sharing the supposed largesse from the 
state and the market, have turned against those perceived to be benefiting. Although wealth 
disparities are arguably not always directly correlated with societal conflicts (Sen, 2006; 1992), a 
closer look at the Kenyan social and economic realities suggests a different picture. Indeed, as 
McVeigh (2006: 512) proposes, ‗structural conditions can generate pockets of discontent. This 
discontent can provide incentives to participate in social movement activism, but may also be 
expressed in other ways, including criminal activity.‘  
 
The cleavages in Kenyan society, while fundamentally economic in nature, have in most 
instances been disguised as ethnic. Mamdani (1996) in Citizens and Subjects offers useful 
insights into why and how ethnicity is a compelling explanatory variable of societal cleavages 
throughout Africa. He posits that while the postcolonial African nationalists succeeded in de-
racialising (i.e. Africanising) the civil and military bureaucracies, they failed to detribalise and 
democratise the countryside. Moreover, in post independent Kenya, regional development 
inequalities continue to be expressed as ethnic and political conflicts (Currie and Ray, 1986).
5
 A 
majority of Kenyans still see themselves first, through ethnic lenses. State power in the hands of 
one of their kinsmen is seen as the ultimate solution to a ‗tribe‘s‘ economic maladies.  As such, 
the ‗tribal card‘ has been invoked quite often by politicians of different political and ethnic 
origins, who preach tribal populism and perpetrate ethnic animosity while doing little to address 
the plight of the poor. Such ethnic manipulation precipitated the 2008 Kenyan post-election 
violence. 
 
The 2008 post-election violence was a symptomatic manifestation of recurrent episodes of a 
rebellion based on ‗social grievances with long roots to Kenya‘s pre- and post- independence‘ 
                                                 
5
 Currie and Ray (1986: 48), argue that ethnicity is particularly important in explaining the ‗tension between Central 
[…] and Western Kenya [...] often presented as ―Luo-Kikuyu rivalry‖[…].  While the ―ethnic‖ factor should not be 
over-stressed, one should recognise that ―uneven development‖ might be given ideological expression in terms of 
ethnic loyalties. Indeed, since 1966, several radical politicians (Luo and non-Luo) have argued that whereas Central 
Province has benefited from land re-distribution, other areas, especially western Kenya, have done less well.‘ 
 3 
era (Ochieng W., 2008) resulting from political elites whipping raw ethnic emotions. While the 
2008 post-election violence is an example of one of the most horrific manifestations of such 
grievances, there have been constant and perhaps comparatively less violent protests for a long 
time. Some of these struggles have taken the shape of organised social movements engaged in 
sustained protests in the context of multiple crises of economic and political (mis)governance, 
human rights abuses, and distribution concerns (e.g. land, jobs, political opportunities, education) 
in the Kenyan society.  
 
On August 4, 2010, Kenyans, in a constitutional referendum, overwhelmingly voted by 68.55% 
in favour of a proposed constitution (Kenya Gazette, 24/08/2010). When the new constitution 
was promulgated on August 27, 2010, it was a culmination of a two decade long sustained 
struggle for a new constitution. This struggle was initially led by political and civil society
6
 
activists but later diffused to the broader Kenyan society. In the course of this protracted 
contention, several successive social movements reflective of Tarrow‘s (1998) concept of ‗cycles 
of contention‘ were the engines of these social mobilisations.  The Ufungamano Initiative was, 
between 1999 and 2005, one such important player in these social contentions and mobilisations 
in the recent constitution reform project in Kenya.  
 
The Ufungamano Initiative, emerged in December 1999 from citizens‘ palpable rage against the 
refusal of the government of President Daniel arap Moi (Kenya‘s second president who reigned 
between 1978 to 2002) and the then ruling party –the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) – 
to allow popular participation of the Kenyan people in reviewing their constitution. The 
Ufungamano Initiative was a broad based movement. In its formative years, it epitomised a 
social movement with extraordinary mass appeal and a multiplicity of actors that many social 
                                                 
6
 This thesis adopts a Gramscian dialectical conception of civil society. Gramsci (1971) perceives civil society as 
‗intertwined in a hegemonic historic bloc‘ in which ‗the massive structures of modern democracies, both as state 
organisations and as complexes of associations in civil society, constitute for the art of politics, as it were, the 
‗trenches‘, and the permanent fortifications of the front in the war of position‘ (Gramsci, 1971: 243). Civil society is 
therefore the ‗sturdy structure . . . and powerful system of fortresses and earthworks‘ (Gramsci, 1971: 238) behind 
the state that serves as a stabilizing, conservative force and ensures popular consent to hegemonic forces. It includes 
a whole range of non-coercive institutions: non-state and non-market structures and activities such as trade unions, 
schools, professional, educational and cultural associations, political parties, and churches that organize consent 
backed up by the potential application of force (coercion) (Bond, 2006; Katz, 2006; Price, 2003). At the same time, 
if society is to free itself from hegemonic oppressive and exploitative forces in society, Gramsci advocates for a 
counter hegemonic ‗war of position‘ for ideological dominance (hegemony) of civil society. More discussions in the 
operationalisation of the concept of civil society are dealt with in chapter two. 
 4 
movements, especially its predecessors like the National Convention Executive Council (NCEC), 
had failed to achieve. Its membership was drawn from fifty-four stakeholders of citizens‘ 
organisations including human rights non-governmental organisations (NGOs), faith groups, 
students and youth organisations, women‘s organisations, grassroots social movements, trade 
unions as well as some opposition political parties. The Ufungamano Initiative mounted a 
credible challenge to the Moi/KANU state in Kenya‘s constitutional review project (Ogony, 
2004; Andreassen and Tostensen, 2006). Available literature converges on the fact that the 
government of President Moi resorted to violence, harassment, arresting or beating the 
Ufungamano Initiative leaders and supporters in order to break the movement (Amnesty 
International, 28 November, 2000; 7 February, 2001; 13 February, 2001; Human Rights Watch, 
2000; The Economist, 10 Feb. 2001; Karanja, 2008; Majtenyi, 2000). However, the Ufungamano 
Initiative leaders and its supporters remained undeterred in their mission. 
 
The Ufungamano Initiative is a remarkable story of how direct citizens‘ actions pressured an 
autocratic and intolerant regime to acquiesce, thereby opening up space for democratic 
engagement of citizens in the Constitution Reform Process. It utilised direct social movement 
action through one of its organs, the People‘s Commission of Kenya (PCK) that was in direct 
competition with the Moi/KANU state for control of the Constitution Reform Process. This 
direct competition and challenge, posed a legitimacy crisis on the state led process. But the 
Ufungamano Initiative is also a story of the limits of social movements, which, while holding so 
much power and promise, are limited in their ability to effect fundamental changes in society.  
Even after substantial gains in challenging the state, the Ufungamano Initiative was vulnerable 
and in a way, agreed to a ‗coerced‘ merger with the state-led process in 2001. The merger 
dissipated the Ufungamano Initiative‘s energy. 
 
Building on the convergence of Polanyi‘s (1944) concept of ‗double movement‘ with the 
‗political process model‘ (see for example Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 2004; 1977; 1978), this thesis 
explains the sources, processes, actors, and outcomes of social contentions in contemporary 
Kenya. Additionally, the thesis explores the viability of the political process model to explain 
these social contentions in light of the fact that the concept and theory of social movements trace 
their intellectual roots to the social, political and economic transformations in the ‗1750s 
Western Europe and North America‘ (Tilly, 2004: 3; Foweraker, 1995; Seddon, 2002). As 
 5 
Foweraker (1995) observes, the increasing separation between the sites of theoretical production 
and collective action, raises questions on the applicability of theories modelled on Western 
Europe and North America to analyse social movements in other social, economic and political 
settings, as they do not take sufficient account of the local situations of popular struggles and 
changes elsewhere (Foweraker, 1995; Chan and Zhou, 2009; Seddon, 2002; Voss and Williams, 
2009[2011]). 
 
The study further seeks to contribute to the scholarship on the congruencies of, and relationships 
between state structure and the emergence, operations and achievements of social movements in 
the constitutional reform process in Kenya. In so doing, the thesis draws its methodological 
approach from Charles Tilly‘s (2004) proposition that the contentious nature of social 
movements requires systematic socio-historical approaches. Following this approach, the thesis 
argues that an attempt to explain the Ufungamano Initiative and its constitutional reform 
struggles must be located within the broader historical socioeconomic and political struggles and 
contestations in Kenya. The Ufungamano Initiative, the thesis contends, was one wave of social 
mobilisations in the Kenyan constitution making that emerged encumbered by memories and 
images of previous struggles. This, I argue, resulted in certain contradictions in the movement. 
The contradictions essentially emanated from a duality of the movements‘ strength and 
weakenesses drawn from the diversity of its membership and mass support. The diversity of 
support and membership was its most potent power. Nonetheless, diversity also presented a 
potential Achilles heel in the event the movement failed to accommodate the various 
expectations of such diverse groups. This became especially true with regard to the movements‘ 
operational democracy and in ensuring agreements on the substance of the constitution that 
emerged from its collective action efforts. The deep divisions in Kenyan society and multiple 
sites of struggle did not make things any easier for the Ufungamano Initiative. As such, the thesis 
attempts to answer the question why and how previously disjointed and disparate individuals and 
groups of individuals came together in a ‗movement of movements‘ known as the Ufungamano 
Initiative and become a critical actor in the Kenyan constitutional reform contentions.  
 
At this point, some critical questions emerge regarding the choice of the Ufungamano Initiative 
to illustrate one of the cycles of contention in the Kenyan constitution reform project. First, why 
is the Ufungamano Initiative an appropriate reference point for this kind of study? Or put another 
 6 
way, how is it representative of these struggles? Second, why does this analysis concentrate on 
the period 1999 to 2005? The succeeding section in this introductory chapter attempts to answer 
these questions by presenting the specific study aims and thereafter, a discussion on the rationale 
for choosing the Ufungamano Initiative as a case study. Additionally, the rationale section 
foregrounds the emergence of Kenya‘s contemporary constitutional reform struggles that are 
analysed in-depth in chapter four. The chapter then provides an outline of the entire thesis before 
concluding. 
Study aims 
Broadly, this study seeks to unravel how citizen‘s actions through social movements can effect 
fundamental change in society. The thesis primarily provides answers to the following key 
questions:  
1. What were the specific factors (i.e. social, economic and political) and conditions that aided 
the emergence of the Ufungamano Initiative?  
2. What were the Ufungamano Initiative‘s key organisational and mobilisation structures, 
resources and actors? What were the political dynamics and nature of relationships between 
the different structures, resources and actors?  
3. What were the dynamics and outcomes of the interactions between the Ufungamano 
Initiative and its targets/antagonists (the state, the ruling party)?  
4. What explains the key successes and limitations of the Ufungamano Initiative? 
 
To address these questions, the thesis utilises an analysis of seventy in-depth interviews held 
with a cross section of activists, civil society leaders, government officials, and ordinary 
Kenyans, conducted between September 2009 and April 2010. Given that the constitutional 
reform struggles have been a nation-wide project in Kenya, and the Ufungamano Initiative 
claimed to have had widespread mass appeal in these struggles, the study sampled participants 
from six of the then eight Kenyan provinces. The six provinces are Nairobi, Eastern, Coast, 
Nyanza, Rift Valley and Central. The thesis also uses primary documents from the Ufungamano 
Initiative archived at National Council of the Churches of Kenya at its Jumuia Conference Centre 
in Limuru. Furthermore, the analysis uses ethnographic observations of successor groups from 
the Ufungamano Initiative such as the Kenyan Civil Society Forum that continued keeping vigil 
on the constitutional change struggles in Kenya. Finally, the thesis also utilises data from 
 7 
published books and journal articles, government of Kenya official publications such as Kenya 
Gazette, parliamentary Bills and Acts, as well as newspaper and magazine articles. A detailed 
discussion that covers these aspects is the focus of the methodology chapter. 
Study rationale  
My interest to study the Ufungamano Initiative emanated from observing that while the second 
wave of democratisation struggles that began in the mid 1980s in Kenya, and the actors driving 
them have been widely studied, there is no systematic study to date of the Ufungamano Initiative 
struggles. Perhaps, this is because much as the Ufungamano Initiative straddles two regimes 
(having emerged in the twilight years of Moi/KANU reign) it is still a relatively recent 
phenomenon.  
 
This study therefore illuminates a social movement, which has been an important facet of 
Kenya‘s recent tumultuous social and political landscape, but largely neglected so far in in-depth 
scholarly analysis. Moreover, while Kenya‘s constitutional reform contentions over the last two 
decades have been a scholarly staple, most of the scholarship on these struggles is limited in 
scope and depth. Most scholarship identifies human and political rights as the determinants for 
the emergence of these struggles. For example, some of the analyses concentrate on specific 
accounts of the role played by civil society or religious groups prior to 2002 (see for example, 
Willy Mutunga‘s (1999) Constitution Making from the Middle that describes the role of human 
rights NGOs in challenging the existing constitutional order). Others analyse only a fraction of 
actors or specific aspects or causal factors. Examples here include, but not limited to, Robert 
Maxwell Press‘s (2004) thesis, Establishing a Culture of Resistance: The Struggle for Human 
Rights and Democracy in Authoritarian Kenya 1987-2002, which concentrates on the framework of 
fighting for human rights and democratisation in Kenya between 1987 and 2002; Stephen 
Ndegwa‘s (1996) The two faces of civil society dealing with the dynamics of relationships 
between state and civil society; Duncan Okello‘s (2004) edited work, Civil Society in the Third 
Republic; and John Karanja‘s (2008) ‗Evangelical Attitudes Towards Democracy in Kenya‘. 
 
These works pay little attention to the role of the economy, especially free market 
fundamentalism pushed by the Bretton Woods Institutions in cahoots with the Kenyan political 
and economic elites, in fuelling discontents that culminated in struggles for constitutional 
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reforms. Indeed the effect of encroachment of free market fundamentalist forces on the lives of 
Kenyans in fuelling the grievances that led to the emergence of the various constitutional change 
struggles and movements remains largely unexplored. Perhaps, notable exceptions here include 
Godwin R. Murunga and Shadrack W. Nasong‘o‘s (2007) edited volume Kenya: the Struggle for 
Democracy;' Julius Nyang‘oro‘s (2000) ‗Civil Society, Structural Adjustment, and 
Democratization in Kenya‘; and Katumanga‘s (1999) article, ‗Civil society and the politics of 
constitutional reforms in Kenya: a case study of the National Convention Executive Council 
(NCEC).‘ 
 
Another notable gap is the silence of these works on the linkages between civil society and social 
movements‘ struggles. Most of these works equate civil society with Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs), which in the Kenyan case are far from being social movements. Such 
arrogation and instrumentation of the concept of civil society by NGOs has denuded civil society 
of its classical intellectual roots in social movements.
7
 In effect, this NGOisation has led to most 
analytical work on Kenyan constitutional reform struggles overlooking a key ‗conceptual 
apparatus [social movement literature] in comprehending the implications of these struggles‘ 
especially on state-civil society relations (Nasong‘o, 2007: 25). This study attempts to bridge the 
two bodies of theoretical literature. 
 
Further, this thesis makes another scholarly contribution by utilising empirical evidence to 
suggest that contemporary Kenyan constitution change struggles, cannot be explained by a single 
factor, a single actor, and more importantly, have not been singularly directed. Moreover, their 
root causes are not necessarily contemporaneous. Rather, there have been and continue to be, 
multiple struggles within at least two realms: 1) the broader political liberalisation and 
democratisation struggles since the 1990s, and 2) struggles against the social and economic 
effects of neo-liberal economic policies.
8
  These two realms, the study argues, have been the key 
                                                 
7
 I am indebted to a reader to the proposal for which this research is based -Gilbert Khadiagala-for bringing this to 
my attention.   
8
 This thesis uses the term neo-liberalism, to mean an ideological system consisting of a ‗heterogeneous set of 
institutions consisting of various ideas, social and economic policies, and ways of organizing political and economic 
activity […] it includes formal institutions, such as minimalist welfare-state, taxation, and business regulation 
programs; flexible labor markets and decentralized capital – labor relations unencumbered by strong unions and 
collective bargaining; and the absence of barriers to international capital mobility‘ (Campbell and Pederson, 2001: 
5). Neoliberalism according to Fourcade and Healy (2007: 287) is  'rooted in a moral project, articulated in the 
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drivers of social mobilisations leading to constitutional change struggles in Kenya. As such, 
while some aspects of the cocktail of struggles are easily explained by socio-political factors, 
others are derivatives of long histories of economic grievances. As such, I posit that any attempt 
at building a coherent explanation of the constitution reform struggles in Kenya and especially 
how the different socioeconomic and political struggles culminated in the clamour for a new 
constitutional dispensation, must of necessity, use an assortment of variables. Following this 
reasoning, chapter four situates the genesis of the contemporary Kenyan constitutional reform 
struggles and the Ufungamano Initiative emergence in socioeconomic and political discontents. 
The thesis approaches this task by applying the logics of at least three theoretical concepts: a) 
Gramsci‘s (1971) concepts of ‗the war of position‘ in ‗counter hegemonic‘ struggles; b) 
Polanyi‘s (1944) concept of ‗double movement‘; and c) the ‗political process model‘ in an 
attempt to explain contemporary struggles in Kenya‘s governance.  
 
The main thesis here is that contemporary constitution reform struggles in Kenya are, to borrow 
from Polanyi (1944), double movement type, composed of two opposing forces –  ‗the laissez-
faire movement to expand the scope of the market, and the protective countermovement that 
emerges to resist disembedding the economy‘ (Block, 2001: xxviii).  It is worth noting, however, 
that Polanyi‘s double movement thesis singles out the expansion of the ‗self-regulating market‘ 
as the central factor that threatens to push society to the ‗edge of a precipice.‘ Societies in turn, 
react by resisting to ‗act like lemmings marching over a cliff to their own destruction‘ (Block, 
2001: xxv). Society retreats from the tenets of market‘s self-regulation by ‗(re)constituting itself 
as active society‘ (Burawoy, 2003: 193) ‗to save [itself] and nature from destruction‘ (Block 
2001: xxv). Block (2001: xxv) continues to argue that: 
In a sense one may say that disembedding the market is similar to stretching of a giant elastic 
band. Efforts to bring about greater autonomy of the market increase the level of tension. With 
further stretching, either the band will snap – representing social disintegration–or the economy 
will revert to a more embedded position.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
language of economics, that praises ‗the moral benefits of market society‘ and identifies ‗markets as a necessary 
condition for freedom in other aspects of life‘ (cited in Mudge, 2008: 705).  
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While a clear correlation of Polanyi‘s ‗double movement‘ is reflected in the social upheavals 
resulting from the effects of post Cold War market and economic liberalisation,
9
 the concept is 
an insufficient analytic model in studying the motivations for all the societal responses reflected 
in the struggles to change the Kenyan constitution. The reason for this lies partly in the context 
within which the ‗double movement‘ concept originated. While Polanyi‘s ‗double movement‘ 
concept was developed to largely explain a different phenomenon – i.e. the post First World War 
political economy vortex in Europe, this thesis tries to explain a contemporary social and 
political phenomenon in Kenya. The point to note, therefore, is that this study does not claim to 
neatly fit into the application of ‗double movement‘ as an analytic model. Rather, the study 
borrows from the logic of ‗double movement‘ due to the historical entanglement of the political 
and economic elites who collectively, have been at the centre of ravaging Kenyan society (Currie 
and Ray, 1986). The ‗double movement‘ logic is reflected in an increasingly avaricious market 
with the political elite on the one end of the contestations, and a countermovement of citizens 
resisting their entanglement on the other. As such, this thesis posits that excessive encroachment 
on Kenyan society by political and economic elites through political, social and economic 
repression incubated mass discontent that in turn nurtured the emergence and development of 
social struggles seeking changes through constitution reforms.  
 
To understand how mass discontent on social, economic and political conditions in Kenya 
crystallised into social struggles and social movements and later into a ‗movement of 
movements‘ (the Ufungamano Initiative), I offer a historiography of successive struggles in 
chapter four. As such, it needs mention that while the thesis focuses its analysis on the period 
1999 to 2005; this is purely for pragmatic reasons. This is based on careful considerations that 
the mid 1990s marks a critical threshold of a great social epoch in the political history of 
Kenyans‘ quest for a new constitution. Moreover, it is important to acknowledge that social 
struggles and especially the constitutional change struggles are not a phenomenon limited to the 
                                                 
9
 Examples here include widespread labour unrests as a result of massive labour layoffs and ghettoisation and 
arrested social economic progress in many developing countries. Some of the resultant social movements struggles 
on the African continent are the subject of analysis in Mahmood Mamdani and Earnest Wamba-dia-Wamba (1995) 
African Studies in Social Movements and Democracy. Robert H. Bates (1999), ‗Economic Bases of Democratization‘ 
as well as Thandika Mkandawire (1999), ‗Crisis Management and Making of ―Choiceless Democracies‖‘ also deal 
with the impacts of economic neo-liberalism on the democratization project on the African continent.  
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period 1999-2005. As such, this thesis devotes some space in analysing the post 2005 
developments in Kenyans‘ quest for a new constitution.  
 
Contemporary constitution reform mobilisations and struggles are a product of a long history of 
nested and successive layers of struggles rooted in social, economic and political grievances over 
unjust modes of Kenya‘s governance (social, economic and political). Some of the underlying 
discontents especially on the dynamics of wealth creation and distribution, for instance land 
ownership, began in colonial times and have never been fully resolved in the post-colonial 
period. A socio-historical approach is therefore imperative to enable this study to probe the 
theoretical question and offer explanations of growth and decay of successive Kenyan social 
movement struggles and to locate the emergence of the Ufungamano Initiative within the same.  
 
This socio-historical approach traces the broader context of contemporary Kenyan constitutional 
reform struggles that the Ufungamano Initiative illuminates, to the 1980s and the immediate 
aftermath to the enactment of the constitutional amendment Act No. 7 of July, 1982 that 
introduced Section 2A in the Kenyan constitution (see for example, Mwaura, 1997; Ajulu, 2000; 
Nasong‘o, 2007; Cottrell and Ghai, 2007). This constitutional amendment made Kenya a de jure 
one party state and declared KANU the sole political party.  It led to further erosion of basic 
liberal democratic rights like free speech, the right of assembly and association. The state also 
usurped enormous powers to clamp down on those who expressed dissent (Mbingu, 1991). 
Despite continued political oppression, these struggles, accompanied by changes in the global 
political arena due to the end of the Cold War forced the state to repeal Section 2A in 1991. The 
post-Cold War developments specifically contributed to the withdrawal of political support 
hitherto enjoyed by repressive regimes (including Kenya‘s) purely on the basis of alignment of 
politico-economic ideology. After the end of the Cold War, former friendly Western allies and 
the Bretton Woods Institutions turned to push for the embedding of neo-liberal fiscal austerity 
measures as part of donor conditionality −Washington consensus policies-in the Kenyan 
economy as well as entrenchment of political pluralism.
10
 
                                                 
10
 The transition from one party to multiparty politics in Kenya as in many other African countries has been 
attributed in part to the influence of the wave of political changes occasioned by the end of the Cold War (Oyugi, 
2002. See also Huntington, 1993; 1996; and Osaghae, 2008 for similar arguments). This resulted in political 
opportunities created by the waning support of the authoritarian Moi government by Western powers that had 
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As part of these reforms, donors cut funding while at the same time pushing the state to reduce 
expenditure on basic services, introduce user fees, and privatise public enterprises and services. 
The reduced support had numerous effects: the collapse of the state‘s ability to deliver essential 
services; the erosion of basic social solidarity; increasing inequality (Stiglitz, 2002); and most 
importantly, the state‘s dwindling ability to crush dissent. The resulting socioeconomic and 
political doldrums were perfect recipes for widespread Polanyi-type responses against the 
political elite, forcing Moi‘s government to give in and introduce political reforms. The pressure 
included mass protests, worker strikes, student protests and a proliferation of social movements 
and civil society organisations questioning neo-liberalism and advocating a greater role of the 
state in the provision of social services (Kanyinga, Mitullah and Njagi, 2007).   
 
As such, just before the turn of the 21
st
 century, the ‗anti-capitalist‘ protests gained ground 
against neo-liberal globalisation that had by then, been mainstreamed in global political 
economy. In Kenya, there were localised struggles, many of which found allies in what has come 
to be referred to as democratization movements. It is through such convergences that a stronger 
and larger collection of movements known as the Ufungamano Initiative emerged. This did not, 
however, happen overnight. The turn of the millennium saw continued struggles especially on 
economic and political fronts. Years of accumulating economic strain with a negative 0.2% 
growth in 2002 (Republic of Kenya, 2007) and growing income inequality, with over 50% of the 
population living in poverty, bad governance, and mismanagement of the economy in a more 
liberalised political environment, saw increased activism with calls for a new constitution in the 
country.  
 
The analysis in this thesis reveals that there are a number of key features of the Kenyan 
movements.  First has been the centrality of ethnicity. Struggles have sometimes taken a 
distinctly ethnic angle, or ethnicity has been selectively applied to ‗kill‘ the collective spirit of 
such struggles. For instance, many of the so-called dissidents during the Kenyatta era (1963-78), 
were mainly non- Kikuyu (his tribe). Conversely, in Moi‘s time (1978-2002), it was mainly non-
Kalenjins who were the main dissidents. 
                                                                                                                                                             
hitherto supported it during Cold War for ideological reasons.  This study, however, adopts a hybrid of reasons as 
providing the impetus for the creation of social movements that challenged Moi‘s authoritarian rule. 
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Second, Kenyan politics and economy, has since independence been controlled by a corrupt and 
avaricious ruling class, which has been increasingly oppressive to the masses (Lamb, 1975). 
Over the years, politicians of all political and ethnic persuasions have bonded in creating and 
perpetuating a well-oiled system that multiplies miseries for the ordinary masses. This has led to 
the third key characteristic of Kenyan struggles, especially since the 1980s – the escalating use of 
violence in some of these protests. This militarisation is a product of large numbers of young and 
jobless poor people, who have been hirelings to loot, destroy, maim, rape and kill in the service 
of ethnic power barons. This has been most rampant especially after the introduction of political 
pluralism in 1991.  
 
But these struggles have been complicated, as the Ufungamano Initiative demonstrates, by 
convenient elite pacting in the face of collective threats to their hegemony. This, as the thesis 
shows, has been a key feature of post independent Kenya. This bonding and ganging up of 
political and economic elites through creation of artificial crises, or use of, and manipulation of 
ethnicity, has ensured the reproduction of their hegemony. Even the supposedly non-ethnic 
secular and religious Kenyan civil society has not been spared these ethnic rivalries. The vicious 
wars at the National Council of NGOs of Kenya since 2002 are indeed a reflection of this. This 
study sees these manifestations of struggles and protests within what Gramsci (1971) describes 
as the ‗war of position‘ to win the control of the Kenyan society. As such, there is consensus that 
one of the reasons for Kenya‘s backward slide from 2005 even after the mirage of change in the 
2002 general election in which KANU was defeated by a united opposition, was due to the 
massive co-optations of civil society and social movement leaders by former fellow activists 
turned parliamentarians and cabinet ministers in the new National Alliance Rainbow Coalition 
(NARC) administration.  
 
In this study, the Ufungamano Initiative illuminates one key moment and features of the many 
successive waves of social mobilisations for constitutional reforms in Kenya since the early 
1990s. The Ufungamano Initiative, this thesis shows, emerged from the ashes of earlier 
mobilisations and militancy of 1997 led by the NCEC (for in-depth analysis of the NCEC, its 
work, achievements and decay, see Mutunga, 1999; Katumanga, 1999). By succeeding to bring 
together a large number of actors opposed to the Moi/KANU state‘s refusal to demands for 
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popular participation of Kenyan citizens in reforming their constitution, the Ufungamano 
Initiative managed to achieve what NCEC had unsuccessfully tried to do in 1997. This raises an 
important question of interest to this study: What factors allowed the Ufungamano Initiative to 
succeed where its predecessors had failed?  
 
The Ufungamano Initiative is attractive for other reasons too. In December 1999, in the face of 
the state‘s refusal to allow popular participation in the Constitution Review Process, the 
Ufungamano Initiative resorted to a rare form of direct social movement action by forming its 
own Constitutional Review Commission – the People‘s Commission of Kenya (PCK). The PCK 
competed with the state-led process by mobilising, organising and leading Kenyan citizens in 
what was termed a parallel process of writing the constitution instead of relying on the more 
orthodox strategic repertoire of actions and reactions of social movements.
11
 By forming the 
PCK, the Ufungamano Initiative illustrated that it was not just offering abstract criticism to the 
exclusive Moi/KANU regime-led Constitutional Review Process, but practical alternatives on 
how citizens would be directly involved in writing their own constitution. This demonstrable 
effect served to challenge the legitimacy of the state process that had been designed to be an 
exclusive domain of a Parliament controlled by the Executive. The direct actions of the 
Ufungamano Initiative through the PCK are illustrative of the changing nature of collective 
action that existing social movement theories fail to predict or account for. The Ufungamano 
Initiative therefore raises several interesting questions. These include: how does society respond 
to increasing repression by the state, especially to refusal to involve citizens in such a crucial 
matter as constitutional review? At what point does society respond to refusal by the state to 
engage with popular will? What type of responses does society resort to?  The Ufungamano 
Initiative case serves to provide answers to these questions. 
 
The ambitious actions of the Ufungamano Initiative also raise several questions that pertain not 
only to its power, but also to its weaknesses, especially when compared with its main targets – 
the state, ruling party, and part of the political elites. These include: what political opportunities 
                                                 
11
 Tilly (2004) enumerates such repertoire of social movement actions and reactions as including demonstrations, 
campaigns, rebellions, riots and strikes. Adil Najam (2000), from his studies of civil society relationships with the 
state in the policy process, argues that such repertoires include engagement that involves civil society making 
submissions to the relevant state institutions. The Ufungamano Initiative, as shall become clear in this thesis, went 
beyond such repertoires of action/engagement.                                
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allowed the Ufungamano Initiative to emerge? What were the key activities and strategies 
utilised in its work? What were the determinants for the different strategies employed in these 
interactions? To what extent did the strategies employed, act as either sources of strength or 
weakness for the Ufungamano Initiative? How did the state respond to the Ufungamano 
Initiative‘s actions to form a commission to lead Kenyans in writing the constitution outside of 
the state‘s established structures? What was the nature of public support for the Ufungamano 
Initiative? How successful was the movement?   
 
In answering these questions, the thesis engages the state-civil society relations‘ theoretical 
model to establish the nature of relationship between the Ufungamano Initiative and the state in 
the course of its struggles. Specifically, as the Ufungamano Initiative‘s work bestrides two 
regimes (i.e. the sunset years of KANU and the subsequent National Alliance Rainbow Coalition 
(NARC)), the study explores the nature of relationships with the state under both regimes. The 
study specifically utilises Adil Najam‘s (1996; 2000) Four-Cs model (cooperation, 
complementarity, co-optation and conflict) to analyse the nature of relationships between the 
Ufungamano Initiative and the state.
12
 The thesis further engages both empirical studies and 
theoretical models of state and civil society relations in Kenya (see for example Oyugi, 2002/4; 
Ndegwa, 1994; 1996; Katumanga, 2004).  
 
The use of the Ufungamano Initiative for this study is also informed by the fact that arguably, no 
single movement in Kenya‘s recent history systematically, powerfully, and in a protracted way, 
challenged the state in the constitution review, as did the Ufungamano Initiative. The 
Ufungamano Initiative epitomises effective conglomeration of ethnic, religious, generational and 
class power politics.  
 
To explain how and why Kenyan constitutional change has been possible despite strong 
opposition by the Moi/KANU regime, this thesis conceives the Ufungamano Initiative and its 
struggles for constitutional reforms, as a ‗counter hegemonic‘ movement that crystallised from 
recurrent episodes of protests against social, economic, and political marginalisation of citizens, 
                                                 
12
 Najam‘s Four-Cs model argues that convergence or divergence of policy goals determines strategies used by 
social movements/civil society. See also Coston (1998), Sanyal (1994), Waddell (1998), Bebbington and Farrington 
(1993), Pearce (1997), Fisher (1998), Young DR (1999), Tandon (1989), Bratton (1990), Commuri (1995), for 
similar arguments on state-civil society relations.  
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and continued suppression of political dissent. This countermovement posed a crisis of 
legitimacy to the political leadership, which further fragmented elite political consensus.
13
 
Happening at a time when the state‘s capacity to suppress dissent was dwindling, this widened 
political opportunities for further protest cycles. Chapters two, four, and five, engage and 
demonstrate this argument in greater detail.  
 
The choice of the period (1999-2005) and the movement (the Ufungamano Initiative) are also 
illustrative of growth and decay of social movements. The Ufungamano Initiative has been 
celebrated and romanticised by some who were behind its formation and operations as a potent 
example of organised citizens‘ power to order and effect change in society (see for example 
Pinto, 2008; Kibaki, 2003 as cited in Lumumba 2008: 93). However, the Ufungamano Initiative, 
as shall become clear in this thesis, remained vulnerable and its leadership acrimoniously drove 
it to a merger with the state-led process in 2001.   
 
This merger had conflicting outcomes on the Ufungamano Initiative. On the one hand, the 
merger was arguably an indicator of success, and by extension, the potency of the movement. 
Owing to the distinctive contentious actions of its Commission, the Ufungamano Initiative 
managed to get recognition as a legitimate actor in the constitutional reforms in the country to 
warrant the state to approach it for concessions and a merger. Indeed, the Ufungamano Initiative 
got a major political boost in November 2000, when the nominated chair of the government 
review team, Kenyan constitutional law expert, Professor Yash Pal Ghai, stated, as a condition of 
his acceptance, that he is given a free hand to negotiate for a joint Constitutional Review Process 
between the Ufungamano Initiative and the government Commission. To demonstrate his 
seriousness, he declined to take the oath of office unless there was a joint Commission (Chitere 
et al, 2006; Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, 2004). Arguably, Ghai‘s stance 
enhanced political opportunities available to the Ufungamano Initiative and effectively reduced 
the power discrepancy between the two groups. Ghai successfully negotiated a merger with the 
PCK with an amendment to the Constitution of Kenya Review Act introduced to effectively seal 
the merger in 2001.  
                                                 
13
 This is not to say that the Kenyan political elite had hitherto, been a united entity. Rather, as shall become clear in 
this thesis, there have always been fragmentations long before independent and this has continued to date. As such, 
the argument here is that the fragmentation was within the then ruling elite as typified by the break-up of KANU and 
the formation of opposition groups by the same people who had initially been in KANU. 
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However, the merger, among other things, contributed to the decay of an otherwise vibrant 
movement. With time, it lost the mass support it had enjoyed. Ultimately, the promise that the 
Ufungamano Initiative held slid into the dustbin of lost opportunities and false dawns of the 
transformation of the Kenyan state. While the Ufungamano Initiative managed to push the 
frontiers of constitutional reforms, the rejection of the draft constitution in a national referendum 
in November of 2005 left the constitutional overhaul project on going. Specifically, the said 
rejection of the draft constitution did not result in the withering of the dream of a new 
constitution. Instead, it opened new frontiers for contention.  
 
As such, the Ufungamano Initiative type struggles and its key demands continued to manifest in 
different forms. Indeed, a new wave of contention peaked after the 2007 widespread citizens‘ 
insurrections as a result of a slipshod presidential election that resulted in the realisation of a new 
constitution in August 2010. The Ufungamano Initiative itself did not collapse after the 
absorption of its Commission into the state-led Constitution of Kenya Review Commission. The 
Ufungamano Initiative continued to be a critical voice and force in the Review Process. 
However, after the merger, new cleavages that deflated the energy of the Ufungamano Initiative 
emerged. By 2005, the Ufungamano Initiative was no longer a united force, differed on the 
substance of the proposed constitution, no longer commanded a mass following and its 
leadership had fallen out with each other. This reveals an important trajectory on how social 
movements decay when they are absorbed into rigid power structures.  
Organisation of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into three main parts. The first part comprises of the first three chapters. 
This introductory chapter, the first in section one, has offered the background to the study. It has 
brought forth arguments that made this case an interesting subject for social scientific inquiry. 
Chapters two and three cover the literature review and the methodology respectively. In chapter 
two, the thesis lays the theoretical bedrock, building on the convergence of Polanyi‘s (1944) 
concept of double movement with the political process model as the analytical tool employed in 
explaining the social contentions in contemporary Kenya. The chapter also looks at state-civil 
society relations‘ model as employed in the analysis of the relationship of the Ufungamano 
Initiative and the state. Additionally, the chapter deals with the concepts and theories of social 
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movements, civil society and their role in shaping citizen power and participation as employed in 
the thesis. 
 
The third chapter Methodology- presents an argument in support of the appropriateness of a 
case study approach. The chapter argues that given the many overlaps in the boundaries between 
the Ufungamano Initiative and other constitutional reform struggles in Kenya, a qualitative in-
depth study allowed for ‗explorations of broad historical patterns and macrostructures‘ 
(Burawoy, 1998: 6) and thereby reconstruct[s] the chains of sequential interactions and events to 
enrich the analysis (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). The chapter specifically provides details and 
reflections on the experiences in the operationalisation of a qualitative research methodology.  
These reflections address the issues of data collection including data collection techniques and 
procedures (in-depth interviewing and note taking, observations, document analysis and 
sampling), data analysis processes employed, as well as measurement, reliability, validity, 
objectivity, and the inherent challenges and how such were addressed. Lastly, the chapter deals 
with ethical issues relevant to the study.  
 
The second part of the thesis deals with the empirical findings of the study. This section is 
divided into four chapters. Chapter four Sowing the seed for constitutional change struggles in 
Kenya- is a historical analysis of the precursors to the contemporary socioeconomic and political 
struggles in Kenya. It is a story of the successive cycles of contention preceding the Ufungamano 
Initiative. These are treated as preparatoria Ufungamano Initiative. The chapter provides the 
socio-political and economic specificities leading to emergence of different constitutional reform 
struggles in Kenya. Here, the social, economic and political grievances that ignited desires and 
struggles for contemporary constitutional changes in Kenya are periodized from pre-
independence to present. The discussion identifies the main players in the contentious politics 
and how each period and its actors feed into the next.  The chapter ends by showing how the 
congruence of issues and actors in mid to late 1990s prepared for the emergence of the 
Ufungamano Initiative opposing a state-led and-controlled Constitution Review Process. 
 
Chapter five The birth of the Ufungamano Initiative: from discordant voices in wilderness to a 
forceful movement of movements- builds on chapter four, identifying the main players behind 
the formation of the Ufungamano Initiative, their relationships, as well as the specific triggers 
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that informed its emergence. This chapter looks at the following questions: first, why and how 
was the Ufungamano Initiative formed after 1997 when the issues it set to address had been a 
part of Kenya for a long time? Second, why did a new movement emerge when there were 
already too many other groups pushing for constitutional reforms? In answering these questions, 
the chapter argues that the Ufungamano Initiative emerged after the 1997 general elections as a 
broad umbrella movement of fifty-four different organisations and epitomises both intra and inter 
ethnic, religious, generational, and class power politics in Kenya. This phenomenon, the chapter 
argues, imbued the movement with multiple contradictions that subsequent chapters analyse. The 
chapter argues that the emergence of the Ufungamano Initiative, just like many of its attributes, 
is full of contradictions. Building on the analysis of such contradictions, the chapter poses the 
question: how viable and effective are movements with diverse constituencies and internal 
competing interests and strictures? Can they hold together for long periods and collectively 
continue pushing for common demands in light of often differing interests, and in effect, achieve 
changes in society? This question is addressed in subsequent chapters.  
 
The sixth chapter Getting down to work: The power and limits of the Ufungamano Initiative in 
framing contention, mobilisation, strategies and structures- analyses two key parameters–issue 
framing and mobilisation versus the architecture of the movement. The analysis reveals a 
contradiction between rhetoric and practice in the Ufungamano Initiative. This contradiction 
emanated from the Ufungamano Initiative‘s framing of contention and agitation on a people-led 
process that drew from Rousseau‘s political philosophy on direct democratic participation of 
citizens. However the movements‘ practices and structures were deficient in ensuring People‘s 
direct participation. To demonstrate such contradictions, the chapter analyses the 
(dis)connections between the grassroots struggles that found expression in national struggles and, 
by extension, in the Ufungamano Initiative struggles. This is especially on the nature of the 
participation of grassroots movements in shaping the Ufungamano Initiative agenda at the 
national level. The specific variables analysed include: the nature of participation, mobilisation 
and accountability (upward, horizontal and downward) within and between the Ufungamano 
Initiative members/constituent groups. Additionally, the chapter addresses the question of how 
the above-mentioned internal contradictions contributed to, or hindered the Ufungamano 
Initiative‘s work.  
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The seventh chapter Merger and after: a dream deferred? -applies a co-evolutionary analytic 
frame in looking at the convergence of structural conditions (including political, economic, and 
social such as class formations, worsening economic conditions in the country, a crisis of state 
legitimacy, and increasing threats of violence), as drivers that enabled the Ufungamano Initiative 
to push the Moi/KANU state to appoint an internationally credible person to lead the statutory 
Constitution of Kenya Review Commission. The impact of this appointment, the chapter argues, 
motivated talks and processes for a merger between the Ufungamano Initiative‘s People‘s 
Commission of Kenya and the government led process. The chapter argues that given the 
multiple strictures within the movement, a part of the Ufungamano Initiative leadership took the 
overtures from the state-led process, to agree to a merger. Utilising Gramsci‘s concept of 
hegemony, the chapter advances an argument that the different contenders in the Kenyan 
constitutional reform struggle managed to turn popular democratic contentions (as exhibited by a 
majority of actors identifying with the Ufungamano Initiative cause), into a terrain of struggle 
between different elite formations (i.e. political-economic, academic and religious). The end 
result was a reproduction of elite domination of the under classes, thus undermining a radical 
transformation of the existing order.  The chapter further analyses the post merger developments 
and their effects on the eventual decay of the Ufungamano Initiative.  
 
I conclude the thesis in chapter eight A turning point when history failed to turn?- where I 
reflect on the contributions of the Ufungamano Initiative to the constitutional reforms including 
post 2005 referendum developments of the constitutional reform project in Kenya. The chapter 
shows that while some actors behind the Ufungamano Initiative kept vigil and new alliances 
emerged as some of the old ones broke, there were others who opposed the very reforms they 
had fought for. The chapter also offers reflections on key findings and key contributions of this 
study to the theoretical and empirical literature on social movements and political change 
struggles, in specifically answering the question: what new knowledge does it give to the 
scholarship of social movements, especially in African contexts?  
Conclusion 
This chapter concludes with a note that Kenya‘s political and social struggles since the 1990s 
have centred on constitutional reforms to embed democracy. Some scholars theorise that the 
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culmination of these struggles into constitutional reform movement, is reflective of Kenya‘s 
desire to transform the state to be of service to the majority in society (see for example Kindiki, 
2007; Currie and Ray, 1986; Bannon, 2007). Specifically, it was aimed at structuring the state 
away from an imposed independence constitution that resulted from compromises between the 
departing colonial regime and the incoming cooperative African elite (Currie and Ray, 1986; 
Bannon, 2007; First, 1970; Zeilig et al., 2008). As Mamdani (1996) observes these struggles 
have been reflective of a dialectic conflict of state reform and popular resistance that owes its 
roots to colonial institutional legacy that continues to be reproduced throughout Africa.  
 
In Kenya, this dialectic resulted in over 38 constitutional amendments by 2004 (Ojwang, 2003), 
many of which have had adverse effects on Kenya‘s social, political, and economic 
fabric.
14
These developments ignited protests and calls initially for democratization, and later 
transformed into constitutional reform struggles. As this thesis shows, due to multiple cleavages 
in Kenyan society as well as in the movements at the heart of these struggles, it took two decades 
to realise a new constitution.   
 
I posit a theory bridging approach to the understanding of these struggles. Specifically, this is 
because while Polanyi‘s ‗double movement‘ concept offers a theoretical logic to explain the 
emergence of these contentions, it is Gramsci‘s (1971) concept of hegemony, and specifically his 
framing of the ‗war of position‘, that offers the conceptual apparatus for comprehending how 
popular struggles either succeed or are captured to reproduce domination in society. This case 
study of the Ufungamano Initiative clearly illustrates this duality. Specifically, the thesis shows 
that the divisive characteristics of Kenyan society such as ethnic, religious, economic and 
political differences were the drivers leading to the abortion of the dream for a new constitution 
in Kenya in 2005.    
 
                                                 
14
 According to Kindiki (2007), the core adverse amendments included: 1) the 1964 amendment, which unified the 
offices of the Head of State and the Head of Government. 2) The 1964 and 1968 removal of the constitutional 
protection against the redrawing of regional and district boundaries or the creation of new regions or districts. 3) The 
1965 amendment that changed the state of emergency approval from 65% to simple majority and the 1966 
amendment that removed the time limitations on state of emergencies. 4) The 1966 amendment requiring Members 
of Parliament who defect or start a new party, to seek a fresh mandate from their constituents. 5) The 1968 abolition 
of the Senate. 6) The 1968 amendment that gave the President the authority to appoint twelve nominated Members 
of Parliament. 7) The 1975 amendment that allowed the President to waiver the penalty on persons found guilty of 
an election offence not to contest elections for five years. 8) The 1982 constitutional amendment that made Kenya a 
de jure one party state. 
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Gramsci‘s concept of ‗hegemony‘ further helps this thesis give meaning to opposition parties‘ 
unity under the umbrella of the NARC that effectively ended KANU‘s forty-years of political 
hegemony in 2002. Specifically, Gramsci‘s concept of hegemony helps us explain why the 
newfound unity imploded under the weight of the very maladies that NARC had vowed to fight: 
tribalism, corruption and politics of exclusion, poverty and deprivation. The NARC coalition 
partners‘ honeymoon after the December 2002 electoral victory was short-lived. Simmering 
disquiets over the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) derailed many of the pre-election 
pledges and illusions of progress quickly faded as political elites soon turned to fight each other. 
The thesis treats these intra-elite struggles as manifestations of hegemonic wars that frustrated 
the transformations that the Ufungamano Initiative had sought.   
 
The 2005 constitutional referendum provided a perfect opportunity for the final fallout. Soon, 
there were political realignments and those who had been part of the former Moi regime and 
would have otherwise been permanently consigned to political dustbins, found a new lease of 
political life as new alliances were built. This also bred new sources of dissatisfaction that led to 
tensions and mobilisations culminating in ethnic bloodbath after disagreements on the outcomes 
of the presidential election in 2007. Though ethnic in nature, the 2008 post-election violence 
threatened the collective interests of political and economic elites. This forced them into a 
negotiated truce that among other things delivered a new constitution.  
 
The analysis in the succeeding chapters extrapolates the propositions made in this introductory 
chapter in an attempt to answer the key research questions. 
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Chapter Two   
 
Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 
 
Introduction 
Dramatic transformations in society intermediated by social movements, social protest actions, 
trade unions, and even political organisations unaligned with major political parties, are the 
empirical fodder, which have nurtured social movement scholarship and theory building (della 
Porta and Diani, 2006). As Tilly (2004) as well as della Porta and Diani (2006) show, social 
struggles and the organisations that drive them have been many, and for several centuries. 
However, they have multiplied in numbers, forms, and manifestations, which dot grassroots to 
the trans-national planes, so much so that Snow, Soule and Kriesi (2004: 5) comment that they 
have ‗become a more ubiquitous social form in the world today, even to the point of becoming 
routinized avenue for expressing publicly collective grievances.‘  
 
Charles Tilly‘s greatest contribution to social movement theory was his systematic socio-
historical approach in the study of protests and collective action. Tilly also demonstrates that 
‗social movements are modern phenomena that find their genesis in the advance of capitalism 
and especially with the development of the modern nation state‘ (Voss and Williams, 2011: 4). 
Modern social movements protest over a wide number of issues and themes that include gender 
inequality, ecological conservation, human rights, democracy, child labour, neoliberal 
globalisation, etc. According to della Porta and Diani (2006: 2), the ensemble of individuals, 
organisations, and forms of protests involved, ‗illustrates what doing ‗social movement analysis‘ 
actually means.‘ Essentially, it presents conceptual challenges due to the changing nature of 
social movements and collective action.  
 
This chapter specifically reviews literature on concepts and theories utilised in this thesis.  In 
doing this, it seeks a good interplay between theory and concepts in keeping with Kaplan‘s 
postulation that ‗proper concepts are needed to formulate a good theory‘ (Kaplan, 1964: 53) 
while aware of Hirschman‘s (1970) warning that over-adherence to theory can be a hindrance in 
research. At the same time, a good theory is needed to arrive at the proper concepts. The chapter 
proposes a convergence of Polanyi‘s (1944) concept of ‗double movement‘ with the ‗political 
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process model‘ as a theoretical framework utilised in studying and explaining the emergence of 
contentions centred on constitution reforms in contemporary Kenya, and specifically in 
understanding the Ufungamano Initiative‘s efforts in creating an alternative socio-political order.  
 
The chapter specifically engages the two main strands of theoretical literature; one focused on 
social movements, and the other on what Obadare (2007: 136) following Tvedt (2000) calls civil 
society and its ‗ambiguous relationship with the state‘. For the purposes of this study, it is 
important at the onset to acknowledge that the intermeshed nature of actors within the 
Ufungamano Initiative and other forms of civil society, presents not just a conceptual challenge, 
but also an opportunity to mainstream civil society in the broader social movement literature. A 
case study approach is appropriate for creating this conceptual linkage particularly in the Kenyan 
and African contexts, where as noted in chapter one, the ‗NGOisation‘ of the concept of civil 
society has stripped it of its intellectual roots in social movements.  
 
In this study, I propose to bridge the two literatures (civil society and social movements) in order 
to show their relationships. Social movements are therefore treated in this study as actors with a 
civic agency that is directed toward change. They therefore engage in contentious politics for the 
purposes of change. On its part, civil society generally includes more actors, such as religious 
organisations, development NGOs, grassroots community-based organisations, some of whom, 
are denuded of politics (Fowler and Bieckart, 2011). This raises interesting dilemmas on the 
nature of the relationship between the different forms of civil society, especially religious 
organisations and secular civil society
1
 within the Kenyan constitutional reform struggles.  
Chapter six reflects on these dilemmas within the Ufungamano Initiative as well as in the wider 
constitutional reform struggles in Kenya.   
 
The study applies the political opportunity model (developed by the likes of Tilly 1978, 2004; 
McAdam, 1995; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996) and Polanyi‘s (1944) double movement 
in the analysis of power and participation as defining features of contention for the movement 
under study. As chapter four will show, neither Polanyi‘s concept of double movement 
explanation of social contention to be a product of market penetration on society, nor the 
                                                 
1
 Secular civil society is a term used in this study to denote civil society excluding faith-based groups. I adopt this 
usage to separate Faith Based civil society organisations from other civil society forms and more so, to amplify the 
internal differences between Kenyan civil society.  
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political process model on their own, can adequately explain the emergence and operations of the 
Ufungamano Initiative.  
 
The chapter has three sections: The first section below defines and sketches the conceptual 
cornerstones (social movement and civil society). This is followed by an attempt at marrying the 
political process model to Polanyi‘s double movement in the evolution of an analytic model 
utilised in this study. Lastly, the chapter engages with state-civil society relations‘ literature.  
Defining and theorising social movements 
Different theoretical models have evolved and been utilised, overtime, in the study of social 
movements. This therefore means that there is no single theory referred to as ‗the‘ social 
movement theory but rather, a nested collection of theories and models advanced in the study of 
social movements. This multiplicity of underlying theories, has resulted in the concept of social 
movement being described fluidly as something that ‗sponges up so many different meanings‘ 
(Tilly, 2004: ix) which presents conceptual challenges to students of social movements. Tilly 
(2004), links the term social movement in sociological literature to Lorenz von Stein‘s (1850) 
History of the French Social Movement from 1789 to the present.  von Stein used the term social 
movement to convey the ‗idea of a continuous, unitary process by which the working class 
gained self-consciousness and power‘ (as cited in Tilly, 2004: 5). Tilly (2004) argues, however, 
that works on social movements, predate von Stein‘s publication. Despite the term‘s long history, 
its usage and meaning has not escaped what has been described as commonplace but ‗wrong‘ 
practice of scholars defending specific usage of certain concept(s) in the firm belief that it is the 
most appropriate, or simply because it belongs to their paradigm of reference (Kuhn, 1962). 
 
Kuhn‘s observation is relevant in explaining why, despite the fact that social movement struggles 
have been a phenomenon on the political scene for over two centuries (Tilly, 2004), there are still 
conceptual and theoretical contestations on how best to define and study social movements. 
These contestations are rooted in the different theoretical models that have been advanced and 
utilised over time in the study of social movements. Buchler (2000)
 2
 identifies at least five 
                                                 
2
 della Porta and Diani (2006) have similar typologies as Buechler (2000) of social movement scholarship. Habib 
(2008: 3) gives three different explanatory variables advanced by distinct schools in social movement theory: i.e. the 
political structure which defines both opportunities and constraints (Tarrow, 1994[98]), the human and financial 
resources that enables movement‘s mobilisation and operations (McCarthy and Zald, 1973; Tilly, 1978) and the 
identities which provides the impetus for actors to get involved and provides the movement its legitimacy.  
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different theoretical models employed in the study of social movements. These are: 1) the 
collective behaviour theory (which has three variants: symbolic interaction (Blumer, 1951; 1969; 
Turner and Killian, 1957), structural functionalism (Parsons, 1951; Smelser, 1962) and relative 
deprivation (Davies, 1962; Geschwender, 1968; Gurr, 1969)); 2) the resource mobilisation theory 
(McCarthy and Zald, 1977; 1973; Tilly, 1977; McAdam, 1982; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 
1996); 3) the political process theory (Gamson and Meyer, 1996; Jenkins and Perrow, 1977; 
McAdam, 1982; 1986; Tarrow, 1994; 1998; McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Tilly, 1978; Snow et al., 
1980; Jenkins, 1983; McAdam and Paulsen, 1993); 4) the new social movement theory 
(Touraine, 1981; Melucci, 1980; 1989; 1996; Cohen and Arato, 1992; Escobar and Alvarez, 
1992; Buechler, 1995; 2000; Pichardo, 1997; Habermas, 1987); and 5) the social constructionist 
theory (Gamson, 1995; Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford, 1986; Piven and Cloward, 1991; 
1977; McAdam, 1982; Goffman, 1974).  
 
Each of these models has a distinct conception of social movement, which has implications to its 
empirical application. From the start, it is important to note that while this study primarily 
utilises the political process model, this chapter also cites and engages other theories utilised in 
the study of social movements as theoretical antecedents influencing the political process model. 
Moreover, the engagement of such theories helps demonstrate the challenges entailed in studying 
social movement as both a contested concept and social reality.    
 
Tilly (2004) apportions the basic conceptual challenge in studying social movements, to 
scholars‘ loose application of the term to all relevant popular collective action, be it random, 
unorganised or organised and carefully planned. For example, collective behaviour analysts have 
for long treated social movements as random occurrences of individuals emotionally reacting to 
situations outside their control (see for example Blumer, 1951; 1969; Turner and Killian, 1957; 
Parsons, 1951; Smelser, 1962; Davies, 1962; Geschwender, 1968; Gurr, 1969).  However, as 
Tilly (2004) as well as della Porta and Diani (2006), point out, such conception obscures: a) the 
incessant jockeying and realignment that always go on within a social movement; and, b) the 
interaction among activists, constituents, targets, authorities, allies, rivals, enemies and audiences 
that make up the changing texture of social movements. Tilly (2004) also faults analysts‘ oft-
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conflation of a movement‘s collective action with organisations and networks3 that support the 
action, or even sometimes, consider the organisations and networks to constitute the movement 
rather than the work and campaigns in which they engage. For Tilly (2004), while this inflation 
and conflation does not do much harm in casual political discussions, and that it may in fact aid 
social movements in their recruitment, mobilisation, and morale, it can greatly handicap efforts 
to describe and explain how social movements actually work.  
  
According to della Porta and Diani (2006), another conceptual problem emanates from the 
treatment of social movement actors, especially by the collective behaviour theorists as 
homogeneous entities with their struggles or even as a single unitary actor (See Touraine, 1977, 
1981). This obscures the different actors, targets and actions that make up a movement (Axtmann 
et al., 2008; Zeilig, Dwyer and Seddon, 2002; Petras and Engbarth, 1988; Tilly, 2004). Melucci 
(1996: 19) criticises this approach arguing that ‗collective behaviour is too general a container, 
bringing together under its categorical unity a great multitude of different empirical phenomena 
ranging from ―spontaneous‖ panic to planned revolutions.‘  
 
Still, other scholars and activists have a romanticised and valorised conception of social 
movements. Habib (2008: 5) criticises the often-romantic description of movements as:  
Arenas of free egalitarian and democratic debates and participation epitomised in ―principled 
internationalism, a socialist vision, and an independent mass-based mobilisation and struggle as 
an ideological and organisational alternative to … capital[ism] (McKinley 2004)‖ and excesses of 
a predatory state.
4
  
Such normative stance can be problematic. For instance, a closer look at Kenyan social 
movements and their struggles, reveals that they are replete with constant frictions, internal 
tensions and contestations ‗between ethnicities, classes and other interests‘ and they do not 
always necessarily agree on what to contest, and most crucially, how to contest (Nasong‘o, 2007: 
24. See also Mati, 2008; Murunga, 2000). This is particularly instructive for the Ufungamano 
Initiative case. As this study shows, dynamics such as ethnicity, class, generational and other 
                                                 
3
 A network is used in this study to mean an organisational structure or architecture that allows people to network 
(activity). Networking connotes the active participation in activities together with other network members 
(Østergaad and Nielsen, 2005). 
4
 See also Voss and Williams, 2009/2011; Atibil, 2010; Cohen and Arato, 1992; Diamond, 1999; Harbeson, 1994; 
Habermas, 1996; Nasong‘o, 2007; Offe, 1985; Silva, 2008 for similar arguments. Voss and Williams (2011: 2) for 
instance sees these movements, as ‗seek[ing] to build participatory democratic mechanisms for economic, social, 
and political justice, [and therefore] create new spaces for practicing democracy.‘ 
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interests played a role in the establishment and operations, and had implications on the 
Ufungamano Initiative‘s inclusiveness, internal democratic mechanisms, and generally to its 
struggles and unity.  
 
Finally, some analysts treat social movements as ‗normatively oriented interactions between 
adversaries with conflicting interpretations and oppose societal models of a shared cultural field‘ 
(Touraine, 1981: 31-2; Cohen and Arato, 1992: 510 as cited in Nasong‘o, 2007: 21). As such, 
they treat social movements as sources of the contentious dynamics in politics that contradict 
those of the larger society rather than sometimes, seeing them as emanating from contentious 
dynamics in politics in the larger society (for example Buechler, 2000; Touraine, 1985). 
Touraine (1985: 749) for instance argues that social movement‘s ‗goals and strategies have a 
social coherence and rationality of their own […and] cannot be understood within the logic of 
existing institutional order, since their overriding function is precisely to challenge that logic and 
transform the social relations which it mirrors and reinforces.‘  
 
Despite the many differences, works by scholars such as Tilly (2004), Wilkinson (1971), 
Mamdani (1996), Nasong‘o (2007), and della Porta and Diani (1999), converge on the fact that 
social movements essentially refer to ‗means through which ordinary people come together to 
make collective claims on others […] through a distinctive combination of campaigns, 
performances, and displays‘ (Tilly 2004: ix). For a struggle to qualify as a social movement, 
Tilly (1977: 3), argues, it should be ‗durable and pursue broad aims.‘ Furthermore, actors 
involved must be aware of their common interest and distinct identity, and self-consciously 
seeking a set of changes.  For Tilly (1978: 7), a social movement must: 
 Evince a minimum degree of organisation, though it may range from a loose, informal or partial 
level of organisation, to highly institutionalized and bureaucratized structures […. It must be] 
founded upon the conscious volition, normative commitment to the movement‘s aims or beliefs, 
and active participation on the part of the followers or members.
5
  
della Porta and Diani (2006) advance a similar but more integrated conception of a social 
movement.   
                                                 
5
 See also Snow, Soule and Kriesi (2004: 11) who see movements as ‗collectives acting with some degree of 
organization and continuity outside of institutional or organizational channels for the purposes of challenging or 
defending extant authority whether it is institutionally or culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, 
or world order of which they are a part.‘ 
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For della Porta and Diani (2006), a social movement is characterised by at least three distinct 
aspects: 1) structurally, it is constituted by dense informal networks
6
 of interactions that create 
the preconditions for mobilisation of resources (financial and human) necessary for collective 
action; 2) A social movement relies on a shared system of beliefs and ties of solidarity between 
participants, which constitutes its collective identity. The network structure contributes to this by 
providing a continuous flow of information and meanings between participants; 3) A social 
movement‘s raison d’être is its deliberate collective endeavour to promote change either for the 
benefit of members or secure a common societal goal through collective action outside the 
spheres of the established institutions and structures of the state (see also Tilly, 1978; Touraine, 
1985; Nasong‘o, 2007; Osaghae, 2008). This change or transformational orientation is a defining 
character of the conflictual relationship social movements have with those that they seek changes 
or concessions from. 
 
Building on the discussion above, this study conceives of social movements as organised and 
sustained collectives independent from the state and market, with shared identity and goals, 
engaged in resistance and protests against social, political, economic or cultural hegemony or 
dominance with a view to changing or transforming the status quo.  The words change and/or 
                                                 
6
 Such informal networks have not received much attention in the scholarship of Kenyan constitutional reforms that 
suffers from over concentration of on formal civil society organisations such as labour unions, church, business and 
professional associations. Arguably, the reasons for this bias are obvious as formal ‗organised groups are more 
amenable to empirical investigations‘ (Maina 1998: 136). However, such an approach blinds investigators who fail 
to see that much of the struggles also took place outside of formal organised groups. Evidence from the current 
study corroborates observations pointed in a variegated body of literature including Maina (1998), Mutunga (1999), 
Nzomo (2003), Press (2004), Anderson (2005), among others, that ‗much that is both interesting and transformative 
in Kenya‘s history occurred outside, or at the periphery, of formal organisational life. Spontaneous protests, laxity 
and lack of discipline and active non-cooperation with the state are important civic activities that take place outside 
the formal organizations. Spontaneous, non-confrontational methods such as these are safer ways of registering 
one‘s disagreement with the government than more robust public activities such as protest marches, placard-waving 
and burning effigies‘ (Maina, 1998: 137). Press (2004: 244-5) for instance demonstrates how a protest by ‗elderly 
mothers of Kenyan political prisoners‘ was ‗an example of spontaneous support for individual activists that stirred 
much of the Kenyan public and brought harsh international condemnation for its brutal disruption…‘ This protest 
started in March 1992. The Mothers of Political Prisoners ‗were not supported by any organisation other than their 
own informal network among half a dozen or so mothers‘ and tactical support from Wangari Maathai and Njeri 
Kabeberi, the then chair of the Release Political Prisoners, described by Mutunga (1999: 41) as ‗an extremely astute 
organiser, an activist, a courageous and intelligent woman.‘ Although they made no concerted effort to attract 
crowds, they soon had the nation‘s attention (Press, 2004: 245). People began showing up spontaneously at their 
open-air camp in Uhuru Park. In the event, the mothers, coupled with the local and international support they 
received managed to push the state to release all political prisoners. An analysis of such informal networks reveals 
that informal associations are important because of their ability to act as and provide a social security system critical 
in times of need. 
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transform are critical in the conception of social movement for this study because it highlights 
collective understanding and constitutional change orientation of the Ufungamano Initiative. As 
shall be discussed in chapter five, these were key generative forces for the Ufungamano 
Initiative. The movement was built by actors collectively driven by a desire to change the 
existing constitutional order, shared the objective of a people-driven Constitution Review 
Process which the state opposed. These actors collectively acted in establishing an alternative 
process that challenged the states‘ established one. This in turn, forced concessions from the state 
and allowed popular participation in the constitution making process. 
 
Arguably, while the constitutional change processes remained largely elite-led, as the empirical 
analysis shall confirm, it is evident that the movement achieved some of its goals. This building 
of alternative modes of collective action, is an emergent form of social movement action that 
‗focus[es] on building alternatives and new collective capacities for civic engagement rather than 
simply oppositional politics‘ (Voss and Williams, 2011: 19). As such, this thesis is also an 
attempt to respond to Voss and Williams‘s (2009: 5) call on ‗scholars to reorient theory by taking 
seriously recent changes in the nature of collective action.‘  
 
The operational definition used in this study therefore views the Ufungamano Initiative as a 
counter movement that sought fundamental changes in Kenyan society through constitutional 
reforms. It is this conception that also marries Polanyi‘s double movement concept with 
Gramsci‘s conception of civil society – another key concept utilised in this study and closely 
related to social movements. But how exactly do the two concepts become enmeshed in their 
application to the current analysis? The next section provides answers to this question through 
theorising social movements‘ emergence before turning to define and theorise civil society. 
Critical questions that the chapter addresses here are: how do movements emerge? How does 
existing literature theorise and provide empirical evidence for the emergence and operations of 
social movements in an effort to create alternatives and change in society?  
 
Since the emergence of social movements and collective action as a phenomenon on the political 
scene, there have been contestations on how best to study social movements. The section below 
unpacks literature on the political process the main theory utilised in this study, explanations of 
emergence of social movements. However, considering the successive nature of the nested 
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theories collectively termed social movement theories, the discussion begins by citing earlier 
theories used in the study of social movements as they have influenced the development of the 
political process model.  
Theoretical explanations for emergence of social movements  
Although it is no longer as widely used, the collective behaviour theory needs mention as the 
historical antecedent that has informed later developments in social movement theories. Leading 
collective behaviour theorists, such as Turner and Killian (1957), Parsons (1951), Smelser 
(1962), Blumer (1951), and Kornhauser (1959), argue, albeit with varying degrees of emphasis, 
that social movements are fundamentally irrational (psychological) forms of reactive, defensive, 
and particularistic actions and behavioural responses to changes in society (see also Buechler, 
2000; Foweraker, 1995; Mamay, 1991; Tilly, 1995; Scott, 1991; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 
1996; Scott, 1991; Habermas, 1973, 1979; McAdam et al., 1988; McAdam, 1982). For collective 
behaviour theorists, these actions are elementary, amorphous, unpredictable, non-institutional 
and spontaneous (Blumer, 1951, 1969; Kornhauser, 1959; Buechler, 2000). The ensuing 
collective behaviour leads to a social movement if it persists, and evolves integrated structures 
and establishes new norms.  
 
Today‘s dominant political opportunities model and its immediate predecessor, the resource 
mobilisation theory, challenge earlier view of collective behaviour theory that movements were 
psychological. Rather than conceiving social movements as deviance and disorganisation 
symptomatic of social malfunction, they treat social movements as part of the ever-present 
political processes and organisations competing over interests in modern pluralistic societies 
(Oberschall, 1973; Voss and Williams, [2009] 2011; Buechler, 2000; Mamay, 1991; Tilly, 1984; 
1978; McCarthy and Zald, 1977, 1973). As such, these theories see social movements as 
extensions of politics by other means (Tilly, 1984). For resource mobilisation and political 
process theorists, social movements are created to tap new political resources and opportunities 
available in modern democratic societies, which can be analysed in terms of conflicts of interest 
just like other forms of political struggles (Buechler, 2000; Mamay, 1991; McCarthy and Zald, 
1973; 1977; Oberschall, 1973; Tilly, 1978; 1984; Voss and Williams, [2009] 2011).  
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Empirical confirmation of these views is found in the fact that social movements at times are 
geared not at contesting the status quo, but in ensuring that ruling party politicians do not 
abandon the masses that voted them into power (Tilly, 2004). To this effect, Tilly (2004) cites a 
Canadian activist Murray Dobbin who in 1999 argued:  
The most basic understanding of the state theory tells us that when a social democratic party wins 
―power‖ in an election, it really does nothing. Senior bureaucrats, virtually all of whom are now 
schooled in neo-liberal ideology operate as a fifth column to sabotage progressive policies. As 
well, when transnational corporations threaten a capital strike … governments don‘t have the 
―power‖ to stop them…. (Tilly, 2004: 2-3)  
Dobbin therefore advocates building of social movements that can spontaneously get thousands 
of people into the streets to ensure that when a Leftist party that they support wins an election 
and takes office, it is does not abandon its constituency, by ‗cav[ing] in to the very real power of 
corporations, exerted with breath-taking ferocity and on a daily basis‘ (1999: 2 as cited in Tilly, 
2004: 2-3). On a similar note, Nyamu-Musembi (2006) argues that the failure of representative 
democracy to produce a political culture of accountability and responsiveness especially to poor 
and marginalised people is the reason why there have been significant investments in the search 
for alternative ways for citizen engagement. Significant attention has therefore been directed 
toward political activism by organised civil society groups since the second wave of 
democratisation in the early 1990s (Nyamu-Musembi, 2006. See also Held, 1993; Fung and 
Wright, 2003; Cohen and Rogers, 1995).  
 
As such, social movements respond to, but at times create substantive political uncertainty in 
democratic systems (Schedler, 2001: 19 as cited in Habib, 2008) as they promote democratic 
accountability of the elected to the citizenry (Habib, 2004; 2008; Habib and Opokuh-Mensah, 
2008; Ballard et al., 2006; Fowler, 2011b).
7
 Nyamu-Musembi (2006) concurs that civil society 
and social movements‘ activism has provided some stitches. However, she is sceptical of 
organised civil society‘s power to bring about substantive change. Citing the Kenyan case, 
Nyamu-Musembi (2006: 1), argues that after more than a decade of ‗political activism by 
                                                 
7
 Habib and Opokuh-Mensah (2008 citing Schedler 2001: 19), argue that the essence of democracy is political 
uncertainty, which takes two distinct forms; institutional and substantive.  Institutional uncertainty - the uncertainty 
about the rules of the game – implies the vulnerability of the democratic system to anti-democratic forces.  
Substantive uncertainty – the uncertainty of the outcomes of the game – is about the perceptions of ruling political 
elites in a democratic system on whether they will be returned to office. The latter – substantive uncertainty - is good 
for democracy for it keeps politicians on their toes, and makes them responsive to the citizenry.  
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organised civil society groups [and] an observable change in a significant number of civil society 
actors […] join[ing] competitive politics and government bureaucracies,‘ there is little evidence 
to show that this has enriched the political culture. Here, I digress a little to invoke resource 
mobilisation theory‘s postulation of continual political realignment and transformation due to 
competing interests in society, to argue that the retreat of social movements occasioned by 
contentment that the new regime would deliver a better life for all, might explain the turn of 
events in Kenya post- 1963, as well as post- 2002 transition. 
 
A significant contribution of the resource mobilisation theorists to social movement theory was 
the argument advanced by McCarthy and Zald (1977) that social movements develop when 
individuals with grievances are able to mobilise sufficient resources to take action. This happens 
through organisation and continuity of leadership without which, social movements and their 
protests cannot occur. This brings to the fore, the role of agency in incubating social movements 
through leadership and participation. In this thesis I borrow the conception of agency from 
Emirbayer and Mische (1998: 962) to mean: 
A temporally embedded process of social engagement, informed by the past (in its ―iterational‖ or 
habitual aspect) but also oriented toward the future (as a ―projective‖ capacity to imagine 
alternative possibilities) and toward the present (as a ―practical-evaluative‖ capacity to 
contextualize past habits and future projects within the contingencies of the moment).
8
 
Nonetheless, both the resource mobilisation theory and the political process model do not 
specifically use the terminology agency in their theories. Its value in these theories is only 
implied. Indeed, the political process model has been criticized for its neglect of agency (Voss 
and Williams, 2011). Agency and structure are common threads of analysis used in the empirical 
chapters to show the role of leadership, followers and the structural conditions that allowed for 
the Ufungamano Initiative‘s emergence and operations and how these determined outcomes.  
 
The resource mobilisation theory therefore views participants in social movements as rational 
decision-makers who utilise their agency to weigh costs and benefits of collective action and 
decide that goals of protest are worth time and effort (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Resources 
utilised in social movement protests include money, knowledge, political influence, media, 
                                                 
8
 Debates of what agency is are as old as the discipline of sociology. In its more generally used form, it refers to the 
capacity of individuals to act independently and to make own free choices. But these choices and actions, are 
depended on   
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labour solidarity, legitimacy, and internal and external support from power elite.  It was Tilly‘s 
(1977), and McAdam‘s (1982), further refinement of the resource mobilisation theory that 
offered explanations why some discontented/deprived individuals are able to organise while 
others are not. For both theorists, the answer lies in social movement entrepreneurs who catalyse 
and transform collective discontent (read here as a manifestation of structural strain) into social 
movements. Applying this tenet, this study endeavours to establish the nature of the resources 
that the Ufungamano Initiative entrepreneurs mobilised for its formation and operations. 
 
Critics of this theory charge that the emphasis on resources, especially financial resources is 
misplaced as some movements have been effective without money and are more dependent upon 
the movement members for volunteered time and labour. Moreover, the theory fails to account 
for the principal differences between diverse types of social movements. As such, it does not 
answer the question, why and how, for example, fascist social movements, or revolutionary, 
harmful radical ones, emerge and why they lead society to self-destruction (Mamay, 1991).  In 
the last two decades, much work has gone into refining the theory resulting in the political 
process model. Contributions from scholars such as Jenkins and Perrow (1977), McAdam (1982; 
1986); Tarrow (1994/98), McCarthy and Zald (1977), Tilly (1978), Snow, Zurcher and Ekland-
Olsen (1980), Jenkins (1983), McAdam and Paulsen (1993) led the refinements and 
improvements to the resource mobilisation theory. At the same time their contributions were able 
to speak to the deficits of the collective behaviour model.   
 
Among the leading lights of the political process theory are Tilly‘s (1978) socio-historical work 
on the emergence of social movements, and Doug McAdam‘s (1982) study of the American civil 
rights movement (Voss and Williams, 2011). Like the resource mobilisation theory, the political 
process model conceives social movements as rational actors having enduring, patterned and 
institutionalised elements trying to gain entry into the established structures of society to produce 
social reforms (Walsh and Warland, 1983; Buechler, 2000).  
 
The political process theory emphasises three key aspects as important in the emergence of a 
social movement. First is the existence of political opportunities i.e. the degree of receptivity or 
vulnerability of the political system to organised protest groups (Chan and Zhou, 2009; McAdam, 
1982; 1999; Tilly, 1978; 1984; Voss and Williams, 2011). Second is insurgent consciousness, 
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which is a collective sense of injustice felt by certain members of society that they are mistreated 
or that somehow, the system is unjust and with it, a sense of ‗cognitive liberation‘ (McAdam, 
1982), i.e. a sense of optimism that by ‗acting collectively, they can redress the problem‘ 
(McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996: 5). For McAdam (1982), insurgent consciousness is a key 
determinant for ‗whether or not groups can take advantage of …political openings‘ (Voss and 
Williams 2011: 5).  It is this ‗cognitive liberation‘ that scholars such as Snow and Benford 
(1988), Snow, Worden, and Benford (1986), Keck and Sikkink (1998), reinterpreted as ‗framing‘ 
of shared feelings of grievance or outrage prompting people to form collectives (see Habib, 2008; 
Voss and Williams, 2011). Chapter six of this study deals with how such cognitive 
liberations/framing was conceived and utilised in the Ufungamano Initiative.  
 
The third key aspect of the political process model is borrowed from the resource mobilisation 
theory: social movements are generated if there is sufficient organisation and mobilisation of 
resources to utilise existing political opportunities. To do this, social movements need to 
organise, have strong leadership and sufficient resources (McAdam, 1982; Voss and Williams, 
2011).  By identifying these aspects, the theory addresses the timing of emergence as a 
determinant of social movements‘ success (Mati, 2008; James and Malunga, 2006). The political 
process theory also advances the political mediation process that outlines the way in which the 
political context, wherein movements operate, intersects with the strategic choices (and 
consequences) that movements make. This is an important observation for this study in 
explaining the strategic choices that the Ufungamano Initiative movement had to make in the 
course of its work and what the implications of the same have been internally on the movement, 
its struggles, as well as its targets or antagonists.  
 
As such, this study finds conceptual alignment with the political processes theory, and especially 
so, because it allows for a convergent application of Polanyi‘s concept of double movement in 
focusing on social responses to the state in capitalist societies (Voss and Williams, 2011) and 
Gramsci‘s logic of counter hegemonic war, in analysing the Ufungamano Initiative as a social 
movement seeking to change the Kenyan political landscape. At this point, it may be useful to 
reiterate the argument made in chapter one that the Kenyan constitutional change struggles, 
which climaxed in the mid-1990s, cannot be explained by a single factor but must be viewed 
within the broader democratisation and anti-economic liberalisation struggles in Kenya. While 
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the Ufungamano Initiative case illustrates how collective actions are generated and utilise 
political opportunities to challenge the state, it is also illustrative of what Burawoy (2003: 23) 
calls the universalism of the impacts of the market offering possible grounds for counter 
hegemony (see also Harvey, 2003; Pithouse, 2004; Hardt and Negri, 2000; Habib, 2008 for 
similar arguments).  
 
The embrace of the political process model for this study is a qualified one though, as despite its 
popularity within the academy, its deficits have been a subject of a barrage of criticisms (see for 
example Buechler, 2000; Chan and Zhou, 2009; Crossley, 2002; Eyerman and Jamison, 1991; 
Gamson and Meyer, 1996; Goodwin and Jasper, 1999; Johnson and Klandermans, 1995; 
Melucci, 1988; 1996; Voss and Williams, 2011). First, as Voss and Williams (2011: 4) observe, 
is the models‘ ‗neglect of the role of community organizing in social movement‘ 
creation/generation, as well as overlooking important questions of agency (Flacks, 2004) and 
locally based initiatives (Warren, 2001 cited in Voss and Williams, 2011). Yet, as the empirical 
chapters shall demonstrate, community organising is a key dimension of contemporary 
movements‘ focus on building organisations and enduring mobilising structures that ensure 
‗victories won are actually implemented‘ for long-term transformation of communities (Voss and 
Williams, 2011: 8).  
 
This thesis takes the view that while the political process model can explain the emergence of the 
Ufungamano Initiative by looking at the relationship between civil society and the state, it is 
precisely due to community organising that different struggles by middle and lower classes were 
able to unite under the Ufungamano Initiative. This reasoning is pursued further in the analysis in 
chapters five and six to show that while civil society mobilisers were interested in long-term 
community organising aspects that are transformative, the political and economic elites in the 
Ufungamano Initiative (e.g. opposition Members of Parliament) were not. This, the thesis argues, 
accounts for some of the reasons for the complex nature of the relationships within the 
Ufungamano Initiative. 
 
Second, the political opportunities theory fails to acknowledge the reality of changing political 
opportunities within a state (Chan and Zhou, 2009; Gamson and Meyer, 1996). Moreover, due to 
its structural deterministic nature (Goodwin and Jasper, 2004), the political process model takes 
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as a given, that social movements emerge only to take advantage of existing political 
opportunities within a democratic state (Tilly, 1984; McAdam, 1982). This renders political 
process model less useful in accounting for emergence of social movements under restrictive 
political conditions (Chan, 2005; Chan and Zhou, 2009; Goodwin and Jasper, 2004; Payne, 
1996; Press, 2004). Also, the political process model does not take sufficient account of the 
interpretative processes of social movement actors to the existence or absence of political 
opportunity. This means that unrecognised and un-interpreted opportunities cannot be regarded 
as political opportunity, nor can they be utilised to affect a movement. Additionally, as Chan and 
Zhou (2009: 3-4) argue, the political opportunity should not be ‗treated purely as something 
―objective‖ and … independent variable in causal analysis… as political opportunities are 
dynamic, can be produced and magnified.‘ As shall become clear later in this thesis, the 
Ufungamano Initiative entrepreneurs made many strategic choices in recognising and creating 
opportunities that it utilised.  
 
Third, the state-centric focus of the political process model has been criticised for its 
marginalisation of culture and identity (see for example Armstrong and Bernstein, 2008; 
Buechler, 2000; Goodwin and Jasper, 1999; Habib, 2008; Poletta, 1999, 2006; Poletta and Jasper, 
2001; Taylor and Whittier, 1992 as cited by Voss and Williams, 2009). This critique is somewhat 
true for the Kenyan case because, as shall become clear in chapter four, there have been distinct 
artistic and cultural aspects in these struggles (see for example Njogu and Oluoch-Olunya, 2007). 
Besides, as the new social movement school‘s critics charge (see for example Kitschelt, 1990; 
Melucci, 1988; 1996; Offe, 1985; Routledge, 2002; Touraine, 1981 as cited in Voss and 
Williams, 2011), political opportunity model neglects social cleavages that generate new ‗habitus‘ 
and class based identities and types of movements, and how these new formations affect the 
speed of the tide and direction of transformations. Nonetheless, however appealing identity and 
cultural variables maybe, the two are insufficient in explaining the Ufungamano Initiative 
especially given the multiplicity of both distribution politics as well as mixed identities of those 
who congregated under the Ufungamano Initiative.  
 
The above critique is particularly relevant for the Kenyan case because of the incessant 
jockeying in the contestations among different groups of varying identities. The argument here is 
that it is important to analyse these cleavages. They have partly been behind the reason why the 
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Ufungamano Initiative and other social movement actors did not successfully deliver a new 
constitution in Kenya in 2005. But the struggles continued until a new constitution was delivered 
in August 2010. 
 
I submit here that as shall become clear in the course of this thesis, both the delays and false 
starts in the achievement of a new constitution, and the cleavages displayed in the course of the 
long struggle, are products and manifestations of a multiplicity of actors with competing 
interests. At various points in this struggle, multi-interest coalitions and alliances
9
 have been 
built between different forces resulting in remarkable progress. However, frequent disagreements 
between the most influential actors, social movements, religious institutions, and political party 
elites have always derailed the reform train. This has resulted in a series of ‗cycles‘ or ‗waves‘ of 
protest where movements are formed, take off, take on a life of their own, and sometimes 
metamorphose into phenomenal forces of change or just fizzle out.  
 
Cycles or waves of contention are utilised in this study to refer to ‗a ‗strong increase and 
subsequent decrease in the level of contention‘ (Koopmans, 2004: 22. See also Tarrow, 1998; 
Strang and Soule, 1998 for similar conception). According to Koopmans (2004: 22), there are 
three distinct characteristics of waves of contention. These are: 
First…a strong expansion of contention across social groups and sectors superseding the narrow 
boundaries of policy fields […] second […] a transformation of contention, that is, changes in 
strategies, alliances, structures […] which inevitably arise in the process of dynamic interactions 
and ensure that no protest wave ends up where it begun […] third […] contraction of 
contention.
10
 
                                                 
9
 Alliances are defined as organised groups of organisations that share common concerns, synchronise efforts and 
resources and have a well-defined understanding about how they will work together (Ashman, 2001: 5). Coalitions 
are more tightly organised groups of diverse organisations that need each other to accomplish goals beyond the 
capacities of individual members. Coalitions tend to produce a new organisational entity (Ashman 2001; Fowler 
1997). Coalitions and alliances have similarities in the ‗centrality of values or principled ideas,  [and] the belief that 
individuals can make a difference, the creative use of information, and the employment of sophisticated political 
strategies in targeting their campaigns‘ (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 2). 
10
 Strang and Soule (1998: 280) see such cycles of protest as exhibiting at least three kinds of diffusion: ‗(1) 
Collective action spreads across space and sectors... (2) New frames of meaning diffuse across as well as within 
movements ... and (3) novel tactics, such as the sit-in, are forged and diffuse within protest cycles.‘ For his part, 
Tarrow (1998: 142) sees cycles of contentions as characterised by: ‗(1) a phase of heightened conflict across the 
social system, with a rapid diffusion of collective action from the mobilised to the less mobilised sectors. Collective 
action spreads across space and sectors […].  (2) a rapid pace of innovation in the forms of contention; (3) the 
creation of new or transformed collective action frames; (4) a combination of organised and unorganised 
participation; and (5) sequences of intensified information flow and interaction between challengers and authorities.‘  
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Koopman (2004: 22) further explains that: 
Expansionist forces work throughout a wave, though they will obviously be less powerful – at 
least relative to counteractive forces- towards its end. Transformative and counteractive 
mechanisms and process are likewise not confined to the later stages of a protest wave, but are 
present from the beginning and may, in fact, prevent a wave from taking off altogether.  
 
Koopman‘s observations are important in explaining the various waves and cycles in the struggle 
for a new constitution in Kenya. Specifically, the vortex of the 2008 post-election violence, that 
forced a political marriage between the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and the Party of 
National Unity (PNU), is one such cycle of heightened contention. It is specifically treated as the 
conjecture that forced the different elite formations to agree to give Kenyans a new constitution. 
The key questions arising then are: does the Kenyan constitutional reform struggles narrative 
suggest that confluence of means and ends within the different elite formation are a sine qua non 
for transforming the power relations in a polity? What has been key to sustained pressures and 
success for reforms in Kenya after such a protracted period of time?  
 
Building on the available criticism, I identify the limitations of the applicability of the political 
process model in this study on at least four accounts. First, while arguably, the emergence of the 
Ufungamano Initiative is traceable to a specific conjecture (the enactment of the Constitution of 
Kenya Review Act, 1997) political process theory does not help us in analysing the immediate 
political environment within which the Ufungamano Initiative emerged. In fact, the state in 1999 
was busy blocking the very political opportunities that it had earlier acceded to, two years earlier. 
Second, after the formation of the People‘s Commission by the Ufungamano Initiative, the state 
responded with excessive force in trying to break the Ufungamano Initiative. This raises 
important questions on how the movement emerged and continued to operate under such 
restrictive conditions that the political process model may not necessarily answer.  
 
Third, the political process model cannot help us understand why the Ufungamano Initiative 
decided to form its own Constitution Review Commission, both as a new form of collective 
action as well as an institution in civil society that in a significant way contributed to challenging 
the status quo and extending the frontiers of democratic participation. Understanding this 
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requires reflecting on what Voss and Williams (2011), borrowing from the work of Payne (1996) 
and his emphasis on the creation of new alternatives for collective capacities to act (i.e. 
organising), have called the ‗generative aspects‘ of social movement. Voss and Williams observe 
that, existing social movement theories have given less attention to this partly because they are 
less dramatic forms of protest or collective action.  
 
However, Payne‘s (1996) propositions are less useful for the analysis of the Ufungamano 
Initiative. Unlike Payne‘s observation on the Civil Rights Movement in the United States, the 
Ufungamano Initiative was forged from pre-existing organisations like human rights 
organisations, religious organisations, opposition political parties as well as some other 
grassroots civil society and social movement formations. These existing organisations (churches, 
Mosques, temples, civil society organisations, and opposition political parties) crystallised into a 
new movement structure that launched an alternative Constitution Review Process (the People‘s 
Commission of Kenya). The Ufungamano Initiative never invested in building local capacity, 
leadership, and organisation.  As shall become clear in chapter six, it is arguably this failure to 
build local capacity, yet arguing for citizen participation as a driver of the constitutional change 
process that antagonised the more radical and empowered groups within the movement. 
 
Fourth, the political opportunity model cannot help us understand how the Ufungamano 
Initiative expected to build a consensus among Kenyans to accept the constitution that its 
Commission (i.e. the PCK) would produce especially given that they were operating outside of 
the state structures. Moreover, was it even possible for the PCK to go all the way? These are 
interesting aspects that this study probes in the empirical chapters. For these reasons, this thesis 
adopts a theory-bridging approach as it recognises that no single social movement theory can, on 
its own, offer an analytic model to address the different facets of the Ufungamano Initiative that 
the study examines.  
 
The question for this study then is whether the political process model is useful in the analysis of 
the Ufungamano Initiative given the highlighted weaknesses of the model. To answer this, I 
argue that it is important to remember the context within which this theory originated. It largely 
developed in the context of the increasing power of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries‘ 
democratic Western Europe and North America, which led to theoretical emphasis on how 
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movements could secure concessions and rights from powerful nation states (Foweraker, 1995; 
Seddon, 2002; Tilly, 2004; Voss and Williams, 2011). Notwithstanding the above criticisms, the 
political process model‘s place in the analysis of social movements especially in relationship to 
the state is not in doubt. This study takes the view that the political process model, combined 
with Polanyi‘s double movement are sufficient analytic models for the Ufungamano Initiative as 
they help us understand how the movement was able to force concessions from the state. It is a 
narrative of complex relationships between the state and civil society. It is these that the chapter 
turns to address.  
Defining and theorising civil society 
Due to its different theoretical origins, disciplinary traditions, as well as its content, scholars of 
civil society generally agree that it is a uniquely imprecise, fuzzy, and extremely complex and 
contested concept (Atibil, 2010; Burbidge, 1998; Chatterjee, 2000, 2004; Corry, 2010; Foley and 
Edwards, 1996; Harriss, Stokke and Tornquist, 2004; Heinrich, 2005; Jenei and Kuti, 2008; 
Keane, 2003; Mati, 2009; 2008; Monga, 1996; Munck, 2006; Osborne, 2008; Voss and 
Williams, 2011). As such, the concept of civil society has infamously earned itself the tag a 
‗loose and baggy monster‘ (Kendall and Knapp, 1995 cited in Corry, 2010: 11).  
 
Students of civil society do not agree on whether studying civil society should be approached 
ontologically or epistemologically
11
 (see for example Corry, 2010; Nasong‘o, 2007). Even then, 
ontological conceptions have differing views on what civil society is made of, and what is 
excluded. This is partly due to disciplinary contentions, but also to the normative stances taken 
by different schools of thought. Corry (2010: 12) though not claiming a neat geographical fit, 
subdivides the schools of thought in the study of civil society as encompassing the American and 
European traditions. For him, the American school treats civil society (he uses the term ‗third 
sector‘) as ‗a discrete sector characterized by certain qualities such as civility‘ and therefore 
excludes anything uncivil in its analysis.  
 
                                                 
11
 Ontological approaches are interested in defining what things ‗are‘, charting out their existence and finding 
methodology to uncover the truth of their being while epistemological approaches are concerned with how things 
(structures, organisations, or identities) come to be made real, defined, and authorised, and how different 
perspectives generate different understandings of them (Corry, 2010: 12). 
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The European traditions theorists on the other hand, criticise the American selectivity in the 
normative operationalisation of civil society (see for example Munck, 2006; Nasong‘o, 2007). 
As such, European traditions theorists take ‗―the hybrid view‖ that …third sector organizations 
[are] essentially… mixtures of other kinds of social organization such as private and public, or 
hierarchic and anarchic‘ (Corry, 2010: 12). These organisations can be ‗illiberal, anti-democratic 
and violent as well as liberal, democratic and peaceful‘ (Wild, 2006: 2; Evans, 2005; Held and 
McGrew, 2003; Mati, 2009; 2008).  
 
The epistemological approach views civil society not as an ‗object out there waiting to be 
authoritatively defined but as a kind of societal process‘ (Corry 2010: 12). The epistemological 
approach therefore looks at, and interrogates, the kinds of knowledge that inform how identities, 
practices, structures, organisations of civil society are ‗generated, the position of observations 
that identify a third sector in a particular way, and what makes it possible to see such a thing in 
different ways‘ (Corry, 2010: 13.  See also Åkerstøm, 2003). It is from an epistemological point 
of view that economists for instance focus on the non-redistribution constraints. On their part, 
sociologists look at value-based motivations, persuasions, normative appeals, communicative 
rationality and idealism of participants as key generative and operative drivers of civil society 
(Corry, 2010; Etzioni, 1973; Jenei and Kuti, 2008; Lewis, 2003).   
     
There is also a different form of contention centred on whether civil society actually exists. Some 
scholars (see for example Bratton, 1994; Young C. 1994; 1999; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; 
Nasong‘o, 2005) dismiss the ‗notion of civil society as a mere metaphor masquerading as a 
political player‘ (Nasong‘o, 2007: 23). Some of these scholars ‗deny the concept concrete reality 
and contend that it is essentially a child of anthropomorphic fertility of the social scientific mind. 
In this view, civil society is a theoretical construct lacking empirical locus, whose contemporary 
currency is only an intellectual fad that is inherently limited in heuristic value‘ (Nasong‘o, 2007: 
23).  
 
Ensuing from such theoretical disagreements, Seligman (1992: 3) notes that ‗works of writers as 
diverse as Ferguson and Marx, Hegel and Adam Smith, de Tocqueville and Gramsci are all 
invoked in contemporary ―rediscovery‖ of civil society‘ (cited in Mati, 2008: 21). The usage of 
the term civil society nonetheless is traceable to seventeenth and eighteenth century political 
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realities and thought in the development of princely city-states in Western Europe and later in 
North America and has undergone several adaptations over the centuries (Hyden, 1998; Voss and 
Williams, 2011; Chweya, 2004). For Kaldor (2003: 6), ‗originally, civil society referred to a 
rule-governed society in which the public good comes before the ruler‘s private interests, but 
was later refined through the idea of a social contract, the rise of individual rights, and the 
assumption of human equality.‘  For Corry (2010: 14), these were termed ‗civil societies‘ in 
reference to ‗virtues of citizenship associated with the rule of law and political society.‘  For him 
therefore, ‗civil society was at one stage closely related to the very idea of the state and political 
society that governed and ordered a society‘ (Corry, 2010: 14).    
 
As Voss and Williams (2009) as well as Kaldor (2003: 7) argue, Hegel (1996, 185-6) took the 
idea of civil society further by distinguishing it from the state through his definition of civil 
society as the ‗realm of difference, intermediate between the family and the state.‘ In the 20th 
century, ‗Gramsci further refined civil society to refer to forms of social interaction that are 
distinct from both the state and economy‘ (Voss and Williams, 2009: 11). 
 
Some of the contemporary usage of civil society has inherited the valorised and virtuous 
conception. Some scholars argue civil society is defined by voluntary and non-coerced 
associational life, independent of, and competing with the state and as protections against the 
domination of society by the state, and in pursuit of shared public interests, adherence to value-
based rationality (see for example Atibil, 2010; Corry, 2010; Salamon and Anheier, 1997).  For 
some therefore, the idea of civil society comes imbued with a potential as a watchdog and as a 
way to educate citizens by fostering democratic dialogue and deliberative democratic control 
over terms of political discourse and the operation of governance (Silva, 2008: 5; Fowler, 2011b; 
Monga, 2009; Glasius, 2010).  Others however, reject this normative conception (Fowler, 
2011b). For the purposes of this study, contemporary literature on the conceptions of civil 
society can be categorised into the following: a) civil society as relational concept (Voss and 
Williams, 2009; 2011); b) civil society as an arena of contestation (Bayart, 1996; Corry, 2010; 
Nasong‘o, 2007; Gramsci, 1971); and c) civil society as a process (Foucault, 1978). Below, I 
explore each of them. 
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Civil society as a relational concept  
Here, most of the literature conceives civil society (mainly referred to as ‗third sector‘) as a 
residual category, in relation to two other sectors with state as first sector, and market as the 
second sector (Etzioni, 1973; Corry, 2010; Kanyinga, Mitullah and Njagi, 2007; Katumanga, 
2004; Mati, Silva and Anderson, 2010; Voss and Williams, [2009] 2011; Walzer, 1991; Chweya, 
2004). Civil society lies between and intersects with both the state and economy (Chweya, 2004; 
Ngunyi 1996; de Tocqueville, 1835; Hegel, 1821/1952).
12
 For Corry (2010: 11) the logic of civil 
society, ‗unlike the state and the market economy, …can scarcely be subjected to detailed 
planning or regulated without it losing some of its …qualities such as voluntary participation, 
value-based motivation, and independence from more institutionalized power structures.‘  
 
But such residual conception of civil society as the ‗third sector‘ has been faulted on the basis 
that ‗it is always one (or two) steps behind in terms of primacy‘ and that the other two sectors or 
domains affect its nature and character and in the process subordinating it (Corry, 2010: 15; Voss 
and Williams, 2009; 2011). As Corry (2010: 15) citing Kaldor (2002), argues:  
Defining the third sector in relation to the market and the state (as separate or hybrid) points focus 
toward its functionality vis-à-vis those sectors: nongovernmental organizations fill a service gap 
for welfare states; the ―social economy‖ covers for failings in the market economy. If the fourth 
―private‖ sector of family and community is included, the third sector is again conceived in terms 
of its functionality for ―cohesion‖ or ―the family.‖ This is why the third sector, despite its 
potentially subversive effects, is accused of being a ―tamed‖ sector subservient to other societal 
forces, in particular neoliberalism. 
The relational and sectoral approach also assumes coherences in the entities that make up civil 
society. It also suggests clear lines of demarcation between it and the other sectors (Corry, 2010). 
However, there are many differences in the forms of social, political, and economic organisations 
that fall within civil society, creating doubts as to whether a third sector necessarily exists (see 
for example Evers, 1995; Laville et al., 1999).  
 
                                                 
12
 Chweya (2004: 28) notes that the addition of the markets appears 'justified in the light of the threats that citizens 
face from the market besides threats from the state. That is citizens are under siege from both the state and the 
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Moreover, there are disagreements among scholars of different disciplinary traditions especially 
between economics and sociology or even with political science regarding what the primary 
defining characteristics of human organisations occupying the civil society terrain should be. The 
primary disagreement is on ‗whether civil society is primarily an economic or a sociological 
phenomenon‘ (Hyden, 1998: 19). Here, the interchangeable usage of terms ‗non-profit sector‘ 
with ‗civil society‘ is the case in point. This has however been charged as  ‗conceptually 
unsound, as the two terms denote quite different phenomena and use different perspectives, with 
the non-profit sector being grounded in economic and social policy debates, and civil society 
being rooted in democratic political and social theory‘ (Heinrich, 2005: 219).   
 
The relational conception of civil society has also resulted in disagreements on whether ‗civil 
society is essentially autonomous of the state or civil society and the state are organically linked‘ 
(Hyden, 1998: 19. See also Atibil, 2010; Beckman, 1998; Clayton, 1998; Corry, 2010; Mamdani, 
1995; Nasong‘o, 2007; Shivji, 2006). While some scholars, for example, Price (2003), Putnam 
(1993), Walzer (1991) among others, have embraced the state-civil society dichotomy, others for 
example, Beckman (1998), Mamdani (1995), Shivji (2006), Katumanga (2004), see such as 
either oxymoronic, or an ‗ideological strategy of current neoliberal offensive‘ (Nasong‘o, 2007: 
23).  
 
Some scholars taking cue from Hegel (1952), reject the idealisation of separateness of civil 
society arguing that civil society and the state are mutually inter-dependent (Atibil, 2010). Shivji 
(2006: 15) for instance rejects the idea that civil society is separate from the state arguing that 
‗whereas civil society likes to present itself as an ensemble of free individuals and as a separate 
sphere from state/politics, it is, as a matter of fact, the soil from which state power arises, and is 
embedded‘ (cited in Atibil, 2010: 6). Other scholars argue that ‗civil society is incapable of 
remaining ―civil‖ unless it is so ordered politically and subjected to higher surveillance by the 
state‘ (Katumanga, 2004: 44). It is from such that the Kenyan state for example, required civil 
society organisations to register through the various legal and administrative instruments (Oyugi, 
2002/4; Ndegwa, 1996; Katumanga, 2004). For Ndegwa (1996), this is a step towards neutering 
civil society, as a state controlled civil society is more unlikely to be a challenge to the state.  
 
Beckman (1998: 46) offers a reason for emergence of state-civil society dichotomy arguing:  
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In an effort to delegitimise the principal ideological rival −economic nationalism- neoliberals 
seek to delegitimise the state, the main locus of nationalist aspirations and resistance to the 
neoliberal project. In order to undercut the claims by the state to represent the nation, its alien 
nature is emphasised. Its retrogressiveness is explained in terms of its separation from civil 
society… [its] rent-seeking, patrimonialism and … autonomy (cited in Nasong‘o, 2007: 24). 
 
But this bastardisation of the state has not been just a neoliberal economic orthodoxy. Rather, the 
gospel spread far and wide. The resulting delegitimisation of the state became a generally 
accepted reality by even the loudest of anti-economic neoliberal scholars and activists in many 
parts of Africa and the world. In effect, civil society has abetted the expansion of the frontiers of 
economic neoliberalism in society (Bond, 2007: 43; Petras and Veltmeyer, 2002; Munck, 2006). 
Some scholars have indeed argued that:  
It is understandable that given the scholarly preoccupation of Africanists with the weakening of 
the African state and its presumed lack of capacity to fulfill its obligations to its people, coupled 
with the pattern of actions by external donors to push the African state out of many of its 
traditional functions, African civil society entities are wont to believe that they are equal to and 
independent from the state. […] to a large extent, these assumptions of independence from and 
equality with the state […] have something to do with the character of state-civil society relations 
in Africa (Atibil, 2010: 5. See also Moyo, 1993; Ngunyi, 1996). 
Civil Society as an arena and means of contesting and challenging state power 
Some scholars, following conflict traditions, have conceived civil society as a transformative 
‗providential spirit dispatched to redeem a political world gone awry‘ (Nasong‘o, 2007: 24) or a 
‗corrective add-on to the blind spots of a market economy‘ (Corry, 2010: 15).  Here, we see a 
valorised conception of civil society based on struggles for human rights, democracy and even 
economic freedom. This celebrates actual and potential capacity of civil society to transform 
politics towards greater democracy (Nasong‘o, 2007; Silva, 2008; Whitfield, 2003; Atibil, 2010; 
Fowler, 2011b; Glasius, 2010).  
 
It is from such normative twists that the role of civil society in the struggle for democratisation 
and constitutional changes in Kenya has remained largely romanticised in existing literature (see 
for example Kibwana, 1996; Nasong‘o, 2007; Mutua, 2008; Mutunga 1999; Ngunyi, 1996; 
Oloka-Onyango, Kibwana and Peter, 1996). In reality however, a closer analysis reveals that 
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arguably, civil society is more of a battleground for hegemonic wars for the control of Kenyan 
society.
13
  Civil society is not always the innocent and germane victim pursing collective public 
interest, and ‗the state always the aggressor whose power has to be checked‘ (Atibil, 2010: 5).  
 
It is true that through civil society, we have seen society actively contesting increased 
encroachment of private and social spheres by market forces. As Gramsci argues, civil society is 
therefore an ‗arena of conflict‘ and where ‗the control the dominant class has over society can be 
overturned‘ (Hyden, 1998: 21) through counter hegemonic ‗war of position‘ (Gramsci, 1971) for 
ideological dominance of civil society in the struggles against hegemonic oppressive and 
exploitative forces in society (Glasius, 2010; Katz, 2006; Burawoy, 2008b). Such ‗war of 
position‘ results in creation of alternative norms for transforming society. As Burawoy (2008b: 
5) argues, Gramsci is not alone in the belief that ‗the dominated, or some fraction thereof, can 
indeed, under certain conditions, perceive and appreciate the nature of their own subordination.‘ 
Other social theorists of distinctive Marxist perspectives such as Fanon (1967), De Beauvoir 
(1949), follow similar lines of argument (Burawoy, 2008b).  Polanyi‘s (1944) conception of civil 
society as a counter-hegemonic project that challenges economic, political, social and cultural 
hegemonies (Mati, 2009) is also an example of theorisations of possibilities of societies to throw 
off the yoke of their domination.  
 
Through civil society a-la Gramsci, alternative leadership and movements from below can emerge 
to mobilise consciousness around real or perceived deprivation that can lead to a revolution 
(Gramsci 1971; Katz, 2006). As such, according to Katz: 
Hegemony necessitates counter-hegemony—hegemony and counter-hegemony are best seen as 
‗simultaneous double movements‘ that reciprocally shape one another—hegemony informs 
counter-hegemony, and counter-hegemonic efforts cause hegemonic forces to re-align and 
reorganize themselves (Persaud, 2001, p. 49). Civil society, and not the state as in Hegel, is the 
active and positive moment of historical development. It is the creative space, where subaltern 
groups, encouraged by intellectuals, can coalesce, form a historic bloc, and engage in a counter-
hegemonic war of position to alter society (Sassoon, 1982) (as cited in Katz 2006: 336).  
 
The current study also concurs with Atibil‘s (2010) observation that there are clear demarcations 
between civil society as an arena of spontaneous citizens‘ collective action and the 
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institutionalised/organised (NGOs) forms of civil society. Like Atibil (2010: 6), the study takes 
the view that ‗only the people, the citizens, can speak for themselves. Non-profit organizations, 
NGOs, governments, and the market are all subject to their own forms of repression‘ as well as 
limitations in the levels of participation that they allow. Because of such repressions, active 
citizen participation in social movement has been declining. In its stead, we have seen an onset 
of managerial forms of civic organising with an impoverished base of paper membership and 
steadily declining collective action (Skocpol, 2004 cited in Voss and Williams, 2011: 8).  This 
observation is important in the analysis of the structures created by the Ufungamano Initiative 
and how such structures enhanced or stifled participation. It will also be useful in the 
comparative analysis of congruencies and contradictions in the different forms of organisations 
that joined the Ufungamano Initiative. Atibil‘s (2010) observation while limited to the Ghanaian 
case is also particularly applicable in analysing the differentiated nature of relations between the 
Kenyan state (both under Moi and Kibaki regimes) and its attitudes towards different forms of 
civil society organisations (professional associations, NGOs, grassroots civic organisations etc.). 
I argue that both regimes were selective in their relationships.   
 
This selectivity and relationship has largely been defined by client patronage, ethnicity and class 
(Nasong‘o 2007, Ndegwa, 1996; Ngunyi, 1996), but to some extent, also by religion (Karanja, 
2008; Gecaga, 2007). I propose here that this essentially explains the paralysis of the society, 
state, and civil society, as there has not been a clear winner in the (counter)hegemonic war in 
Kenya. While chapters six and seven shall explore this proposition, I specifically, submit here, 
that part of the reason for Kenya's arrested developments in the counterhegemonic project results 
from the inherent repressions in existing participation channels, and most importantly, the 
complicity in the massive co-optations of social movements and civil society operatives by 
fellow activists-turned- politicians. For example, in the post 2002 era, the following who had 
civil society activism backgrounds made it to the cabinet: - Kiraitu Murungi, Kivutha Kibwana, 
Mukhisa Kituyi, Koigi wa Wamwere, Wangari Maathai, and Kijana Wamalwa. The co-optations 
were mainly in the form of appointments into the civil service, a prominent one being John 
Githongo, a leading anti-corruption activist and head of Transparency International, Kenya 
Chapter, who became the ethics and governance permanent secretary. By agreeing to work with, 
or for the government, and not pushing for transformations, former civil society and social 
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movement activists‘ turned-politician- and-bureaucrats failed to keep eternal vigilance as the 
price to pay in ensuring that the new political elite they had elected to power, implemented the 
social democratic agenda they had been elected to fulfil. The co-optation in effect had two main 
impacts on the civil society. First, even those who were left in civil society slackened as they 
were now too close to the government and some of them had an illusion, naively so, that the fight 
was over. Second, a huge gap was left in civil society leadership and mobilisation abilities since 
it was the top leadership that was co-opted.       
 
It is such co-optations that studies on the transformative potentials of African civil society, read 
as betrayals and variously termed as ‗catalepsy‘ (Maina, 1998: 135), or  ‗paralysis of 
perspective‘ (Mamdani, 1996) due to ‗tout court applied assumption that civil society is by 
definition primarily a countervailing power to the state‘ (Maina, 1998: 135). Maina (1998: 135) 
offers a generalised explanation for such an assumption of civil society, which, while would be 
contested for example by Tarrow (1998), may still offer a qualified reason. For Maina (1998: 
135), such assumptions are: 
Moored to a fact true of western society but hardly so of Africa: namely, that political resources 
are on the whole, fairly distributed in society or, at any rate, that the rules for the distribution of 
such resources are even-handed. By this accounting, civic groups have a roughly equal chance of 
accessing these resources. That assumption rests in turn on a view of the State as a largely passive 
and generally indifferent bystander with limited adjudicatory functions [… between different civil 
actors…] coming in only to stem acrimony and adjust conflicts that get out of hand. This 
assumption ignores the fact that in Africa, the assumed boundaries between the State, political 
society and civil society are rather porous, often blurring into each other… the State in Africa is 
neither indifferent nor passive (Ekeh, 1992). Historically, its political project has been domination 
and its modus vivendi the fragmentation of any opposition to that project.              
 
Also cited in conception of civil society are collective actions and struggles against economic 
neo-liberalism. This conception builds on Polanyi‘s (1945) contributions that show society‘s 
capacity to challenge the deleterious effects of a market economy through counter-hegemonic 
struggles (Gramsci, 1971). Here, civil society is seen as a way in which citizens acting either 
spontaneously or through organised associations confront the vagaries of market failure and 
excesses of the state (Atibil, 2010; Anheier and Salamon, 2006; Murunga, 2007; Nyang‘oro, 
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2000; Voss and Williams, 2009; 2011; Burawoy, 2008b). Voss and Williams (2009: 11) for 
example offer two dimensions in conception of civil society:  
It is both a domain of social organization and is [...] an arena of contestation and generative 
practices made up of concrete organizations. As an arena of contestation and generative practices, 
civil society consists of discrete organizations between the state and economy where daily life is 
lived out and includes a multitude of publics each with their own vision and interests. […] since 
civil society is a space in which daily life is experienced, it offers tremendous space to challenge 
the penetration of the market into this domain and hence helps clarify the shift in movement 
practices.  
Civil society as a process  
This view takes cue from systems theory approach. It views civil society as a particular form of 
communication between different societal systems facilitating certain activities while obstructing 
others (Corry, 2010: 12). As such, civil society is a zone of dialogue or struggle between diverse 
actors and holders of institutional power. This, as Cory (2010) notes, draws from Foucault‘s 
(1978) discourse-theoretical view of how holders of institutional power order people and ideas 
along certain practices while discouraging others. This idea therefore suggests that: 
Civil society […is] not free of power or coercion, nor essentially dialogical, but on the contrary 
forms of power that to a large degree condition and constrain which actors can exist and what 
they can do and say.… In this light, civil society has been seen as part of, or even a tool for, the 
dominant liberal order in Western countries and the global Western conglomerate of international 
organizations and global civil society (Corry, 2010: 16).  
 
In empirical terms, the above conception would then dispute popular orthodoxy that conceives 
civil society as including a whole range of non-coercive institutions: - non-state and non-market 
structures and activities like trade unions, schools, professional, educational and cultural 
associations, political parties, churches, charities, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), self-
help groups, social enterprises, networks, and clubs etc. (see for example Corry, 2010; Mati, 
2008, 2009; Putnam, 1993; Walzer, 1991; Voss and Williams, 2009; 2011). The key to 
appreciation of why these still qualify to be part of civil society lies in three related concepts in 
the definition of civil society applied in this study. These are hegemony, domination, and 
symbolic violence. 
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Towards a working definition of civil society 
While acknowledging the contentions and the blurry usage of the concept of civil society, this 
thesis adopts a Gramscian perspective. Gramsci (1971: 238, 243) sees civil society as sturdy 
structures of fortresses and earthworks of modern democracies that include what he called 
private organisations like church, the trade unions, schools, where state organisations, and 
complexes of associations in civil society, are part of politics. While Gramsci‘s definition 
includes political parties, I have excluded these from my conception of civil society because of 
the state power capture orientation that they have. Gramsci‘s (1971: 243) conception is 
particularly instructive for this study due to its argument that civil society ‗constitutes for the art 
of politics, as it were ‗trenches‘ and the permanent fortifications of the front in the ‗war of 
position.‘ In this, Gramsci argues that civil society is one of the ‗mechanisms for exercising 
control in society‘ (Hyden, 1998: 21. See also Corry, 2010; Mati, 2009; Katz, 2006; Bond, 2006; 
Price, 2003). For Gramsci, this happens because civil society is intertwined in a hegemonic 
historic bloc as the massive ‗sturdy structure […] and powerful system of fortresses and 
earthworks‘ behind the state that serves as a stabilising, conservative force and ensures popular 
consent to hegemonic forces (Gramsci 1971: 238).  
 
For Gramsci (1971), hegemony involves subordination obtained by psychologically conscious 
and deliberate consent or a ‗substratum of agreement so powerful that it can counteract the 
division and disruptive forces arising from conflicting interests‘ (Femia, 1987 as cited in Press 
2004: 21). Citing Gramsci (1971) and Femia (1987), Press (2004: 20-21) argues that this 
consent/conformity can be extracted in several ways: 1) coercion or fear of sanctions; 2) habit or 
‗unreflecting participation‘; 3) conscious attachment to, or agreement with, certain core elements 
of the society, especially the dominated, and 4) pragmatic acceptance.  
 
Gramsci‘s conception of consciousness on the part of the dominated is however criticised by the 
likes of Bourdieu.  According to Burawoy (2008a), Bourdieu explains the mechanics of 
domination through ‗symbolic violence‘ and claims that submission ‗is deep and unconscious.‘ 
For him, ‗submission is not a matter of consciousness but of habitus, those deeply embedded 
perceptions and appreciations, inaccessible to consciousness‘ (Burawoy, 2008a: 21). However, 
as Burawoy (2008a: 28) observes, one can discern parallels between Gramsci‘s powerful system 
of fortresses to Bourdieu‘s proposition that the ‗state orchestrates hegemony through its 
 52 
connections to civil society, so the state holds the monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence by 
consecrating the classifications, capitals, and stakes of the separate fields that compose the field 
of power.‘  
 
Following these arguments, this study has chosen the Ufungamano Initiative for its illustrative 
power of such antinomies. On the one hand, it shows how such transformative power can create 
a ‗politically and/socially directed collective, involving multiple organizations, networks, and 
people focused on changing some elements of the social, political, and economic system within 
which they are located‘ (Ballard, Habib and Valodia, 2006: 3).  It also builds on Press‘s (2004) 
work on the Kenyan case (1987-2002) that invokes Gramsci in an attempt to show how 
individual citizens were able to create alternative norms through shifts from compliance or 
indifference to resistance and defiance to an authoritarian regime. Press‘s (2004) central thesis 
explains how individuals created political opportunities and processes, and collectively organised 
and mobilised, to force democratic concessions from the state.  
 
On the other hand, the Ufungamano Initiative demonstrates the limitations on the power of 
movements in achieving their objectives. This is explained in this thesis to be a result of the 
heterogeneity of civil society and social movements and their competing ideologies, interests, 
and purposes. This heterogeneity means that there is not a single type of relationship between 
different types of civil society organisations and the state (Oyugi, 2002/4; Ndegwa, 1994; 1996). 
Moreover, while the heterogeneity has been a source of strength, it has also been a source of 
internal frictions within civil society including social movements, especially as different actors 
have at times failed to agree on common positions or have differing relationships with the state. 
As such, as shall become clear in the empirical chapters of this study, this heterogeneity of the 
actors was a major fault line within the Ufungamano Initiative. 
 
Linking civil society and social movements  
Having dealt with conceptual and definition issues for both social movements and civil society, 
we turn to establishing linkages between the two concepts. This study is of the view that the 
concept of civil society is an overarching one and subsumes within it a variety of social 
formations including the more or less spontaneously emergent associations, organisations, and 
social movements, NGOs, trade unions, professional associations, student organisations and 
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other civic organisations ‗attuned to how social problems resonate in private life spheres, distil 
and transmit such reactions to the public sphere‘ (Habermas, 1996 cited in Nasong‘o, 2007: 25). 
‗The core of civil society comprises a network of associations that institutionalizes problem-
solving discourses of general interest inside the framework of organised public spheres‘ 
(Habermas, 1996: 367).  Therefore, this study concurs with Chandhoke‘s (1998: 29) observation 
that ‗if the literature on social movements describes a phenomenon of popular struggles, civil 
society provides the conceptual apparatus to comprehend the implications of these struggles on 
state-civil society relations‘ (cited in Nasong‘o, 2007: 25).  Thus at this point, this chapter turns 
to looking at the state-civil society relations. The main argument is that a defining feature of 
social movements as a form of civil society is the conflictual nature of its relationship with the 
state because their core business is to make demands on others. 
State-civil society relations  
This study does not treat the Kenyan state or Kenyan civil society as homogeneous units.  This 
emerges from the contentions on definitions and composition of civil society and secondly, from 
the fact that fragmentation has been an intermittent feature of the Kenyan state since pre-
independence days (Press, 2004).  As Press (2004) argues, such fragmentation leads to a fragile 
hegemony of the elites, hence opening political opportunities for challenges. In such a scenario, a 
regime stays in control because ‗the dominant economic groups…maintain their rule through… 
the practice of incorporating the leaders – cultural, political, social, economic – of potentially 
hostile groups into the elite network, the result being ‗the formation of an ever broader ruling 
class.‘ Inducements range from ‗flattery to offers of employment in administration to the 
granting of substantial power in decision-making‘ (Femia, 1987: 47, cited in Press, 2004: 23-4).  
 
This observation is particularly important for the Kenyan case. As Press (2004) observes, 
African leaders, and President Moi in particular, have been able to metamorphose through the 
use of a system of patronage to maintain support. As shall be explained in chapter four of this 
thesis, I suggest here that a weak economy in the late 1980s and 1990s reduced the resources 
available for buying support. In turn, this reduced ability to buy patronage led to a disgruntled 
middle class, especially lawyers as well as the business class and some politicians. These groups, 
feeling the negative consequences of a weak economic environment, turned against the Moi 
regime and pushed for change. This was the tipping point as new civil society‘s power forced the 
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state to acquiesce to constitutional reforms. The Kenyan constitutional reform struggles therefore 
fit well into Gramsci‘s analysis, and in many ways, ‗lays the ground for understanding how 
activism or resistance to the regime could result in a shift of norms from deference to defiance or 
resistance for an important segment of the public‘ (Press, 2004: 23). 
 
Historically, the Kenyan fragmentations have had shades of ethnicity and ideology. For example, 
during the protracted Lancaster House constitutional conferences (1960, 61, and 63) that 
negotiated Kenya‘s independent constitution, the smaller ethnic groups in the country were 
represented by the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) that advocated a federal 
constitution so as to protect minorities from the major ethnic groups (Kikuyu, Luo, Kamba, 
Gusii, Meru and Embu). As such, Kenya gained independence in an environment of ethnic and 
ideological mistrust among the political elite who inherited the colonial state (Barkan, 1992; 
Wanyama, 2002).  
 
Further manifestations of political elite and state fragmentation surfaced immediately after 
independence. These were initially due to ideological tensions between the radical and 
conservative forces in KANU. I deal with these in detail in chapter four where I show that the 
ensuing divisions gave rise to new conflicts and fragmentations of the political elite that still 
manifest in Kenya to date. In the period under review, we see fragmentation in the state and the 
political class in Kenya through the fact that some of those who actively supported the 
Ufungamano Initiative or were behind its formation were prominent opposition members of 
parliament. Examples here include James Orengo then of Social Democratic Party, and Njeru 
Kathangu of Ford Asili who were prominent leaders of the Muungano wa Mageuzi (a part of the 
Ufungamano Initiative). On the other end of the spectrum were the likes of Raila Odinga who 
chaired the government-led Parliamentary Review Committee.    
 
While acknowledging the fragmented nature of both the State and civil society, this study 
borrows from Najam‘s (2000) Four-Cs model of state-civil society relations. The thesis is also 
intellectually indebted to many other scholars such as Oyugi ([2002]4), Katumanga (2004), 
Ndegwa (1994; 1996), who have researched this subject in Kenya and whose works help us 
understand the dynamics in state-civil society relations in Kenya. Ndegwa (1994), for instance, 
identifies tensions between state and civil society as centred on civil society‘s activities in 
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political reforms. Oyugi ([2002]4) identifies two key factors that determine the nature of 
relations between civil society and the state: 1) the regime type and 2) function served by civil 
society. On the second aspect, Edwards and Hulme (2002: 56), argue that ‗traditionally, most 
NGOs have been suspicious of governments, their relationships varying between benign neglect 
and outright hostility.‘14    
 
However, Najam‘s theoretical model is particularly useful for this study because of its 
postulation that civil society organisations are policy entrepreneurs and that the congruence or 
divergence of means and ends between the state and civil society in the policy process is what 
determines the nature of relationship between state and civil society. Najam identifies four main 
types of relationships, which include co-operation, complementarity, co-optation and conflict.  
 
Najam‘s (2000) thesis is that when civil society and State seek similar ends and have similar 
means, they cooperate (see also Coston, 1998; Sanyal, 1994; Waddell, 1998). When state 
agencies and civil society consider each other‘s goals and strategies to be antithetical, there is 
confrontation (see also Bebbington and Farrington, 1993; Pearce, 1997; Najam, 1996; Young 
D.R., 2000). For the Kenyan case, Oyugi ([2002]4) argues that confrontation has resulted from 
the alternative leadership approach that certain civil society organisations propagate. Citing 
Fisher (1998), Najam (2000: 385) argues that in confrontational relationships, ‗governments … 
are often willing to use, their coercive powers for outright repression and harassment‘ of the 
nongovernmental actors (see also Ndegwa, 1996).  Complementarity, according to Najam 
(2000), happens when the state and civil society seek similar ends but prefer dissimilar means, 
i.e., they have divergent strategies but convergent goals (see also Coston, 1998; Young. D.R, 
1999; 2000). Lastly, when they prefer similar means but dissimilar ends, there is co-optation (see 
also Tandon 1989; Bratton, 1990; Commuri, 1995; Pearce, 1997; Fisher, 1998). 
  
Najam‘s theoretical formulation is significant in the analysis of the dynamic interactions between 
the Ufungamano Initiative and the state in the different phases of the constitution making process 
in Kenya. This is because there is empirical evidence to support the different theoretical 
formulations of the theory in Kenya, especially given that its lifespan stretched across two 
regimes, each with a different type of relationship to civil society. Moreover, Najam‘s (2000) 
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model helps this thesis build a hypothesis that the Ufungamano Initiative lost its appeal after 
merging with the state-led process because it was a co-optive rather than cooperative process.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted a review of the theoretical literature relevant for this study. The 
chapter has identified, defined and theorised the concepts of social movements and civil society, 
which are the two theoretical building blocks for this study. In doing so, the chapter has shown 
the relationship between the two and how they are applied in the current study. By looking at the 
contestations in the usage and application of these terms, as well as the deficiencies of usage, the 
chapter has managed to come up with an operational definition of each of these concepts.   
 
Additionally, by looking at the strengths and the deficiencies of the political process model and 
Polanyi‘s double movement concept, the chapter has succeeded in developing a theoretical 
model that applies the convergence of the political process model and Polanyi‘s double 
movement as an appropriate framework for studying and explaining the Ufungamano Initiative 
and its role in the contentions for creation of an alternative socio-political order in contemporary 
Kenya. Utilised together, the political process model and Polanyi‘s double movement concept, 
offer possibilities of comprehensively understanding why the contemporary social, economic and 
political struggles have been deeply embedded constitutional change struggles.  
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Chapter Three  
 
Methodology 
 
Introduction 
This chapter outlines and discusses the methodology employed in this study. It covers the 
research design, the procedures in sampling, the instruments and techniques of data collection, 
and analysis employed to ensure validity and reliability of the results presented in this thesis. The 
chapter starts by building a case for why a case study approach is appropriate for a study 
concerned with power and limit of social movements in effecting fundamental changes in 
society. Moreover, it attempts to justify why the Ufungamano Initiative is an appropriate case for 
this analysis. The chapter also gives detailed reflections on the experiences of the 
operationalisation of a qualitative research methodology in this socio-historical analysis, with a 
view to explain how measurements were done, choices made, what informed these two, the 
results they yielded, and how reliability and validity were ensured. Lastly, the chapter deals with 
ethical issues pertaining to this study.  
The study design: a case for qualitative case study 
As already mentioned in chapter one, while there is a lot of generic work on the constitutional 
reform process in Kenya, little attention has been paid to the intricate intersections of issues, 
actors, and the ensuing relationships between social movements and state structure in the 
constitutional reform process in Kenya.  Such terrain, coupled with the fluidity and subjectivity 
of human behaviour and relations, rendered a deductive approach common in quantitative 
research design undesirable for this study. Instead, an exploratory design was deemed a better 
option in uncovering, understanding and yielding novel insights on the Ufungamano Initiative 
mainly from the perspectives of its various internal as well as other relevant external actors.  The 
interactions between and amongst these actors have profound discursive significance regarding 
the course of the struggles for the Constitution Review Process in Kenya between 1999 and 
2005, given that these actors and their interactions have informed the theorising and explanations 
of why certain phenomena have happened the way they have in the Ufungamano Initiative.  
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This thesis therefore, explored the Ufungamano Initiative in an attempt to unpack the contextual 
micro and macro nature of a social movement involved in the contentions of embedding a new 
constitutional order to serve as the bedrock for Kenyan society. To do this, the study utilised a 
socio-historical approach to analyse the emergence, operations, successes and limitations of the 
Ufungamano Initiative to illuminate and explain the variables and context of the subject matter 
(Mwanje, 2001a). This approach draws intellectual strength from Tilly‘s immense contribution 
in the scholarship of social movements‘ contentious protest and collective action. This is 
especially so, from his proposition that because social movements and protests are expressions of 
recurrent attitudes, interests, or social conditions with long-running histories, their understanding 
requires a systematic socio-historical analysis (Tilly, 2004; Voss and Williams, 2009: 6).   
 
As a sociological phenomenon, the Kenyan constitutional change struggles have not, to quote 
Karl Popper (1972: 254), been a ‗closed physical system [to be viewed in] strictly deterministic 
ways.‘ Such deterministic views would render illusory, the rationality of human creativity 
embedded in the collective actions in these struggles. This qualitative approach is further 
indebted to ontological assumptions posited by Mwanje (2001a: 85), that the ‗reality‘ of the 
subject matter of this study—contestations around the constitutional reform struggles in Kenya—
just like many other social phenomena, has been highly ‗subjective‘ as different actors have 
multiple perspectives on their experiences. The perceptual interpretations of these struggles are 
therefore not fixed and predictive and have always had a degree of uncertainty (Press, 2004).  
 
As such, considering that the key concern for this study was to offer in-depth and contextual 
understanding and meanings to the experiences of participants of these contentions (Kitthananan, 
2006; Mwanje, 2001a; 2001b; McBride and Schostak, 1995), a qualitative approach was found to 
be necessary. The interesting and intricate details of the Ufungamano Initiative and its struggles 
are interplays between the human imagination and creativity emanating from both agency and 
social structure. Such experiences, perceptions and attitudes are not quantifiable. As such, they 
require an interpretive investigation (Silverman, 2001; Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Indeed, as 
Berlin (1998) comments, ‗there is something intangible and often quite [unquantifiable] that is 
involved in political change.‘  A qualitative approach therefore helps me to accurately dissect the 
pieces of what happened, as well as explain why things happened the way they did, by providing 
sufficient insight into attitudes, lived experiences, and motivations for certain actions and 
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behaviour in the struggles for constitutional reforms in Kenya (see Press, 2004 for similar 
arguments on the struggle for human rights and democracy in Kenya). 
 
Qualitative approaches have been criticised especially by the positivist paradigm for their 
relative bias and subjectivities. However, given the multi-faceted nature of social science 
research, and its primary nature of seeking to interpret and understand social phenomenon, it 
may be difficult to completely eliminate values or biases (Mwanje, 2001a).  Axiological values 
direct or influence social science research at different levels. These values emanate either from 
internal or external factors to the researcher or the research subject itself (Mwanje, 2001a). Such 
values determine the interpretive processes and choices of what is relevant at the various phases 
of a social science research project. 
 
 For the case at hand, values and interests influenced choices in the conception and formulation 
of the research problem/question and approach, the development of study instruments, the entry 
into the study site, the way data was collected, the exit strategies and the power relations between 
the researcher and the researched, the way data was analysed, interpreted, and disseminated and 
the use to which the findings were put. Values have been at play specifically because material 
conditions and lived experiences influenced the choice of the subject of study. Being a Kenyan I 
lived and experienced some of the phenomena that I attempt to give a sociological meaning to.  
For instance, the impacts of the Structural Adjustment Programmes in higher education and the 
economy in general hit hard in the 1990s and the resulting vortex of social and political unrests 
caught the attention of many. Moreover, as it is impossible to study all the aspects of particular 
social phenomena, I narrowed down to constitutional reform aspects and further to the 
Ufungamano Initiative case in order to understand the power and limitations of citizens‘ 
collective action in effecting constitutional changes in society.   
 
To conclude, I attempt to apply a method of sociological inquiry that is, as Burawoy (2008a: 10) 
stresses, ‗reflexive [and] capable of objectifying the very process of knowledge production‘ in 
understanding the sociology of the contention in the Kenyan constitutional reforms which, 
besides generating knowledge for its sake, I hope will be of some use in similar or related 
contexts of on-going struggles for fundamental socio-political and economic transformations in 
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society. This project therefore takes the form of research as social action common in many 
sociological analyses.  
Is the Ufungamano Initiative a sufficient case for this analysis? 
The usage of the term case study in this thesis is both in its narrower sense, i.e. the Ufungamano 
Initiative as a unit of analysis, but also as a research method employed in the analysis of broad 
study phenomenon: social movement struggles in constitutional reforms. As a method, a case 
study approach enabled me to pay close enough attention in observations, reconstructions of the 
chains of sequential interactions and events (Strauss and Corbin, 1990) in the development of the 
Ufungamano Initiative within the context of the constitutional change contentions in Kenya. As 
such, the approach broadly covers multiple variables and actors at play in efforts aimed at 
shifting the political sphere while simultaneously paying close attention to the specific context to 
demonstrate the power and limits of social movements in effecting fundamental changes in 
society through analysing the emergence, operations, strategies and structures, successes and 
challenges of the Ufungamano Initiative.  
 
The constitution making and reform processes in Kenya have been quite complex and have 
involved multiple actors and processes. A basic question would then be: Is the Ufungamano 
Initiative a sufficient case to study the broader social phenomenon of social movements‘ 
constitutional change struggles? As shall become clear in chapter five, the Ufungamano Initiative 
was not just a single actor movement. It (the Ufungamano Initiative) epitomised the largest 
umbrella gathering of the pro-reform groups of civil society, religions organisations and 
opposition political parties from the late 1990s, replete with many ideological paradoxes. It was a 
manifestation of high class and power politics, of promises and betrayals in Kenyans‘ quest for a 
new constitutional order. It is therefore clear that it is difficult to analyse the Ufungamano 
Initiative outside the context of the constituent and protracted socioeconomic and political 
struggles against marginalisation in Kenya. These struggles, as chapter four shows, are traceable 
to: 1) the resistance to the pacification and colonisation of Kenya; 2) the anti-colonial struggles, 
including the socioeconomic; and 3) socio-political struggles after independence. This research 
identifies the broader pro-democracy and anti-economic neo-liberalism struggles of the late 20
th
 
century, as well as the beginning of the new millennium, as the specific epoch in which the 
Ufungamano Initiative was a leading movement.  
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A mapping of the different pro-reform forces and their crystallisation into the Ufungamano 
Initiative in chapters four and five will reveal a long list of actors and history of struggles for 
democratization and constitutional reforms in contemporary Kenya. The Ufungamano Initiative 
and its attendant contentions, as reflected in its emergence and operations (analysed in detail in 
chapters five and six), present an empirically complex social phenomenon evidenced by its non-
unitary and intricate web of multiple actors/units –secular civil society,1 religious organisations 
and opposition political parties. As Yin (2003) proposes, a case study is the best approach for 
studying such complex social phenomena within their real-life context. For the case at hand, the 
Ufungamano Initiative as a case study is representative of one of the many heightened moments 
of social mobilisations in the wider terrain of the Kenyan socioeconomic and political 
contestations of the last two decades.  Moreover, the many overlaps in the boundaries between 
the Ufungamano Initiative and the constitutional reform struggles in Kenya between 1999 and 
2005, and the ensuing complexities, allow for in-depth dialogues and ‗explorations of broad 
historical patterns and macrostructures‘ (Burawoy, 1998: 6) of the actors in the Constitution 
Review Process in Kenya and attendant contentions reflected in the emergence and operations of 
the Ufungamano Initiative.  The same multiplicity and overlaps also allow for isolation of the 
crucial variables and their influence in the rise, operations, successes, challenges and failures of 
the movement.  
 
The Ufungamano Initiative case study therefore offers a chance for multi-perspective analysis on 
the general issues of the Kenyan constitutional reform struggles to yield results that allow some 
accurate, reliable, and limited generalisations and qualified inferences to the broader 
constitutional reform struggles. But crucially, a case study also allows for the analysis of the 
peculiarities of this case (Burawoy, 1998).  The current study is therefore concerned with 
achieving a balance of what may be regarded as the broad brush strokes of trends, events and 
happenings in the constitutional reform struggles, with the ‗underbrush of [intimate] facts‘ 
(Moore, 1966, cited in Press, 2004: 37). This is in an attempt to measure as accurately as 
possible, the contentious politics the Ufungamano Initiative engaged in trying to create an 
                                                 
1
 Secular civil society is a term used by many of the participants in this study to denote civil society excluding faith-
based groups. I adopt this usage to separate Faith Based civil society from other civil society form and more so, to 
amplify the internal cleavages within Kenyan civil society. 
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alternative socio-economic and political order in Kenya through constitutional reforms. The in-
depth dialogue with multiple actors involved in the Constitution Review Process in Kenya 
enables the understanding of the explanatory variables in the context of Ufungamano Initiative‘s 
emergence, operations, successes and challenges, constituent parts, competitors, allies and 
antagonists, and the multi-causality of factors/variables in all these processes and outcomes. 
 
This thesis does not, however, purport to recreate the entire field and events within which the 
Ufungamano Initiative was embedded as that is far from the objectives of this study. Moreover, 
while some of the explanatory variables specific to this case may be general and thus travel well 
to other settings with different circumstances, caution must be exercised in over generalising 
from this case as it is only representative of Kenyan social movements involved in constitutional 
reform struggles at a specific time and under specific circumstances. As such, the explanations 
from this case may not guarantee complete ‗accuracy, generality and parsimony‘ advocated by 
Przeworski and Teune (1970: 74) to allow for unqualified generalisation. Hence the wider 
applicability of this case study should be further tested.  
Data collection and analysis 
Three different kinds of data collection tools were employed to complement each other and to 
also enhance internal validity and reliability. These tools included in-depth interviews, document 
analysis and observations. Combined, these tools and techniques helped the study to avoid one- 
sided views and perspectives by getting documented views from a variety of relevant actors, 
researchers and commentators while also observing some of the activities of some of the actors 
(especially civil society and the Committee of Experts for the review of the Kenyan constitution) 
in the then, yet to be concluded constitutional reforms in Kenya. The aim of the observations was 
to help capture a sense of how the continuing civil society activism and the civic education 
around constitutional reforms by the Committee of Experts, was being done. These observations 
have enriched this study by capturing practices and operations in their ‗naturally‘ occurring 
sense. Furthermore, some of the observation sessions also afforded me an opportunity to identify 
people I targeted for later in-depth interviews so as to get more information from them.  
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Literature review 
The process of data collection did not follow a specific chronological order of finalising one type 
of data collection and then moving to the next. However, as is standard practice, data collection 
and analysis started with a review of existing literature as well as document analysis of 
newspaper articles, and secondary data (articles and books written about the Ufungamano 
Initiative and the Constitution Review Process in general). Given that there is no one set of 
literature that describes the process and the inherent contestations in the constitutional reform 
struggles in Kenya, the thesis had to draw on a variety of literature and themes on social 
movements, as well as on agency and structure in political protests and mobilisation, 
democratisation struggles and the role of civil society in all these aspects.
2
  
 
The literature review helped in the writing of the proposal for this project. Its subsequent design 
fed into this thesis in different ways. Specific examples of reviewed literature included but are 
not limited to Andreassen and Tostensen (2006), Cottrell and Ghai (2007), Kindiki (2007), 
Mutua (2008), Mutunga (1999), Ngunyi (2001), Karanja (2008), Okello (2004), Press (2004), 
Oyugi, Wanyande and Odhiambo-Mbai (2003), all who speak to one or more objectives of this 
study or offer historical background on the issues.
3
 Relevant articles were reviewed in blogs like 
Mashada, and Mars Group, and local newspapers in Kenya such as Daily Nation, The East 
African Standard, The People Daily (all private but ideologically diverse) and the Kenya Times 
(owned by KANU at one point but has since changed hands).  These newspapers were chosen on 
the basis of the differences in their ideological orientations as well as ownership (state/ruling 
party versus private).  The reviewed literature also helped develop an analytical frame through 
which in-depth interviews were framed and analysed.  
 
Importantly, the literature review also enabled me to make references to the wave of social 
mobilisations towards democracy on the African continent as documented in works such as 
Mahmoud Mamdani and Wamba-dia-Wamba‘s (1995) African Studies in Social Movements and 
Democracy, and Richard Joseph‘s (1999) State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa to mention 
but a few. Such reviews enabled the identification of similarities between the Ufungamano 
Initiative struggles with similar ones on the African continent. Like the Ufungamano Initiative, 
                                                 
2
 See Press (2004: 7) for similar framing of his approach in the study ‘Establishing a Culture of Resistance: The 
Struggle For Human Rights and Democracy in Authoritarian Kenya 1987-2002.’ 
3
 Full titles in the reference list 
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such movements have been marked by what Crawford Young (1999: 15) refers to as ‗political 
vitality yet precarious fragility‘ because they have been manipulated or outmanoeuvred by the 
state. Most importantly, this literature review also enabled me to isolate the peculiarities of the 
Ufungamano Initiative and in the process, strengthen the theory-testing dimension of this study.   
Document review 
The selection of analysed documents started with visiting three organisations in Kenya, i.e. the 
Citizens Coalition for Constitutional Change (4Cs) Resource Centre in Nairobi, the National 
Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) library in Limuru, and the Kenya National Archives in 
Nairobi. From these visits I was able to draw a detailed catalogue of documents available on the 
historiography of the general Kenyan constitutional reform struggles. Specifically, the 
documents covered the Ufungamano Initiative‘s origins, conditions for its emergence, key 
organisational structures, operations, and strategies as well as key achievements and challenges, 
the political dynamics and relationships of the actors and key allies and adversaries. This 
compendium of analysis helped to identify the political conditions that made the Ufungamano 
Initiative possible. It also enabled the determination of some of its crucial features (structures) 
and strategies. Lastly, it enabled explanation of significant changes in the movements‘ 
operations. The construction of this historiography involved analysis of relevant literature in 
articles, books, as well as archived surveys and opinion polls, websites (especially of 
institutionalised civil society and religious groups within the Ufungamano Initiative), blogs and 
press reports relevant to the study. Moreover, articles and manuals produced by the Constitution 
of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC) were also identified for analysis. 
 
Journals and magazines like Nairobi Law Monthly, Society, Weekly Review and the Finance were 
also reviewed. These magazines and Journals were chosen on the basis of their different 
ideological orientations. This review was in the form of archival research as these magazines are 
no longer in publication (except for the Nairobi Law Monthly which is back in circulation since 
2010).  But past copies of such magazines are still available in public archives as well as in 
archives and libraries of a few CSOs in Kenya.  
In-depth interviews 
The review of archived documents informed interviews, especially in drawing up names of 
people directly involved or interacting with the movement. The interviews took a key informant 
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format where an interview guide/schedule was utilised in interviewing participants who were 
knowledgeable on the constitutional reform struggles in the country. A majority of the 
participants were people who had been active participants or interacted with the Ufungamano 
Initiative either as civil society activists, clergy, politicians, state bureaucrats, parliamentarians, 
and ruling party operatives. With participants‘ consent, the interviews were tape recorded and 
then transcribed verbatim, with the exception of only those participants expressly declined to be 
tape-recorded.
4
 Tape recording was appropriate to ensure accuracy in comparison to other 
techniques such as note taking and memory (Lankshear and Knobel, 2004). In addition, notes 
were also taken and memos drawn up in the course of interviewing. These helped later in the 
analytical process (Silverman, 2001).  
 
As has become increasingly clear, interviews in social research have moved from the traditional 
hierarchical arrangement to acknowledging them as a co-constructed interaction and interpretive 
process. In my view, this is where the greatest biases from value judgments may come into 
research because of demands for greater reflexivity on the part of the researcher. To guard 
against such bias, interview remains the best way for a respondent to tell their story, albeit one 
bounded by the concerns of the researcher. My interviews were with a carefully selected sample 
to allow for what Seidman (1991) calls ‗in-depth phenomenological interviewing‘ by working 
closely with participants to hear their own narratives of their experiences while interrogating the 
social, cultural, political and historical milieu in which these struggles emerged and were played 
out.  
 
Further, steps were also taken to ensure the maximization of interactions with the study 
participants. Specifically, two rounds of data collection were done. The first round of data 
collection was carried out in September and October 2009 and the second between March to 
April 2010. This punctuated way of collecting data allowed for preliminary analysis of both 
interviews and documents in between. The advantage brought by this approach was that it 
allowed for identification of emerging themes as well as critical gaps from the fieldwork that 
needed special attention in subsequent field visit. Specifically, the second round of field work 
was more targeted and concentrated mainly with interviewing people at the grassroots – ordinary 
                                                 
4
 There were only four participants who requested not to be tape-recorded. In this case, I collected data by taking 
notes as I interviewed them.      
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people in communities that had their own struggles somewhat enjoined in the clamour for a new 
constitution and by extension, found expressions and representation in the Ufungamano 
Initiative. It also allowed for targeted follow-up interviews (two of them were done in Nairobi 
and another in Taita Taveta) to fill some of the gaps identified from previous interviews. 
Moreover, the number of interviews (70) was aimed at ensuring there were opportunities to 
interview more people to either confirm or challenge the various issues that emerged as 
contentious in a study of this nature.  
Sampling and access for interviews 
Data collection procedures were flexible and aimed at capturing reality based on actions, 
perceptions, and experiences of informants. As such, the study utilised a targeted purposeful 
snowballing technique in choosing appropriate and most relevant respondents knowledgeable 
enough to give information useful for this thesis.  This reflective critical approach was applied in 
sampling to ensure that participants included both people who were active participants in the 
movement as well as others not directly in the movement, but were in one way or another, 
participants in contentions for the constitutional reforms. This ensured that the sample would not 
have glaring biases. I therefore developed a sampling frame for categories of interviewees as 
shown in table 3.1 below. 
Table 3.I: Categories of interviewees  
1. Employees of civil society organisation involved in 
constitutional reforms 
2. Grassroots community organisers and 
mobilisers 
3. Convenor of the Ufungamano Initiative 
 
4. Members of the Ufungamano Initiative 
5. Activists (e.g. political party/civil 
society/community etc.) 
6. Commissioners of the Constitution of Kenya 
review Commission (CKRC) 
7. Members of People‘s Commission of Kenya. 8. Members of People‘s Commission of Kenya 
and later CKRC  
9. Members of Parliament (current and past) 
 
10. Members of Parliamentary select committee on 
the constitutional review (from 1998).  
11. Members of the National Constitutional Conference  12. Religious leaders 
13. State employees involved in relevant departments 
dealing with constitutional reforms 
14. Ordinary members of the Kenyan society  
 
Besides sampling, a critical analytic approach was also taken to ensure that words of different 
participants were not taken at face value. As such, two levels of analysis (vertical and horizontal) 
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were utilised where each view was closely analysed taking cognisance of the different 
constituencies the participant came from. Views at this level were later correlated to views of 
other participants in different categories in order to establish convergences and divergences.  
 
Selection of the respondents hinged on personal experiences, expertise, and availability to 
participate in the study. As such, respondents included the Ufungamano Initiative leaders, 
activists and religious leaders, public agencies like parliament, employees of the state dealing 
with constitutional reforms, former commissioners of the Constitution of Kenya Review 
Commission, Members of Parliament, researchers, and experts. In order to achieve deeper 
insights of the actions, perceptions and experiences of the respondents in the contention for the 
Kenyan constitutional review, an open-ended interview schedule was used for the in-depth and 
mostly face-to-face interviews save for four interviews that were done telephonically due to 
distance, time and availability constraints.
5
 
Issues dealt with in the course of data collection 
Power relations between a researcher and the researched impacts on the quality of data collected 
through face-to-face interviews. As such, gaining entry into a research site and leaving with 
accurate information are important tasks for any researcher. How well this is done, depends on 
the cultivated power relations between a researcher and the researched. On the whole, the mode 
of entry and exit has to take into consideration the existence of gatekeepers who are a critical 
linchpin in a study community.  Getting blessing from such people was key for the success and 
validity of the data gathering exercise and also for the purposes of ensuring that the narratives 
that I unearthed made sense and represented the different and competing view points on the 
subject. Besides, I knew that gatekeepers of the Kenyan constitutional reform struggles would be 
very good sources of information as they serve as opinion leaders. A potential challenge however 
arises from a situation where one might get a gatekeeper who has lost touch with the evolving 
complexities of the Kenyan constitutional reform struggles. Such a gatekeeper could potentially 
mislead/misinform the research. 
 
                                                 
5
 The three of the four telephone interviews were done with participants in Taita Taveta in Coast province who had 
not been available face to face when I visited this site in September 2009 and again in April 2010 while the forth 
was with a former convener of the Ufungamano Initiative and currently a member of parliament since 2008.    
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As a researcher, I knew these were key issues I had to deal with long before I ventured into the 
field. In a way, while I am Kenyan and have lived experiences of some of the struggles at the 
heart of this study, I have been away from the country since 2003. As such, I have lost the 
grassroots feel to issues and the way they have unfolded over the last couple of years. 
Nevertheless, I had the advantage of having contacts from the past that have continued to be 
intimately involved in these struggles. I utilised such contacts to gain audience with the 
appropriate interviewees. In essence, I utilised a snowballing method in sampling. The first key 
contact was an activist I knew Lawrence Apiyo. Apiyo is a grassroots community organiser and 
current chair of Community Organisers Professional Association (COPA) of Kenya. I have 
known Apiyo since 2000 as we both worked in Kibera in community organising and civic 
education for the constitutional reform struggles through the Catholic Justice and Peace 
Commission.  Apiyo was a great resource in granting me an interview and going out of his way 
to give me contacts to other activists. 
 
Apiyo‘s equivalence within the Kenyan bureaucracy was also a friend of many years who works 
for the Kenyan parliament. Though a civil servant and not involved in these struggles, this source 
advised me on the relevant state departments and people to approach. He was particularly 
instrumental in providing names of parliamentarians (current or former) who had been directly 
involved with the constitutional reform processes or struggles.  
 
The next link for me pertaining access, was to physically visit the offices of the National Council 
of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), the Kenya Episcopal Conference (KEC), and the SUPKEM, 
which were the three most visible actors within the Ufungamano Initiative.
6
 From these two, I 
was able to get contacts within the faith community. Moreover, I also established that all the 
documents of the Ufungamano Initiative‘s activities in the constitutional reforms were archived 
at the NCCK Resource Centre at Jumuia in Limuru (40 kilometres from Nairobi). Besides this 
information, I also requested interviews with the heads of these institutions or with the most 
relevant persons. As it turned out, in both institutions, I did not manage any interviews. The 
                                                 
6
 This is not to underplay the role of the Hindu Council of Kenya or the National Council of NGOs, but was rather 
for pragmatic reasons given the numerical dominance of the other three religious actors in Kenya as well as in the 
Ufungamano Initiative. Moreover, I had a fair knowledge on the Kenyan civil society and as such did not find it 
worthy going to the NGO Council as I could still get access to the non-religious NGO type actors without 
necessarily going to the NGO Council.    
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current General Secretary of NCCK had an extremely busy schedule throughout the period of my 
stay in Nairobi. He also had international trips. The person he delegated to be interviewed did not 
have adequate knowledge on the subject. Nonetheless, I interviewed the former General 
Secretary of NCCK Rev. Mutava Musyimi who was at the helm of the NCCK until he joined 
elective politics in 2007. Musyimi, who represents Gachoka Constituency in Parliament, was a 
co-convenor of the Ufungamano Initiative.   
 
As for the Catholic Church‘s Kenya Episcopal Conference (KEC) head, despite numerous 
attempts to get him, the church bureaucracy proved too difficult to crack. After numerous 
physical visits I was instead asked to talk to the Secretary of Kenya Catholic Secretariat. The 
secretary sent me back to the KEC chair whose secretary never gave me a definitive interview 
date despite numerous attempts. I was however able to interview the theological advisor to the 
KEC as well as two other people working within the Catholic Church‘s Justice and Peace 
Commission and Chemi Chemi ya Ukweli (Oasis of Truth). As such, the views on the role of the 
Catholic Church may not represent any of the official leadership accounts.  
 
The snowballing modus operandi was driven in part by the fact that I needed to get people who 
were knowledgeable enough on the Ufungamano Initiative either based on their own experiences 
in the same or through interacting with the main actors in Ufungamano Initiative. The approach 
yielded both successes and failures. On the whole, a majority of the participants did not have any 
reservations participating in the study expect for one case where the former Chair of the 
Parliamentary Select Committee on the Constitutional Review indicated his hesitation to 
participate in the study on fears that I ‗might not be genuine‘ in what I was doing. He cited his 
experiences of having been interviewed by Prime Minister Raila Odinga‘s biographer – 
Babafemi Badejo. He argued that Badejo did not inform him that he was going to write a book 
from the interview. Despite my assurance that I was not into such a mission, he did not grant me 
an interview. 
 
Another critical aspect was the utility of cell phone numbers for all those who agreed to 
participate. Through snowballing, I was able to get personal contact details wherever possible for 
the people I targeted for interviews. Whenever I got cell phone numbers and called, it was 
always easier to get potential interviewees to agree to an interview. This was especially so 
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whenever I indicated that I had received their contact details from people they knew or were 
professional colleagues or comrades in the struggles.  
 
The cell phone helped me overcome an important hurdle of gatekeepers (this time, security men 
and women, and secretaries in offices of these high society participants) who had real power over 
access to potential participants. Moreover, it also helped me avoid unnecessary bureaucratic 
procedures in government offices, NGOs and religious institutions. Indeed, in all cases where I 
did not have direct cell phone contacts and had to approach possible participants through their 
offices, I was always asked to follow certain formal protocols of access, such as having to 
explain in great detail to receptionists what my intention was. I was usually asked to leave a 
formal letter requesting an interview and in many cases not even to the person I had said I 
wanted to interview, but to an organisation or a department of the government or an NGO. I was 
advised that the ‗concerned‘ people would look into my request and respond accordingly.  
 
Except for three cases (Dr. Kamau Kuria, Abubakar Zein, and Prof. Kivutha Kibwana) all other 
requests
7
 did not yield positive results. It is probable that the targeted individuals did not get to 
know that I had requested an interview, as my requests were most likely not forwarded. I believe 
that, given the bureaucratic nature of access, I would for example never have managed 
interviews with high ranking government officials like the Director of Committee of Experts, or 
a judge of the High court besides many others, had I not been given their direct cell phone 
numbers by people who knew them at both professional and/or personal levels. This is not to say 
that I succeeded in all cases as the already cited case of the former chair of the parliamentary 
select committee on the constitutional reform, Paul Muite attests. Moreover, there were a couple 
                                                 
7
 These were over 20 requests that included but not limited to, Hon Raila Odinga, Kenya‘s Prime Minister and 
former chair of the Parliamentary Select Committee on the Constitutional reforms (1998-2002) (I spent two half 
days trying to secure the attention of his diary manager without any success); the Kenya Human Rights 
Commission‘s Executive Director, Muthoni Wanyeki; Federation of Kenya Women Lawyers (FIDA); Law Society 
of Kenya; Kenya National Commission of Human Rights Commissioner Lawrence Mute; Dr. Phoebe Asiyo of the 
Kenya Women Political Caucus (credited as the brains behind asking the religious community to take charge of the 
Review Process, though I interviewed a programme officer in the organisation); Rev. Ndingi Mwana a Nzeki 
(former Archbishop of the Archdiocese of Nairobi); Cardinal John Njue (the current head of the Catholic Church in 
Kenya), Rev. Wambugu of Kenya Catholic Secretariat; Hon. Kiraitu Murungi (former Justice Minister (2003-2006); 
Hon Prof. Anyang‘ Nyong‘o (minister for Health Services), Hon. Charity Ngilu (Minister for water), Hon. James 
Orengo, James Mageria (former Ufungamano Initiative Secretary) among others, all who were closely involved in 
one way or another in the contestations on the constitutional reform processes in Kenya. I was however able to 
compensate for these with other equally involved people. 
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of other cases where time was a great hindrance to securing an interview as shall be explained in 
detail later.    
 
While aware that this nature of getting access has a potential for creating a validity or internal 
reliability bias as a result of potentially sampling people who agree with each other on certain 
aspects, I did not have a reason to suspect this to be the case as I had multiple starting nodes in 
my snowballing. I do not also suspect any ‗doctoring‘ of responses from any of the respondents 
as my analysis of data reveals very interesting convergences as well as divergences especially on 
opinion questions.   
 
I did not restrict my fieldwork to just Nairobi. I did interviews in various other provinces 
including Coast, Central, Eastern, Nyanza, and the Rift Valley. While this might have added to 
the costs of my research budget, as I had to travel long distances and even spend some time to 
get few interviews done, each individual interview was worth the time spent and the resources 
invested on it.   Moreover, such visits enabled me to get a feel of the surroundings and the 
environment which somewhat shaped some of the experiences in the struggle.  
 
As already noted, I conducted two rounds of data collection. The second round of interviews was 
aimed at, amongst other things, establishing the linkages between the grassroots and national 
struggles that had congregated under the Ufungamano Initiative. These interviews were therefore 
like litmus paper tests on some of the ideas reported mainly by national civil society leadership 
during the first round of my fieldwork. During the second round of data collection, I also 
observed two public forums in Kibera and Dandora (Nairobi) that afforded me a glimpse of 
current mobilisations and discussions happening at grassroots on various issues in the proposed 
draft constitution. Moreover, the second round of interviews came well into new heightened 
mobilisation and advocacy by activists in a new civil society formation known as Katiba Sasa 
(Constitution Now) Coalition. Katiba Sasa Coalition had emerged from some remnants of the 
Ufungamano Initiative membership who remained a critical voice pushing for constitutional 
reforms. I had an opportunity to observe one of their activities (a regular press briefing every 
Sunday morning to drum up support in the run-up to the August 4, 2010 constitutional 
referendum) as well as interview some of the activists involved.  
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Even though interviews were done in at least six of the then eight Kenyan provinces, I further 
sampled three areas in three provinces in Kenya to get in depth insights of the grassroots and also 
to ascertain the Ufungamano Initiative‘s claim to be a national movement with widespread 
grassroots appeal and following. The first of such sites was Nairobi. Nairobi is the national   
capital of Kenya and draws its inhabitants from all the parts of the country. Most civil society 
organisations are concentrated there. The Ufungamano Initiative was also run from there. I 
therefore did most of the interviews in Nairobi with civil society activists, state officers, 
politicians, religious leaders and ordinary citizens. I did the majority of the interviews with 
ordinary citizens with residents of Kibera slum. I chose Kibera because of the fact that it has 
provided the majority of the ordinary masses of people supporting the reform struggles. 
Moreover, it has been an arena for the exercise of intra-elite contestations for the control of the 
under classes.  
 
Kisumu in Nyanza province in Western Kenya was the second site of intense investigations.  
Kisumu has since mid-1960s to date, been the bastion of pro-reform struggles. Kisumu is 
Kenya‘s third largest city and predominantly inhabited by the Luo ethnic group. It was the only 
place in Kenya that the Ufungamano Initiative‘s People‘s Commission of Kenya (PSC) had a 
hostile reception that degenerated into chaos after the PSC commissioners were petrol bombed in 
2000 at a public meeting while seeking views of the citizens. 
  
The third site sampled was Taita Taveta in the Coast province. This is a fairly rural site. Taita 
Taveta typifies some of the areas in Kenya with the most acute land problem. I chose Taita 
Taveta as it epitomises struggles for land reforms as well as the distribution of the national 
income, which were key grievances in the generic constitutional reform struggles in Kenya. 
According to respondents from Taita Taveta, 78% of the land is owned by three families (who 
farm sisal or mine gemstones), or falls under the largest game park (Tsavo) in the country. 
Proceeds from this park do not directly benefit the local people. This has created intense human-
wildlife conflicts in the area.  
 
Besides the formal interviews, I had informal discussions with at least four other respondents at 
the Institute for Policy analysis and Research (IPAR) who hosted me during my fieldwork. In 
addition to the interviews, as already indicated, I also spent time going through files of 
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documents at the NCCK as well as 4Cs. From the two organisations, I accessed over 200 
different documents that included communications (emails, letters), strategy papers, press 
statements, reports of meetings, minutes of the Ufungamano Initiative meetings – all of which 
informed this study on both the process as well as the content of the movement‘s evolution and 
operations.  
Reliability and validity issues  
Reliability refers to ‗the degree of consistency with which instances are assigned to the same 
category by different observers or by the same observer on different occasions‘ (Hammersley, 
1992: 67 cited in Silverman, 2001: 33). This consistency is limited in qualitative studies 
principally by space constraints, which leaves researchers to provide only a brief of what they 
consider (and unfortunately sometimes in a subjective manner) to be ‗persuasive extracts‘ of 
interviews and observations (Silverman, 2001; 33). Moreover, such reporting in qualitative 
research studies could suffer from what Silverman (2001: 34) calls ‗anecdotalism.‘ Here, 
research reports presents only a few ‗telling ―examples‖ of some apparent phenomenon, without 
any attempt to analyse less clear or even contradictory data‘ (Silverman, 1989 as cited in 
Silverman, 2001: 34). The net result is that such approaches may dilute the validity of the 
explanations.  
 
Some qualitative researchers argue that reliability should be a concern only within the 
quantitative research traditions. This is because of the positivist position that ‗sees no difference 
between the natural and social worlds. Conversely, it is argued, once we treat social reality as 
always in a flux, then it makes no sense to worry about whether our research instruments 
measure accurately‘ (Silverman, 2001: 34; Mwanje, 2001b). However, the selection and use of 
relevant statistical figures to explain social phenomenon may also produce their own 
interpretation out of the value-based identification of relevant variables because ‗statistical 
correlations may be based upon variables that, in the context of naturally occurring interaction, 
are arbitrarily defined‘ (Silverman, 2001: 31).   
 
Despite these challenges, all research should strive to ensure reliability and validity. The ability 
of research to produce reliable and valid results depends on a number of factors at different 
levels. For example, the interviews should be able to yield consistent results over time. They 
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should also be able to represent accurate views of the population under study (Golafshani, 2003). 
In other words, if the same participants were interviewed again under the same methodology, 
their responses to the questions would be consistent to those gathered from the initial interviews 
(Golafshani, 2003). This is only possible if the interview questions are unambiguous and as clear 
as possible.  In this study, such clarity and standardisation of the questions in the interview guide 
ensured that different participants‘ answers to the same/similar questions were consistent. This in 
effect ensured reliability of the interview schedule, process and the results.  
 
The interview schedule served as a guide in directing the questions that were asked to 
participants and the interview sequence was designed to check for consistency of claims made 
through each respondent's story. I constantly probed responses in cases where the questions 
seemed unclear to participants or unclear answers were given. Probing was therefore used to 
clarify responses and to elaborate questions whenever necessary. In this way, probing allowed 
for the questions to yield answers that were focused instead of vague and generic. Thus, for the 
above-mentioned reasons, the interview schedule was perceived to be reliable. Additionally, the 
interview schedule was also perceived to be valid in that from the initial process when it was 
designed, questions were developed in such a way that they were able to answer specific research 
questions and therefore ensured instrument validity (Golafshani, 2003).  
 
To further ensure reliability at the analysis level, interviews were tape recorded unless the 
interviewees declined the same. Hand written notes were also taken for all interviews. However, 
as Silverman (2001: 33) warns, great care had to be taken because ‗even when people‘s activities 
are audio or video recorded and transcribed, the reliability of the interpretation of transcripts may 
be gravely weakened by a failure to note apparently trivial, but often crucial, pauses, overlaps or 
body movements.‘ I ensured that I took into consideration such issues during transcription. Once 
transcription was done, I also sent the transcripts back to the interviewees to check for accuracy 
of their own views and make amendments accordingly. This, however, was not a smooth process 
as a great majority of the respondents did not get back to me even after several reminders and a 
couple of months of waiting.  
 
For the current study, I utilised sufficient steps to ensure that personal subjectivity, bias and 
beliefs that could affect the conclusions (Leedy, 2000; Opie, 2004) are avoided in the analysis. 
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Besides this, there are multiple confirmations and verification tests from the 70 interviews, and 
the multiple documents analysed for this study that ensure greater reliability of conclusions 
drawn from these data sources. Document analysis gave me a unique opportunity to get data on 
events, albeit sometimes with an element of subjective orientation, to the experiences described 
from the perspective of the participants without introducing my own perspectives to shape the 
study phenomenon. Document analysis therefore enabled elimination of researcher perspectives 
(see Mariampolski and Hughes, 1978 for a detailed explanation of how a researcher‘s 
perspective can influence the interview process as well as responses).  
 
Even then, this is not to say that it is possible to eliminate all biases in research. On the contrary, 
as Pommerolle (2006: 75) argues, and this is particularly instructive for this study:  
The strength of Kenyan human rights nongovernmental organizations derives partly from this 
symbolic and ideological heritage. Manufacturing heroes and combining ideologies and moral 
standpoints requires the erasure of contradictions and, at times, the simplification of history in 
order to fit the past into contemporary political movements. Nevertheless, recurrent references to 
the past have allowed human-rights defenders to further their cause and justify their demands 
regarding wealth and accountability in the national community.  
This essentially means that some of the documents analysed may already carry biases of the 
original authors. Moreover, some of the archived documents may present a sanitised position and 
fail to capture the background of what happened and why.  However, as much as possible, I have 
tried in this analysis to get multiple sources (triangulation) to the perspectives presented in the 
documents. This, I hope, enhanced the validity of the results.   
Data analysis 
I utilised multi-layered qualitative data analysis techniques that included text and thematic 
content analysis. The analysis frame drew upon the objectives of this study, and from the themes 
predetermined from the literature and the research questions. I further delineated these into 
thematic categories that include: a) historical background and the emergence of the Ufungamano 
Initiative. This covers the various activists and groups, their political dynamics and the nature of 
their relationships, main motivations for involvement in constitutional review struggles to 
coalesce around what became the Ufungamano Initiative, as well as the political opportunities 
that allowed for the same; b) the key architectural features of the Ufungamano Initiative which 
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cover the strategic structures developed by the movement to ensure Ufungamano Initiative‘s 
running as well as accountabilities to different stakeholders of the process, the nature of public 
support for the Ufungamano Initiative; c) the dynamics and nature of interactions between the 
Ufungamano Initiative and its antagonists,  the Ufungamano Initiative‘s activities and strategies 
and outcomes, its key allies and adversaries; d) threats to the Ufungamano Initiative‘s operations, 
and e) the Ufungamano initiative‘s impact and influence on the constitutional reform process in 
Kenya and lessons therein. 
  
I present and discuss the findings thematically in the next four chapters according to this 
framework drawing upon the interviews and linking the findings and analysis to the theoretical 
and conceptual framework. Excerpts from the interviews are used to illustrate responses from the 
participants. The analysis also seeks to establish trends, convergences and divergences within 
and between different categories of participants.    
Ethics appraisal 
This research endeavoured to be sensitive to the study participants‘ rights while being as 
objective as possible in ensuring the final research findings are accurate, reliable and unbiased.  
At the design phase of the study, I was acutely aware that the nature of the research touches on 
people, institutions (some, who were targets of the state in past years during the struggle) as well 
as spaces. Many of the actors in the Ufungamano Initiative or in the broader Constitution Review 
Process are public figures and were interviewed in their official capacity. Thus, the findings of 
this research speak not just to the academy, but also to these organisations and individuals who 
gladly agreed to be exposed to a sociological gaze. Such a gaze, of necessity, raises the 
possibility of exposing sensitive information on people and organisations. This raises ethical 
dilemmas that this study had to deal with by paying heed to potential conflicts between the 
production of sociological knowledge and protecting the interests of the movement and 
participants in this study (see Bevington and Dixon, 2005 for similar dilemmas in the study of 
social movements).  
 
I undertook necessary precaution to ensure the protection of interviewees from possible harm as 
result of their participation in the study. To do this, I ensured confidentiality by upholding the 
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participant‘s right to remain anonymous whenever they chose to.8 I therefore explained to each 
participant verbally and in a letter, the nature of the research and that participation was 
voluntary. The same letter assured the participant of his/her confidentiality and that the 
information obtained from interviews would only be used for purposes of this research and no 
personal risks would be incurred from participating in the study. The letter also sought 
permission from the potential study participants, informed each potential interviewee of the 
purpose of this study, and the nature of the questions (see annexed interview guide/schedule 
appendix V).  
 
The letter also sought permission for usage of any internal documents and communications 
relevant to this study but not available in public archives such as the parliamentary Hansard, and 
websites. The letter also explained the participants‘ right to decline to take part in the study if 
they so wished (see appendix II). A consent form annexed to this thesis (see appendix III), was 
used for the purpose of registering consent.  As I intended to tape record the interviews to 
capture verbatim the responses of the interviewees in order to allow for fuller records than notes 
would, I also sought permission to tape record the interviewees (see appendix IV). Moreover, 
each participant was assured that data and information obtained through interviews would be 
stored using pseudonyms.  Some participants found such level of formality a little bizarre. Many 
however, signed these forms except for a few who requested to be interviewed even without 
signing the forms indicating that they did not have any reasons to suspect me of any malice and 
therefore trusted my mission. Nonetheless, to ensure that the interview material utilised in this 
thesis reflected the true views of the participants as expressed in the interviews, I sent the 
interviewees a verbatim transcript for their review and confirmation before I started the analysis 
and writing.  
 
There was a challenge in the course of data collection involving how to obtain cooperation from 
marginalised communities such as residents of Kibera who have good reasons to distrust 
researchers. The challenge in data collection came compounded in what Mertz (2002) calls the 
‗worry of gazing at poor communities or groups disorganised by multiple challenges.‘ Perhaps 
this is because of the fact that Kibera is an ‗over‘ researched community that has over the years 
                                                 
8
 Nonetheless only one participant expressed a desire to remain anonymous but only on matters of sensitive 
information.  
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not seen much ‗tangible‘ positive results for all the information they give to researchers every 
year. At times, respondents asked what they stood to gain if they gave information. I was able to 
get the cooperation of the participants by explaining that the study was for academic purposes 
and any publications from the same may benefit future struggles. As such, engaging in an 
exercise aimed at levelling expectations helped not just me, but the participants to know what to 
expect in return for their participation. I will also share electronic copies of this thesis with my 
respondents. I believe this may assist future researchers in getting easy access, besides helping 
members of target communities to feel greater ownership of the results and appreciation for their 
efforts. In short, the ethics of dissemination to a wider stakeholder audience and especially to the 
sources of information are crucial in this case as they help create mutual respect and trust 
between me as a researcher, and the participants in this study.  
Study limitations 
As a case study, this study is, by nature in-depth and narrow in its extent and period. It is 
therefore not exhaustive and so generalisation to social movements in Kenya is limited. Although 
the Ufungamano Initiative may not reflect a wide scope of all the contemporary social 
movements in Kenya, because of its broad- based nature, as well as the heterogeneity of actors 
within it (members), its findings allow for qualified generalisation of the social movement 
struggles in constitution making in Kenya during the period under review.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the research design, approach, methods, instruments and techniques 
of data collection and analysis used in the study. The chapter has justified the research design 
and methodology utilised. Specifically, it has argued why a qualitative case study is best suited 
for the study phenomenon in question. Methods of collecting data as well as analysis have been 
discussed and justifications for the same offered. The chapter has reflected in detail, the ways in 
which reliability and validity of the results was ensured throughout the study process. While 
agreeing that it is not easy to have a completely value free research, it has shown how every 
effort has been made to ensure this by justifying data collection and analysis methods to ensure 
validity and reliability of the results. The next four chapters present and analyse the empirical 
data and findings of this research.  
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Chapter Four 
 
Sowing the Seeds for Kenyan Constitutional Reform Struggles 
 
‗Often times, individual opinions and concerns turn into various forms of political and 
social participation. Moral and philosophical worldviews and deeply felt convictions are 
then paralleled by specific attempts by individuals to stop threatening developments, 
redress instances of injustice, promote alternative options to the managing of social life 
and economic activity’ (della Porta and Diani, 2006: 3). 
Introduction 
This chapter traces the socio-political and economic realities that ignited struggles for 
constitutional changes in Kenya. This is done through a periodization approach that follows 
an evolutionary path. It traces the roots of these contentions to the early decades in the 
establishment of a colonial state in present day Kenya. It then moves to cover successive 
periods up to the present. The discussion involves identification and analysis of the issues, 
and the main players in these contentions. It further shows how each period and its actors fed 
into the next wave of contentions that ultimately led to Ufungamano Initiative in late 1990s. 
The chapter specifically speaks to what the earlier waves of social contentions in Kenya that 
the Ufungamano Initiative inherited in the late 1990s, can tell us about the political 
opportunities and collective action in the emergence and sustenance of social movements and 
contentious politics in Kenya.  
 
This socio-historical analysis reveals that the Kenyan struggles for constitutional changes 
were, like for most other parts of Africa, reactions to social, political, and economic malaise 
of the time. Emerging after the 1997 general election as a broad umbrella movement of 54 
different organisations
1
, the Ufungamano Initiative epitomises ethnic, religious, generational 
and class power politics in Kenya. The analysis foregrounds the central argument in the next 
chapter which shows that the Ufungamano Initiative evolved from a confluence of at least 
three key actors in the constitutional reform struggles in Kenya: i.e. secular civil society, 
opposition political parties and movements, and religious groups.  
 
                                                 
1
 These organisations included among others, the Kenya Human Rights Commission, the Release Political 
Prisoners (RPP), the National Convention Executive Council (NCEC), the Citizens‘ Coalition for Constitutional 
Change; the Catholic Church‘s Kenya Episcopal Conference; the Anglican Church of Kenya; the Presbyterian 
Church of East Africa; the Seventh Day Adventists, Salvation Army; the Methodist Church in Kenya; the 
Evangelical Alliance of Kenya; the National Council of Churches in Kenya; the Organisation of African 
Instituted Churches; and the Hindu Council of Kenya and the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims; the Kenya 
Women Political Caucus, the Democratic Party, the Social Democratic Party, Saba Saba Asili, Ford Kenya.  
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By the time the Ufungamano Initiative came into being, these three constituencies had carved 
a niche for themselves as critical players in pushing for socioeconomic and political reforms. 
This discussion will demonstrate how, at different times, these actors have come together in a 
unity of purpose but without necessarily choosing to be under a unitary identity, to push for 
state reforms. By analysing the nature of relationships between actors, the chapter highlights 
a series of ‗betrayals‘ by different actors at various points in these struggles. I argue here that 
these ‗betrayals‘ are products, as well as manifestations, of fragmentations within these 
groups (Currie and Ray, 1984). Such cleavages have served as opportunities but also 
constraints to the achievement of comprehensive constitutional reforms in Kenya.
2
   
Struggle cycles in Kenya’s reform project: background and analytic model 
Although the terminus a quo of this study is 1999, the phased nature of the constitutional 
reform struggles in Kenya, and their historical anchorage in the larger socio-political and 
democratisation struggles, dictate that of necessity, any analysis of the emergence of the 
Ufungamano Initiative must be nested within wider struggles. As such, while I cannot 
recreate the entire canvas within which the Ufungamano Initiative was embedded, the task 
for this chapter is, to borrow from Burawoy (2008), to place the Ufungamano Initiative in the 
context of the field of its production, its competitors, allies and antagonists, as these 
invariably shaped its emergence and practice. Therefore, while the thesis does not focus on 
the generic social movements and especially those in early Kenya‘s history, as it is an area 
where much scholarly analysis has been done, it is nonetheless, important to highlight these 
as they inform the nature of subsequent movements and their struggles. In so doing, this 
thesis builds on Tilly (2004), Wallerstein (1974), and Silver and Slater‘s (1999), advocacy for 
the centrality of history in explaining contemporary social political contestations. This 
illumination of history is therefore an effort to avoid a common pitfall of some analysts who 
treat social movements as ‗expressions of current attitudes, interests, or social conditions 
rather than as elements of longer-run histories‘ (Tilly, 2004: 8). This analysis concludes that 
the propulsion of a conglomeration of actors into the Ufungamano Initiative propelling it to 
the centre stage of activism for constitutional reforms is a product of its time. Specifically, it 
was a citizens‘ response to a conflict orchestrated by political behaviour of the state.  
 
A socio-historical analysis of Kenya‘s political economy and the attendant social struggles 
reveals three key interesting features relevant to the current case: the primacy of externally 
                                                 
2
 A necessary qualification here is that this refers to the period up to 2005 as it is primarily the concern for this 
study.  
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driven economic, social and political strains initially mediated by colonialism and later neo-
colonialism and global capitalism, as drivers of contentions; the centrality of ethnicity in 
social contentions; and the existence of elite consensus and fragmentation as a common 
feature of these struggles. Below I illustrate how these have played out.  
 
A) Externally induced economic, social and political strains  
European imperialism in Africa, mediated by slave trade and later Christian missionary work 
that prepared the ground for the imperial colonial project, heralded what Huntington (1993) 
while predicting the nature of future global conflicts, called the ‗clash of civilisations‘. 
Specifically, both soft power and brutal force were utilised in the establishment of the 
colonial state. Such brutality was central in the germination of substantial distrust of colonial 
state institutions that served as both opportunities and constraints for the emergence and 
nature of collective action. The effects of the colonial state still continue to manifest in the 
forms of associational life as well as the relationship between citizens and the state in present 
day Kenya (Maina, 1998; Gimode, 2007).  
 
The emphasis on state brutality as fuel for contentions is synonymous with social movement 
literature‘s stress on social dysfunctions, socioeconomic and political strains as generators of 
social contentions in societies (see for example McAdam et al., 1996; Foweraker, 1995; 
Scott, 1991; Habermas, 1973; 1979; McAdam et al., 1988; Buechler, 2000; Blumer, 1951). 
This formulation of sources of social contention owes its intellectual ancestry to the 
functionalist approach in sociology. Specifically, mass society theory prominent in the 1950s 
drew from Emile Durkheim‘s theory of modernity and anomie. It theorised social disorder as 
resulting from breakdown of traditional patterns of order and social control incubated by 
rapid or massive changes and dislocations in society (Kornhauser, 1959; Buechler, 2000; 
Foweraker, 1995).  
 
The mass society theory holds that: 
A normal or healthy society is characterised by strong class and group solidarities, 
which play the controlling function and prevent the manipulation of the people. But 
when this class or group solidarity becomes weak under the conditions of 
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industrialisation and urbanisation, the processes of ‗massification‘ (‗anomie‘, 
‗atomisation‘, ‗rootlessness‘) begin (Mamay, 1991: 47. Quotation marks in original).3  
This leads to a shared sense of either excitement or stress or anxiety or frustration (Buechler, 
2000). To adapt to these strains, elementary forms of amorphous, unpredictable and non-
institutional collective behaviour spontaneously evolve among individuals who feel 
insignificant or socially detached from the new form of society (Kornhauser, 1959; Blumer, 
1951; Buechler, 2000; Tarrow, 1998). As pointed out in chapter two, later theories in the 
study of social movements such as resource mobilisation and political opportunity no longer 
conceive collective action as psychological, but rather as political responses. Nonetheless, as 
this chapter demonstrates, the primacy of social dysfunctions in germinating social 
contentions and social movements throughout Kenyan history cannot be gainsaid. 
 
Historically, we see early forms of collective action in modern day Kenya to be responses to 
socioeconomic and political imperial occupations. In this regard, Maina‘s (1998: 141) 
observations are insightful. For him, the early Kenyan African associational life during the 
colonial times was predicated on a two-fold objective:  
To ameliorate the rigours of the colonial labour system on the one hand, and on the other, to 
preserve their imperilled traditions. On the labour question, the colonial government would 
not relent… the labour system was harsh. It comes as no surprise then, that some of the more 
radical associational activities in colonial times, African as well as Asian, involved trade 
unionism. Some famous names of Kenya‘s liberation movement (Bildad Kagia, Fred Kubai, 
Kung‘u Karumba, Makhan Singh, and …Tom Mboya) were all children of the labour 
movement (Maina, 1998: 141).  
  
B) Centrality of ethnicity 
 The earliest social struggles in Kenya emerged as a response to the imposition of the colonial 
state. These protests, as shall be illustrated later in this chapter, took a distinctive ethnic 
character in addressing grievances. Even after the amalgamation of the various struggles into 
nationalist struggles against colonialism after 1945, there were distinct ethnic, if not intra-
ethnic (family, clan)
4
 cleavages that continue to permeate Kenyan, and in general, African 
                                                 
3
 See also Buechler (2000: 27), who argues that the mass society leads to isolation, depersonalisation and 
alienation that result to individual and structural strains. Structural strain in turn leads to psychological, 
discontent, irrational ideation, and extreme, deviant, or short-circuited behavioural responses.     
4
Such intra-ethnic/clan and family struggles pursue valued social goods such as power to control, 
recognition/respect, economic goods (e.g. land, jobs). See Phillip Mbithi, 1974, Rural Sociology and Rural 
Development: Its Application in Kenya on his analysis of ethnicity, kinship and tribalism as well as power and 
leadership. These intra-ethnic cleavages are not of core concern for the current thesis. Nonetheless they are 
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societies. Several commentators offer various reasons for the primacy of ethnicity as a basic 
defining feature of African struggles. Two of them (Mamdani, 1996 and Maina, 1998) are 
particularly useful. Below I engage their arguments with a view to highlighting their 
relevance to the current study.    
 
For Mamdani (1996), colonial rule in Africa through a policy of institutional segregation 
resulted in racial dualism of two separate developments. On the one hand was a powerful 
colonial state with mainly white (enjoying political and legal rights) and a few Africans as 
citizens. On the other hand were separate native communities with unprivileged subjects of 
colonised people who included mainly rural based African peasants. This duality had an 
effect on the nature of social contentions that emerged. Principally, it divided African protest 
movements. As urban African city-dwellers started demanding for themselves the same rights 
the Europeans enjoyed, in the customary courts of collaborationist African chiefs in the 
countryside, ‗decentralized despotism‘ flourished (Mamdani, 1996: 23). I argue here that 
these dichotomies between the urban and the rural struggles remain a feature of modern 
Kenyan society. 
 
In colonial Kenya, developing alongside the nascent labour movement, which had a more 
urban and intertribal membership, was a cementing of the ‗traditionally, high trust institutions 
such as the family, clan and tribe‘ into sites for political activism (Maina, 1998: 138; Nzomo, 
2003). As Nzomo (2003: 186), argues, this was because of the ‗institutional exclusion of 
African associational forms and the failure of the colonial state to provide an institutional 
channel for Africans to express themselves and their grievances.‘ This is especially so, as the 
only opportunities open to African populations for any associational life until late 1950s were 
only up to district level. Districts had themselves been chiselled as ‗insular ethnic enclaves‘ 
(Maina, 1998: 143). This was for operational purposes of divide and rule (along ethnic lines). 
Nonetheless, the same were used as opportunities rather than a limitation to collective action 
mobilisation. The Mau Mau example, as do many other struggles in colonial Kenya, serves to 
amplify the fact that transformative resistance occurred mostly within ethnic groupings. The 
Mau Mau used the language of ethnicity to protest the duality of autocratic colonial authority.  
 
The colonial regime especially during the State of Emergency years (1952-60), further 
entrenched ethnicity. The intensification of the conflict with the colonial administration 
                                                                                                                                                       
viewed as impediments to deny Kenyans an opportunity to mobilise collectively across the different ethnic 
groups.       
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revealed what Berman (1990) refers to as the ‗two faces of Africans‘ in the conflict. 
Specifically, there were deep divisions between militant freedom fighters and colonial 
African chiefs cooperating with the colonial government who gave ‗orders to billet askaris 
(police) attached to their offices and generally recruited from ethnic communities considered 
dependable by the colonial government‘ (Maina, 1998: 143). This deepened ethnic cleavages. 
 
Maina (1998: 138) citing Berman and Lonsdale (1992), advances two compelling reasons for 
the centrality of ethnicity in Kenyan politics: 
[First is], tribe and ethnic identity [which] give groups a political language, ‗unites people 
over what to argue about; …provides the images on which they can base their ideologies 
(and) ideologies mobilize political support around social divisions….[Second is] people’s 
histories and identities [that] are encoded in their customs, as are their philosophies of 
power, justice and entitlements (emphasis in the original).  
 
On the second reason, Maina (1998: 141-2) continues to argue that colonialism‘s cultural 
assault on African traditional societies led to a second strand of associational life in an 
attempt to preserve African ‗traditions, often suppressed by the new [Christian] missionary 
teaching.‘ Moreover, the Church‘s (especially the Anglican Church) proximity to the state 
symbolized physically by the ‗erection of the bishop‘s house next to the governor‘s residence 
…created a perception among Africans that the Church was itself an instrument for 
buttressing colonial rule […a] suspicion that carried over into independent Kenya‘ (Maina, 
1998: 141).  
 
Quasi-religious and ethnic movements such as Gikuyu Karing’a (‗authentic Kikuyus‘) with 
its African Independent Churches and schools, as well as Dini ya Msambwa and Legio 
Maria, emerged soon after, to counter the cultural affront that Christianity had brought. The 
Gikuyu Independent Churches for instance, went as far as reworking the Old Testament 
theology by:  
Infusing their own Kikuyu creation myths and religious beliefs with prophetic and heraldic 
messages of the Bible. Their hymns foretold the coming of a deliverer, secular rather than 
spiritual, and reminded the Gikuyus of the special divine ordination by which Ngai, their 
[G]od, gave them their land and bid them never to surrender it …The Mau Mau songs 
illustrate dramatically the debt that the Mau Mau fighters owed to the theology of power 
churned out by these churches (Maina, 1998: 142. See also Nzomo, 2003 for similar 
arguments). 
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According to Maina, these quasi-religious and ethnic movements provided then, as they do 
today, effective counterweight to the State‘s hegemonic project of official histories that ‗have 
reworked the past to buttress predatory government, ethnic awareness and historiography‘ 
(Lonsdale and Berman 1992: 210 as cited in Maina, 1998: 138). Taking cue from this, one 
recognizes, as Maina rightly observes: 
Ethnicity supplies the grammar and metaphor of African politics, even for the middle classes. 
It frames the political and social demands that they make on the state. The African middle 
class straddles the twilight zone between individualism and communitarianism. They are not 
just members of a class, they are also sons and daughters of the tribe. They are held up as 
icons of progress and power, its emissaries at negotiations, and their exploits, the stuff of 
which fireside tales are made (Maina, 1998: 138).  
 
Generally speaking, Kenyan civil society has not been spared manifestations of ethnicity. As 
a result, it remains riven down the middle. The vicious wars at the National Council of NGOs 
of Kenya since 2002 are a reflection of this. This suggests that formal institutions be they 
civil society or otherwise, are not necessarily representative of popular social and political 
interests (Maina, 1998). Rather, they have been iterations of intra-elite struggles, an elite, 
with a cunning ability to impose a ‗national consensus‘ that reflect interests of dominant 
social groups, with only a few concessions to other groups in society (Mutunga, 1999; 
Nzomo, 2003; Mutua, 2008; Maina, 1998).
5
  
 
C) The role of elite consensus and fragmentation 
 An analysis of successive eras and interregnums of struggles for state reforms in Kenya 
isolates the existence of elite consensus and fragmentation as a common feature of these 
struggles (see for example Currie and Ray, 1984; Mutua, 2008; Mutunga, 1999). This has in 
effect ensured that the transformation of the state does not occur. Indeed, there is evidence to 
support a claim that while the language of reforms has been framed to indicate the need for 
fundamental changes in the architecture of the state and its relationship with the citizens, this 
has not been achieved due to the duality of elite consensus and fragmentation.  
 
Classic political process model sees elite fragmentation as opportunities for social 
movements‘ advance (see for example Tarrow, 1998). However, for the Kenyan case, while 
                                                 
5
 Reflecting on the constitutional reform struggles, Nzomo (2003: 203), as does Mutunga (1999) observe the 
hegemony of middle-class in the ‗constitutional reforms [because these struggles were] clearly engineered and 
led by an urban-based middle class composed of pro-democracy human and legal rights NGOs, religious 
organisations and opposition forces.‘ A critical question relevant to this study then is how these groups managed 
to do this. 
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elite fragmentation has offered vanguards of these struggles, further fragmentation and, at 
times, momentary consensus within their ranks, have resulted in derailing of the reform train.  
To this effect Mutua (2008: 117-8) notes: ‗the African state has shown a surprising ability to 
be impenetrable by the citizenry, a fact that makes its reform a daunting task. Invariably, 
even new elites who yesterday sang from the hymnbook of reform seem to quickly fall into 
the pit of anti-reform after they ascend to power.‘6 But betrayal and ensuing marginalisation 
of some social groups provide fodder for continued contentions, sometimes, outside of 
formally structured civil society. The next section identifies and analyses the key phases in 
Kenyan contentions since the colonial era with a view to showing the deep-rooted causes of 
contemporary constitutional reform struggles.  
Phases in the Kenyan reform struggles  
A mapping of the different pro-reform forces and their crystallisation into the Ufungamano 
Initiative reveals a long list of issues and actors in socioeconomic and political struggles in 
Kenya. These struggles have long roots in the colonial and immediate post-colonial socio-
political economy and governance. The rich and long history of popular struggles in Kenya is 
a statement of massive discontents on social, economic and political conditions that 
crystallised into social movements‘ struggles. For purposes of this study, I offer broad 
brushstrokes of the key factors that over the last century have generated discontents leading 
to emergence of resistance movements in the country.  
  
This analysis identifies at least six distinct phases in the struggle for political, socio-economic 
change that eventually resulted in a unified struggle for constitutional reforms in late 1990s. 
It is instructive to note that a historiography of popular struggles in Kenya broadly reveals 
many similarities with a Pan-African periodization offered by Zeilig et al (2008).
7
 However, 
Zeilig et al.‘s (2008) periodization can only be useful as a generalisation that describes the 
main features, issues, and how these harboured the embryo for constitutional reform 
struggles.  As such despite its utility for the African case, there are peculiarities of the 
Kenyan case that warrant a different periodization. Table 4.1 below summarises the key 
                                                 
6
 See also Currie & Ray (1986), Zeilig et al., (2008), Davidson (1992), Lamb (1975), Fanon (1967) for similar 
conclusions for Kenya and other African states. 
7
 Zeilig et al., (2008: 4-26) in a comparative study of African social movements offer at least four significant 
moments through which popular struggles can be categorised and analysed in Africa: 1) Classic nationalism: 
1945-70; 2) Critical nationalism and ‗IMF riots‘: 1970-1990; 3) Pro-democracy movements: 1990-2000; and 4) 
The beginning of the ‗fourth‘ period is marked by the ‗anti-capitalist‘ Seattle protests. Zeilig et al. (2008: 1) 
argue that even though ‗each period is more or less distinct, there have always been similarities in the 
composition of exploited and oppressed social groups involved in a revolt against those who exercised power 
and control over them.‘  
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periods, mobilisations, actors and characteristics as identified by this study. As the table 
shows, the land question has been a key concern throughout the phases. In this regard, 
Mathiu (2011) is correct in his invocation of colonial and postcolonial historical reasons 
when he opines: 
The land conundrum…started with the British at the turn of the last century. The Land Title 
Ordinance of 1908 declared all land, which was not under cultivation to be Crown property. 
Another 1915 law stripped Africans of land ownership, turning them into tenants of the 
State.
8
 
Table 4.1: Summary of the key Kenyan social mobilisations periods, issues, actors, and characteristics   
Period Key mobilisation issues/triggers Examples of Keys actors and 
movements 
Key characteristics 
Pre-1945 Struggles against the pacification 
for colonialism 
Land and livestock 
dispossessions, taxation, colonial 
oppression, education.  
The Giriama rebellion (1914) 
led by Mekatilili wa Menza 
The Nandi rebellion (1894-
1905), East African 
Association  (1921) led by 
Harry Thuku, Kikuyu Central 
Association (1936), 
Kenya African Union (1944), 
Taita Hills Association, Coast 
African Association, North 
Kavirondo Central Association, 
The Akamba members 
Association.  
Mainly tribal/ethnic 
grievances against 
establishment of the 
colonial state 
 
 
 
 
1945-1963 Land and livestock 
dispossessions, taxation, colonial 
oppression, jobs, anti-colonialism.   
Mau Mau, Dini ya Msambwa, 
Kenya African Union, KANU, 
KADU, labour movement 
(Kenya Labour Federation) 
Nascent nationalism, 
militarisation, ethno-
religious, labour, 
ideological.  
1960s Distribution concerns (land, jobs); 
ideology. 
Petty bourgeois elements, intra 
elite struggles, political 
opposition by Kenya People‘s 
Union.  
Critical nationalism, elite 
fragmentations along 
ethnicity, economic 
concerns and ideology, 
shifting alliances, political 
assassinations. 
1970‘s to 
1982 
State predation vs. opposition 
from within.   
Military and student-
intelligentsia, 1982 failed coup. 
Critical nationalism, elite 
fragmentations along 
ethnicity, economic 
concerns and ideology. 
1982-1990 Distribution concerns (land, jobs); 
ideology; SAPs; political 
pluralism.  
Mwakenya, December Twelfth 
Movement, Release Political 
Prisoners.   
Critical nationalism, 
ethnicity, economic 
concerns, ideology, 
political assassinations.  
1991-1997  Distribution concerns (land, jobs); 
ideology; corruption; SAPs, 
changes in global political 
economy; democratisation; human 
rights abuses; constitution change.  
Associational revolution: Ford, 
NCEC among others.  
Ethnicity, nationalism, 
economic focussed. 
1998-2005 Distribution concerns (land, jobs); 
ideology; corruption; SAPs, 
changes in global political 
economy; democratisation; human 
Ufungamano Initiative, 
Mungiki. 
Inter-ethnic, elite 
fragmentations, ethnicity. 
                                                 
8
 http://www.nation.co.ke/blogs/-/446718/1297198/-/view/asBlogPost/-/vi1txa/-/index.html  
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rights abuses; constitution change. 
Post 2005 Constitutional change, land, 
distribution concerns, Ethnicity 
Remnants of the Ufungamano 
Initiative; Kenya Civil Society 
Forum, Katiba Sasa Coalition, 
Sabaoti Land Defence Forces, 
Mombasa Republican Council, 
Mungiki. 
Ethnicity, religious 
divisions, Intra-elite 
contentions. 
 
The periodization adopted here is based on key epochs of the Kenyan nation. It is also 
important to mention that each of these phases has shaped the nature and character of 
subsequent struggles. In the following section, I analyse each of these phases using the key 
characteristics as well as generative issues and players, in an effort to offer a general 
understanding of the environment within which Ufungamano Initiative emerged. A caveat is 
however in order.  What I offer is a simplified summary for the purposes of showing the 
cumulative nature of the contestations. Greater in-depth analysis is nonetheless offered for 
the periods starting 1980s because these had direct connections to the focus of this thesis – 
constitutional reform struggles.  
The pre-1945 struggles against colonial pacification 
The reform agenda has been on Kenya‘s political lexicon since the 1885 forceful annexation 
of various parts/tribes of present day Kenya by Britain. The processes of establishing a 
colonial state, the ensuing violence of the colonial state in both physical and symbolic terms, 
nurtured the emergence and an enduring civic/associational life and even armed 
insurrections. Specifically, Kenyans‘ contact with European colonialism led to at least four 
different types of grievances that fuelled discontent. These were grievances against: 1) 
pacification to formal colonialism; 2) land annexations by the colonial state; 3) the 
integration of indigenous non-monetary socioeconomic systems to the global capitalist 
economy; 4) discriminatory colonial administration systems like the Kipande (the pass) law
9
 
and taxation.  These struggles, perhaps with the exception of Harry Thuku‘s East African 
Association formed in 1921, were mainly tribal/ethnic in nature. They ranged from violent 
revolts, trade unions, and even quasi-religious social movements opposed to colonial rule in 
almost all parts of present day Kenya.
10
 Despite their distinct ethnic constituencies, these 
                                                 
9
 Kipande was an identity document introduced under ‗The Native Registration Amendment Ordinance of 1920.’ 
This ordinance made it compulsory for African males above the age of 15 years to register and carry it 
whenever they went. It was meant to restrict mobility of Africans. It was extremely unpopular (Anderson, 2005; 
Elkins, 2005). 
10
 Some of the best-known examples of such early revolts include the Giriama at the Coast, who, led by the 
charismatic young woman-Mekatilili wa Menza, rebelled against British Colonial Administration and policies 
between 1913-14 (Mugi-Ndua, 2000; Orchardson-Mazrui, 1999). Other examples included the eleven-year 
(1885-1905) Nandi resistance movement against British colonial rule led by Koitalel Arap Samoei.  Another 
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movements converged on the fact that they were all against the impositions of the colonial 
state.   
Nascent nationalism and militarisation of the struggle (1945 and 1963) 
The period 1945-1963 is specifically critical in understanding how a negotiated independence 
and the resultant independent constitution heralded long struggles aimed at transforming the 
post-colonial state. The 1940s marked the first major transition of movements from tribal 
enclaves to nationalist mass movements. Like the rest of Africa, at least five different actors 
drove the wave of nationalist movements in Kenya (Zeilig et al., 2008). These were: the 
students and intelligentsia, trade unions, the Pan-African movement (which up to 1945 had a 
strong presence in the Diaspora), the co-opted African leadership (i.e. colonial chiefs), 
colonial settlers, and mass movements. Their roles are briefly explained below. 
 
The burgeoning Kenyan student-intelligentsia was exposed to their own kind through the 5
th
 
Pan-African congress held in Manchester in October 1945. Jomo Kenyatta, a Kenyan Pan-
African nationalist, was among its organisers and attendees.   In its ‗Declaration to the 
Colonial Peoples,‘ the Fifth Pan-African Congress exhorted intellectuals and professional 
classes of the colonies to:  
Waken to their responsibilities. By fighting for trade union rights, the right to form cooperatives, 
freedom of the press, assembly, demonstration and strike, freedom to print and read the literature 
which is necessary for the education of the masses, you will be using the only means by which 
your liberties will be won and maintained. Today there is only one road to effective action—the 
organisation of the masses. And in that organisation the educated Colonials must join (Padmore, 
1947/63: 7).  
 
This call shaped the anti-colonial struggles in the years that followed. Firstly, as Zeilig et al., 
(2008: 5) argue, ‗the role that African students played in these movements was crucial. They 
believed that they embodied the aspirations of national liberation and saw themselves as the 
liberators of Africa ―representing‖, speaking for, and leading the emergent nation.‘ Zeilig et 
al., (2008: 1) further argue that the ensuing period (i.e. after the 1945 Pan-African Congress), 
Saw poorly organised ...trade unions come to the fore of a nascent nationalism ... often under 
the leadership of petty bourgeois elements, notably the military and student-intelligentsia. 
This leadership...played a particularly crucial – but in many senses contradictory and non-
                                                                                                                                                       
example was Dini Ya Msambwa in western Kenya in the 1940s. This was a quasi-religious movement whose 
spiritual leader was Elijah Masinde.  Dini Ya Msambwa opposed the colonial government and earned its leader 
many years in detention. It also opposed the independent government after 1963. Its activities were thus 
declared illegal by both the colonial and subsequent post-colonial governments. 
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visionary role in national liberation. The political and ideological influences drew upon a 
cocktail of ideas ranging from Soviet influenced socialism, African nationalism and anti-
colonialism.  
  
Former African fighters who had taken part in the Second World War (hereafter WWII) also 
contributed to the nationalistic bonding as well as the militarisation of anti-colonial and other 
social struggles. While many of the movements behind these struggles remained largely free 
of violence, the colonial state always responded with inordinate force against unarmed 
people. A critical observation here is that again, contacts with the external forces, mediated 
by Africans‘ participation in WWII, where they fought alongside white colonialists 
contributed largely to the emergence of the armed insurrection as well as to the nationalist 
sentiments that galvanised and banded student-intelligentsia, labour movements and peasant 
revolts together in these struggles (Elkins, 2005). Many black Kenyans were recruited as 
soldiers, porters and scouts for the Allied forces during the WWII. These soldiers returned 
home to a colonial state that still considered them inferior. They had fought to protect the 
interests of colonial power only to return to exploitation and indignities of colonial rule. They 
became bitter and discontented
11
 with colonial rule fraught with systemic abuses and denials 
of social, political and economic rights for indigenous populations.  
 
The above-mentioned conditions produced widespread resentment and sometimes, violent 
protests that ultimately culminated in, among other things, the Mau Mau insurrection aimed 
at liberating the black population and its land in central parts of Kenya (Kanogo, 1987; 
Throup, 1987; Furedi, 1989; Maloba, 1998; wa Kinyatti, 1992; 1986). The Mau Mau 
insurrection, and the resultant brutality of the colonial regime after declaring a state of 
emergency in Kenya, has since become scholarly fodder for many. Commenting on the 
resultant declaration of the State of Emergency on October 20, 1952 by the colonial regime to 
suppress the Mau Mau insurgency, Elkins (2005: ix) writes:  
From the start of the war in October 1952, tales of Mau Mau savagery spread wildly among 
the white settlers in the colony and at home in Britain. Mau Mau was portrayed as a 
barbarous, anti-European, and anti-Christian sect that had reverted to tactics of primitive 
terror to interrupt the British civilizing mission in Kenya...While the Mau Mau insurgents 
claimed they were fighting for ithaka na wiyathi, or land and freedom, few people in the 
Western world took seriously the demands of these so-called savages. 
 
                                                 
11
 http://science.jrank.org/pages/10398/Nationalism-in-Africa-African-Nationalism-after-World-War-II.html. 
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The state of emergency was to last until January 1960. This period ‗witnessed the inauguration 
of the Lyttelton (1954) and Lennox-Boyd (1957) constitutions‘ to give Africans limited 
representation in both the Legislative and Executive Council (Maxon, 2009: 12). However, in 
both instances, these constitutions had been non-negotiated and imposed by the colonial 
regime. They were only meant to appease the agitating masses and local comprador class, 
while domination continued.
12
  
 
The Lyttelton (1954) and Lennox-Boyd (1957) constitutions failed to appease Africans and 
agitations for comprehensive constitutional talks to facilitate independence continued to be a 
key demand of Africans and their representatives. Subsequently, the first fully pledged 
Constitutional Conference was held in January to February 1960 at the Lancaster House. This 
produced what came to be known as the Iain Macleod Constitution. The Iain Macleod 
Constitutional Conference was ostensibly meant to map out future constitutional 
developments for Kenya.
13
 The reaction of the colonial regime and the subsequent 
concessions to some forms of self-rule for the so-called natives, were results of pressures 
from below. Owing to these pressures, internal self-rule was finally achieved on June 1, 
1963. Six months later, Kenya gained her ‗full independence‘ from Britain.  These 
developments serve to denote what some social movement scholars have theorised as co-
evolution of social movements and their targets.  As Oliver and Meryer (2003) argue, 
movements and their targets learn and adjust in response to each other‘s actions and in an 
effort to outmanoeuvre each other. Nonetheless the bottom line is that social change is shaped 
by such actions and counteractions between movements and their targets. Chapters five, six 
and seven illuminate how similar processes occurred through mobilisations by the 
Ufungamano Initiative.   
The immediate post-independence decade contentions  
The anti-colonial struggles succeeded to midwife Kenya‘s‘ independence. However, they did 
not necessarily transform the new independent state. After liberation, the new post-
independent political elites did not develop a satisfactory programme of socioeconomic 
reforms especially in regard to the question of land reforms. Neither did they challenge the 
                                                 
12
 The point I am making here is that a local comprador class was deliberately created by the colonial state to 
ensure fragmentation of native African opposition to the colonial rule by ensnaring part of the local Africans. 
This local comprador was made of ‗chiefs and headmen- outriders of the colonial administration [created and 
nurtured by the colonial administration after bastardising traditional leadership and authority structures] 
indebted [to the departing colonial power] because of the opportunities for accumulation and personal 
advancement that these positions offered‘ (Maina, 1998: 142-3. Italics my emphasis). 
13
 http://www.ski-pix.com/parliament/history_Steps_2_Independence.php 
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exploitative production relations. This ensured that Kenya stuck to production relations in 
world capitalism with her economy (a periphery) producing primary agricultural goods for 
the core (Britain and other developed economies). As such, the independent Kenyan 
economic script was no different to the rest of Africa. For ‗a growing and increasingly radical 
generation of Africans, independence was gradually being seen by the 1960s as a charade 
barely disguising the imperialism of former colonial powers‘ (Zeilig et al., 2008: 9). Frantz 
Fanon (1967) as well as Basil Davidson (1992), described such developments throughout 
Africa as ‗the African encounter with the ―curse of independence‖ characterised by growing 
authoritarianism, and corrupt economic aggrandisement of the political class at the expense 
of the nation‘ (cited in Zeilig, et al., 2008: 2. See also Kamau, 2007; Muluka, 2011b14 for 
similar arguments).  
 
Subsequent disillusionments were manifold. Looking at the Mau Mau struggles and the 
subsequent political developments in Kenya for instance, one comes to a disheartening 
conclusion that the personal sacrifices by hundreds of thousands of ordinary Kenyans came to 
nought. The main beneficiaries of Uhuru were Jomo Kenyatta, a man who despised the 
militancy and violence of the Mau Mau, together with a group of Western educated sons of 
African comprador class. The post-colonial Kenyan state has since been under the firm grip 
of this group.  
 
It is ironical though that some of those behind the betrayal, came to power from a strong civil 
society background. This gives credence to the argument that the African civil society is 
exhibits a particular dualism. It has both a pluralising potential, but has also been utilised by 
the state and power elites as a ‗vehicle for its hegemonic project, shrinking the popular 
sectors of civil society and sundering and frustrating democratic deepening processes‘ 
(Maina, 1998: 135). It is essentially this dialectic characteristic that makes the Gramscian 
                                                 
14
 Barrack Muluka, in an article published in the Standard on 08/07/2011 titled ‗As Africa welcomes Southern 
Sudan, there's cause to celebrate with caution‘ on the eve of South Sudanese declaration of independence, 
argues that ‗Africans know how to turn a blessing into a curse‘. He gives a compelling account of past liberation 
stories that turned out to be a disaster for the continent as ‗heroes of yesteryear reinvented themselves as the 
enemies of the people...There have been far too many false dawns in Africa... Everywhere, the parties of 
independence became draconian behemoths. They began trampling on the people‘s rights and freedoms soon 
after independence.  African liberators have confounding capacity to transformation into dictators. Even the 
very finest ... degenerated into dictators and megalomaniacs [or...] integrated harvester of wealth and property 
[who...] dared anybody to challenge‘ [them as they embraced not good governance and equal opportunity but a] 
‗political economy of negative ethnicity and exclusion...   corruption...vaporisation of citizens and detention 
without trial...‘ (Italics own insertions) Available online at: 
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/columnists/InsidePage.php?id=2000038593&cid=650&. (accessed on 
09/07/2011). 
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conception of civil society amenable to this study. It is important, however, not to quickly 
jump to conclusions that the new African post-colonial elites were just eager to embrace the 
capitalist economic model. A couple of factors came into play to ensure this outcome. First, 
the departing colonial elites ensured that their rights to land would remain unchallenged. The 
independence constitution said as much. The capital and land owning class (the white 
immigrant settler community) were constitutionally protected from any acts by the state that 
would undermine their continued land and capital ownership monopoly. Moreover, they went 
to great lengths to ensure that no real transformation in the new ‗independent‘ state occurred. 
In this regard, Bruce Mackenzie, a member of the colonial cabinet was retained as the 
Minister for Agriculture and in charge of land, in the post independent government. As 
already mentioned in chapter one, Mamdani (1996: 3-4) attributes this kind of protection in 
many of post-colonial African states, to the resultant dialectic of state reform and popular 
resistance that remains intact to date.   
 
Second, as noted in almost all African countries, the independence constitution was a 
compromise between the departing colonial regime and the incoming collaborating African 
elite (Currie and Ray, 1986; Bannon, 2007; Fanon, 1967; First, 1970; Zeilig et al., 2008). 
This left intact, the ‗bureaucratic state machinery that had been developed to facilitate 
extraction of an economic surplus, rather than furthering the needs of local welfare‘ (Currie 
and Ray, 1986: 47-8. See also Zeilig et al., 2008, and Mamdani, 1996 for similar 
observations on other African countries). This happened through protracted constitutional 
negotiations (in Lancaster House in 1960, 1961, and 1963), which resulted in what came to 
be known as negotiated settlements at independence. As such, critics like Ruth First charged 
that decolonisation had been nothing more than a ‗bargaining process with cooperative 
African elites.…  The former colonial … government guarded it options and …the careerist 
heirs to independence preoccupied themselves with ―Africanization‖ of the administration‘ 
(First, 1970: 57-8 as cited in Zeilig et al., 2008: 7).   
 
Independence also exposed the new independent state to the geopolitical dynamics of the 
time. In particular, the Cold War played a significant role in the mobilisations as well as 
demobilisations that followed in Kenya. The Cold War specifically played itself on the 
Kenyan domestic front as one part of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) party with 
the help of the skilful Thomas Joseph Mboya, the first Minister for Economic Planning and 
Development in post-independent era, pushed for continuation of the economic capitalism 
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model. Mboya ingeniously renamed capitalism ‗African Socialism‘ through the Sessional 
Paper no. 10 of 1965 that he aptly named ‘African socialism and its Application to Planning 
in Kenya.‘ Perhaps, this was to counter the true socialist camp in KANU.15 The Sessional 
Paper no. 10 of 1965 spelt out the economic blue print for ‗independent‘ Kenya. It offered 
governments‘ continued commitment to respect private ownership of capital, 
industrialisation, human resources development, and rejected the existence of a class struggle 
in Kenya.   
 
The Sessional Paper no. 10 also set in motion a project for ideological demobilisation of the 
trade union movement as well as other social groups that had been key actors in the fight for 
independence. George Gona is of the view that Mboya knew and feared the power of unions. 
He helped the Kenyatta state that he was part of, to dismantle all radical elements as a 
strategy for cementing the post-colonial state‘s powers.16 Article 128 of Sessional Paper 10, 
1965 that Mboya penned for example, stated:  
Strikes cost the national output, the workers‘ wages, companies‘ profits, and Government 
taxes. Wages in excess of those warranted by productivity increase unemployment, encourage 
the substitution of capital for labour, and lead to bankruptcies. In order to avoid these drags 
on development, legislation will be needed providing for compulsory arbitration of major 
issues not resolved through regular bargaining processes…. 
As a result, the KANU government was openly disinterested in fostering a vibrant labour 
union. It was Mboya, ironically, who had been from the trade union movement (Kenya 
Federation of Labour, and had been the General Secretary from 1953) who played leading 
role in neutering not only the labour movement in Kenya, but in dismantling any socialist 
ideals in the country (Okwatch, 2008). Commentators such as Okwatch (2008), Ng‘weno 
(2008), among many others, have offered varying reasons for this. I find the reason suggested 
by Okwatch (2008) a compelling one for this study. 
  
In an article published in the East Africa Standard on July 28, 2008 Okwatch implicates 
Mboya for having been used by the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Okwatch 
argues that Mboya was in fact a CIA agent out to nip in the bud, any ideas of socialism in the 
country. Mboya targeted the same labour movement that had nurtured and propelled him to 
national and international limelight. To support his claim, Okwatch (2008), cites an article 
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 I deal with the ideological cleavages later in the chapter. 
16
 Informal talks with this author on the September 5, 2008. 
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appearing in the June 1969 issue of the now defunct American political and literary magazine 
published in the 1960s and early 1970s magazine Ramparts, argue:  
The CIA programme in Kenya could be summed up as one of selective liberation. The chief 
beneficiary was Tom Mboya. … Both a credible nationalist and an economic conservative, 
Mboya …was ideal for CIA‘s purpose. Soon after, Mboya joined the CIA jet set, travelling 
around the world…on funds from such conduits as the Africa Bureau and from the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). ICFTU, which played a key role 
in Kenya‘s independence through trade unionism, was an aggregation of international trade 
union secretariats set up in 1949 to counter an upsurge of left-wing trade unionism outside the 
communist bloc.... The CIA allegedly funded operations at the time…. Initially, CIA‘s natural 
strategy was to underwrite Mboya and his labour federation as a force against Kenyatta who 
was considered not ‗sufficiently safe‘ owing to his initial deep socialist leanings.17 
 
As such, after independence, the Mboya and Kenyatta camp continued its systematic 
ideological assault on the Left using such policy documents as the 1965 Sessional Paper no. 
10 that guaranteed there was little room for social movement unionism. Studies of ICFTU 
and American Federation of Labour and Congress of Industrial Organisations (AFL-CIO) 
activities during this time, confirm that indeed, trade union leaders world over, were recruited 
to serve American interests during the Cold War (see for example Spalding, 1976). Arguably, 
due to his association with, and funding by AFL-CIO, IFTUC and CIA, Mboya was 
instrumental in reducing an otherwise vibrant and progressive social movement unionism of 
the Kenyan labour movement to business unionism concerned with only bread and butter 
issues of the workers. This business unionism left the Kenya labour movement vulnerable to 
their own myopic interpretations of social, economic and political issues, which impinged 
their actions. The Kenyan labour movement is yet to recover from this. Its co-optation by 
KANU in the post-independence era, further limited its ability to act as a progressive social 
force in search for the country‘s social economic and political solutions.18  
 
Perhaps the critical questions to ask are: why did labour in the immediate aftermath of 
systemic oppression through colonialism, relax and leave politicians without any meaningful 
opposition? Did the absence of political opposition undermine both labours‘ and social 
movements‘ ability to mobilise for ‗substantive uncertainty‘ (Schedler, 2001) to push for real 
transformation? I submit that a look at the Four-Cs (cooperation, complementarity, co-
                                                 
17
 http://africanpress.me/2008/07/03/revealed-mboyas-fatal-links-with-cia/  
18
 The Kenyan case therefore contradicts Munck‘s (2003) assertion that labour movements can be a ‗progressive 
solution‘ to the contemporary social economic problems.  
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optation and confrontation) model proposed by Najam (2000) might help us discern the 
nature of relationships between the state and social organisations in post-independence 
Kenya.
19
 Specifically, the confluence or divergence of means and goals between civil society 
and the state defined the subsequent demobilisation of the social forces that had been key 
drivers in the independence struggle. Furthermore, the nation-building project of the 1960s 
throughout Africa played a big role in these demobilisations as one party states were pushed 
as vehicles of achieving national unity. This required subordination of all other forces to the 
party. 
 
The end result was that the 1960s came to reflect a certain dichotomy. On the one hand, it 
reflected what Bates (1999: 93) describes as ‗the creation of characteristic political patterns; 
clientilistic and patronage politics, corruption, and privatization of public institutions.‘ On the 
other hand, these developments elicited serious intra-elite contestations – initially ideological 
but later turned ethnic, between the pro-capitalist and pro-socialist groups in KANU.  
 
Immediately after independence, ideological cleavages between radical and conservative 
forces in KANU
20
, the party that won the elections that ushered Kenya‘s independence, 
emerged. On the one hand, a pro-capitalism wing led by President Jomo Kenyatta and Mboya 
preached Uhuru na kazi (independence with hard work). This group, intent on continuity of 
the nature of state power, did not question or reform it. The Kenyatta group viewed the state 
as an enabler of free market economy and took an increasingly pro-business, and anti-
reformist stance (Mutua, 2008: 76; Odinga, 1967). On the other hand, a pro-socialist group 
that coalesced around the then vice president Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, and included Ochieng 
Oneko, and Bildad Kagia among others, pushed for the transformation of the state to better 
serve Kenyans.  
 
The pro-capitalists later known as the Kiambu Mafia
21
 ultimately prevailed in these murky 
ideological wars. They enriched themselves through massive corruption and flawed ‗land 
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 The literature review chapter (two) as does chapter five deal with this in greater details. 
20
 KANU had been crafted by the then major ethnic groups i.e. Kikuyu and other groups with close affinity to 
them (e.g. Embu, Meru) and the Luo. Its formation triggered some panic among smaller ethnic groups such as 
the Luhya, Miji Kenda and the Kalenjin, who, with the support of White Setters, formed the Kenyan African 
Democratic Union (KADU) to cater for their interests.    
21 
The pro-capitalist group led by President Kenyatta came to be known as the Kiambu Mafia as many of these 
were Kikuyus from Kiambu district where the president came from. These controlled the country and 
increasingly became corruptly wealthy, avaricious, and oppressive in a sea of ‗continuing poverty and 
deprivation for the masses‘ (Lamb, 1975: 84). However, there were other pro-capitalists who were non-Kikuyu. 
Some stood firm against what they saw as an immoral primitive accumulation by the so-called Kiambu mafia.  
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reform processes‘ that replaced the white bwana (master) with a black one. They became the 
new national black bourgeoisie and quickly degenerated into an exploiting class akin to the 
white colonial one that they had supplanted (Fanon, 1967; Currie and Ray, 1986). The new 
elites continued suppressing dissent and totally neglected the radical transformative agenda 
that had underwritten the fight for independence. The Mau Mau freedom fighters, who had 
earlier on, waged a war against these very issues, were shunned, neglected, and forcefully 
reminded by Kenyatta that ‗hakuna cha bure’ (nothing for free) in independent Kenya 
(Hansard, 04/04/2002; Mbataru, 2005).   
 
Looked through a political opportunities and constraints model lens, these developments 
sowed the seeds of disillusionment on Uhuru (independence) especially on the part of the 
masses, which saw nothing different after change of the Kenyan status from a colony to a 
post colony. This disillusionment was the mortar that cemented successive struggles. Thus, 
maintaining unity among political elite after liberation proved difficult. The key political 
contention was based on the framing that Uhuru had been hijacked. These contentions 
resulted in the Oginga Odinga led Left group breaking away from KANU to form the Kenya 
People‘s Union (KPU) in 1966. This was after Pio Gama Pinto, the de facto ideologue of the 
socialist faction, had been assassinated for what was said to be his Communist sympathies 
(Mutua, 2008: 76; Odinga, 1967: 287-8).  
 
The decamping of Odinga and others to form KPU precipitated a constitutional amendment 
(Act No. 17 of 1966) instituted by the Kenyatta camp to force Odinga and his KPU 
camaraderie to lose their parliamentary seats. Consequently, they sought a fresh mandate 
from electorates through what came to be known as the little general election of 1967.  
Thereafter, the Kenyatta regime became overly sensitive to dissent. All forms of protest and 
                                                                                                                                                       
Chief among these was Thomas Joseph Mboya, then the Minister for Economic Affairs who is on record as 
having suggested in Parliament that a number of Kikuyu politicians, including members of President Kenyatta's 
extended family, were enriching themselves at the expense of other Kenyans (Orengo, 2008). However, 
Mboya‘s criticism was almost hypocritical as he was the high priest of the capitalist block. As the minister for 
economic affairs, Mboya led the KANU government in ingeniously renaming capitalism ‗African Socialism‘ 
through the Sessional Paper 10 of 1965: African socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya that he 
penned. The paper spelt out the economic route that Kenya would be taking. It offered to respect private 
ownership of capital, industrialisation, human resources development, and rejected the existence of a class 
struggle in Kenya (Kenya, 1965). On the opposite side of the ideological divide, Oginga Odinga, Bildad Kagia, 
and Ochieng Oneko led the socialists. 
  
98 
dissent were met by strong state repression including mass massacres as happened in Kisumu 
in 1969, detentions without trial, and assassinations.
22
   
  
The creation of KPU as the supposed vanguard of a transformative Uhuru, and the ensuing 
state‘s response, particularly its 1969 detention without trial of Oginga Odinga and the entire 
crop of KPU MPs after the stoning of President Kenyatta‘s motorcade in Kisumu (Odinga‘s 
home area), marked the death of open contention based on ideological and opposition party 
politics in post-independent Kenya (Ng‘weno, 2008). What followed was the systematic 
‗tribalisation‘ of the contention. Both protagonists, i.e. KANU and KPU, were guilty of this.  
 
First, as Currie and Ray (1986: 48) observe, growing regional inequalities were translated 
along ethnic lines to exacerbate ‗tension between Central Province and Western Kenya 
…apparent in the split between …KANU and …KPU.‘ Second, the Kenyatta state portrayed 
KPU as a Luo party led by a disgruntled Oginga Odinga because KPU had a majority of Luo 
support and leadership. KPU also painted KANU as a ‗greedy‘ Kikuyu party (Ng‘weno, 
2008). This was despite the fact that each of these parties had support from different parts of 
the country. Henceforth, contention took an ethnic turn especially among the subaltern. Years 
later, events in the 1980s where majority of those opposing the Moi rule were mainly non-
Kalenjin (Moi‘s ethnic group) served to amplify deep rooted ethnicisation of Kenyan political 
contentions. This point also functions as empirical support for the argument made earlier in 
this chapter that tribe and ethnicity have been central to political contentions in Kenya.   
 
Third, the assassination of Thomas Joseph Mboya (an ethnic Luo,
23
 and one of the strongest 
of the Kenyatta allies during the ideological battles) on July 5, 1969 by a KANU youth 
winger, Nashon Njenga, an ethnic Kikuyu – did not help matters. The youthful and brilliant 
Mboya, was a man of immense international connections with widespread support across the 
country. He was widely seen as a serious contender to the presidency (Okwatch, 2008). 
Mboya‘s assassination was perceived as authored by Kikuyu elites close to Kenyatta who 
distrusted his power and influence. This was read as yet another plot by Kenyatta and his 
Kikuyu elite allies to prevent any Luo from assuming the presidency (Ng‘weno, 2008; 
                                                 
22
 Examples of prominent persons assassinated during Kenyatta‘s rule (1963-78) include Pio Gama Pinto (1966), 
Thomas Mboya (1969), J.M. Kariuki (1974). Those detained without trial included Oginga Odinga, Bildad 
Kagia to mention but a few.  
23 There are contestations on Mboya‘s ‗Luoness‘ as he was ethnically a Suba, a Bantu ethnic group that was 
assimilated by the Luo, a Nilotic group. Critics charge that Jaramogi Oginga Odinga appropriated Mboya‘s 
ethnic proximity to the Luo after he was assassinated to advance his war against Kenyatta and his Kikuyu 
tribesmen.  
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Orengo, 2008). Commenting on the effect of Mboya‘s assassination, in a film documentary: 
The making of a Nation, Hilary Ng‘weno (2008) notes:  
Within hours, there were riots and demonstrations in Nairobi and in towns and villages in 
Luoland. The experience of the KPU had given most Luo the feeling that the Kikuyu were out 
to deny them any position of political leadership. They had pushed Oginga Odinga out of the 
ruling party-KANU. Now they had killed Mboya.  
 
With Mboya assassinated, and the opposition KPU leadership detained, Kenya became a de 
facto one party state. This continued until 1982, when KANU pushed through parliament, a 
rushed constitutional amendment that introduced the infamous section 2A, making Kenya a 
de jure one party state and KANU the only legal party. This effectively criminalised any 
political opposition in the country.  I discuss the effects this had on Kenyan struggles later in 
this chapter.    
The 1970’s: State predation versus opposition from within    
The 1970s saw a continuation of the ‗non-traditional nationalism‘ (Zeilig et al., 2008). It was 
characterised by continued intra-elite political contentions against increasing centralisation of 
state power into the presidency, and the curtailing of freedoms of speech and assembly. 
Ethnicity firmly took centre stage in the contentions. There were, however, many cleavages 
and paradoxes within existing contentions.  
 
While there were some contentions against the Kenyatta regime, the new challengers were 
bereft of ideas for meaningful change (See Davidson, 1992 for similar observations about the 
African continent). This was because such challenges came from ‗mostly the same coalition 
of petty bourgeois elements who identified the problems of independence but could not 
resolve their contradictions‘ (Davidson, 1992 as cited in Zeilig et al., 2008: 3). By early 
1970s, only a few dissenting voices were left questioning state‘s failure to transform land 
ownership as the key driver of the economy and development. Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, a 
former Mau Mau detainee and a fierce anti-establishment MP, was arguably, the most visible. 
Kariuki questioned the ‗willing buyer willing seller‘ policy on land reforms adopted by the 
Kenyatta regime. For his troubles, Kariuki was assassinated on March 2, 1975 by elements of 
the Kenyatta government (Mutua, 2008; Mutunga, 1999; Ng‘weno, 2008).  
 
Kariuki‘s murder did not necessarily end challenges against Kenyatta‘s centralisation of 
power and his resolve to further push Kenya into a capitalist model. The mantle passed on to 
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what Charles Njonjo, the then Attorney General derogatorily referred as the ‗seven bearded 
sisters‘ who included the fiery legislators Mashengu wa Mwachofi, Koigi wa Wamwere, 
James Orengo, George Anyona, Onyango Midika, Dr. Chibule wa Tsuma and Lawrence 
Sifuna. This group, including Ms. Chelagat Mutai, Martin Shikuku and Jean Marie Seroney, 
were the only opposition left in KANU. The group carried its anti-state crusades in 
parliament (Mutunga, 1999). For this, some paid with detentions or escaped into exile, except 
for Sifuna and Mwachofi who continued being a thorn in the flesh of the government until 
they were rigged out of parliament through the infamous Mlolongo (queue) voting in 1988 
(interviews: Mwachofi, 27/09/2009; Gitari, 21/09/2010).  
 
What is also instructive in this phase is that after vanquishing their common ‗enemy‘, the 
now clearly hegemonic capitalist group turned on each other mainly on the basis of tribe in 
their competition for the largest share in looting the state. Furthermore, due to fears by a 
group close to Kenyatta on losing out in the event of his death as he was aging and clearly 
frail, there were growing frictions with calls for constitutional changes pushed by Gikuyu, 
Embu and Meru Association (GEMA) politicians meant to block Daniel arap Moi (then vice 
president), from ascending to power (Ng‘weno, 2008; Currie and Ray, 1984).24  
 
Ethnicity therefore continued to play a huge role as a key obstacle to realization of any cross 
regional/inter-ethnic movement (Currie and Ray, 1984). During Kenyatta‘s era, many of the 
so-called dissidents with the exception of the likes of Ngugi wa Thiong‘o, JM. Kariuki, 
Bildad Kagia, and Koigi wa Wamwere (whose differences with Kenyatta were ideological) 
were all people from other ethnic groups and mainly Luo. Despite a spirited campaign to 
prevent Moi from assuming office, Kenyatta died in office in 1978 and Moi took over. Upon 
taking over, Moi‘s main critics continued to be mainly from GEMA communities, who were 
now joined by their erstwhile ‗enemies,‘ the Luo. This illustrates that when it suits them, 
elites close ranks to face a commonly defined ‗enemy.‘ The above is particularly important 
for this study as it endeavours to establish the conditions that allowed the Ufungamano 
Initiative to emerge as a mass appeal movement across the different Kenyan ethnic groups in 
such a divisive environment. The study also analyses whether ethnic cleavages influenced the 
operations of the Ufungamano Initiative.  
                                                 
24
 Moi was saved by a decisive intervention by Charles Njonjo, then Attorney-General, who, ‗in a strongly 
worded statement, subsequently endorsed by Kenyatta himself … ruled that it was an offence even to ―imagine‖ 
the President's death‘ (Currie and Ray, 1984: 585).   
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The militancy of the 1980s 
This study treats this period as the ‗preparatoria’ constitutional reforms decade. It was 
marked by co-evolutionary Polanyi type ‗double movement‘ developments defined by 
heightened tensions and militancy between the ruling elite and dissident groups. The period 
was also characterised by intensification of elite antagonisms and dwindling of resources that 
political elites had utilised to keep themselves in power, i.e. foreign aid and economic 
resources brought by commodity (especially coffee) boom (Parsitau, 2008; Rono, 2002; 
Currie and Ray, 1984). The Moi state resorted to greater corruption, oppression of political 
competitors and any pro-change elements and the general masses, while at the same time 
flirting with ‗mass line populism‘ (Currie 1984: 570). 
 
The first wave of heightened tensions and militancy of the pro-reform formations were 
largely shaped by the events leading to and immediately after the 1982 failed coup. Further, 
available literature on the contemporary constitutional reform struggles in Kenya traces the 
origins of these struggles to the events leading to and immediately after the constitutional 
amendment Act No. 7 of June 9, 1982 that introduced Section 2A into the constitution, 
making Kenya a de jure one party state (see for example Currie and Ray, 1986; 1984; Ajulu, 
2000; Nasong‘o, 2007; Cottrell and Ghai, 2007; Mutiga, 2010). These contestations included 
intra-elite antagonisms as well as wider political and economic grievances centred on 
deteriorating political rights, and land tenure systems which remained a key divisive issue 
(see Currie and Ray, 1986; 1984; Kanogo, 1987; Throup, 1987; Furedi, 1989; Maloba, 1998; 
wa Kinyatti, 1992; 1986).
25
  
 
On the land question, its control and ownership system had by now become an instrument for 
entrenching political patrimony. While a majority of the masses remained landless, political 
elites led by Kenyatta accumulated so much land and also continued large-scale commercial 
farming in many highly productive agricultural areas of the country (Ng‘weno, 2008). This 
sowed seeds for grievances against political and economic elites. These grievances 
intensified to a point where in 1982 squatters moved on to some farm estates (Currie and 
Ray, 1986). This alarmed political and economic elites to a point the Daily Nation ran an 
editorial in June 1982 that among other things stated, that ‗land is so central to the political 
health of this nation that we believe that whatever else is occupying the centre stage in 
politics should be relegated to second place‘ (cited in Currie and Ray, 1986: 49).  
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 These authors place the unresolved land problem at the heart of Kenya‘s contemporary constitutional conflicts  
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While this was happening, the ruling elite moved to formally criminalise political opposition 
in an environment of growing discontent with the state and elites. On June 9 1982, amid talks 
of the registration of a new political party, the Moi/KANU regime rushed through parliament, 
a constitutional amendment that made Kenya a de jure one party state and declared KANU 
the sole legal political party (see Hansard, 09/06/1983). The effect of this constitutional 
amendment confirmed Franz Fanon‘s warning that single parties would be nothing but ‗the 
name, the emblem, and motto [and that they would be used to] immobilise the people [and 
become] a means for self advancement‘ (cited in Murungi 1995: 16).  Essentially, the move 
led to further erosion of basic liberal democratic rights like free speech, assembly and 
association. The state also usurped powers to clamp down on those who expressed dissent 
(Mbingu, 1991). Mbingu (1991) asserts that this made even members of parliament think 
twice before speaking up in parliament as the state continued repressing those opposed to it 
(see also Currie and Ray, 1986).  
 
What followed after, in the words of Ndubi (interview, 24/09/2009), was that the 
‗Moi/KANU rule became so brutal that the division between right and wrong was so clear. 
There was no grey area in between‘ (see also Atieno-Odhiambo, 2004). Such state brutality 
continued to fuel anti-regime sentiments. These sentiments were used to ‗mobilise popular 
opinions on need for reforms, and also in the development of common principles and 
understanding of what the constitution should be like so as to curtail the excesses of Moi‘s 
absolute and brutal powers‘ (Ndubi, interview 24/09/2009). As such, instead of the death of 
contention, the first major threat to the Moi regime came less than two months after this 
infamous constitutional amendment. This was in the form of a coup attempt on August 1, 
1982.  
 
Many commentators attribute the abortive coup spearheaded by non-commissioned officers 
of Kenya Air Force with tacit support of students
26
 and intelligentsia on August 1, 1982 to 
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 Students were seen prematurely celebrating in the streets immediately following soldiers‘ pronouncement of 
the toppling of the Government of President Moi. In the aftermath of the coup, the Government charged 
numerous university students (most notable being Titus Adungosi -a student leader who later died in prison, 
Paddy Onyango, Joseph Hongo, Maurice Adongo Ogony, Onyango C. A., Oginga Ogego, Francis Kinyua, 
Onyango Oloo, Thomas Mutuse, Johnstone Simiyu, Jeff Mwangi, Ongele Opala, Muga K‘Olale and Wahinya 
Bore) and as well as some professors for a role in the failed coup (Mbingu, 1991; Atieno-Odhiambo, 2004; 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2003). It is ‗important to note that prior to the coup the student community …was the 
only group to publicly challenge the decision by parliament to impose a one party rule by law in Kenya. The 
students organised several rallies culminating in the presentation of a memorandum to president Moi that called 
for a national referendum to ask Kenyans to decide on the one party rule‘ (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2003: 2).   
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dissatisfaction with the Moi/KANU regime (see for example Mutunga, 1999; Currie and Ray, 
1986; 1984; Mbingu, 1991; Kamau, 2007; Atieno-Odhiambo, 2004; Badejo, 2006; Mwaura, 
1997; Ajulu, 2000; Nasong‘o, 2007; Cottrell and Ghai, 2007). Specifically, these included 
increased human rights abuses, a generally ‗worsening economic crisis, and [deepening] 
regional-ethnic tensions
27
, open struggles over land allocation, and deteriorating relations 
between the Government and the University of Nairobi‘ (Currie and Ray, 1986: 47).28  
 
The Moi/KANU state nonetheless blamed the uprising on foreign ideologies and cultures, 
which was a euphemism for Marxism (Currie and Ray, 1986; Mbingu, 1991). Commentators 
such as Mbingu (1991: 14) on the contrary, argue that the ‗student struggles were not inspired 
by foreigners or Marxism,‘ but were rooted in Kenyans‘ material conditions and sought ‗to 
address the problems of dictatorship, underdevelopment, cultural dependency and state 
unaccountability.‘ As Kamau (2007) points out: 
Other than the announcement of the takeover by the Peoples‘ Redemption Council (PRC), 
four other things that … Ochuka [the Kenya Air Force Senior private who was the coup 
leader] mentioned were …the economy is in shambles…Government ministers have grown 
rich overnight…the KANU regime has impoverished the masses… and the decree of the 
immediate disbandment of the Kenya Police Force, and immediate replacement of the same 
by the Military.
29 
 
The coup had a tremendous impact on the Kenyan political scene. The political environment 
in Kenya worsened after the 1982 coup attempt. The irony of the attempted coup is that it also 
gave Moi‘s government a perfect excuse to be overly repressive (wa Thiong'o, 1983; Mwaura, 
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 Currie and Ray (1986: 47) amplify the regional-ethnic tensions stating that ‗the short-lived ―People‘s 
Redemption Council‖ … received extensive popular support in Nairobi, Mombasa, and Western Kenya.‘ 
28
 See also Kindiki, 2007; Zeilig, et al., 2008; Mutunga, 1999, Ngunyi, 2001; Currie and Ray, 1986; Bates, 1999 
all who converge on deteriorating economic, social and political conditions as harbingers of contemporary 
contentions in Kenya. Bates (1999: 93) for instance notes that an orchestra of ‗disequilibria in the markets, 
clientilistic politics, fiscal crisis and growing political disaffection…constituted the core characteristics of the 
African malaise‘ a phenomena that included international capital and the donor community imposed conditions 
that fragmented domestic bourgeoisie and introduced new pressures for change on many African states. The 
conditions were part of what the Bretton Woods Institutions framed as Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAPs) traceable to international recession of late 1960s and falling commodity prices of mid 1970s (Zeilig et 
al., 2008; Ake, 1996; Babawale et al. 1996; Momoh and Adejumobi, 1999). Kenya started implementing SAPs 
during the ‗1980/81 fiscal years…and did not become an important part of economic management until after the 
publication of the Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986. Since then SAPS have been integrated as policy tools for 
economic management‘ (Rono, 2002: 82-3). Nonetheless by 1982, things were already getting out of hand as 
hope and optimism evaporated with the economic crisis that followed the gradual slide into social, economic 
and political doldrums due to implementation of SAPs. I deal with the impacts of SAPs on the nature of 
contentions later in this chapter.  
29
 Accessed from http://kumekucha1.blogspot.com/2007/07/august-1st-1982-coup-attempt-unanswered.html  
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1997; Mbingu, 1991). Writing in 1983, Ngugi wa Thiong'o for instance had this to say of the 
coup:  
The August 1 attempted coup came as a God-sent opportunity for the regime to root out and 
silence its critics.  The same pattern of repression it had embarked upon has since been 
intensified and accelerated.  More lecturers and students and critical politicians have been 
arrested; detained without trial or else imprisoned in the same dubious legal circumstances.  
More students have been killed.  Many Kenyan Air Force members were killed or imprisoned 
after the coup attempt was crushed.  Now, American and British Royal Air Force personnel 
fly Kenyan planes.  More American and British advisers have been added to the neo-colonial 
think-tank of the regime (wa Thiong‘o, 1983: 2). 
 
While the coup failed, there emerged an extraordinary cocktail of social forces opposed to 
state repression. Most were underground movements like the Mwakenya and led mainly by 
the intelligentsia. The University of Nairobi continued to be an active arena of dissent against 
the state (Mutunga, 1999). A section of university academics such as Nana Tago, Micere 
Mugo, Kamau Kuria, Willy Mutunga, Ngugi wa Thiong‘o, Alamin Mazrui, David Mulwa, 
Kivutha Kibwana, Shadrack Guto, among others, were particularly instrumental in what was 
then branded as radical Leftist intellectuals (interviews: Zein, 07/10/2010; Kibwana, 
21/10/2009; Omar, 11/10/2009; Kibara, 15/10/2009). Many of these lost their jobs, others 
were detained, and many more went into exile especially after the 1982 attempted coup 
(Atieno-Odhiambo, 2004).  
 
Willy Mutunga‘s Constitution Making from the Middle offers a useful chronology of the 
developments of the subversions within the intelligentsia from early 1980s. According to 
Mutunga (1999: 2-3), when Moi banned the University Academic Staff Union (UASU) on 
July 19
th
 1980, their agitation resurfaced as an underground December Twelfth Movement. 
This movement published its first organ, Pambana (Kiswahili for Struggle) in May 1982 in 
which it declared support for armed struggle as Uhuru had been betrayed. Former official of 
UASU including Maina wa Kinyatti, Alamin Mazrui, Edward Oyugi, Kamonji Wachira, 
Mukaru Ng‘ang‘a and Willy Mutunga were arrested, jailed or detained especially in the 
months prior to and immediately after the failed coup (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2004).  
 
These spates of detentions did not end the struggle. The December Twelfth Movement‘s 
subversion project was inherited by another underground movement –Mwakenya, and its 
organ Mpatanishi (Kiswahili for Reconciler) (Mutunga, 1999; Currie and Ray, 1986; 
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Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2003). Mwakenya operated for several years until a major state 
crackdown on its members in 1986/87. The continued crackdown on dissenting voices saw 
the struggle moving to spheres occupied by professional associations who had so far 
maintained aloofness to political issues (Nzomo, 2003; Kibwana, interview 21/10/2009).  
 
As far as the professional societies are concerned, the Law Society of Kenya (LSK) stands 
out. The LSK, Nzomo (2003:187-8) writes, has had a chequered career. Up to the early 
1970s, the LSK was mainly dominated by Asians and Europeans and rarely spoke out on 
political issues. Instead, it confined itself to the welfare of its members. It is the increase in its 
African membership that brought about a change in orientation of its Council. From the 
1980s, it took an increasingly critical stance on the repressive activities of the government. 
Most importantly, it resisted government‘s unofficial policy of co-optation of all strategically 
placed civil society organisations as befell such organisations as the premier Women‘s 
organisation – Maendeleo ya Wanawake Organisation (MYWO) and the Central 
Organisation of Trade Unions (COTU) during the 1980s.   
 
Teaming up with the religious bodies, the LSK emerged as an important pro-democracy civil 
society actor from the mid-1980s (Nzomo, 2003). Kibwana (interview, 21/10/2009) 
highlights the drivers for these developments when he argued that this happened because for 
lawyers, there were many abuses on not just their clients, but on themselves too. Lawyers 
perceived by the state to be anti-establishment, simply because they represented political 
actors agitating for return to political pluralism faced the same fate as their clients – 
harassment, abductions, imprisonment, assassinations, and/or exile (see also Mutiga, 2010; 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2003). Major examples here include Gitobu Imanyara who had 
made a name representing soldiers prosecuted for their role in the aborted 1982 coup. 
Imanyara was also at the time publishing the highly influential journal-Nairobi Law Monthly 
that he had established. The journal was renowned for its outspoken condemnation of the Moi 
regime‘s excesses (interviews: Imanyara, 28/10/2009; Kihoro, 23/09/2009; Kuria, 
23/09/2009).  
 
Imanyara was jailed in 1987. In 1990, his prominent journal was banned. Leading lawyers 
opposed to the regime including Paul Muite, Kivutha Kibwana, Martha (Njoka) Karua, Willy 
Mutunga together with Dr. Gibson Kamau Kuria, Kiraitu Murungi, and Mirugi Kariuki 
among others were either detained and/or exiled for their advocacy. Under these 
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circumstances, it is easy to understand why motivations for the legal fraternity to join these 
struggles aligns with Tarrow‘s (1998: 56) assertion that bereft of a middle class as a buffer 
between the state and society, people become ‗self seekers practicing narrow 
individualism…the result [is] a jealous egalitarianism, sporadic and uncoordinated 
mobilisation,‘ that may ultimately lead to a revolution. Specifically, the treatment meted by 
state on perceived dissidents including lawyers and their clients, convinced them that ‗there 
was no more law to practice...life was not worth living anymore. So [they] decided to oppose 
these things‘ (Kibwana, interview 21/10/2009). LSK mobilisations further strained its 
relationship with the state. By the end of the 1980s the strain had reached a point of no return 
as LSK became firmly embedded in the democratic change movement (Maina, 1998).  
 
LSK also played a role in diffusion of the change agenda. It sought alliances with a section of 
the Kenyan clergy actively involved in struggles against further erosion of the political space, 
especially after the introduction of the 1988 infamous Mlolongo (a queue) voting system by 
the now openly intolerant and dystopic Moi/KANU. The Mlolongo voting system operated 
such that electorates would openly queue behind their preferred candidates (see figure 4.1. 
below) but not cast any ballots. The system was open to voter manipulation and intimidation, 
as voters would be threatened not to queue behind any politicians who spoke ill of the Moi 
political establishment. With Mlolongo, KANU dropped all pretences of championing a mass 
democratic party as citizens were coerced through intimidation and indoctrination
30
 into 
supporting unpopular candidates approved by Moi. In instances where electorates defied 
threats and intimidation and queued behind a politician of their choice who was not 
sanctioned by Moi, the direct outcome was a declaration by the provincial administration, the 
elections supervising authority in these elections that the candidate had lost even though 
he/she had the longest queues.  
                                                 
30
 Such indoctrination included instruments of state propaganda such as the ‗Nyayo‘ patriotic songs, the Loyalty 
Pledge, which had been tailored to ensure loyalty to President Moi with the words:  ‗I pledge my loyalty to the 
President and Nation of Kenya, My readiness and duty to defend the flag of our Republic, My life, strength and 
service in the task of nation building, In the living spirit embodied in our National motto 'Harambee' and 
perpetuated in the Nyayo philosophy of Peace, Love and Unity.‘ The patriotic songs have their origins to the 
colonial era when, according to Dennis Onyango (2007), ‗Kenyans, as was the case in many colonised African 
nations, came up with inspiring compositions that sought to remind the populace of its need to free itself from 
oppression.‘ Post independence, a Permanent Presidential Music Commission (PPMC) was established to 
nurture talent and facilitate research in Kenyan indigenous music. At the height of Moi‘s era, the PPMC did 
more than just what its mandate required. It turned into a huge propaganda machine responsible to composing 
numerous praise songs for the regime (For a detailed arguments of this aspect of PPMC, see Amos Ngaira 
‗Nostalgia of a groovy musical tradition‘ in Daily Nation July 13, 2011).      
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Figure 4.1: A picture of citizens voting through the mlolongo (queue) in the 1988 general election. Source: The 
Weekly Review December 5 1997: 4)  
 
The first victims of this gerrymandering were the outspoken ‗seven bearded sisters‘ 
mentioned earlier in this chapter (interviews: Gitari, 21/09/2009; Mwachofi, 27/09/2009; 
Odenda, 07/10/2009). There were also attempts to deny victory to several other key 
politicians including the then Moi‘s own vice president (Mwai Kibaki) and ministers like 
Kenneth Matiba.  At the height of this, Moi established a powerful KANU disciplinary 
committee that he used to humiliate other politicians through expulsions from the party. 
Given the fact that there was no other party, anyone expelled from KANU risked political 
isolation. Moreover, expulsion from KANU meant suffering at the hands of ruthless state 
secret agents.  
 
Among the notable clergymen who openly opposed this system of voting and other forms of 
state excesses was Bishop Henry Okullu of the Anglican Church. The Anglican Church, 
despite its earlier (especially during the colonial era) pro-establishment stance, had by now 
re-established itself as a voice of dissent against the excesses of the state (Maina, 1998). In 
the aftermath of the 1988 general elections, Bishop Okullu is on record as having said that 
‗75% of the members of parliament were selected not elected‘ (Gitari, interview 21/09/2009).  
Others included Rev. Timothy Njoya of the Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA), 
Bishop David Gitari (Anglican), and later Bishop Alexander Muge, Lawford Imunde, 
Manasses Kuria, Ndingi Mwana a Nzeki, all who were against the excesses of the one party 
state dictatorship by late 1980s (Mutua, 2008). Reminiscing on this, Gitari (interview, 
21/09/2009) stated: ‗we preached against the queuing system every Sunday until it was 
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scraped in 1990...they [KANU] were determined to continue the queuing system but pressure 
locally and internationally was too great ... The following year, they scraped section 2A.‘ 
 
The clergy at the heart of these struggles were not spared the Moi/KANU regime‘s wrath. 
Some suffered physical harassment and oppression. Some were defrocked and others 
murdered. Bishop Alexander Muge, a fierce critic of the Moi establishment for instance was 
killed on August 14, 1990 in a mysterious road accident en route from Busia in Western 
Kenya. Muge had been warned a week earlier by Peter Okondo, then Labour Minister and a 
KANU stalwart, that because of his opposition to the government, should he set foot in 
Busia, he would never leave alive (Menya, 2010; Press, 2004). Paradoxically, such acts 
hardened some of the otherwise conservative clergy. These repressions emerged as 
opportunities. For instance, in spite of Muge‘s killing, the clergy became more emboldened 
in their criticism of the Moi regime. It was this section of the clergy, together with radical 
elements in secular civil society and opposition political elite whose interest was establishing 
an even political playing field that incubated the struggles for constitutional reforms in 
Kenya.  
 
The tide started turning against the Moi/KANU regime in late 1980s when prominent 
politicians openly joined the clergy and LSK in calling for political changes in the country. 
Towards the end of 1980s, a general consensus started emerging among the older generation 
of politicians particularly former KPU operatives, academics and religious leaders that 
Kenya‘s ‗political transition from authoritarian, illiberal state to a more open society…was 
centred on the constitution‘ (Mutua, 2008: 99). By 1988, calls for political pluralism to 
embed democracy and transform the state were heard from many quarters.  
 
Despite the emerging consensus, the late 1980s are also significant for the lack of consensus 
on how best to carry out the state transformation project. In this regard, Mutua (2008: 99-
100) posits:   
Starting in the 1980s, two schools of thought emerged in Kenya with respect to the 
democratic transformation of the state. The first, whose adherents advocated for the 
legalization of opposition, argued for minimum legal and constitutional reforms to level the 
playing field. Its main objective was the capture of state power. The second school, prevalent 
within the emergent civil society organisations, called for a constitutional overhaul of the 
state and a basic reformulation of the purposes of political society. Although the two schools 
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formed the opposition to the Moi/KANU regime until 2002, their visions of reform sharply 
diverged beyond a certain point because of these fundamental differences.       
This lack of consensus is important in explaining the manifestations of the potentials but also 
limitations that characterised constitutional reform struggles when they took off in earnest in 
1990s (Mutunga, 1999; Zein, interview 07/10/2009).  
The late 1980s to mid-1990s: confluence of pro-democracy forces in the birth of 
contemporary constitutional reform struggles   
Vladimir Lenin is credited for writing in 1910 that ‗despair is [only] typical of those who do 
not understand the causes of evil, see no way out, and are incapable of struggle‘ (own 
emphasis). Clearly, the Kenyan pro-democracy advocates were not about to despair. As 
pointed out, state brutality emboldened activists and a pro-democracy movement started 
crystallising in 1990. The actual source of the push for political pluralism is contested. Rev. 
David Gitari, a key figure in these struggles for instance stated, ‗the debate for multiparty was 
started by Njoya on January 1, 1990 when, preaching at St. Andrews in Nairobi arguing we 
should be a multiparty state.
31
 Later, Bishop Okullu joined him. Then Matiba and Rubia were 
the politicians who started to vigorously oppose the one party system‘ (interview, 
21/09/2009).
32
  But religious leaders did not start struggles for constitutional changes. On the 
contrary, a section of the Kenyan political elite, students and intelligentsia, and some 
members of the legal profession were already in active opposition, even in the most 
repressive days. However, it is definitive that the debates for the contemporary struggles for 
democratization that mutated later into struggles for constitutional reform in Kenya were re-
ignited by among others, the clergy. The clergy‘s opposition to the excesses of the 
Moi/KANU regime after the 1982 coup attempt and the ensuing crackdown on political 
opposition did expand political opportunity as well as diffusion of anti-state sentiments 
among the faithful congregants that they ministered to (interviews: Gitari, 21/09/2010; Njoya, 
29/09/2010; Ombok, 24/09/2009; Weekly Review, 11/07/1997; 24/01/1997; 05/10/1990).  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the critical questions here are: what motivating factors enabled 
                                                 
31
 This information is corroborated by among others, personal interviews with Njoya (29/09/2009) and Ndubi 
(24/09/2009) as well as in works by Nzomo (2003), Atieno-Odhiambo (2004) among others. 
32 As shall become clear later in this chapter, the significance of Kenneth Matiba, a cabinet minister in Moi‘s 
government announcement that he was joining those calling for restoration of multi-partyism cannot be 
gainsaid. Together with other political activist, they formed the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy 
(FORD) movement. Despite the tribulations faced by leaders of FORD and the Kenyan masses who supported 
it, by sheer determination and a mix of different strategies including mass protest as well as the changing global 
political environment in the post cold era led to Moi‘s government giving in to all the pressure and introduced 
political reforms. 
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this crystallisation of the pro-democracy struggles into a constitutional change movement? 
What strategies did they use? What opportunity structures did they use? What form of 
framing did they use to elicit support? In the following section, I analyse the broad political 
opportunities and constraints for the emergence of pro-change movements in Kenya. I argue 
that these movements were essentially possible given the new geopolitical realities 
occasioned by the end of the Cold War. This saw an ‗ascendancy of a new ideological 
dispensation among Western donor countries that increasingly linked aid disbursement to 
good governance and economic and political liberalisation‘ (Nzomo, 2003: 189. See also 
Maina, 1998; Murunga and Nasong‘o, 2007; Press, 2004; Diamond et al., 1988; interviews: 
Ochanda, 22/09/2009; Odhiambo M., 01/04/2009; Ndubi, 24/09/2009; Kibwana, 
21/10/2009). Further, I argue that these developments should be read together with the effects 
of a near decade of neoliberal austerity measures implemented through SAPs on the Kenyan 
economy.  
 
Taking cue from Mkandawire (1999), I further argue that the twin push for political and 
economic liberalisation presented nascent prodemocracy movements with contradictory 
opportunities. Writing in 1999 on the then ongoing ‗democratic transitions in Africa‘, 
Mkandawire pondered over whether the ‗exigencies of globalization can be reconciled with 
the processes of political liberalization and democratisation‘ (119). He continued to wonder: 
‗how can fragile democratic regimes improve their prospects for consolidation at a moment 
when the distributive impact of concurrent programs of economic liberalization and 
adjustments may be highly contested?‘ (Mkandawire, 1999: 119).  Mkandawire  (1999: 119-
120) concludes: 
Globalization contains within it two contradictory effects on democratization. On the one 
hand, the ―opening up‖ of economies and societies, the political conditionalities transmitted 
through global institutions, and the solidarity from movements encapsulated in the notion of 
―global civil society‖ are generally supportive of democratization efforts in many countries. 
On the other hand, the demands of globalization, especially the erosion of national 
sovereignty and the uniformalization of what are considered ‗fundamentals‘ in economic 
policy, limit the range of policy options for democratic regimes. Those who hold the first part 
of the dominant effect of globalization consider democracy and economic liberalization as 
simply two sides of the same coin – the edification of a liberal order, a natural convergence of 
the processes that marks the triumph of liberal capitalist order and ―the end of history‖ an end 
of state toward which teleology has dutifully moved us all along. This ‗good things go 
together‘ approach is often derived from first principles, whether liberal democracy and free 
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markets always go hand in hand, since both processes entail the dispersion of power and the 
emergence of a bourgeoisie, both of which are said to be good for democracy.  
To demonstrate how this binary played out in Kenyan‘s pro-reform movements, I analyse the 
effects of Structural Adjustment Programmes before bringing into the picture, the changing 
geopolitics in the global arena. Before doing this, it is imperative to mention here, that 
economic neo-liberalism and political liberalisation originally fashioned by Milton Friedman 
(1962) as Siamese twins, was not a late twentieth century phenomenon in Kenya.
33
 
 
The effects of SAPs in the generation of constitutional reform struggles 
Economic liberalism grew from imperial capitalism. As already indicated, independence did 
not pose any serious challenge to capitalism. The Sessional Paper 10 of 1965: African 
socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya, that deceptive economic blueprint, 
promised respect for private ownership of capital. As a result, Kenya became one of the 
greatest allies of corporate capitalism and a regional hub for multi-national capitalism in 
Eastern Africa (Lamb, 1975). This type of capitalism was presented with a deceptive coat of 
social justice and equity. Paragraph 16 of the Sessional Paper 10, 1965 for instance stated:  
No matter how pressing immediate problems may be, progress towards the ultimate 
objectives [political equality; social justice; human dignity including freedom of conscience; 
freedom of want, disease and exploitation; equal opportunities; and high and growing per 
capita, incomes, equitably distributed] will be a major consideration. In particular, political 
equality, social justice, human dignity will not be sacrificed to achieve more material ends 
more quickly. Nor will these objectives be compromised today in the faint hope that by so 
doing they can be reinstated more fully in some unknown and far distant future [Italics, my 
own insertion drawn from paragraph 4 of the same document] (Republic of Kenya, 1965: 6).  
 
While the practice of capitalism deviated from this, as the country was ‗controlled by a 
corrupt and avaricious local ruling group,‘ who became increasingly oppressive and wealthy 
as ‗poverty and deprivation for the masses‘ continued (Lamb, 1975: 84), the state, at least on 
paper, continued its commitment to social goals by providing for some basic health care, 
education and many other social services. However, the 1990‘s saw major structural changes 
in the management of the economy. Donor conditionalities aggressively pushed through 
                                                 
33
 The Chicago school thinkers are credited to be the intellectual force behind the wave of economic neo-
liberalism from the late 1970‘s initially pushed in Chile and then by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan 
regimes in the United Kingdom and the United States respectively. Friedman (1962), of the Chicago School had 
earlier argued that political freedom can only come through competitive capitalism This neo-liberal economic 
agenda was later picked and mainstreamed by the Bretton Wood Institutions through the Washington Consensus.   
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Structural Adjustment Programmes required the country‘s economy to embed itself into the 
highly competitive global market economy, while simultaneously inducing growth and 
development in a volatile global political economy.   
 
Notwithstanding arguments by commentators like Williamson (2002, cited in Dervis and 
Özer, 2005: 90) that SAPs were ‗a fiscal discipline; a redirection of public expenditure 
priorities toward activities offering both high economic returns and the potential to improve 
income distribution, primary health care, primary education, and infrastructure‘ these policies 
failed to inspire much economic and social wellbeing for a majority of the world‘s population 
in the developing economies.  
 
Like in many other developing countries, Structural Adjustment Programmes in Kenya led to 
cataclysmic social and economic problems. This was characterised by an economic crisis, 
collapse of the state‘s ability to deliver essential collective goods and an increase in 
inequality, which destroyed basic social solidarity (see Evans, 2005; Duda, 2007; Esteva, 
1992; Forrest, 2003; Stiglitz, 2002). This crisis was further characterised by spiralling 
unemployment and massive labour lay-offs. Moreover, reduced budget support resulted in 
dwindling state resources and inability to buy patronage and to crush dissent. The infamous 
cost sharing in social services led to a near collapse of the public health care and education 
systems.  
 
Indicators of social economic wellbeing such as infant mortality and life expectancy started 
to deteriorate. As Ikamari (2004: 9) notes, analysis of Kenyan Demographic and Health Data 
on infant and child mortality since 1970s for instance shows that: 
Infant, child and under-five mortality rates had declined in the 1960s and 1970s but were 
taking an upward trend since early 1990s. This situation is attributable to a combination of 
factors, including increased poverty, adverse effects of economic hardships and cost recovery 
programs associated with structural adjustment programs, increased childhood malnutrition, 
decreased use of certain maternity care services, decline in the coverage of child 
immunisations, inability of the public health system to provide services, and the HIV/ AIDS 
epidemic.... (My emphasis). 
 
A select sample of various Kenya Demographic and Health Survey data is presented in table 
4.2 below to demonstrate the worsening infant mortality from late 1980s. 
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 Table 4.2: Recent trends in early Childhood mortality rates in Kenya (1974-1994) 
Period Infant Mortality Rate Child Mortality Rate Under-five Mortality rate 
1974-1978 64.1 44.2 105.5 
1979-1983 57.6 37.8 93.1 
1984-1988 59.6 31.5 89.2 
1989-1993 61.7 36.7 96.1 
1994-1998 73.7 40.8 111.5 
Source: Ikamari (2004: 10). Data compiled from the 1989 Kenya Demographic and Health Surveys (1989, 1993, 
and 1999).  
 
SAPs also aggravated an already spiralling debt problem and depletion of foreign currency 
reserves (Ikamari, 2004; Were, 2001).
 
Were (2001), using a time series data for the period 
1970 to 1995 shows that Kenyans‘ external debt rapidly rose from US$477.5 Million in 1970 
to US$ 4,412.4 Million in 1995. At the same time, the ‗debt-to-GDP ratio and debt-to exports 
ratio, [rose] from an average of 38.5 per cent and 121.1 per cent for the 1970-80 period to 
89.2 per cent and 268.2 per cent for 1991-99 period, respectively‘ (Were, 2001: 1). This had a 
negative impact not only on economic growth, but also on provision of social welfare 
services as substantial amounts of revenue went to servicing this debt. Table 4.3 below 
summarises the external debt figures. 
Table 4.3: Kenya‘s external debt stock and debt service. 
Year External 
debt (in 
million 
US$) 
Debt 
service 
(in 
million 
US$) 
Growth 
in debt 
(in %) 
GDP 
Growth 
rate (in 
%) 
 Year External 
debt (in 
million 
US$) 
Debt 
service 
(in 
million 
US$) 
Growth 
in debt 
(in %) 
GDP 
Growth 
rate (in 
%) 
1970 477.5 50.0  6.2 1985 4,181.3 621.2 19.1 5.1 
1971 497.5 52.4 4.3 4.9 1986 4,603.6 677.3 10.1 5.5 
1972 581.2 48.3 16.7 6.4 1987 5,783.7 691.4 25.6 4.9 
1973  844.7 65.2 45.3 4.0 1988  5,809.7 737.6 0.4 5.2 
1974  1,152.7 97.6 36.5 3.1 1989  5,890.1 708.8 1.4 5.1 
1975 1,290.2 151.0 11.9 2.9 1990 7,058.1 790.9 19.8 4.2 
1976 1,493.3 169.3 15.7 4.4 1991  7,452.9 719.4 5.6 2.1 
1977 1,658.9 326.0 11.1 8.1 1992  6,898.1 669.9 -7.4 0.5 
1978  2,173.7 215.7 31.0 7.7 1993  7,11.3 631.5 3.1 0.3 
1979  2,721.0 299.3 25.2 4.9 1994  7,202.3 880.8 1.3 3.0 
1980  3,386.8 433.5 24.5 3.9 1995  7,412.4 901.4 2.9 4.9 
1981 3228.2 485.0 -4.7 6.0 1996  6,931.0 844.4 -6.5 4.6 
1982 3,367.8 496.9 4.3 3.4 1997  6,602.8 669.1 -4.7 2.4 
1983 3,628.3 515.0 7.7 3.0 1998 6,943.3 611.7 5.2 1.8 
1984 3,511.5 578.7 -3.2 0.4 1999  6,561.5 716.0 -5.5 1.4 
Adapted from Maureen Were (2001: 3&5). Data source: World Bank (Global Development Finance [CD] 
2001). 
Explanatory notes drawn from Were (2001: 2-6) 
 The table shows a significant rise in Kenya‘s external debt for periods 1973-74, 1978-80, 1985-87 and 1990 
due to increased borrowing. The first (1973-74) and second (1978-80) periods coincided with the first and 
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second oil crises, respectively. These created a severe balance of payments (BOP) crisis and decelerated growth 
that forced the Kenyan government to borrow heavily from external sources. Moreover, a drought in 1980 led to 
more borrowing for food imports compounded by increased interest rates on international loans that raised debt 
service charges substantially.  The two oil crises were punctuated by the 1977 coffee boom whose effect was an 
abrupt increase in export earnings and therefore a temporary drop in the debt-servicing ratio in 1978. The third 
period (1985-87 and 1990) coincided with the funding of structural adjustment programmes by International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. 
  The decline in growth of external debt in 1988 and 1989 is partly due to debt write-offs (of US$ 463 million 
1989) and a decline in bilateral and private debt. The decline in the 1990s can be attributed partly to the negative 
net repayments and aid embargos/freezes in 1991 and 1992 but also to a slackened and conditional aid flow 
thereafter resulting in rescheduling for the first time in 1994 as well as a fall in the level of external indebtedness 
as the government resorted to borrowing more from the domestic market.  Of note here is also the fact that the 
debt burden also came at a time of severe economic declines that started in 1997. The Encyclopaedia of Nations 
writes that the ‗economic performance in the 1990s declined severely, and the average annual GDP growth rate, 
which stood at 6.5 per cent between 1960 to 1980, fell to 2 per cent between 1990 to 1999. In August 1993, 
inflation temporarily reached a record high of 100 per cent. Five years later, in 1998, the unemployment rate 
soared to 50 per cent. Both the IMF and the World Bank suspended structural adjustment programs in 1997, as a 
result of KANU's failure to implement governance conditionalities. 
 
The effects of SAPs were not limited to social services. Physical infrastructural developments 
such as roads were frozen while existing ones decayed into a sorry state of disrepair. 
Moreover, falling international commodity prices forced many primary farmer producer 
cooperatives in rural Kenya to collapse (see for example Ombongi and Kanyinga, 2001). 
Multiple ghettoes sprung up in all urban centres. The picture below clearly captures what had 
become of Kenya‘s infrastructure by early 1990s.  
 
Figure 4.2: A section of a desperately in need of maintenance road in Nairobi’s Eastlands in the 1990s (photo 
Courtesy of Antony Kaminju). 
 
The significant thing to note for our case is that the ensuing socioeconomic and political 
doldrums were perfect recipes for widespread Polanyi type ‗double movement‘ protests 
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against political and economic elites. These manifested themselves as popular mass protests, 
workers‘ protests and strikes, student‘s protests and a proliferation of social movements. 
Popular support for the Moi/KANU regime took a nosedive resulting in a crisis of legitimacy 
as various social forces emerged to challenge the regime. Besides ethnicity,
34
 which 
continued to provide some of the undercurrents for ensuing political agitations, students and 
the working class were the centrepieces of the emergent struggles. Their mobilisations and 
ensuing collective actions were therefore clearly counter movements against the great 
upheavals they faced. It was a time that also witnessed the resurgence of labour militancy 
especially from the teacher‘s union, the Kenya National Union of Teachers (KNUT). 
However, labour unions generally remained concerned only with bread and butter issues for 
their members. In doing this, a natural starting point was to question neo-liberalism.  
 
There is substantial literature mapping actors at the heart of these emergent struggles as well 
as providing insight into the critical questions of the motivating factors, strategies, the 
existing and created political opportunities for the pro-democracy movement in Kenya in 
early 1990s. These studies (for example Mutunga, 1999; Ngunyi, 2001; Press, 2004; 
Nasong‘o, 2007; Karanja, 2008) enumerate multiple actors including the clergy, students and 
intelligentsia, youth, workers, political and social activists, and civil society organisations. 
Common among these actors was their feeling that the repressive political regime and limited 
economic opportunities they were facing were not insurmountable. Citizens therefore 
mobilised as organised society and as social movements to confront the adverse socio-
economic and political issues in Kenyan society. This mobilisation coupled with their 
challenges to existing laws tended to put the state on the defensive and naturally attracted 
negative reaction from the state (Oyugi, 2002[4]).  
 
It was no accident that the increased thrust of economic neo-liberalism from the late 1980s 
witnessed a dramatic growth in the number of citizen groups whose primary mission was 
service delivery/self-help as well as protest movements (Kanyinga, Mitullah and Njagi, 
2007). Moreover, their capacity, scope, reach, public profile and influence increased at the 
same time (ibid).  This ‗associational revolution,‘35 as it came to be known, was in effect a 
                                                 
34
 Members of Moi‘s own Kalenjin community were perceived to be unfairly benefiting from state largesse at 
the expense of other Kenyans. As already noted, most of Moi‘s adversaries, arguably save for a few Kalenjins 
like Rev. Muge and Tirop Kitur, most were non-Kalenjins.   
35
 Lester Salamon is credited with the phrase ‗associational revolution‘ to denote the massive growth in numbers 
of not for profit citizens associations in late 1980s to early 1990s. See for example Salamon, L. (1994) ‗The 
Rise of the Nonprofit Sector‘, Foreign Affairs, 73: 109; Salamon et al., (1998) The Emerging Sector Revisited: 
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reaction to the many effects of neo-liberalism. Noteworthy here, is the fact that economic 
liberalisation pushed together with political liberalisation, fronted civil society organisations 
especially NGOs as the sponge to soak up the social costs of economic liberalism. 
Consequently, the welfare of the most vulnerable and dependent reverted from the state to the 
individual, family and community through these NGOs (White, 2003).  
  
Clearly, NGOs failed to soak up the social costs of market fundamentalism. As social distress 
resulting from the economic stagnation of the 1990s started building up, neo-liberalism came 
under severe attacks. A wide range of civil society organisations took up active agenda for 
advocacy on ‗right to development‘ as a necessity in the struggle to reduce massive distress 
induced by neo-liberal economic policies. Many started calling for the abandonment of neo-
liberalism and for the state to play a greater role in the provision of social services due to a 
realisation that markets or NGOs cannot solve development challenges. Prominent 
movements opposed to neo-liberalism included the Kenya Social Forum, Jubilee 2000, 
among others.  
 
As pointed out already, democratisation and the accompanying struggles were also heavily 
influenced by the changing nature of global geopolitics that favoured and funded 
democratisation struggles especially in the developing world. Below, I look at how this 
played out. 
Changing nature of global geopolitics and their role in generation of social 
struggles 
Wachira Maina (1998) extensively documents the relationship between donor conditionalities 
and democratisation in Kenya. As already argued, after the ‗triumph of western liberalism‘ 
and the fall of the Berlin Wall, donors stressed ‗both economic and democratic reforms as the 
overall goals of their aid programmes‘ (Maina, 1998: 154). This in turn ended political 
support that many repressive regimes (including Kenya‘s) had enjoyed for ideological 
reasons. The Moi/KANU regime‘s intransigence to calls for democracy, and the ruthlessness 
with which it came down on prodemocracy protesters in 1990 saw some donors resort to 
tying aid explicitly to political reforms. The US was the first such donor country to suspend 
‗balance of payment support to Kenya, awaiting further progress on a select number of 
governance issues in 1991 with Denmark following suit‘ (Maina, 1998: 154).  
                                                                                                                                                       
A Summary. Baltimore: Institute for Policy Studies, Johns Hopkins University; Salamon, L. and Anheier, H 
(1998) ‗Social Origins of Civil Society: Explaining the Non-profit Sector Cross-nationally.‘ Voluntas, 9 (3): 
213-248. 
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These developments further constricted the state‘s capacity to provide social welfare and 
security to citizens. This created greater opportunities for the nascent civil society and 
opposition groupings to continue pushing for democratic space (Nzomo, 2003. See also 
Ibrahim, 1997; Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999 for similar conclusions on other African 
countries). Nzomo (2003 citing Maina, 1998) attributes the immediate release of all political 
prisoners and repeal of the one-party law to the pressure that the suspension of the balance of 
payment support had on the Moi/KANU regime. Other analysts attribute the suspension of 
aid to the emergence of opportunities for movements like Mothers of Political Prisoners 
(cited in chapter two) and other prodemocracy and human rights movements to emerge and 
flourish (Mutua, 2008; Mutunga, 1999; Nzomo, 2003).  
 
Whatever the reasons for the suspension of balance of payment support to the Moi/KANU 
regime, it is clear that the mounting pressures from activists and the nascent movements 
coupled with state‘s reduced ability to quell mounting civil disobedience, forced the regime 
to finally cave in (Maina, 1998). In an extraordinary Annual General Meeting, Moi 
convinced KANU leadership to allow for the repeal of section 2A of the Kenyan constitution 
on December 19, 1991. This opened the floodgates to political pluralism and ignited several 
other significant political developments. A key political opportunity availed by the repeal of 
section 2A was the opening up of space for new forms of protest action. Consequently, by 
1992, calls for a total overhaul of the Kenyan constitution started emerging.  
 
While the repeal of section 2A of the constitution opened up some democratic space, it did 
not necessarily translate into fair democratic political competition. From 1991, in a desperate 
effort to maintain power, Moi/KANU government initiated or abetted systematic violence 
against pro-opposition groups in many regions of the country (Kagwanja, 2003; 2006). This 
resulted in further crisis of negative ethnicity and distribution concerns. Under state‘s watch, 
people were raped, killed, and their property destroyed on the basis of suspicions that 
different ethnic groups supported other candidates in the political competitions based on 
ethnicity. Massive dislocation ensued as many in the affected regions (mainly Rift Valley, 
Coast, Eastern and Western provinces) were internally displaced. The cycle of violence has 
repeated itself every five years during general elections. The 2008 post-election violence in 
most parts of the country was the most recent and serious. Based on this, some commentators 
conclude that Kenya‘s embryonic democracy has been confined to a ‗cold storage‘ 
(Kagwanja, 2003). 
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As a result of state sponsored violence, certain sections of the citizenry established covert and 
overt ethnic and generational identity movements as counter-forces to state sponsored 
violence against the targeted ethnic groups. The state, as expected, responded by declaring 
them illegal. This only served to harden such groups while most became clandestine and 
violent. Perhaps the most popular and one that refuses to die despite successive regime‘s 
assault on its members is the Mungiki
36
 made up of mainly Kikuyu youth (Kagwanja, 2003; 
2005). Others include Baghdad Boys (Luo), Chinkororo (Kisii) Sabaoti Land Defence Force 
(Sabaoti), Kamjesh etc.  Most of these groups became criminal extortionist gangs with the net 
effect of the privatization of violence (Wamucii and Idwasi, 2011). The emergence of these 
groups corroborates McVeigh‘s (2006) observations that crime and protests are symptomatic 
of structural strain. However, the propensity for groups to turn violent or into crime depends 
on how the state responds to them as well as the opportunities available for them to flourish. 
In this regard, Wamucii and Idwasi (2011: 196) citing Branch and Cheeseman (2009: 15) 
note: 
The emergence of gangs throughout Kenya in the 1990s was largely in response to economic 
rather than political stimuli, which formed the foundations for the privatisation of violence. 
The majority of gangs in Kenya evolved first because of the marked absence of the state and 
later because of the direct sponsorship of the state.… Many youth gang activities were geared 
towards providing some of the public services that would ordinarily be provided by 
government, therefore earning the groups the label of ‗shadow governments.‘  
 
But not all struggles turned violent. For example, it is interesting to note that pressure groups 
like Release Political Prisoners (RPP) did not turn violent despite the repression that its 
leaders and followers faced. The RPP was not alone in this regard. Many of the pro-
democracy and human rights organisations in the country remained non-violent. This may 
suggest that social struggles in pursuit of issues of distribution (land, jobs, etc.) as opposed to 
the more abstract ones of civil and political rights are more likely to resort to violence.  
 
It is also instructive to note that this should be viewed within the context of the state‘s 
significant reaction. Important to note for this study, is that outright political repression was 
not the only instrument that the state used. Other means such as legislations were also 
                                                 
36
 Mungiki is considered a neo-traditional religious movement and a vigilante organisation, which takes 
inspiration from the spirit and practices of Mau Mau (Anderson, 2002; Kagwanja, 2003; Pommerolle, 2006; 
Wamue, 2001). The name means ‗a united people‘ or ‗multitude‘ in the Kikuyu language. Many reasons have 
been advanced to explain the origins of Mungiki but they all point to it having developed in late 1980 to early 
1990s as response to the ethnic clashes in the rift valley (see for example Kagwanja, 2003; 2005). 
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employed. For example, by 1990, the state in an effort to control and regulate the activities of 
a large number of civil society organisations at the forefront of the struggles resorted to 
enacting the Non-Governmental Organisations Co-ordination Act no. 19 of 1990 (hereafter 
NGO Act 1990). This Act required NGOs to register with a central NGO Bureau ‗ominously 
placed under the internal security secretariat of the Office of the President‘ (Ndegwa, 1994; 
1996).  In the process of enacting this Act, Ndegwa (1994) argues: 
The government considered the need to control NGOs so urgent that the bill introduced in 
parliament was rushed through the required readings, debated, and passed within two days. 
The only other comparable legislation passed by a full house and at similar speed was a 
constitutional amendment establishing a de jure single-party state in 1982.  
Because of this law, the state refused to register civil society groups that it considered too 
adversarial. The new Act also forced the ‗NGOisation‘ of many social movements‘ struggles 
that wanted to operate within the law while criminalising many others.  
 
Another significant development relevant to this study was that donor conditionalities and 
suspension of funding did not just ‗force‘ the Moi/KANU state to concede some political 
space. As already mentioned, the tantalising embrace of civil society as an alternative to state 
meant that civil society became a key actor in donor politics of resource allocation from the 
late 1980s (Maina, 1998; Nzomo, 2003; van Rooy, 1998). This resulted in huge investments 
in germinating a civil society empowered to play a major role in poverty alleviation, 
governance, social change, and even ‗mobilization in favour of SAPs‘   (Mkandawire, 1999: 
129. See also Chole, 1999; Harbeson, 1999; Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999; Nyamu-
Musembi, 2005; van Rooy, 1998).  
 
These developments also led to a condition Maina (1998: 166) describes as Kenyan civil 
society‘s ‗donor aid addiction, fostering financial and, more perniciously, intellectual 
dependency‘ (see also Mutunga, 1999 for similar conclusions). This dependency raises key 
questions about contemporary Kenyan civil society‘s transformative potential (interviews: 
Odhiambo M., 01/04/2009; Kibwana, 21/10/2009; Omtatah, 31/03/2010). The critical 
question is: how transformative, can civil society be when it is dependent on funds from the 
same forces that masquerade as friends but who stand to lose should the very structures of the 
Kenyan society be reformed to be pro-people? Some previous studies have reflected on this 
question. For instance, in a preface to their book, Kenya: The Struggle for Democracy, 
Murunga and Nasong‘o (2007: xx-xxi) argue: 
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Some local intellectuals, activists and politicians simply lacked the critical sensitivity to 
engage this donor discourse without relenting on the noble goal of fighting internal 
mismanagement, corruption and authoritarianism, [while] others hoped to use donor demands 
as leverage to fight the Moi/KANU regime. But they failed to offer credible alternatives to the 
donor-driven agenda whose aims are not consonant with local interests and needs and cannot 
therefore be beneficial to local communities. 
 
Participants in the current study including Odhiambo M. (interview, 01/04/2009), Kibwana 
(interview, 21/10/2009), Omtatah (interview, 31/03/2010) Njoya (interview, 29/09/2009) as 
well as Timothy Njoya‘s key note address during the 2007 World Social forum in Nairobi 
titled ‗The Remaking of the Global Family (Jamaa)’37 concurred with the above observations. 
Odhiambo M., for instance, suggested that donor funds might have served as a subversive 
force against radical transformations of Kenyan society.  Traditional Western donors have a 
stake in the status quo in Kenya. As such, they have covertly and 
Continuously undermined the underclasses from organising on their own. This is why very 
many movements are quickly attracted and co-opted by the donor dangled funds…With the 
donor community, I have seen certain trends.  When movements become radical, they 
[donors] tend to be quite apprehensive…They do not want to fund any work that in effect 
‗radicalises‘ communities. So the question of resources will always be hindrance to radical 
transformations in society. Our struggles cannot continue to be funded by foreign donors if 
we expect to transform our society. Our struggles have to find ways of sustaining themselves. 
They have to get more grounded in the grievances of the people (Odhiambo M., interview 
01/04/2009).  
 
Another participant in the current study, Kivutha Kibwana, shares Odhiambo‘s views. 
Reflecting directly on the successful emergence of the Ufungamano Initiative, Kibwana 
(interview, 21/10/2009) stated: 
The Ufungamano Initiative was an offshoot of an earlier movement –the NCEC. Part of its 
emergence was because NCEC was perceived to be very radical. There was therefore a need 
in the view of the international donor community and the political elite as a whole, and not 
just the opposition, together with the religious groups, to kind of de-radicalise the contention.  
 
The above examples are cited to dramatize the constraints that the pro-democracy movement 
faced and which may easily pass as opportunities. This notwithstanding, secular civil society, 
                                                 
37
 In this address, Njoya, borrowing from Andre Gunder Frank‘s (1967) centre-periphery model of the 
organisation of global relations in capitalist production decried the global capital forces' ensnarement of post-
colonial societies in an extractive and exploitative relationship.   
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religious organisations, and nascent opposition political parties played a significant role in 
political socialisation and sensitisation of ordinary citizens. This was mainly through voter 
education programmes. These enlightened citizens were critical in turning the constitutional 
reform contestations tide in favour of pro-democracy groups as the reform message spread 
outside a small middle class coterie who up to then, had hegemonic dominance over the 
same. 
A constitutional change movement crystallised 
To understand how these struggles moved from the exclusive domain of the middle class and 
elites, one needs to look at the finite developments within this phase (late 1980s to mid-
1990s). The phase had two specific distinct sub-phase developments. First were 
developments between late 1980s up to 1992 and later, post-1992 to mid-1990s. The 1992 
election results in which Moi/KANU defeated a divided political opposition was a significant 
landmark in these struggles. The defeat of the opposition by the Moi/KANU regime saw the 
struggles fundamentally moving to change the rules of the game to benefit not just the 
political elites but Kenyans in general (Harbeson, 1999). Notwithstanding the question of 
whether these struggles were capable of pursuing a more radical agenda, they did in fact 
move from just agitating against political rights infringements to issues of inequalities in 
access to land, insecurity, jobs, healthcare, and education among others. This was possible 
because of the amalgamation of middle class and grassroots struggles. The joining of 
Muungano wa Wanavijiji –a subaltern slum dwellers movement– to the NCEC forces dealt 
with in detail in the next chapter, aptly demonstrates this.   
 
As shall be discussed in greater details in chapter five, another significant and related 
development was also the deepening of the fragmentations among the nascent pro-reform 
struggle actors. This was specifically highlighted in their diagnosis of the Kenyan problem. 
On the one hand, an emergent civil society formation coalescing around the Kenya Human 
Rights Commission (KHRC), Release Political Prisoners (RPP) as well as the Law Society of 
Kenya (LSK), called for fundamental changes in Kenyan basic law arguing that the national 
debate was not simply about political pluralism. This group saw the national debate as a 
search for the ‗most appropriate political system that would create the political conditions 
within which Kenyans can meaningfully achieve their social, cultural, economic and other 
related societal goals‘ (Mutua, 1991: 25 as cited in Mutua, 2008: 100). For this group, such 
change was only possible through the overhaul of the constitution because the then 
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constitution was, by its very nature, tyrannical.  After all, they argued, in addition to the 
multiple mutilations after independence, the original post-independence constitution was an 
imperial imposition, its framework was non-participatory, and was therefore not a true 
reflection of the will of the people of Kenya (Zein, interview 07/10/2009). On the other hand, 
a group, mainly of emergent political opposition parties and their leaders, whose greatest 
proponent included Mwai Kibaki, then leader of the Democratic Party, argued that what was 
needed to solve the Kenyan problem were well-trained technocratic managers to transform 
Kenya because the constitution was not that bad (Zein, interview 07/10/2009). From these 
two positions, we can clearly discern cleavages in the reform project. 
 
Despite these divisions, in May and June 1992, the National Council of Churches of Kenya 
(NCCK) organised two symposia that brought together different forces including some civil 
society organisations and the nascent opposition political parties to discuss unity among those 
who advocated the need for more fundamental constitutional changes (Mutunga, 1999; 
Mutua, 2008; Nasong‘o, 2007). While these symposia did not achieve their stated intent, they 
are significant for this study for at least two reasons. First, it was from the preparations for 
the second symposium held July 11-12, 1992 that the Coalition for National Convention 
(CNC), the first ever coalition of forces seeking a national dialogue on the way forward for 
Kenya after the repeal of section 2A was formed on June 17 1992. The CNC is significant for 
the current case (the Ufungamano Initiative) as it brought together many civic organisations, 
opposition political parties and individuals who were later instrumental in the formation and 
operations of the Ufungamano Initiative. Below, I cite extensively from Mutunga (1999) to 
bring home the import of these developments to the crystallisation of the constitutional 
reform movement. 
 
According to Mutunga (1999: 27-30), in the Coalition for National Convention‘s fold, were 
mainly unregistered (save for a few exceptions) groups with grievances against the state, and 
included: 
1) Youth and student organisations such as National Union of Students in Kenya (NUSKE), 
the Kenya Youth Foundation Movement (KYFM), Students‘ Organisation of Nairobi 
University (SONU '92).  These agitated for students and youth issues such as 
participation of students and the youth in the democratisation process and unemployment 
among others. 
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2) Workers‘ rights and economic justice movements such as Restoration of Workers‘ 
Freedoms and Rights  (ROWFAR), Matatu Touts Organisation, (MATO), Jua Kali 
Association, Matatu Owners Association (MOA).   
3) Human rights advocacy groups such as Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), 
Release Political Prisoners (RPP), Kenya Ex-Exiles and Ex-Political Prisoners 
Organisation (KEPPO), February Eighteenth Movement (FEM), Kimathi Funeral 
Organisation (KIFO), Kenya Anti-rape Organisation, Recompensation of Ex-Mau Mau 
Organisation, Stop Political Clashes Group. 
4) Democratisation and governance organisations such as Mwakenya, Umoja wa Wazalendo 
wa Kupigania Demokrasia  (UWAKE), Committee for Democracy in Kenya (CDK); 
New Approach to Democracy (ANAD), Policy Advisory Foundation (PAF), and Citizens 
for Good Governance. 
5) Registered and unregistered political parties. Registered parties included Kenya Social 
Congress (KSC), Labour Party of Kenya (LDP) and Kenya National Democratic Alliance 
(KENDA). Unregistered parties included the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK), Green Party 
of Kenya (GPK), Democratic Movement, and People‘s Party of Kenya.  
 
The organic emergence of these groups by Kenyans from different walks of life, all victims 
of various forms of injustice perpetrated by the state, is testament to the deep-rooted anxieties 
experienced at different socioeconomic strata. Common among these struggles was a shared 
‗systems of reference‘ (Melucci 1989) in the form of a collective outrage over an 
economically predatory and anti-democratic state that they wanted to change (interviews: 
Khairallah, 26/09/2009; Lamba, 23/10/2009; Ndubi, 24/09/2009; Zein, 07/10/2009).  
 
The Coalition for National Convention experiment stagnated and did not take off because of 
a lack of decisive leadership and deep-rooted divisions between the two pro-reform 
groupings – civil society and the political parties (Mutunga, 1999). Moreover, the Coalition 
for National Convention failed to attract support from mainstream opposition parties and 
religious organisations who, even though part of the national symposia (religious groups had 
in fact organised the symposia), were ‗horrified‘ with CNC‘s radical agenda of demands for a 
total overhaul of the political, economic and social fibre of the nation (Mutunga, 1999). For 
political parties and mainstream religious groups, the only reforms they were interested in 
were those that ensured free elections that would ensure state capture for them. These 
developments clearly confirm arguments advanced by Mutunga (1999), Maina (1998), 
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Nzomo (2003), Katumanga (1999), Murunga and Nasong‘o (2007), among others. 
Specifically, these authors argue that:  
[There was a] conspiracy by political parties to confine constitutional changes to contestations 
of political power [… because] a new social order [that the CNC advocated for...] would 
inhibit the winning political parties from inheriting the machinery of violence and power 
reflected by the presidential authoritarianism seemed unacceptable to opposition political 
parties (Mutunga, 1999: 35).  
Instead of joining the Coalition for National Convention, mainstream religious groups‘ 
initiatives, in particular the Catholic Church‘s Justice and Peace Commission project and the 
National Council of Churches of Kenya led processes, together with the mainstream 
opposition parties, formed the National Ecumenical Election Programme. 
 
The formation of National Ecumenical Election Programme pointed to the fact that these 
major forces in the politics of the day were content with the constitutional status quo. At the 
time, Muslim leadership, with notable exception of the very active Islamic Party of Kenya 
(which the government had refused to register), and the Hindu community, were generally 
indifferent to the constitutional change project (interviews: Wandati, 17/11/2009; Lamba, 
23/10/2009). Pentecostal churches had been on the side of the Moi/KANU state and 
vehemently opposed to both religious and secular challenges to the state (Karanja, 2008; 
interviews: Gitari, 21/09/2009; Ndubi, 24/09/2009).   
 
Notwithstanding the above observations, the Coalition for National Convention dialogues, 
though short-lived, were opportunities for those congregating around the idea that Kenya 
needed a radical constitutional reform to vigorously contribute to these debates, and in the 
process, sowed the seeds for ensuing constitutional reform struggles. More fundamentally, as 
it retreated to oblivion in early 1993 after the 1992 general election, the Coalition for 
National Convention‘s agenda was bequeathed to its various successors, some of them from 
constituencies that had opposed CNC‘s call to overhaul the constitution.  One such 
constituency was the Catholic Church‘s Kenya Episcopal Conference, which in March 1994 
issued a pastoral letter calling for a new constitution to reflect the new multiparty reality in 
Kenya.   
 
It is however, the Kenya Human Rights Commission‘s Model Constitution project that is 
singled out as the real heir of Coalition for National Convention and whose efforts kept the 
constitutional reform struggles' ship on course. The Model Constitution project brought 
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together a steering committee made up of the Law Society of Kenya, the International 
Commission of Jurists, and Kenya Human Rights Commission, in the drafting of a Proposed 
Model Constitution as well as in organising a series of three consultative workshops between 
1993 and 1994 culminating in the launch of a printed Proposal for a Model Constitution on 
November 3 1994 at Ufungamano House (Mutunga, 1999). According to Mutunga (1999: 
56), the successful launch and the ‗popularisation of the [Proposal for a Model Constitution] 
was deeper than had been anticipated.‘ Copies of the document were reproduced, distributed 
and even sold in the streets for one hundred Kenya Shillings by some unknown 
entrepreneurs. These unknown entrepreneurs, Mutunga argues, provided a sense that there 
was broader public interest for the constitution reform project and not just the few people and 
organisations that had invested in its production.  
 
For the Model Constitution project, this was therefore an opportunity to broaden the 
constituency interested in the search for a new constitution. This broadening happened 
through the Constitutional Caucus held on December 9, 1994 again at the Ufungamano 
House. The Caucus with 634 individual and organisational invitations had 217 exclusively 
middle class civil society and religious organisations representatives in attendance (Mutunga, 
1999). Apart from the conspicuous absence of lower classes, women, Muslims, the youth and 
cooperative movements were not invited. Also notably absent were politicians as only four 
MPs and one civic leader attended despite an open invitation extended to all of them.  
 
The Constitutional Caucus had a significant impact in the crystallisation of the agitation for a 
new constitution. According to Mutunga (1999: 59) an intervention by Bishop John Njue of 
the Catholic Diocese of Embu and the Deputy Chair of the Episcopal Conference of Catholic 
Bishops brought home to the gathered middle class Kenyans, ‗the essence and spirit of the 
new Constitution if it were to be relevant to the survival of the nation.‘ For Mutunga (ibid) 
Njue registered a sense of moral outrage and spoke for many absent Kenyans when he said: 
We cannot be blind to the sad situations that surround us. As we sit here…there are people 
suffering …in the various parts of the country…living in sub-human conditions…without 
shelter…citizens …deprived of their rightfully acquired lands and have had their property 
destroyed…people in this country… in daily search for employment which they never find… 
people …who do not know where they will get their next meal. Our city and towns are 
teaming with street children. It is not a secret any longer that corruption is the order of the 
day…. Do you need to be told that insecurity is rampant?  Am I the only one who wonders 
why some elected leaders cannot meet their constituents …simply because they are in the 
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opposition? [For] how long must Kenyans continue to pay debts they never even participated 
in borrowing? [For] how long must we stand and watch our cultural and religious moral 
values be[ing] eroded by the Western World with the consent of our government? (cited in 
Mutunga, 1999: 59-60).         
 
Njue further underscored the ‗God-given right‘ of the Kenyan people to make their own 
constitution and as such supported the draft Proposal for a Model Constitution calling it a 
skeleton that needed some flesh to be added to it. His interventions received widespread 
support from other participants such as the Methodist Church, a section of the media, sections 
of labour movement, students‘ movement, NGOs and some political parties. According to 
Mutunga (1999), the Caucus confirmed that more work was needed to market the 
constitution-making project through even wider consultations. Njue‘s contributions, which 
will be highlighted in the next chapter, are an empirical confirmation to the theoretical 
underpinnings of the role leadership plays in a movement‘s emergence. Specifically, it points 
to the relevance of contributions of men and women with the gift of gab and illustrated by a 
sense of conviction that, things can be different and the status quo needs to be challenged. It 
also points to how the creation of counter hegemony was possible.  
 
Following the December 1994 caucus, the constitution-making idea gained some traction. 
This was because of an overwhelming endorsement by a variety of middle class civil society 
and religious actors (Mutunga, 1999). 1995 started on a great note. Firstly, on New Years‘ 
eve, Moi, a politician with an instinct for not underrating his opponents, made a surprise 
announcement that Kenya needed a new constitution. He outlined how he wanted this 
achieved. He told the Kenyan people that his government would invite foreign experts to 
collect views from Kenyans, draft a constitution and hand over the draft to parliament for 
debate and ratification (Mutua, 2008). In this announcement, Moi made it clear that if the 
review were to happen, it had to be something he had to control and determine its outcome.   
 
Another development was that the steering committee of the Proposed Model Constitution 
project in a meeting on January 6, 1995 renamed the project as Citizens‘ Coalition for 
Constitutional Change (4Cs) (Mutunga 1999; 4Cs, 1995). Its structure was expanded to 
include four co-chairs drawn from the Catholic Church, Protestant Churches – mainly the 
NCCK affiliated ones, women‘s and professional organisations, to accommodate the new 
developments (Mutunga, 1999). The crucial role played by these groups in the emergence of 
the Ufungamano Initiative is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.   
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The 1995 New Year‘s announcement by Moi incensed the constitutional reform activists 
drawn from civil society and religious groups because they felt the president and KANU 
were insensitive to the demands for popular participation of the Kenyan people. This would 
soon open new frontiers for contention. The succeeding chapters of this thesis discuss in 
greater detail, the inviolability of the fundamental principle of citizens to write their own 
constitution. This remained one of the key pillars driving the contentions in the Kenyan 
constitutional reform project. Moi‘s announcement, however, turned out to be just hot air 
meant to steal thunder from middle class civil society groups coalescing around the 4Cs, and 
their published Proposal for a Model Constitution that had captured a lot of public 
imagination. Nonetheless, his 1995 New Year announcement was also a welcome political 
opportunity to mobilise for greater interest and participation of Kenyan citizens in a 
constitution reform project whose dawn seemed in sight. More importantly, the 
announcement also offered an opportunity for the nascent movement to utilise what Keck and 
Sikkink (1998), refer to as ‗accountability politics‘ when Moi reneged on his promises to the 
nation.
38
 This therefore may explain the escalation of militancy in the push for a new 
constitution that distinctly marked the next phase of the struggle.  
 
Of significance here, and as shall be shown below, is that despite public pronouncements and 
promises to the nation, Moi and KANU spent the next two years tarnishing the idea of a 
comprehensive constitutional review. The following year (1997), 4Cs convened what came to 
be known as the National Convention Assembly (NCA). The NCA had brought together over 
500 individuals from different civil society, social movements and political organisations 
(except KANU) at Limuru in April 1997 and gave birth to the National Convention 
Executive Council (NCEC) as NCA‘s executive implementation organ (Mutua, 2008; 
Mutunga, 1999).  NCEC took the Moi/KANU regime head-on, through mass action and 
political sensitizations to mobilise for reforms before the December 1997 general election. 
These mass protests threatened to derail general elections.  
 
                                                 
38
 According to Keck and Sikkink (1998: 22-24) there are at least four political strategies that activists use to 
make their campaigns and struggles effective and ensure clarity, potency and dramatic appeal: 1) Information 
Politics: The ability of a movement to quickly and credibly generate politically usable information and using it 
where it will have the most impact; 2) Symbolic Politics: identifying and providing convincing explanations for 
powerful symbolic events; 3) Leverage Politics: mobilisation of targets to hold up to the scrutiny of peers, 
thereby exerting moral leverage on the assumption that governments and other targets, value the good opinion 
of others; 4) Accountability Politics: social movements try to convince their targeted actors to publicly change 
their positions on issues. This also happens through exposing the differences between the talk from the walk.  
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Ultimately, the Moi government was forced to concede some space through minimum 
electoral law reforms. In an effort to arrest the NCEC‘s wave of militant protests that were 
gaining ground, Moi invited religious leaders and opposition political parties (but not the 
NCEC), for dialogue through what came to be known as the Inter-Parliamentary Political 
Parties Group (IPPG). This resulted in the infamous IPPG agreement of 1997.  The events 
and actors in these developments are dealt with in greater detail in the discussions in the next 
phase. Critically important for this analysis, is that the IPPG agreed to set up a commission to 
review the constitution. The subsequent Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC) 
Act of 1997 formally ushered in the Review Process (Kindiki, 2007).  
The political ping pong of mid 1990s to 2005 
This phase was characterised by intensification of the struggles for constitutional reforms 
through mass actions beginning in mid-1990s. More forces became sympathetic to the 4Cs 
constitutional reforms agenda as a manifestation of their protest against the downward spiral 
of the economy (already cited in the discussion in the previous phase), as well as against 
Moi/KANU state‘s continued suppression of dissent and opposition to reforms. The 4Cs also 
took its task seriously and wanted to bring together Kenyans to discuss and write the 
constitution they desired. To do this, 4Cs started several projects. The first of such projects 
was the popularisation of the Proposal for a Model Constitution. In Mutunga‘s (1999) 
account, 4Cs was at the beginning acutely aware that the Proposal for a Model Constitution, 
because of the conspicuous absence of many of the social groups, was a reflection of the 
voices of the Kenyan male middle class and not necessarily a consensus of all dominant 
social forces. As such, it actively reached out to all the constituency groups (workers 
movements, women, youth, all political parties including KANU, the business community, 
all religious groups, the media, the lower classes in general). This active engagement led to 
fruition of a National Convention Assembly in April of 1997.  
 
While 4Cs had wanted the National Convention to assemble in 1995, internal politics within 
the reform movement, particularly divisions between political party leaders interested only in 
minimal reforms (that would guarantee them a level political playing field), on the one hand, 
and secular civil society and clergy advocating for more fundamental reforms on the other 
hand, plagued the movement. This delayed the realisation of a national convention in 1995 
(Mutunga, 1999). Additionally, politicians from the opposition who congregated under the 
umbrella of the newly formed Inter-Parties Committee (IPC), did not want to participate in 
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the civil society led 4Cs initiative which was gaining popularity among Kenyans. However, a 
deal was brokered, to allow religious leaders arrange for a meeting of all (civic and political 
parties) stakeholders to dialogue on the way forward. This ultimately gave birth to the 
National Convention Planning Committee (NCPC) on May 31, 1996 and helped to steer the 
process towards a National convention. The first meeting of the NCPC held on May 31, 1996 
recorded representations from the opposition, the National Council of NGOs, Kenya Human 
Rights NGO network, the NCCK, National Commission on the status of Women, LSK, 
Kenya Consumer organisation, National University Students Organisation, SAFINA party 
and Islamic Party of Kenya (both had been refused registration). Apologies were sent by 
Maendeleo ya Wanawake organisation, SUPKEM and the Federation of Kenya Employers 
(Mutunga, 1999).  
 
The meeting discussed and agreed on how to go forward with organising a national 
convention. Its management and leadership were agreed upon. This leadership was 
represented by a panel of convenors from the NCCK, the Episcopal Conference of the 
Catholic Bishops, SUPKEM, and a fourth convenor would be chosen jointly by the National 
Council of Women of Kenya, the National Commission on the Status of Women, Maendeleo 
ya Wanawake and Kenya Women Workers Union to represent the women constituency. 
However, as I shall shortly discuss, mobilising some constituencies posed challenges. 
Significant among these was the Women constituency, NCCK and the Episcopal Conference 
(Mutunga, 1999). It is the NCPC that later transformed into the National Convention 
Executive Committee (NCEC) and organised a successful National Convention Assembly 
(NCA). The NCEC/NCA was a coalition of alliances from different civil society groups to 
push for democratisation and constitutional reforms in the country.  The immense 
contribution of the NCEC in shaping the pace of reforms has received widespread attention in 
scholarly works by Murunga and Nasong‘o (2007), Mutua (2008), Katumanga (2006; 2004; 
1999) among others.  
 
In reference to the challenges in mobilising women, the role of Maendeleo Ya Wanawake 
Organisation (MYWO) needs further interrogation. Maria Nzomo writes of the MYWO that 
had been tasked, together with three other leading women organisations, to select one of their 
own as a co-convenor:   
MYWO which has remained the largest national women‘s organisation, with the widest 
national spread— was a creation of the colonial state in 1952 as the only national gender 
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based civic arm of the colonial state, and with an all-white leadership, initially served to 
contain pro–Mau Mau women activists/sympathizers and promote passivity and subservience 
among African women (Nzomo, 1996). … Although it has grown, become Africanised and 
evolved overtime, it largely continued to be a civic arm for promoting the state interests of 
both the Kenyatta and Moi regimes. Despite several attempts in the 1990s to disengage itself 
from state control, it had not succeeded by 2002, when it declared its partisan support towards 
the then ruling party, KANU‘s political bid to retain power (EAS, 16 August 2002, as cited in 
Nzomo 2003: 188). 
This suggests that MYWO leadership was unwilling to support anything seen as subversive 
to the Moi/KANU hegemony. This was particularly so because the State had captured 
MYWO, coupled with the role of ethnicity shaping the complexity of the relationship 
between the State and civil society. By now, even the chairperson of MYWO, Zipporah 
Kittony was a Kalenjin like Moi. Besides this, most leaders in the movement were spouses or 
relatives of key KANU leaders. 
 
MYWO‘s dithering on the reform question enabled other active women groups to emerge and 
later play an active role especially in the formation of the Ufungamano Initiative. One such 
organisation was the Kenya Women Political Caucus (KWPC). The KWPC was constituted 
in 1998 as a national umbrella body, made up of 43 women‘s organisations and 
accommodating 23 women leaders, including six MPs, to lobby for, and influence issues 
relating to constitutional review, economic participation and legal rights of women among 
others (Nzomo, 2003; Mitullah, 2003). Specifically, it was created to engender the 
constitutional reform process through: 
Translating the numerical strength of the Kenyan women into a political voice for creating, 
nurturing and sustaining a democratic, prosperous and peaceful society where women, men 
and children regardless of social, economic and political divides can uphold and enjoy rights 
at all times and under all circumstances (KWPC Draft Constitution, 2000). 
 
The initial Kenya Women Political Caucus was short-lived as it splintered due to leadership 
wrangles and one camp moved to form the Kenya Women‘s Political Alliance. Before its 
split, the KWPC had played a key role in the events leading to the establishment of the 
Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC). The KWPC influence was particularly 
significant in the battles for the control of the Review Process between the Ufungamano 
Initiative and the Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC). The KWPC also utilised the 
provisions of the IPPG agreements (details provided later) to lobby and push for greater 
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women representatives in the Constitution Review Process (Nzomo, 2003).  
 
For the NCCK and the Episcopal Conference, their reservations to participate in the National 
Convention Planning Committee (NCPC) and later NCEC must be seen in light of the fact 
that they both had on-going parallel constitution making related projects. They continued 
being loyal to their own projects and only abandoned them to take up a mediation role 
through what came to be known as the Religious Community Facilitation Team (RCFT) at 
the behest of President Moi in 1997 (Mutunga, 1999; Gitari, interview 21/09/2009). This may 
have influenced their refusal to take up leadership positions in NCPC and later the NCEC 
(Mutunga, 1999; Wandati, interview 17/09/2009). This observation is significant in 
highlighting the potentially subversive role churches played in the reform project. In fact, 
religious leadership secretly met the President on April 1, 1997 in what is believed by those 
close to the NCEC to have been a suspicious agenda detrimental to the reform train. I 
mention this here to demonstrate that the Moi/KANU regime was active in ensuring that 
there would be no long-term unity between the different pro-reform forces by sabotaging any 
mobilisations towards unity.  
 
Some commentators have argued that the clergy‘s dalliance with the state, the lack of 
commitment to the NCEC, coupled with the willingness of opposition politicians to dialogue 
with KANU, gave the Moi/KANU regime room to out-manoeuvre the strong wave of 
reforms buttressed by accelerated mass action across the country prior to the 1997 general 
election (see for example Mutua, 2008). Despite Kenya Episcopal Conference and NCCK‘s 
official absence in NCEC, other individual Christian denominations like the Methodist, 
Presbyterian, Anglican and also SUPKEM, had direct representations in the NCEC. In the 
end, NCEC brought together over 800 registered NGOs, professional organisations, some 
labour unions, youth and women groups from across the entire country. NCEC utilised 
existing structures to mobilise citizens to participate in the struggles for constitutional reform. 
Some of these constituencies were active in NCEC and later in the Ufungamano Initiative. 
The Youth and Women are examples of such constituencies (Mutunga, 1999).  
 
At the time of the first NCA, cleavages —read by some as betrayal–were evident. Such 
betrayals/cleavages saw NCEC escalate its activities by taking the message of the National 
Convention directly to the grassroots after it became apparent that the Moi/KANU regime 
would not relent to have the constitution reviewed. NCEC aggressively campaigned for a 
boycott of the 1997 general election unless comprehensive reforms were put in place. Being a 
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general election year, the Moi/KANU regime was particularly vulnerable to the mobilisation 
that NCEC was marshalling across the country for mass action. These mobilisations went 
hand in hand with wide scale civic education led by religious organisations such as the 
Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, NCCK, and National Ecumenical Civil Education 
programme (NECEP). Though the state fought to keep civic educators at bay, restrictions on 
civic education nonetheless served to harden the clergy as well as their faithful. The upsurge 
of protests that followed in many urban centres in Kenya demonstrates a clear resolve by the 
movements at the heart of these struggles.  
 
Civic education further sensitised the under classes and therefore played a role in creating  
consciousness through assigning meanings to their collective suffering, identifying with their 
cause and bringing the grassroots struggles to the side of the NCEC by blaming their 
problems on a dictatorial state. A leading figure in the Muungano wa Wanavijiji, stated the 
following, as a reflection of such consciousness and ensuing actions in generating the 
Muungano wa Wanavijiji: 
Social struggles are fought by individuals directly affected by injustices. But we did not have 
any formal organisation uniting us. But a few of us realised that the problems we were facing 
were not limited to Kibera alone. It was the same story in all the slum areas of Nairobi, in 
Mukuru Kayaba, Mukuru kwa Reuben, Korogocho, Kingston in Spring Valley, Mutumba, 
City Cotton in Nairobi West, Mariguini etc. We realised that we needed to get organised and 
start a strong movement to raise alarm on the problems of evictions of the poor and grabbing 
of public land. Therefore, we started organising on our own [the poor in urban slums]. NGOs 
then came in later with their own programmes like Operation Firimbi [whistle] of Mazingira 
Institute. Others who came in included Action Aid, Kituo Cha Sheria, the African Network 
for the Prevention and Protection against Child Abuse and Neglect (ANPPCAN) etc. That is 
how we formed the Community Against Forced Eviction and Land Grabbing (CASE), the 
predecessor to Muungano wa Wanavijiji (Rema, interview 22/03/2010).
39
  
Below, I further explain the generative aspects of Muungano wa Wanavijiji to illustrate how 
these grassroots movements were empowered through joining of forces with the middle class 
struggles.  
                                                 
39
 Rema‘s narrative of the emergence of Muungano wa Wanavijiji is corroborated by Mwachofi (interview, 
27/09/2009) who was among the community organisers who helped mobilise residents of 82 different slums into 
forming the Muungano wa Wanavijiji. Mwachofi was also instrumental in formation of other grassroots 
movements like ILISHE in Mombasa and SEMA in Taita Taveta. All these grassroots groups were involved in 
conscientization of the masses through civic education.   
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Muungano wa Wanavijiji as did SEMA among many other grassroots movements, emerged 
in response to issues of distribution concerns over land, jobs, allocation of revenue from 
natural resources such as national parks, occasioned by increasing dispossession by state and 
economic elites through widespread evictions of the poor, and systematic corruption in 
allocation of land. Ordinary people who were victims of the evictions mobilised protest 
against these actions. Overtime, these protests became sustained and organised leading to the 
birth of Muungano wa Wanavijiji as a grassroots slum dwellers movement (Exodus-Kutoka 
Network
40
, interviews: Rema, 22/03/200, Kotieno, 07/04/2010; Ong‘ong‘a, 26/03/2010; 
Mwachofi, 27/09/2009). 41 The narration below by one of the participants in this study (Rema, 
interview, 22/03/200) vividly captures this:  
The small businesses we run here [Toy-Kibera] were always exploited by the provincial 
administration at the behest of the owners of capital…. The land where our business stalls are 
built was said to be owned by a private individual and there were evictions happening every 
time. Even when the president in 1995 gave order for some public land to be given to hawkers 
for the construction of the Kibera Hawkers Market, the allocations were done by the 
provincial administration in a very corrupt manner. Only six hawkers from Toy market were 
allocated stalls from the total 196 stalls allocated in the market. The rest were allocated to 
well-connected people. Because we did not get stalls, we continued occupying our places in 
Toy market and the harassment led by the provincial administration and the Nairobi city 
council continued. In 1996, there were threats of evictions all the time. We mobilised 
ourselves to resist the evictions. During a presidential function in our constituency, we 
decided to have a peaceful protest march to register our displeasure with the way things were 
going. The DO [District Officer] was very unhappy with this. He threatened to demolish our 
stalls whether we liked it or not. He told us that we did not have a right to anything around. 
We however continued organising. On the 14th of June 1996, the market was destroyed by 
city council askaris. …So many people were affected. Many lost their entire livelihood 
sources in the process.  
It is noteworthy that such evictions were not just directed at individuals in the slums but also 
community development initiatives such as schools, houses and any other physical 
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 http://www.kutokanet.com/evictions/evictions.html 
41
 Similar narratives of unfair allocation of resources abound. For instance, proceeds from the Tsavo National 
Park that did not benefit the local people, and land ownership in Taita Taveta were mentioned as grievances that 
ignited grassroots movements like SEMA. As Mwanyumba (interview, 07/04/2010) a local inhabitant of Taita 
Taveta stated, ‗the biggest problem in Taita Taveta is land ownership. The National Park did not benefit the 
indigenous people and if I may add, our land is not very arable. Most of what is arable is occupied by a few 
people and is under large-scale sisal estates. They grabbed these lands from local people. Local people were and 
still are against that. That is why they wanted the land issue changed in the constitution.‘ 
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infrastructure in the slums. A review of literature retrieved from Exodus-Kutoka Network
42
 
confirms this.  
 
Muungano wa Wanavijiji received pro bono legal aid support from Kituo Cha Sheria (Legal 
Resources Centre) in suing the state over the dispossessions and evictions its members were 
facing.  This shows emergence of alliances between middle and lower classes. This was a 
significant step in giving confidence to the masses to continue protesting. It was a symbiotic 
relationship that benefitted the middle class movements and civil society organisations.
43
 
Rema (interview 22/03/2010) captured this best when he stated:  
There were many restrictions especially through the notorious Chiefs Act, which made our 
work difficult. But the support we got form NGOs like Pamoja Trust and Kituo cha Sheria 
helped us in building our confidence. We did not have wealth, but we had good imagination. 
This is what has been key to our survival. We started conventions in the slums and later 
joined the NCEC and later the Ufungamano Initiative to continue pushing for reforms.  We 
joined them [NCEC and later the Ufungamano Initiative] because we wanted our voices as 
ordinary citizens to also be heard alongside others agitating for change in the country. We 
went to them, to tell them that their struggles also resonated with our struggles. And they 
were accommodating. We helped them build their legitimacy because they had people and 
movements like ours in them.   
 
Nonetheless, the NCEC failed to mobilise sufficient mass support and to fully integrate social 
movements of the under classes into its fold (Mutunga, 1999; Nzomo, 2003, Kibwana 
interview 21/10/2009). That said, NCEC did manage to marginally link the legal reform 
agenda to the sociology, economics, culture and political situation prevailing in the social and 
economic sectors, e.g. health and education, as well as to raise pertinent questions regarding 
the sharing of national resources and welfare concerns, including pervasive poverty, the 
inability of the majority of Kenyans to access water, shelter and credit facilities.  Specifically, 
the NCA/NCEC‘s appeal was in bringing together more constituencies particularly of 
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 http://www.kutokanet.com/evictions/evictions.html 
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 Such legal aid and other forms of assistance from middle class organisations to grassroots movements were 
not limited to urban areas only. Indeed, groups like Kituo cha Sheria, Action Aid among many others played a 
leading role in incubating the emergence of many grassroots movements including in rural areas. For instance, 
Mwachofi (interview, 27/09/2009) demonstrates this when he stated: ‗...I went to work with Kituo cha Sheria as 
a volunteer. It is from Kituo cha Sheria working together with Action Aid, that I found myself in Korogocho... 
and later in Mombasa helping community grassroots organisations like ILISHE bringing together squatters, 
women groups and youth groups...when I was done with that, I came into this district [Taita Taveta] and we 
formed SEMA.  In Nairobi while working with Opiyo and others I did a conceptual paper and finally was 
instrumental in forming Muungano wa Wanavijiji as a movement. And in that effort of forming muungano wa 
wanavijiji we also came up with Pamoja Trust which was supposed to facilitate the wananchi‘s (citizens) 
efforts.‘   
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grassroots movements such as Muungano wa Wanavijiji mentioned earlier, as well as SEMA 
and ILISHE into these struggles.  
 
From these examples and many others, I argue that while NCEC may not have succeeded in 
becoming a truly common person‘s mass movement, it played an important role in pushing 
the frontiers of political and constitutional reforms, and managed to mainstream 
constitutional reform struggles into Kenyan socioeconomic and political struggles.  
 
The reaching out to grassroots by NCEC did have some positive impacts on these struggles. 
When calls for mass action were made by NCEC, ordinary citizens heeded to these calls. 
From then, Mutunga (1999) writes, it did not matter whether the NCEC leadership was with 
the religious and political leaders or not. With ordinary citizens on their side, NCEC between 
May and October 1997, called for mass protests to push for minimum reforms before the 
general election could be held. The clarion call from NCEC was ‗No Reforms No Elections‘.  
Between May and October 1997, Kenya was a country at war with herself. NCEC supporting 
citizens and its leadership engaged the police and state hired/sponsored thugs in street 
running battles during mass protests. Talk of a civil war breaking was rife (Mutunga, 1999; 
interviews: Gitari, 21/9/2009; Kibwana, 21/10/2009).  
 
The first of such mass actions was held on May 3, 1997 and started with a meeting at the 
historic Kamukunji grounds.
 44
 A procession from the city centre to Kamukunji grounds by 
Rev. Njoya, one of the co-convenors of NCEC representing the religious community, was 
viciously attacked by a state sponsored ‗group of thugs, thieves, muggers, cutthroats and 
murderers calling themselves Jeshi la Mzee
45
 (The Army of the Old/Big Man)‘ (Mutunga, 
1999: 164). Many people were injured in the process. According to Mutunga (1999), the May 
3
rd
 mass action was even more instrumental owing to the show of concern that the middle 
class had demonstrated.  They had come in large numbers to join ordinary citizens in the 
demonstrations as opposed to their traditional participation in protests only at the level of 
ideas. This, Mutunga (1999) argues, signified increasing support for the reform movement. 
                                                 
44
 Kamukunji grounds in Nairobi‘s Eastlands are historical for the role they played in the independence 
struggles as many public rallies were held there. The Kamukunji grounds were also significant in the struggle 
for democratisation in Kenya.  
45
 It needs mention here that such private militia was not limited to KANU only. Some opposition politicians 
had also funded the establishment of their own militia. The Baghdad Boys in Kisumu and largely associated 
with Jaramogi Odinga and later his son Raila, is such an example. Other examples include the Jeshi la Embakasi 
associated with the DP MP for Embakasi, David Mwenje. Mungiki, which has been a prominent feature in 
organised crime in Kenya has also been associated with Kikuyu political leaders in Rift Valley and Central 
provinces. 
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Standing out in the mass actions were the youth, who Mutunga (1999), credits as the true 
leaders of the mass action.  They were ‗organising the wananchi (citizens), challenging and 
intimidating the police, singing, debating with the police, evacuating the injured, protecting 
their leaders and implementing their [resolve to] make the country ungovernable if reforms 
were not carried out‘ (Mutunga, 1999: 166). 
  
Subsequently, a series of mass actions were called nationally, some of them on symbolic days 
in Kenya. These included May 31, the eve of Kenya‘s attainment of self-internal government 
in 1963, June 17 (the National Budget day), July 7, August 8
,
 September 9 and October 10. 
NCEC chose to organise specific protests and mass actions in other towns in the country. 
Such protests were organised in Kisumu on August 6, Nyeri on October 20, Mombasa on 
July 27 and August 12, 1997. All these were met with raw state brutality and many members 
of the public lost their lives at the hands of the police. There was widespread looting in the 
streets too, with the state blaming NCEC for this.  Of all these mass protests, perhaps the 
most symbolic and which fundamentally altered the rules of the game, was the July 7 (Saba 
Saba) 1997 protests. Saba Saba is specifically significant for its symbolism in Kenya‘s 
contemporary struggle for democracy. On the same day in 1990, peaceful pro-democracy 
demonstrations were violently broken by the police resulting in the death of twenty-one 
Kenyans. This was accompanied by widespread arrests and detention of the leaders of the 
pro-democracy movement. Raila Odinga, Kenneth Matiba, Charles Rubia, Gitobu Imanyara, 
Mohammed Ibrahim, and Dr. John Khaminwa were detained while George Anyona, Njeru 
Kathangu, Isaiah Ngotho Kariuki and Prof. Edward Oyugi, were charged with treason. NCEC 
chose mass action on this day to commemorate the seventh anniversary of escalated 
authoritarianism by the State.  
 
What happened on July 7, 1997 was equally tragic, if not as dramatic, for NCEC. The police 
descended on demonstrators who had taken refuge at All Saints Cathedral, teargased and beat 
many people, including several opposition MPs, the clergy and leaders of NCEC. The 
greatest casualty, however, were two people key to NCEC: Rev. Timothy Njoya a co-
convenor who was beaten senseless and left for dead. The other was Kepta Ombati, the 
Youth Leader in NCEC. Blood was spewed everywhere in the church. Used teargas canisters 
also lay everywhere inside the Church (Weekly Review, 11/07/1999; Mutunga, 1999; 
interviews: Gitari, 21/09/2010; Njoya, 29/09/2009). Twenty-one people were killed during 
the ensuing mayhem (Njoya, 2007). This incident incensed the clergy who had been 
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relatively less militant. Six days after the incident, the head of the Anglican Church in Kenya, 
Rev. David Gitari held a cleansing ceremony of the Cathedral on July 13, 1997. Rev. Gitari 
who led ‗the combative God-fearing flock‘ preached from the Book of Daniel Chapter five in 
the Bible and told President Moi, in front of international journalists and a section of 
diplomatic corps that ‗if you do not change, the hand of God is going to write in the walls of 
the State House Mene, mene, tekel, parsin i.e. the days of your reign have been counted and 
brought to an end; you have been weighed on the balance and found wanting‘ (Gitari, 
interview 21/09/2009; Mutunga, 1999: 175). Mutunga (1999: 175) opines that ‗if the 
presiding Bishop … had given the clarion call of  ―Onward Christian Soldiers‖ to march to 
State House, this call would have been heeded.‘ The photographs below are used to 
illuminate the violence that was meted on otherwise peaceful demonstrators as the contention 
intensified.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Police attack activists enroute to Kamukunji on May 31 1997 (photo courtesy of Antony Kaminju). 
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Figure 4.3: Police attack demonstrators outside parliament buildings on Saba Saba 1997 (photo courtesy of 
Antony Kaminju). 
 
Figure 4.4: Journalists photograph an injured youth dying on the streets after being attacked by the police 
(photo courtesy of Antony Kaminju). 
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Figure 4.5: A leading opposition leader, Ms. Charity Ngilu of Social Democratic Party runs for her dear life 
after a demonstration she was a participant in, is attacked by police and hired thugs in 1997 (photo courtesy of 
Antony Kaminju). 
 
 
Figure 4.6: A section of the crowd attending one of the many NCEC meetings in 1997 (photo courtesy of Antony 
Kaminju). 
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Figure 4.7: A section of the leadership of the ‘No reforms no elections’ campaign attending a rally in Nairobi 
(photo courtesy of Antony Kaminju). 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Kenneth Matiba, a hero of the 1990 mobilisations that forced Moi to allow for multi-party politics, 
and one of the leaders who stuck with NCEC on their ‘No reforms no elections’ campaign, addresses a public 
meeting at Nairobi’s Uhuru Park in 1997. He was the leader of the only political party that refused to contest 
the 1997 election under the then constitution (photo courtesy of Antony Kaminju). 
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The July 7, 1997 incident proved to be a turning point in the struggle. The State capitulated 
under increasing pressures and condemnations especially from international media, diplomats 
and donor countries that threatened to place further economic sanctions on the Moi regime 
unless he dialogued with the opposition. As a result of these condemnations, a senior police 
officer personally visited Rev. Njoya at Nairobi hospital where he had been hospitalised and 
apologised for the ‗violent invasion of the All Saints Cathedral and for the attack on Njoya‘ 
(Weekly Review, 11/07/1997).  Moi himself joined the chorus of those calling on the police to 
tone down their use of violence on demonstrators. More importantly, two days after the 
sermon (July 15, 1997), a clearly besieged Moi called the leading clergy from all faiths 
(Christians and Muslims) to State House to dialogue with them on the way out of the impasse 
created by continuing riots (Weekly Review, 18/07/1997; Mutunga, 1999). He allegedly 
sought the clergy‘s help in containing the NCEC tide with a promise that he was now for 
reforms. According to Gitari (interview, 21/09/2010), Moi asked religious leaders for their 
assistance to end the impasse by mediating between KANU and NCEC. The clergy accepted.  
 
As it turned out, the Moi/KANU game plan was not limited to only appeasing and 
neutralising an angry clergy. As mass protests continued unabated as shown in the images 
above, Moi sensed that he was losing grip of the situation. As Moi was talking to the clergy, 
he also sent KANU emissaries to approach part of the opposition for a political settlement. 
He agreed to minimum reforms that came to be known as the Inter Parliamentary Parties 
Group (IPPG) reforms with a promise that comprehensive reforms would be held after the 
1997 general election. Moi went as far as agreeing to the enactment of a law in parliament, 
i.e. the Constitution of Kenya Review Act, 1997. According to Mutunga (1999) and Mutua 
(2008), both sympathetic to the NCEC mass actions, the opposition fell for the bait and 
abandoned NCEC mass action and went back to parliament to negotiate for the minimum 
reforms. But this development, though read by some as betrayal of a cause that had by now 
become popular in Kenya, begs the question: why did the opposition behave this way?  
 
Activists and politicians close to these developments have advanced several reasons to 
explain the politician‘s behaviour. Mutunga (1999) for instance argues, as does Mutua 
(2008), that a majority of the opposition politicians were already feeling irrelevant as NCEC 
was firmly in control of the struggles, the mobilisation structures, and networks. ‗A bonfire 
for reforms had been stoked in the populace by NCEC and the political parties who claimed 
to represent the masses had to find a way to tap into this political capital or risk 
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marginalization‘ (Mutua, 2008: 108).  Majority of politicians did not wish to be driven to 
further political irrelevance by heeding to NCEC‘s call to boycott elections. Kiraitu Murungi 
(2000 as cited in Mutua, 2008: 107-8), one of the leading lights of the IPPG deal, argues that 
NCEC drove MPs from the National Convention into KANU‘s IPPG arms because NCEC 
had deliberately taken positions to create a crisis. Secondly, MPs who were talking to KANU 
had been exposed to ridicule by NCEC as the latter had become a formidable force. In IPPG, 
they saw an opportunity to neutralise NCEC and in the process ensure that ‗NCEC was no 
longer the solo voice of all pro-democracy voices in Kenya‘ (Murungi, 2000: 80).  I argue 
here that this clearly demonstrates that politicians had a clear plan to either co-opt or arrest 
NCEC‘s agenda so as to remain the dominant. When NCEC‘s terrain of contention proved 
un-co-optive, political elites jumped ship. By doing so, the political elites acted as a unified 
force to derail the reform train. 
 
Another reason advanced for the stalling of NCEC‘s reform train was the role played by 
donors. The events of Saba Saba had also convinced representatives of foreign interests 
(donors) of the need to look for solutions to the political crisis Kenya was facing as more and 
more ‗Western diplomats became weary of a possibility of an election boycott and its 
potential effects on both the stability of Kenya and the interest of their countries‘ (Ng‘ethe 
and Katumanga, 2003: 332; Mutunga, 1999; Murungi, 2000). They therefore began 
pressurizing some NCEC members to initiate dialogue with a regime that had made it clear 
that it did not recognise NCEC‘s contentious claim as a legitimate player in these 
contentions. Therefore, the IPPG initiative came as a relief to many stakeholders including 
MPs, foreign interests, political parties and religious groups (Mutunga, 1999). As Mutua 
(2008: 109), argues, ‗suddenly, there was a ―rational‖ and ―less threatening‖ alternative to the 
NCEC‘s ―radical‖ agenda.‘ In the event, ‗a nod from the clergy and pressure from donors for 
MPs to join the IPPG‘ talks sealed the fate of the NCEC reform efforts (Mutua, 2008: 108; 
Ng‘ethe and Katumanga, 2003).  
 
Significantly, the above cited reasons point to underlying cleavages within the reform 
movement. While existing political opportunities allowed different actors to start cohering 
under the NCEC, this marriage was short lived as both politicians and the clergy had little 
faith in NCEC‘s radical agenda and approach in pushing for comprehensive constitutional 
reforms. 
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The IPPG process and its outcomes, while managing to pacify the anxieties of foreign 
interests, the clergy and opposition political parties, resulted in yet another betrayal of the 
popular will. Its outcome is read here, as preservation of elite dominance/hegemonic interests 
as in the process, it gave Moi and KANU a much-needed respite. But it also points to how 
entrenched interests of the so-called donor countries have subverted meaningful 
transformations (see Brown, 2001 for an analysis of how foreign donors helped to keep Moi 
in power).  The IPPG forestalled the derailing of the 1997 general election, which NCEC and 
other like-minded groups had been campaigning and applying pressure politics (mass 
demonstrations) to push for its boycott or postponement. The IPPG deal and subsequent 
elections enjoyed the participation of all influential political parties.  In the end, only the 
Kenneth Matiba-led Saba Saba Asili boycotted the polls. Opposition political elites‘ decision 
to participate in the 1997 polls left many activists feeling bitter and betrayed by the political 
elites‘ closing of ranks (Mutua, 2008; Mutunga, 1999). More than that, it led to a sense of 
greater distrust of politicians whether in government, or the opposition (Mutunga, 1999; 
Lamba, interview 23/10/2009). Mutua (2008) offers helpful insights to explain why this was 
the case. For him, ‗political parties are essentially governments in waiting because they seek 
to capture political power. Historically however, civil society has not sought the capture of 
the state, but rather has striven to influence the exercise of power‘ (Mutua, 2008: 105).  For 
this thesis, I posit this as a constant alignment that always happens in hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic struggles.  
 
The IPPG marked the deflation of yet another movement at the heart of the struggles for 
transformative reforms in Kenya and gives credence to Mutua‘s (2008: 75) apt summary of 
the key experiences of what befalls majority of Kenyan struggles that do not temper their 
radical agenda:  
Since the British founded Kenya…it has been the graveyard for radical, progressive, Leftist, or 
transformative politics. Virtually every revolutionary political, economic, or social cause has 
been either rejected or crushed. Only gradualist or accommodationist political projects have 
achieved any measure of success…both the colonial and postcolonial states have been pitiless 
in meting out grim fates to radical visionaries and change agents. 
 
As I shall show in greater details in the next chapter, among the key agreements of the IPPG 
package was the enactment of the CKRC Act of 1997. However, its enactment did not result 
in an agreement by different stakeholders involved in the Constitution Review Process. 
Moreover, religious groups and civil society felt that the CKRC Act did not effectively 
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encompass the various interest groups and that the process was captive to the narrow interests 
of the political elites to the exclusion of the Kenyan people (4Cs, 2006). In the midst of this 
acrimony between different interests in the country, protests by civil society and religious 
groups against a government controlled process crystallised into a movement that came to be 
known as the Ufungamano Initiative and agitated for a people-driven constitutional review 
process. The next chapter provides an in-depth analysis of how the disparate actors joined 
forces to form the Ufungamano Initiative. 
Post-2005 development and the realisation of a new constitution 
While it is beyond the remit of this study to deal with the post-2005 developments in the 
Kenyan constitutional reform struggles, it is noteworthy that, the post-2005 referendum in 
which the Draft Constitution was rejected crystallised into a new phase of contention. This 
was characterised by increased ethnic rivalries and emergence of new alliances in the push 
for a new constitution. One such leading alliance was the Katiba Sasa Coalition that 
essentially comprised some of the former members of the Ufungamano Initiative who 
remained steadfast in pushing for a new constitution. What is interesting to note of these 
developments was that the religious leadership remained divided. Further fragmentations 
continued even within the Christian community leadership, which was part of the 
Ufungamano Initiative.  
 
Both the 2010 and 2005 referenda, had similarities in their scripts especially in the political 
behaviour of the actors at the heart of pushing for constitutional reforms. While some civil 
society actors supported the proposed Constitution in 2010 as some did in the 2005, others 
ganged up with part of the political elite and vigorously campaigned against it over the 
inclusion of a contentious abortion clause in the draft as well as the inclusion of the Kadhi 
courts in the new constitution. Muslims were vehemently opposed to anything that would 
deny them a chance to have Kadhi courts as part of their fundamental rights under the current 
constitution. Some ordinary citizens of Kenya saw all these divisions as a ploy to yet again 
deny Kenyans a new constitution as happened in 2005. An analysis of the contentions within 
the constitutional reform process reveals how some part of the political opposition elite 
became co-conspirators in the process. This was made possible by ethnicisation of the 
struggle as well as hero-worship of some of the leaders by the masses.  
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Conclusion 
Kenyan post-independent elites have often closed ranks when collectively threatened by a 
push for a new order that may alter their hegemonic status in society. Such closing of ranks 
has been spearheaded by politicians of all political persuasions who have created, oiled, and 
perpetuated this system of hatred and animosity between the different ethnic communities. 
This became even more pronounced after the introduction of political pluralism in 1991.  
 
The result of such hegemonies has been multiple betrayals widely cited by participants of this 
study as well as by previous studies as the defining feature of these struggles (see for 
example Mutua, 2008; Mutunga, 1999; Amutabi, 2007; Nasong‘o, 2007; Mwangola, 2007; 
Murunga, 2007; 2009; Murunga and Nasong‘o, 2007). Activists and politicians who at 
certain epochs position themselves as champions of democratic struggles have often times, 
turned against the very ideals they fought for. This corroborates Murunga and Nasong‘o‘s 
(2007) observations that:  
Kenyan transition is beset by a politics of selective blame that has, in turn limited the 
emancipative capacity of the new leadership. The transition [2002…] laid bare the disconnection 
between the ideas of the opposition-aligned politicians, activists and intellectuals with respect to 
democratisation and their practices and actions once in power [as they turned against the very 
ideals that they had advocated for while in the opposition] (Murunga and Nasong‘o, 2007: xix-
xx). 
 
This chapter has shown that Kenyan reform struggles have a long history, and have been 
cyclical and duplicitous, characterised by elite consensus and fragmentations and multiple 
betrayals of popular cause. Further, it has located the issues and principal actors behind 
contentious politics in constitutional reforms in Kenya. It has outlined the historical 
specificities that led to the emergence of different pro-constitutional reform struggles in 
Kenya. It has underscored the social, economic and political disquiet as a major factor in the 
emergence of constitutional reform movements in Kenya. Examples of such dysfunctions 
have been enumerated and analysed. Specifically, the chapter has presented evidence to 
support the argument that these social mobilisations were a response to a long history of 
misrule and Executive excesses, which had irredeemably mutilated the constitution as a 
covenant defining the power of the people and relationships with their governors (Kawive, 
interview 13/10/2009).  
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The discussion so far has offered broad-brush strokes in the successive waves of social 
mobilisation that started crystallising as contention for the constitutional review in early 
1990s. These mobilisations confirm both Gramscian and Polanyian perspectives that faced 
with increasing threats to its survival, society retreats by constituting itself to save itself from 
destruction (cited in Burawoy, 2003: 193). Social movements therefore, mirror mobilisations 
against discontents. But not all discontents in society are translated into collective action and 
social movements. Nasong‘o (2007: 21), provides useful insights into how this happens (see 
also Buechler, 2000; McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Jenkins, 1983; McAdam and Paulsen, 1993; 
Snow Zurcher and Ekland-Olson, 1980; Tilly 1978). For Nasong‘o, there are three key stages 
in the evolution and development of social movements. These are: 1) The incubation period; 
2) The action phase; and 3) The institutionalisation phase.  These three phases are discussed 
in more detail in the next chapter in the illustrations for the emergence of the Ufungamano 
Initiative.  
 
An emerging pattern from the analysis presented in this chapter, indicates that these struggles 
have been through successive waves of contention. Taking a cue from this, I argue that 
despite the IPPG stealing the reform thunder from the NCEC, and the paralysis of action 
towards giving Kenyans a new constitution following the 1997 general election, coupled with 
existing mass discontent in the country, it did not take long before a new wave of contention 
started to build up. Sidney Tarrow (1998: 141) argues that:  
Whatever the source of contentious claims, it is political opportunities and constraints that 
translate them into action. They produce social movements by accessing known and flexible 
repertoires of contention; by developing collective identities; and by building mobilising 
structures around social networks and organisations. While opportunities and constraints in 
their environment give challengers incentives to mobilise, it is their cultural, organisational 
and practical resources that are the foundations of social movements.    
The next chapter interrogates the above citation, in an attempt to unearth the political 
opportunities that allowed the emergence of the Ufungamano Initiative.  
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Chapter Five 
 
The Birth of the Ufungamano Initiative: From Discordant Voices in 
Wilderness to a Forceful Movement of Movements 
 
‘Despite the distrust between the Kenyan political parties and civil society, Moi’s ‘chicanery’ 
served to drive the opposition and civil society into each other’s arms’ (Mutua 2008: 105).  
 
Introduction 
On December 15, 1999, two simultaneous and intimately related and significant events, which 
dramatically heightened the contention in the Kenyan constitutional reforms process, took place. 
The first was a gathering of over fifty stakeholder organisations drawn mainly from religious 
groups, secular civil society and opposition political parties at the Ufungamano House in 
Nairobi, to launch what they framed as a people-driven constitutional reform process 
(Ufungamano Initiative, 28/09/1999; Karanja, 2008; interviews: Ombok, 24/09/2009; Kuria, 
26/09/2009; Musyimi, 09/10/2009; Ong‘wen, 09/10/2009). The second was the establishment of 
a Parliamentary Select Commission by members of parliament allied to KANU and its 
cooperating partner, the National Development Party, to spearhead a parliamentary led review of 
the constitution. The two processes were opposed to each other‘s work and existence.   
 
The Ufungamano House gathering was convened under the auspices of the Religious 
Community Coordination Team made up of representatives of the Catholic Church‘s Kenya 
Episcopal Conference, the Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims, the National Council of 
Churches of Kenya, the Hindu Council of Kenya, the Muslim Consultative Council, the 
Organisation of African Instituted Churches, the Anglican Church of Kenya, the Presbyterian 
Church of Eastern Africa, and the Methodist Church in Kenya. This gathering, aimed at finding a 
consensual way forward, out of an impasse created by the Moi regime‘s continued refusal to 
meet a popular demand for a people-driven constitutional Review Process. All stakeholders 
including the then ruling party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), as well as all 
opposition political parties had been invited to the Ufungamano House meeting (Ufungamano 
Initiative, 17/12/1999). KANU, the Shirikisho Party, and the Kenya Social Congress and a 
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section of the National Development Party, specifically its leader, Raila Odinga, boycotted the 
Ufungamano House consultation.  
 
The Ufungamano House consultation took two days (15-16 December, 1999). A significant 
outcome of this consultative meeting was the establishment of the People‘s Commission of 
Kenya (PCK) as an implementing organ of what soon came to be known as the Ufungamano 
Initiative – a movement of over 54 different organisations that included human rights 
organisations, several faith groups, women‘s organisations, as well as some parliamentary 
opposition parties (Ogony, 2004; Andreassen & Tostensen, 2006; Ufungamano Initiative, 
17/12/1999; interviews: Musyimi, 09/10/2009; Njoya, 29/09/2009; Lamba, 23/10/2009; Musau, 
24/09/2009). The PCK was established to lead Kenyans in comprehensively reviewing the 
constitution through collecting and collating their views (Ogony, 2004; Andreassen & Tostensen, 
2006; Kindiki, 2007).   
 
As different stakeholder consultations unfolded at the Ufungamano House, KANU and its co-
operators, mainly the National Development Party, took advantage of the absence of most 
opposition legislators from the National Assembly to set up a Parliamentary Select Committee to 
review the constitution (Karanja, 2008). The committee chaired by Raila Amolo Odinga of 
National Development Party – the party he led and was in cooperation with KANU.  It consisted 
of fourteen KANU legislators and thirteen from the opposition, mostly from Odinga's NDP as 
many other opposition parties, including the Democratic Party, Ford Kenya, and Social 
Democratic Party, refused to partake in the Committee, opting instead, to align with the 
Ufungamano Initiative. 
 
These developments were significant in triggering a new wave of intensified contention among 
the constitutional reform stakeholders. The new wave of contention crystallised on the one side, 
into the Ufungamano Initiative made up of a majority of civil society (both secular and religious) 
and opposition political parties. On the other side of contention, was the Parliamentary Select 
Committee. This group had support from a smaller section of religious organisations represented 
by the Evangelical Fellowship of Kenya and its member churches (e.g. The Africa Inland 
Church, the African Independent Pentecostal Church of Africa, the Deliverance Church, 
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Redeemed Gospel Church of Kenya, and the Church of God in East Africa). Many other 
stakeholders were caught in between the two opposing poles.  
 
The above developments in the contention of the constitutional reforms are the concern of this 
chapter. The chapter specifically traces the emergence of the Ufungamano Initiative. It adopts a 
relational approach in explaining this emergence by borrowing from Jameson (1956: 100) who 
argues that: ‗all the varied activities of men in the same country and period have intimate 
relations with each other, and that one cannot obtain a satisfactory view of any one of them by 
considering it apart from the others‘ (cited in Tilly, 2004: 31-2).  To understand the emergence of 
the Ufungamano Initiative therefore, I holistically look at the conditions that led to the tensions 
and the centripetal and centrifugal forces generated by the socio-political forces and 
organisations contending the Kenyan constitutional reforms. 
 
The chapter uses two concurrent analytical tracks: 1) a chronological narrative of the emergence 
of the Ufungamano Initiative, and 2) a thematic analysis that attempts to mirror the Ufungamano 
Initiative‘s evolution to the theoretical literature on political opportunities and emergence of 
social movements. The second track is aimed at elaborating the applicability of the political 
opportunities model in explaining the Ufungamano Initiative. The first track is socio-historical 
and is informed by Tilly‘s (2004: 3) advocacy that the contentious nature of social movement 
politics ‗requires historical understanding.‘ This track therefore traces the dynamics in the 
emergence of the Ufungamano Initiative to the universe of its contention (Tarrow, 1998), i.e. 
within the catalogue of actors and issues in the constitutional reform processes in Kenya. 
Situating the Ufungamano Initiative in the context of its history helps explain its emergence, why 
it incorporated certain features/structures in its operations, as well as in identifying its 
achievements and limitations. Moreover, as Tilly (2004: 10) argues, explanations of social 
movements and their history must of necessity ‗mesh themselves with explanations of other sorts 
of contentious politics.‘  
 
The chapter is organised into three main parts. The first section maps out the actors behind the 
formation of the Ufungamano Initiative. The next section sifts through the theoretical models 
that explain emergence of social movements with a view to show the utility of the political 
opportunities model in explaining the emergence of the Ufungamano Initiative. The latter part of 
 150 
this section attempts to provide answers to the question: how does the emergence of the 
Ufungamano Initiative empirically illustrate the relevance of the political opportunities model in 
explaining the socio-political contentions in the Kenyan constitutional reform struggles? The 
third section reflects on the specific challenges and contradictions inherent in the Ufungamano 
Initiative given its intentions, as well as the broad nature of its constituent membership. The 
chapter argues that the broad based nature of the Ufungamano Initiative imbued the movement 
with multiple contradictions. The generative contradictions at the formative stages of the 
Ufungamano Initiative are analysed in this chapter. Ensuing from the analysis of these 
contradictions, the chapter poses a critical question on the viability of a movement with a wide 
and diverse constituency in not only effecting changes in society, but also remaining united in 
the pursuit of its collective goal(s). This question is answered in subsequent chapters. 
A cartography of actors in contemporary constitutional reform struggles in 
Kenya  
According to Tilly (2004: 12), social movements are: 
Not solo performances, [but] interactions between temporarily connected (and often shifting) 
groups of claimants and the objects of their claims [whereby] third parties such as constituents, 
allies, rival claimants, enemies, authorities, and various publics often play significant parts in the 
campaigns.‘  
As such, he continues, ‗we will never explain social movements‘ variations and claimants 
without paying close attention to political actors, other than the central claimants...‘ (Tilly 
2004:12).
1
 Taking cue from these views, it is clear from the previous chapter, that contenders in 
the constitutional reforms in Kenya have been many. Indeed, a mapping of the different pro-
reform forces reveals successive interregnums and cycles of contention before and after their 
crystallisation into the Ufungamano Initiative. Borrowing from Tarrow (1998: 24), I propose that 
the perceived success of earlier cycles of contention enumerated in the previous chapter, explain 
the widening of political opportunities for the wave of contention represented by the 
Ufungamano Initiative because of the susceptibility of the Moi/KANU regime especially because 
the Ufungamano Initiative enlisted activists and ‗ordinary people‘ to test the limits of its power. 
                                                 
1
 Because of this emphasis on political actors, especially the relationship between social movement and the state, the 
political opportunity model has been charged of political reductionism i.e. a bias of concern for only the relationship 
between social movement and the government (see for example Chan and Zhou, 2009; Melucci, 1994; Goodwin and 
Jasper, 2004). 
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The nature of the relationships between actors within the Ufungamano Initiative as well as with 
the rival contenders has been fluid and dynamic and mostly dictated by a rationality of 
congruencies or divergences of means and goals between the different contending actors – in this 
case, principally civil society and the government in the constitutional reform process in Kenya. 
As already pointed out in chapters one and two, this study adopts Adil Najam‘s (2000) model for 
the analysis of such congruencies and divergences that produces a set of four possible types of 
relationships – cooperation, complementarity, co-optation and confrontation between the actors 
in the constitutional reforms in Kenya. Najam (2000) plotted such relationships as shown in 
Figure 5.1 below. I briefly look at each of the four types of relationships with regard to the 
Ufungamano Initiative. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: The Four-C’s Model of NGO-Government Relations. Source (Najam, 2000). 
 
Civil society-state cooperation 
Within the constitutional reform process, whenever civil society organisations (taken here not as 
a collective whole, but individual atomised organisations) cooperated with the state (represented 
in this case by Moi/KANU regime), it was because they were seeking similar ends and utilised 
similar means. For the case at hand, such cooperation was exhibited by the then ongoing 
cooperation of KANU and the National Development Party (NDP) in the initial days that later 
assumed co-optive dimensions as well as the religious community mediation work at the height 
of the NCEC-led mass actions (interviews: Wanga, 08/04/2010; Apiyo, 16/09/2009; Ndubi, 
24/09/2009). As will become clear in this chapter, the ‗cooperation of Moi and Raila was a 
blessing in disguise. While it seemed negative in as far as the unity of different reform struggle 
groups were concerned, it made some positive contribution because it inadvertently challenged 
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other reform struggle groups to seek cooperation‘ (Wanga, interview 08/04/2010). This was 
essentially because the cooperation reinforced discontentment against KANU and NDP by other 
forces who found themselves excluded by the new elite bargains that the Moi/KANU state had 
perfected in an effort to ward off increasing pressure from popular protests and retain power 
(interviews: Churchill, 02/10/2009; Lethome, 02/10/2009; Ndubi, 24/09/2009). 
 
Civil society-state confrontation 
According to Najam (2000), confrontational relationships between state and civil society occur 
whenever state agencies and civil society consider each other‘s goals and strategies to be 
antithetical. This was the main form of relationship between the various constitutional reform 
struggle actors such as the Ufungamano Initiative and the NCEC among others, and the 
government.  Citing Fisher (1998), Najam (2000: 385) argues that in confrontational 
relationships, ‗governments … are often willing to use, their coercive powers for outright 
repression and harassment‘ of the nongovernmental actors (see also Ndegwa, 1996 for similar 
views). As we have already seen in the previous chapter, confrontation has been a common 
feature of the Kenyan constitution reform project.  The senseless beating of Rev. Timothy Njoya 
and other peaceful demonstrators at the All Saints Cathedral on July 7, 1997 and earlier on May 
3, 1997, cited in the previous chapter, serve as illustrations of such confrontational relationships. 
Other examples include attempts on the lives of some religious leaders such as Bishop Gitari 
whose Embu home was attacked by thugs said to be on the state‘s payroll. Gitari had to hide in 
the ceiling of his house to save his life (Gitari, interview 21/09/2009). He was also later on, at the 
height of the Ufungamano Initiative struggles, attacked by state incited Muslim youths in South 
B neighbourhood in Nairobi. The attacks were prompted by state agents‘ torching of a Mosque to 
fuel animosity between Christians and Muslims in order to scuttle the Ufungamano Initiative 
(interviews: Gitari, 21/09/2010; Lethome, 02/10/2009; Wandati, 17/09/2009).   
 
Scholars who have studied the nature of state and civil society relations in Kenya offer insights 
into the reasons for such confrontations (see for example Ndegwa, 1994; 1996; Oyugi, 2002/4; 
Katumanga, 2004). Katumanga (1999: 8-9) opines: 
The regime type and response to contestations for an open associational space have over the years 
not only determined the nature of social movements, but also the modes they use to apply in their 
struggles against the state. Essentially, social movements have over time emerged in Kenya 
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consequent to economic and political exclusion. Underlying their emergence has been the attempt 
to pressure the regimes in power for inclusion by mobilizing outside existing social-political 
institutions or the deconstruction and reconstruction of alternative institutions.  While the former 
has been favoured by moderates, the latter model has been preferred by radical formations.  
Those controlling the state on the other hand have tended to respond to any such challenges by 
seeking to co-opt moderates while isolating radicals. The successful application of this strategy 
through economic mutation and application of violence has allowed them to not only maintain 
control over the reins of power, but also sustain its nature.  Consequently to the foregoing, the 
state has remained a contested space, as the leadership and captured institutions have remained 
incapable of responding positively to social processes. 
Oyugi (2002[4]) adds that such confrontation resulted from the alternative leadership approach 
that certain civil society organisations have been propagating. Indeed, this study is premised on 
dynamics of tensions and confrontations in the state-civil society relations centred on civil 
society‘s push for constitutional and political reforms. 
 
Complementarity 
According to Najam (2000), complementarity ensues when State and civil society seek similar 
ends but prefer dissimilar means, i.e., they have divergent strategies but convergent goals (see 
also Coston, 1998; Young D.R., 1999; 2000 for similar arguments). This is exhibited especially 
by the different strategies employed by different actors in the Kenyan constitutional reform 
process. I present and analyse the outcomes of these strategies in chapter six.  
 
Civil society co-optation 
When the actors (State and civil society) prefer similar means but dissimilar ends, there is co-
optation (Najam, 2000; see also Tandon, 1989; Bratton, 1990; Commuri, 1995; Pearce, 1997; 
Fisher, 1998).  Such co-optations happened in the build up to the Inter-Parties Parliamentary 
Group agreements in 1997, and also in the processes of mergers of the Ufungamano Initiative in 
2000 and later of NDP and KANU merger, whose net result ‗undermined civil society 
transformative efforts‘ (Odhiambo M., interview 01/04/2010). 
 
Najam‘s theoretical formulation is useful in the analysis of the dynamic interactions and nature 
of relationship between actors within the Ufungamano Initiative and the state in the different 
phases of the constitutional reform process in Kenya. As pointed out earlier, the life of the 
 154 
Ufungamano Initiative cut across two regimes. Each regime exhibited a different attitude to civil 
society. On the one hand, the Moi/KANU regime was largely sceptical and treated civil society 
disdainfully, hence the confrontations (Katumanga, 2004; 1999; Oyugi, 2002/4). On the other 
hand, the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition regime‘s view of civil society was different, and 
exhibited greater signs of complementarity, cooperation and co-option, than outright 
confrontation (interviews: Ndubi, 24/09/2009; Odhiambo M., 01/04/2010; Wanga, 08/04/2010. 
See also Katumanga, 2004). This is perhaps informed by the fact that the new regime (NARC) 
had many activists whose political training ground had been in these movements
 
in civil society. 
Moreover, Najam‘s (2000) model is useful in explaining why the Ufungamano Initiative lost its 
appeal after merging with the state-led process because it was a co-optive, rather than 
cooperative process, which eventually resulted in betrayal of the popular will. This is covered in 
detail in chapter seven.  
 
Nonetheless, Najam‘s model has an inherent assumption of homogeneity within the two distinct 
groups in contention (i.e. civil society and state). This is problematic because a closer look at the 
contenders reveals that this was not the case. Groups on both sides of the contention were 
heterogeneous and had multiple cleavages within themselves. Thus, there were complex 
relationships, a point that challenges Najam‘s 4Cs model. Therefore, from this analysis, a 
different typology of actors reflective of the realities of the different actors as well as the 
relationship between the different claimants in the constitutional reform struggles in Kenya was 
deemed appropriate.  
Towards a different typology of actors in contention  
To appreciate the idiosyncrasies and the intricacies in the struggles over Kenyan constitutional 
reforms, one needs to look at the dynamic and fluid composition, and relationships, between the 
claimants (secular civil society, religious community and sometimes opposition political parties) 
on the one hand, and targeted objects of claims (the Moi/KANU political edifice and sometimes 
the entire political elites spectrum that included the opposition). From such an analysis, Mutua 
(2008: 124) offers a categorisation of four types of political behaviour to describe the different 
actors in these contestations that have ‗recycled themselves throughout the history of the struggle 
for reforms in Kenya.‘  For him: 
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The first was the centralizing of undemocratic strand [...] the tendency of the fraction of elite that 
has historically held power in Kenya ... The second is the syndrome of the government-in-
waiting, represented […] by the political opposition…. The third tendency is the ―radical‖ and 
progressive option, which […] the NCEC and more activist civil society organizations had 
revived…the last tendency is the cautious middle, a worldview expressed by religious 
organizations, which has historically backed either the first or the second tendency, depending on 
personal, institutional, and external factors (Mutua, 2008: 123-4).  
I mention these tendencies here, as they are significant in explaining the fragile nature of 
alliances formed in the pro-reform camp. Moreover, it helps explain the rise of the religious 
community leadership in mediating between the different initiatives that gave rise to the 
Ufungamano Initiative, specifically, due to the fragility of the political context from the 1990s.  
 
From the four categories of political behaviours, I develop a different typology that 
accommodates different variables. These variables include: organisational identity (i.e. civil 
society organisations in different forms vs. political parties); the actor‘s stance on preferred 
process of constitutional reforms; relationships with similar and differently oriented 
organisations, relationship between reform groups and the state; and models of resource 
mobilisation. At the formative stages of the Ufungamano Initiative, the main actors coalesced 
into at least three distinct groupings: 1) actors advocating people-centric and driven reforms; 2) 
actors opposed to people-centric and driven reforms; and 3) neutral or indifferent actors. It is 
instructive to note here, that the dominance of elites in all these formations denotes presence of 
elite fragmentations, which have served as political opportunities for movement emergence and 
operations. Below, I engage these groupings in greater detail. 
Actors advocating people-centric and driven constitutional reforms  
The actors advocating for people-centric and driven constitutional reforms coalesced around the 
Ufungamano Initiative. This is the group that the current study is primarily concerned with. This 
group brought together a range of actors from the more combative activist human rights civil 
society organisations that had hitherto congregated under the National Convention Executive 
Council (discussed in the previous chapter). The group included both middle class radical 
struggles as well as subaltern struggles such as the Muungano wa Wanavijiji, students, youth and 
women‘s movements. But this group also included opposition political parties whose 
‗government-in-waiting syndrome rendered [them] generally […] unprincipled and subject of 
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corruption by the ruling bloc [with] its interest in reforms ...not centred on democratization of the 
state, but rather on … minimum changes to make its ascendancy to power possible‘ (Mutua, 
2008: 123). Some of the participants in this study corroborate Mutua‘s assertions (for example 
Odhiambo M., 01/04/2010; Onyango, 07/10/2009; Zein, 07/10/2009; Mwachofi, 27/09/2009). 
Odhiambo M. (interview, 01/04/2010), for instance, offers an insightful narrative on how this 
rather large grouping of the so-called pro-reform movement evolved, and how it has been 
characterised by multiple struggles and cleavages within the main constitutional reforms 
struggle: 
From the early 90s we had a coming together of what is called loosely a pro-reform movement 
and pro-reform politicians, largely responding to the closed up Moi/KANU system, into a 
movement that took constitutional reform as its key focus.  Basically this movement was saying 
that in order for us
2
 to anchor other reforms, in order for us to start transforming the state, not just 
in the sense of how the elite share power, but also in the sense of how the common man [sic] 
begins to have a better relationship with governance and with institutions of state, we need to 
overhaul the governance framework itself. But there have been of course, different points of 
emphasis. Politicians have always emphasized aspects that bring them closer to power. On the 
other hand, the common man [sic], in a context where we have very high levels of poverty, has 
always thought that the struggle is about basic rights, access to improved living conditions, and 
generally issues of bread and butter (interview, 01/04/2010). 
 
Odhiambo M. went on further to pose an important question of where these two positions 
converge to explain why certain aspects of this struggle have been emphasized more than others. 
For him, it is important to look at the politicians and other elite and ask: 
 To what extent have the needs of the common man and woman who is thinking about his/her 
kids‘ access to education, food on the table, plough their small shambas etc been emphasized? 
The dominant voices within the struggle have actually been the voices of those who are saying 
power first and in Nkrumaist cliché, ―seek ye the political power and all the rest will flow in‖ 
(interview, 01/04/2010).   
There is therefore evidence to support the conclusion that such cleavages are the bane of socio-
political and economic struggles in Kenya. Indeed, over a decade ago, Katumanga (1999: 6), 
citing the case of the National Convention Executive Council noted:  
                                                 
2
 ‗Us‘ in this case has duo references: firstly to Kenyans, and secondly to movement activists and movements they 
formed.  
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While it is imperative for the success of the movement that the ideas which evolve are clear and 
able to connect the problems with the system, while evolving alternative solutions that seem 
indeed realizable... the National Convention Executive Council‘s... only problem lay in the fact 
that they seemed to talk essentially for the English-speaking external and middle-class audience. 
It was only in the later stages of the movement‘s maturation that they sought to talk for the 
constituency whose manpower they needed for their street battles with the state. Such lapses spell 
doom for movements.
3
 
 
For the current study, as already pointed in chapter four, the words of Abubakar Zein (interview, 
07/10/2009) demonstrate further cleavages even among the elite formations:  
After the repeal of section 2A in 1992, two main schools of thought emerged within opposition 
political parties. The first block were those congregating around Mwangaza trust and later 
SAFINA party and later in Muungano wa Mageuzi and believed that Kenya had undergone a 
transition from single party status to a multiparty without radical transformations. This group 
wanted radical constitutional changes that would radically alter the nature and mind-set of the 
state of Kenya. Without this, true transformation would not be possible. This group was pushing 
for this kind of radical reforms arguing that the constitution was tyrannical because of imperial 
presidency that did not allow for participation of the people or even the true reflection of the will 
of people. Another block congregating around the Democratic Party, which became the official 
opposition in parliament after 1997 general election wanted only piecemeal amendments. This 
group believed and argued that Kenyan problem was a public management or governance 
problem and not a fundamental constitutional question. The biggest proponent was Democratic 
party leader Mwai Kibaki who kept on saying what you need are managers; smart people who 
have gone to university and have got economic degrees like himself. The current constitution is 
not bad, if you had well trained technocrats, you can transform Kenya. In fact, this argument 
played into Moi‘s hands and at some point, even some people in the SAFINA camp were 
persuaded by this change of management theory. These congregated under the leadership of 
Richard Leakey who later on, even after being nominated as a Member of Parliament on a 
SAFINA ticket, joined the government and became the Head of the Civil Service and the 
                                                 
3
 Katumanga (1999: 6) quotes Willy Mutunga (1998: 19-20) position that ‗two contestations seem to take place in 
the constitutional reform movement, that is the radical and the liberal components.  The liberal and the neo-liberal 
line sought to emphasize the lawyer paradigms in constitution making, namely the process and procedures that end 
up in an immensely useful minutiae but which are politically barren.   Here, constitution making assumes a narrow 
project crafting structures of good governance, free and fair peaceful elections, etc.  A radical line avoids the 
nominal form and emphasizes the implantation of reform in the preoccupation of quotidian activities.  These 
included existential issues such as creation of jobs, production and equitable distribution of foodstuffs, health needs, 
issues of ethnicity, regionalism, racism, religious bigotry and sexism.‘  
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Secretary to the Cabinet to lead the so-called technocratic dream team that was to save this 
country.    
 
These cleavages continued to play throughout the life of the Kenyan constitutional reform 
struggles and even within the so-called proponents of the people led-process (interviews: 
Waruku, 29/09/2009; Odhiambo M., 01/04/2009. See also Mutua, 2008; Katumanga, 1999). 
Indeed, with the exception of NCEC allied civil society groups, neither the moderate civil society 
formation represented by the National Council of NGOs of Kenya (NGO Council), nor political 
parties, were necessarily pushing for fundamental review of the constitution. Their interests were 
firmly focused on changes that would allow fairer political competition (Mutua, 2008). It is 
therefore within this context that Mutua (2008) records an instance prior to the 1997 general 
elections, when a bitter struggle ensued between civil society and the opposition politicians over 
the extent and depth of reforms. This struggle had been occasioned by the relative success of 
NCEC in bringing masses of people to the streets in their ‗no reforms no elections‘ campaign. 
This struggle, Mutua (2008: 110), writes: 
Broke the guarded trust and alliance that the two sectors had forged since 1980s.... After the 
electoral debacle of 1992 and 1997, civil society became even more circumspect about joint 
reform projects with the opposition. The opposition appears to have decided that it was unwise to 
have ceded so much political space to civil society. As such, in 1998, even though Moi had 
deceived it, the opposition nevertheless decided to restart negotiations with KANU on the 
constitutional reform process. 
  
The above scenario of multiple cleavages in the struggles poses a couple of critical questions on 
the potency of the constitutional reform struggles in Kenya. Some of these questions include: 
have the different struggles always understood each other? Have the dominant elite voices of the 
struggle always understood what the ordinary citizen is struggling for, and therefore, at least 
within their own struggles, tried to mainstream them? Or have the elite always wanted to capture 
power as an end in itself?  Evidently, there has been tension between the different perspectives 
and intentions within the broader constitutional change struggle. As Odhiambo M. (interview, 
01/04/2010) noted, the voices of elites have been most heard. This has resulted in changes that 
are only reflective elite bargains and pacts rather than transformations that benefit the subaltern. 
As such, the voices of the under classes, even though loud enough, have in most instances fallen 
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on deaf political ears. There have nonetheless, been occasional instances of failure of elite to 
agree among themselves, hence the resultant fragmentation. Part of such intra-elite struggles 
have in some occasions, been forced to congeal with ordinary people‘s struggles to face the 
dominant or hegemonic elite force. The National Convention Executive Council cited in the last 
chapter is a referent case here. Moreover, as we shall see later in this chapter, the Ufungamano 
Initiative was also one such instance.  
 
However, such congealing has been usually characterised by co-optive relationships that have 
resulted in betrayals of the common person‘s cause (interviews: Apiyo, 16/09/2009; Odhiambo 
M., 01/04/2010; Aukot, 19/10/2009; Onyango, 07/10/2009. See also Katumanga, 1999; Maina, 
1998 for similar views). This suggests the reason why one of the most frequent outcomes of such 
improvised convergence, is that things never change for the common citizen. Even when 
anything changes, in the face of multiple internal oppositions, the pace has remained painfully 
slow (Interviews: Odhiambo M., 01/04/2010; Waruku, 29/09/2009). The case of the so-called 
2002 transition, where even after a new set of political elite got into power, riding on the 
promises to fundamentally alter the state, but little if anything changed, serves to augment this 
observation. Moreover, this explains, in part, as we shall see in chapter seven, the circumventing 
of the people‘s will by the NARC administration in 2005 leading to a rejection of the 
government proposed constitution. This further serves to remind Kenyans that even after the 
passing of a new constitution in 2010 radical transformation of the Kenyan state is not going to 
be easy, while the same opposing forces remain relevant in Kenyan politics. 
Actors opposed to people-centric and driven constitutional reforms  
The second major category of actors included those opposed to people-centric and driven 
constitutional reforms and primarily coalesced under the Parliamentary Select Committee. The 
main actor here was the Moi/KANU regime and its collaborators (NDP, Shirikisho Party, Kenya 
Social Congress, and pro-state civil society organisations represented by the Evangelical 
Fellowship of Kenya and its affiliated churches) (Karanja, 2008; Mutua, 2008). According to 
Mutua (2008), actors in this group represented a fraction of elite that has historically held power 
in Kenya, and pushed for undemocratic centralization of power within the presidency and among 
a few political elites. For Mutua (2008: 123), these have been particularly ‗opaque, despotic and 
resistant to democratic transformation.‘ I argue that this has also been the hegemonic political 
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and economic force in Kenya‘s intra-elite struggles and has, over the years, managed to 
subordinate society to its whims through coercion, co-optation, as well as instruments of 
symbolic violence. There is still no conclusive evidence on whether this group lost its hegemonic 
status with the passage of a new constitution in August 2010.  
 
As shall become clear later in this chapter, this group (those opposed to people-centric and 
driven constitutional reforms) was directly the target of the Ufungamano Initiative. In these 
contentions, this group has succeeded in deliberately frustrating reforms in Kenya through a 
combination of 
[…its] ability to divide and successfully isolate the radical formation from the mainstream 
opposition and the religious sector co-optation, economic motivation and diplomatic duplicity and 
the inability of [social movement‘s] leadership to interpret social process correctly, to the extent 
of evolving right institutional design and programmatic responses for mobilisation... (Katumanga, 
1999: 1).   
Neutral/ indifferent actors 
The third type of actors, were the neutral or indifferent ones, who, according to Mutua (2008: 
124), were ideologically ‗pro-establishment.‘ This group has had a ‗distrust and distance from 
the more vocal fractions of civil society or even the political opposition.‘ Mutua refers to this 
collective, as the ‗middle from whence most of Kenya‘s elites are drawn [and] has vast interests 
in land, property, the professions and the marketplace. The middle is ethnically, racially, 
regionally, and religiously diverse, a fact that makes it formidable‘ (Mutua 2008: 124). It is this 
group that has occasionally provided the tipping point in the incessant Kenyan intra-elite 
struggles.   
 
From the three categorisations, and a mapping of the actors within each camp, it is evident, using 
a three sector model of analysing society (i.e. state, civil society and private sector), that there 
was no uniformity or generic consensus between the different actors in terms of where they fell 
in these contentions. Those in favour of what they called a ‗people-led process‘, as did those 
opposed and even the neutral ones, included groups and people drawn from part of political 
parties, civil society and private sector. The three types of actors in relation to their stance on the 
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Kenyan constitutional reforms contention during the period under review are plotted in Figure 
5.2 below. 
 
Figure 5.2: Constitutional reforms actors in Kenya and their relationships 
Explanatory note: Names of actors in the figure are drawn collectively from First Schedule of the Constitution of Kenya Review 
Act (1997), as well as the Ufungamano Initiative’s strategy paper for the people-based constitutional Review Process 
(28/09/1999). The cycles are used in this figure to represent cleavages between different actors (state, political parties, secular 
civil society and religious organisations). The intersections represent fluidity of contention. Considering that the main focus for 
this thesis are the actors within the Ufungamano Initiative, other actors outside our relational references are used to explain the 
crystallisation of these types of actors under the Ufungamano Initiative. There were at least three distinct types of groups under 
the Ufungamano Initiative all who supported a people-driven constitutional change but with multiple variations on the nature of 
reforms required in the country. These groups, as shown in this figure, included secular civil society, religious civil society 
groups, and opposition political parties.  
 
 
 
 
A: Actors in the Ufungamano Initiative supporting People-centred and driven 
Reforms  
Progressive (mainly human rights oriented) civil society organisations and 
movements  advocating fundamantal  reforms: National Convention Executive 
Council, Law Society of Kenya, Kenya Human Rights Commission, 4Cs, Federation 
of Women Lawyers (Kenya Chapter),  International Commission of Jurists (Kenya 
Chapter),  Release Political Prisoners 
Youth Groups: Kenya National Youth Alliance, Kenya National Students Union, 
Kenya Law Students Society, Kenya Alliance for Advancement of Children,  
Muungano wa Vijana Wazalendo. 
Civil Society in favour of qualified but people-centred reforms: 
Activist' Religious organisations:(Karanja 2008) Anglican Church of Kenya, Kenya 
Episcopal Conference (Catholic( Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, National 
Council of Churches of Kenya,  Hindu Council of Kenya, Muslim Consultative 
Council,  Methodist Church of Kenya, Presbyterian Church of East Africa, 
Organisation of African Instituted Churches, Seventh Day Adventists , Muslim 
Consultative Council (Sisters Network)  
National Council of NGOs of Kenya 
Opposition political parties: Democratic Party of Kenya,  Ford Kenya, Ford Asili, 
SAFINA, Ford People. 
Women Civil Society Organisations: Kenya Women Political  Caucus ,  League of 
Kenya  Women Voters,  Collaborative Centre for Gender and Development, , 
National Council of Women of Kenya, Kenya Widows and Orphans Association,  
Kenya Pastoralists Forum, National Council of NGOs of Kenya,    
Kenya Association for the Deaf, United Disabled Persons of Kenya, Kenya Society 
for the Disabled   
C. Neutral/indiferent organisations:  
Association of Local Government Authorities of Kenya, 
Kenya National Farmers Union, Kenya National 
Federation of Cooperatives , National Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, Federation of Kenya 
Employers, Kenya Association of Manufacturers, Kenya 
National Union of Teachers, Association of Professional 
Societies of East Africa, Kenya Medical Association, 
Media Institute 
B. Parties in/or supporting the Parliamentary Select 
Committee’s State-centric reforms:  
 
Actors opposed to people-centric reforms: Ruling  Party and 
Cooperating Opposition political partiesi. I.e. Kenya African 
National Union National Development Party, Shirikisho and  
Kenya Social Congress) 
Civil Society groups resisting reforms (Pro-ruling party stance) 
: Theologically conservative Religious oganisations (Karanja 
2008) under the Evangelical Fellowship of Kenya e.g. The 
Africa Inland Church, African Independent Pentecostal Church 
of Africa (AIPCA) , Deliverence Church, Redeemed Gospel 
Church of Kenya, Church of God in East Africa  
 
Pro-ruling party  Women's Organisations: Maendeleo ya 
Wanawake Organisations  
 
Pro-ruling Party  Central organisation of Trade Unions 
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It is important to note at this point, that the formation of the Ufungamano Initiative and 
particularly its launch of a parallel constitutional reform process divorced from 
state/parliamentary control, was a fruition of an earlier idea that had been floated by Rev. 
Timothy Njoya, one of the co-convenors of the National Convention Executive Council, during 
National Convention Assembly at the Blue Post Hotel in Thika earlier that year (i.e. January 7-9 
1999) but did not gain any immediate traction (Njoya, interview 29/09/2009; Kuria, 1999). When 
the different stakeholders gathered at the Ufungamano House on December 15
th
 to 16
th
 1999 and 
announced the formation of the People‘s Commission of Kenya (PCK), to collect and collate 
views from Kenyans, the Ufungamano Initiative succeeded where its predecessors like National 
Convention Executive Council and CNC had failed. Specifically, it succeeded in bringing 
together, a broad spectrum of pro-reform actors including ordinary peoples‘ struggles, influential 
citizens‘ groups like political parties, religious institutions, and human rights civil society 
organisations into league with one another to mount a coordinated and sustained challenge on the 
Moi/KANU political edifice through direct action in writing the constitution.  
 
While the Ufungamano Initiative started off as an alliance of stakeholders specifically mentioned 
in the First Schedule of the Constitution of Kenya Review Act of 1997, with time, it also 
‗attracted ordinary people‘s struggles in the economic field, political field, those who were 
struggling thorough scholarship in the university, those who were struggling through culture, into 
one umbrella‘ (Zein, interview 07/10/2009; Njogu and Oluoch-Olunya, 2007; wa Mutonya, 
2007). In a way, the Ufungamano Initiative emerged as a ‗movement of movements‘ in that the 
different constituent campaigns and struggles, served not only as hubs of the struggles in 
themselves, but also as arteries for the Ufungamano Initiative‘s work. As a result, the 
Ufungamano Initiative exhibited a great sense of adaptability and complexity in its 
organisational form. This begs two key questions: first, how and why was it possible, for such 
diverse groups to converge under one umbrella movement, in a political atmosphere with so 
much suspicion based on a long litany of betrayals? Second, what changed with regard to 
political opportunities or constraints?  These are the questions that the chapter turns to address in 
the next section. It does this, initially by looking at the theoretical literature on political 
opportunities that inform social movement emergence, and later by empirically locating the 
emergence of the Ufungamano Initiative within the theory.   
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Theorising the Ufungamano Initiative’s emergence   
To explain the emergence of the Ufungamano Initiative in later 1990s, I utilised three closely 
interwoven explanatory variables prevalent in the academy to account for the emergence of 
social movements. The first is the existence of denial of rights of claimants. The second is the 
existence of a leadership that incubates the movement through mobilisations, to respond to the 
third variable – existing political opportunities and constraints (see Tilly, 2004; Tarrow, 1998). 
These three represent a progression in theoretical models that have been utilised by sociologists 
over the years, in the study of why and how social movements emerge.  In utilising the three 
approaches dominant at various times in the development of the scholarship of social 
movements, I position myself in the same camp as Buechler‘s (2008: 1031) who suggests a 
‗viability of a synthesis between older [i.e. strain and breakdown] and newer explanations 
[opportunity] of collective action‘ (my emphasis). The bottom line is an acknowledgement that 
structural conditions generated discontent, which in turn provided incentives for generation and 
participation in social movement activism (see McVeigh, 2006 for similar arguments on 
evolution of social movement activism and crime). 
 
Below, I engage with each of the three variables and their corresponding theoretical and 
empirical explanations of the emergence of the Ufungamano Initiative. First I offer an exposition 
of the developments with a view to recapitulate on the theories explored in chapter two, to 
explain social movement emergence. I then move to analysing empirical data on the emergence 
of the Ufungamano Initiative. 
Relative deprivation of rights and the emergence of social movements 
The last chapter provided a litany of socio-political and economic variables, especially material 
and political rights deprivations that have been the powder keg for the various waves of 
contention in Kenya. As already seen in chapter two, the nexus of relative deprivation, claims to 
denied rights, and injustice as a justification for collective organising that generates collective 
action and social movements is not a new argument in social movement studies. A variegated 
body of work such as Osaghae (2008), Buechler (2000), Gurr (1969), Davies (1962) and 
Geschwender (1968), argues that collective action behaviour results from people subjectively 
judging or perceiving themselves as lacking resources enjoyed by a particular reference group. 
Davies (1962: 5-6) for instance, theorises that collective action is most likely to occur when a 
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‗prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of 
sharp reversal…. People then subjectively fear that ground gained with great effort will be quite 
lost; their mood becomes revolutionary‘. This occurs because there is a substantial intolerable 
gap between what people have come to expect, and what they are actually getting or expect to 
receive in the future based on their sense of deteriorating conditions (Davies, 1962; Buechler, 
2000). For Davies, it is this sense of acute deprivation that motivates people to participate in 
collective behaviour to alter their situations.   
 
Following suit, Geschwender (1968: 127) suggests a theory of cognitive dissonance to explain 
motivations for individual predispositions toward participation in social movements. The theory 
has three temporal hypotheses (i.e. rising expectations; relative deprivation, and downward 
mobility); and one non-temporal one, status inconsistency. For Geschwender (1968) cognitive 
dissonance gives rise to the following cognitions:  a) there is an image of a state of affairs that 
the actor believes is attainable; b) there is a belief that the actor is entitled to that state of affairs; 
and c) there is knowledge that the actor is not currently enjoying that state of affairs (see also 
Buechler, 2000). These situations give rise to a psychological pain that pushes people to act 
collectively to reduce it.   
 
Ted Gurr in his book Why Men Rebel (1969) follows suit to claim that grievance-induced 
discontents are the main determinants for political mobilisation that result in social movements 
(as cited in Langer, 2005). Gurr (1969) posits a primary causal sequence in which relative 
deprivation fosters discontent, which is first politicised and then actualised in political violence 
(cited in Buechler, 2000). Gurr (1969) views ‗collective behaviour‘ in social movement as a 
‗mild‘ (aborted, weak, undeveloped) form of revolutionary outbreak or an aspect of revolution‘ 
(as cited in Mamay, 1991: 47). 
 
Nonetheless, an increasing body of work criticises the emphasis on deprivation as precipitants 
for social movement‘s emergence on a number of counts (see for example Osaghae, 2008; 
Nasong‘o, 2007; Buechler, 2000; McAdam and Paulsen, 1993; Jenkins, 1983; McAdam, 1982; 
Snow, Zurcher and Ekland-Olsen, 1980; Tilly, 1978; McCarthy and Zald, 1977). For instance, 
McAdam (1982) argues that the claim that social movements are a response to social strain 
ignores larger political contexts within which movements arise. The relative deprivation 
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approach also ‗assumes a mechanistic and linear relationship between macro-level strain and [the 
resultant] macro-level behaviour‘ while in reality, the approach cannot explain how social 
discontents over denied rights translate into collective action (Buechler, 2004: 51; 2008). 
Moreover, by identifying individual discontent as the proximate cause of social movements, it 
problematically presumes an abnormal (deviant even) psychological profile for individuals who 
participate in movements (McAdam, 1982: 11–19). As such, while discontents over denied 
rights/entitlements are necessary, they are, in themselves, insufficient in explaining the 
emergence of social movements (Osaghae, 2008; McAdam, 1982).  
Leadership and structural context in the emergence of social movements 
The leadership and structural context approach in explaining social movement emergence, 
borrows from the resource mobilisation model. As pointed out in chapter two, resource 
mobilisation theorists emphasize the importance of resources in social movement emergence, 
development, and success. For instance, McCarthy and Zald (1977) argue that social movements 
develop only when individuals with grievances are able to mobilise sufficient resources to take 
action. As shall become clear later in this chapter, critical resources including money, 
knowledge, political influence, media, legitimacy, and internal and external support from power 
elite enabled the congregation of the different actors feeling aggrieved by KANU‘s refusal to let 
Kenyans write a constitutions of their choice, to challenge the state. This was only possible 
because of organisation and leadership provided.
4
      
 
Scholars such as Osaghae (2008), Tilly (2004), and Tarrow (1998), among others, have argued 
that understanding why and how social discontents translate into collective action groups and 
social movements requires, 
[A deeper analysis of the] historical context of the struggles, the social basis of the movements, 
the nature of leadership of the movements, how the constituency of interests is mobilized, why 
certain rights and not others are demanded, and the prospects for success of the rights struggle, 
which also requires some analysis of the nature of the state and its engagement with social 
movements (Osaghae, 2008: 195).  
Morris and Staggenborg (2004) point out that approaches that attempt to explain the why (i.e. 
structural strain) but also the how (agency-leadership- and structure) in contributing to generative 
                                                 
4
 See Morris and Staggenborg (2004) for similar arguments to explain the role of leadership in movement emergence.  
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and operative aspects of social movement, are largely ignored in social movement theorising. For 
Morris and Staggenborg (2004: 171), the relative drought on the utilisation of structure and 
agency, stems from social movement theorists trying to avoid the obvious dangers as:  
A focus on great leaders [agency] risks neglect of structural opportunities and obstacles to 
collective action, while an emphasis on structures of opportunity risks slighting human agency. 
Moreover, an emphasis on leaders seems to unfairly relegate the critical masses of movements to 
the category of ―followers‖ (cf. Barker et. al. 2001). Thus, any approach to leadership in social 
movements must examine the actions of leaders within structural contexts and recognize the 
myriad levels of leadership and roles of participants. 
Tilly (2004:13) argues that this has resulted in ‗good deal of the twentieth and twenty-first 
century social movement [scholarship]... disguising the entrepreneurial effort in favour of images 
portraying the spontaneous emergence of WUNC‘ (Tilly 2004: 13). 
 
Taking the two together (leadership –agency- and structural context), I posit that the organisation 
and psychology of leadership is an important variable in explaining social movements‘ 
emergence, operations, internal coherence and effectiveness, and in effect, their power and 
limits, success and failures (Tarrow, 1998; Morris and Staggenborg, 2004). Leadership, 
especially charismatic leadership, plays an indispensable role in creating, recognising and 
utilising political opportunities that transform discontents into collective actions by channelling 
and driving them through three distinct phases of incubation, action, and institutionalisation of 
social movements (Nasongo, 2007; Katumanga, 1999). To be effective, the type of leadership 
has to ‗change through time as a function of different forms of structure and of different 
situations in which organized movements operate as they become large and institutionalized‘ 
(Gusfield, 1966: 137). As such, in the life of a movement, leadership plays different roles such as 
creating and recognising opportunities and devising strategies in an effort to influence outcomes 
(Morris and Staggenborg, 2004). Corresponding to the three categorisations of incubation, action 
and institutionalisation sequencing, Erick Hoffer (1958), identifies three types of leadership: 1) 
‗Men [and women] of words‘ 2) the ‗fanatics‘ or cadres; and 3) the ‗practical men [and women] 
of action.‘ As Katumanga (1999: 7) notes, these differentiations of categories of the stages in 
social movement‘s developments, and the corresponding categorisation of leadership, are only 
valuable for their analytical utility. Indeed, they are mutually exclusive and the most successful 
movements are those with individuals who can merge the three roles. Below, I briefly look at the 
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roles each of these plays in the evolution and life of a social movement and specifically link it to 
the Ufungamano Initiative. 
Men and women of words in social movement incubation  
Leaders catalyse collective discontent into social movements by providing ‗a body of organising 
principles and slogans around which people are organised for action‘ (Nasong‘o 2007: 21; 
Katumanga, 1999) while ‗mobiliz[ing] resources and found[ing] organizations in response to 
incentives, risks, and opportunities...‘ (Morris and Staggenborg, 2004: 173; see also Nasong‘o, 
2007; Katumanga, 1999; McCarthy and Zald, 1973: 1977; Oberschall, 1973). Nasong‘o calls 
these catalysts, ‗men and women of words‘ while Tilly (2004; 1997), and McAdam (1982), refer 
to them as ‗social movement entrepreneurs‘ who are mainly the intelligentsia and ideologues on 
which social movements ‗depend heavily ... for their scale, durability and effectiveness‘ (Tilly, 
2004: 13). These entrepreneurs utilise their charisma, oratory capacity and the power of written 
word, to publicise existing social dysfunctions and discontentment of people, and philosophise 
on how these can be fixed (Katumanga, 1999). According to Hoffer (1958, as cited in Nasong‘o, 
2007: 21), these men and women of words seek to ‗undermine the existing belief systems and 
institutional arrangement while simultaneously promoting hunger for faith among masses‘ (see 
also Katumanga, 1999 for a similar argument).  The men and women of words also ‗go out of 
their way to weaken the beliefs of the ―better people‖. This is done mainly to neutralise their 
impact as a new fanaticism evolves‘ (Katumanga, 1999: 6). As such, social movements emerge 
‗in part from prior planning, coalition building, and muting of local differences‘ (Tilly, 2004: 
13).  This is particularly true of the Ufungamano Initiative that emerged from a great diversity of 
actors. For the Ufungamano Initiative, the men and women of the word included a section of the 
clergy, the intelligentsia, politicians, and activists, especially from the Kenya Women Political 
Caucus (whose role is discussed in detail later). 
 
The actual input from the men and women of words in the Ufungamano Initiative was illustrated 
through a conviction held by religious leaders and activists, that the socioeconomic and political 
conditions in the country could be different. The clergy, among others, specifically held moral 
theological convictions. Many of the so-called radical clergy in Kenya borrowed a leaf from the 
Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. who once said that ‗any religion that is not concerned about the poor 
and disadvantaged, the slums that damn them, the economic conditions that strangle them, and 
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the social conditions that cripple them, is a spiritually moribund religion awaiting burial‘ (cited 
in Gabriel Dolan, 2010). Gitari (interview, 21/09/2010), concurred with this positioning of 
religion, arguing that the church took a deliberate step to challenge the state because of the 
leaders and congregants‘ theological conviction that: 
The church‘s mission is just not spiritual. It is spiritual, political, social, and economic...man is a 
psychosomatic being i.e. body and spirit. You cannot separate the two. So we cater not only for 
the spirit, but for the body too. Therefore, our involvement in development and in fighting 
injustices whether it is structural or whatever, is biblically based. It is because of our theology 
that you cannot keep yourself away from the welfare of your people. Yes, we are for heaven, but 
we are in this world, and we cannot just abandon the affairs of the world to politicians... politics is 
so important that it should not be left to politicians alone.  
 
Njoya (interview, 29/09/2010) argued along the same lines when he stated that the clergy have a 
divine role to intervene on issues of injustice and at the time of establishing the Ufungamano 
Initiative, they had strong convictions that they were doing the right thing as God would have 
wanted them to. Even lay people supported such theological convictions. Indeed, Apiyo 
(interview, 21/09/2009) argued that ‗religious leaders are not here just to show the people the 
way to heaven. They must build that heaven on earth by talking about the daily issues that affect 
the people, lead the people, lead the process, and speak for the people when there is need.‘ 
 
As such, it is clear that religious organisations and their leadership played an important role in 
organising and mobilising people to act against injustices in society. The Catholic Church in 
partnership with the African Network for the Prevention and Protection against Child Abuse and 
Neglect (ANPPCAN) for instance introduced formal courses in community organising whose 
primary beneficiaries were the urban poor living in the slums. The Exodus-Kutoka Network 
made up of parishes of the Catholic Church in the slums, is also a demonstration of the Church‘s 
involvement in organising and mobilising citizens in the slums against forced evictions and other 
injustices including constitutional reforms. Chapter six analyses in detail, the strategies as well as 
structures that the Ufungamano Initiative utilised in its action phase. 
Fanatics in social movement action 
The action phase depends on the skills and temperament of fanatics that are imperative for 
hatching and animating movements‘ actions (Nasong‘o, 2007: 21; see also Katumanga, 1999). 
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Katumanga (1999) calls these ‗cadres‘. For Nasong‘o (2007: 21) these ‗take the ideology and 
words of the ideologues and translate them into comprehensible terms for the masses in distress.‘   
 
For Katumanga it is the ability to build cadres that helps movements undercut their opponents by 
‗easily reach[ing] the society through their ability to use and talk the language of the people‘ 
(Katumanga 2006: 6 as cited in Nasong‘o, 2007). Katumanga (2006) further contends that the 
ability of a movement to train a cadreship and pass on its objectives, and to convince and 
motivate them, can determine a movement‘s ability to survive and achieve goals‘ (cited in 
Nasong‘o, 2007: 21). Tilly (1977), as does McAdam (1982), gives weight to the role of these 
fanatics in explaining why some movements develop and others fail. For Tilly (1977), a 
movement‘s accent is contingent upon the aggregation of resources. Organisation and continuity 
of leadership are therefore crucial in explaining success or failure of movements. Also crucial is 
the way movements mobilise support.  
 
Mobilisation processes and structures create support from the general population by forming 
recruitment networks to tap potential members. Recruitment takes place through cadres arousing, 
nurturing, and motivating targeted individuals and groups through issue framing. Once support is 
won, movements have to build collective identity and continue to pursue collective interests. For 
the case at hand, these cadres and fanatics included an already existing large pool of trained 
community organisers who had been part of earlier struggles that became constituent parts of the 
Ufungamano Initiative as well as community activists at the grassroots (Apiyo, interview 
10/09/2009). These played a critical role in mobilising support, especially at the grassroots in 
both urban slums and also marginalised rural areas in some instances e.g. Taita Taveta district. 
These were able to translate people‘s distress into comprehensible actions organising for 
collective action.  
 
The chair of Community Organisers Professional Association of Kenya (COPA), Lawrence 
Apiyo for instance demonstrated their contributions to change through working with care and 
devotion when he said: 
I was involved in political grassroots activism since the clamour for multiparty democracy. I 
remember we used to mobilize our people to hold night meetings for people to push for change of 
section 2A, which made Kenya a one party state. We were doing night meetings because 
 170 
gatherings were not allowed.  If you were found you could be arrested and charged. So, at night 
we went across the slums holding meetings in our houses. This is why Kibera slums of Nairobi 
hosted the first opposition party cell even before the removing of section 2A (interview, 
16/09/2009). 
This confirms that the clergy were not alone in their convictions and zeal. Cadres drawn from 
activists and community organisers in different parts of Kenya took over and propagated the 
desires for, and ensured the idea of constitutional change struggles achieved a life of its own and 
remained alive. Moreover, this happened through conscious efforts by the Ufungamano Initiative 
utilising civic education to sensitise, nurture, and motivate Kenyans on the need to stand up and 
agitate for change. This study treats such zeal in the actions towards organising by both leaders 
but also the followers, as an illustration of agency.   
Practical men and women of action and social movements’ institutionalisation  
According to Hoffer (1958, as cited in Nasong‘o, 2007: 21) the third phase in a movement‘s 
development is its institutionalisation. In this phase, the social movement becomes 
bureaucratised on account of its growth in age and size, as it attracts different elements in society 
as its constituency.
5
 This bureaucratisation results from increasingly routinized nature of the 
                                                 
5
 Hoffer (1958) suggests three types of characterizations: The disciples, militant followers and passive sympathizers. 
A ‗movement‘s success is predicated on the ability of the disciples to work together while submerging their personal 
differences, egos and ambitions. They also contribute to the failure as a result of the converse‘ (Katumanga, 1999: 7).  
Indeed, as discussed in chapter seven, the Ufungamano Initiative was unruffled by what Katumanga (1999: 7) cites 
as ‗petty unprincipled rivalries‘ predicated by ‗ethnic bigotry, opportunism and unbridled ambition which punctured 
the wind out of the reform balloon.‘ Katumanga (1999: 7) further argues that two positions are discernible in 
discussions on the militant followers: the orthodox approach that posits that movements attract psychologically 
maladjusted individuals, seeking what Sigmund Freud called a crowded cure for their neurotic or psychotic 
symptoms; the revisionists approach that posits that movements are a collective response to objective problematic 
situations than a mélange of personally frustrated fringe elements of the society. They indeed contain a wide range 
of humanity that Rudolf Herble (1951), applying Max Weber‘s typology of motivation notes as revolving around 
value rational motivations (i.e. those committed to universal sets of values e.g. religion or ideology and whose 
action is dictated by a desire to realize the goal of the value system; traditional motivations (actors pursuing 
prescriptions of immemorial tradition and seeking to defend traditional values and cultures - common among 
nativistic movements); emotional affection motivations (closer to Hoffer‘s account of misfits); and purposive 
rational motivations (those who seek personal goals such as safety, power and income. These individuals join 
movements less for the ideology or myth, but more for the opportunistic value likely to be derived). Indeed Apiyo 
(interview 16/09/2009) held that ‗there have been a lot of betrayals.  People joined the struggles with different 
intentions...you would think you are on the right path and the process, but other people would deviate because either 
their objectives have been met, or they do not see any of their intentions or objectives being met. So the struggle for 
change kept on changing and taking different shapes and processes…‘ Many other participants such as Waruku, 
Odhiambo C., Athman, Wandati, Oganda, Eban, Basole, Nyokabi, Mwachofi, Omtatah, Musau, Khairallah, Kuria, 
Gathaka, Zein, Onyango, Raiji, Aukot, mentioned betrayal as a key theme running through these struggles. For 
instance, Zein, a former commissioner with Ufungamano Initiative and later the Constitution of Kenya Review 
Commission noted that there were people he had been ‗together in the trenches, and were caught up by the 
attractions of the empire and betrayed the cause and that at a price, they changed their positions.‘ As such, 
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movement‘s activities, which calls for administrative and organisational skills on the part of the 
leadership (see also Katumanga, 1999 for similar ideas). Consequently, this phase requires the 
leadership of practical men and women of action. Nasong‘o (2007: 21) argues that, ‗without such 
leadership, a movement may lose its drive, become tame and experience paralysis and may 
ultimately atrophy.‘ Within the Ufungamano Initiative, this leadership was offered by a 
secretariat that oversaw the running of the movement as well as the People‘s Commission of 
Kenya under Oki Ooko Ombaka who oversaw the operations in the collecting and collating of 
views from the Kenyan public. Chapter six will deal with the functions of these leadership roles 
in greater detail. 
Political opportunities and constraints and social movement emergence 
Political opportunities –defined as the degree of receptivity or vulnerability of the political 
system to organised protest by challenging groups that facilitate or constrain the emergence of 
social movement or other forms of insurgency (Chan and Zhou, 2009) – alongside resources, are 
treated by political opportunity theorists as the most important social structures/factors that 
favour/hinder social movement emergence and evolution (McAdam, 1982; Tilly, 1978). 
Proponents of this theory such as Tilly (2004; 1978); McAdam (1982); and Tarrow (1989; 1998) 
show that this receptivity or vulnerability can be the result of any or a combination of the 
following:  
a) Growth of political pluralism (i.e. democratisation) (Tilly, 2004), or a decline in 
effectiveness of repression by the state.  
b)  Internal fragmentation and disunity of elites which could lead to support of organised 
opposition by some part of the elite. Elites give support by encouraging movements to 
organise, by providing public legitimisation and legal or administrative support. This 
support may at times be traded for electoral support for these elites by the movements.
6
  
c) Broadening of access to institutional participation in political process.  
These factors translate into net gain in political opportunity that movements can utilise. Political 
opportunities improve when the power discrepancy between authorities and challengers is 
                                                                                                                                                             
Katumanga (1999) rightly concludes that these characterizations are important in understanding the levels of 
commitments and the speed with which movements are unruffled. 
6
 A typical example of this in Kenya is politicians‘ flirtations with movements like Mungiki, Sabaoti Land Defense 
Forces, and the recent Mombasa Republican Council, among many others. 
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reduced and the bargaining position of challengers is improved (McAdam, 1982 cited in 
Buechler, 2000).  
 
For Tarrow (1998: 142), the explanatory variable for the broadening of political opportunities is 
what he calls ‗cycle of contention‘ that 
Produces externalities that gives challengers at least a temporary advantage and allows them to 
overcome the weaknesses in their resource base. It demands that states devise broad strategies of 
response that are either repressive or facilitative, or a combination of the two. It produces general 
outcomes that are more than the sum of the results of an aggregate of unconnected events.‘
 7
 
Tarrow further offers useful insights into why and how movements emerge in a contentious 
environment. For him: 
Contentious politics is triggered when changing political opportunities and constraints create 
incentives for social actors who lack resources on their own. They contend through known 
repertoires of contention and expand them by creating innovations on the margins. When backed 
by dense social networks and galvanised by culturally resonant, action-oriented symbols, 
contentious politics leads to sustained interaction with opponents. The result is a social 
movement… [i.e.] sequences of contentious politics that are based on underlying social networks 
and resonant collective action frames, and which develop the capacity to maintain sustained 
challenges against powerful opponents (Tarrow, 1998: 2).  
 
The emphasis here is on structures of political opportunity. Movements therefore develop in 
contingent opportunity structures that influence their efforts to mobilise (Tarrow, 1998; 
McAdam, 1982; Tilly, 1978). Each movement's response to the opportunity structures depends 
on its organisation and resources. As such, there is no clear pattern of movement development, 
                                                 
7
 White (1993: 430) offers a useful synthesis of Tarrow‘s cycles of contention and its linkages to political 
opportunity. For him the cycles of contention result more from political opportunity structure that people face than 
by the grievances that drive them. The political opportunity structures have the following six features: ‗(1) an 
increasing and then decreasing magnitude of disruptive direct action; (2) Social diffusion- characterised by an 
increasingly and then decreasingly broad spectrum of social sectors involved in disruptive direct action; (3) 
increasing spatial/geographical diffusion of contention; (4) increasing involvement of social movement 
organisations (relative to interest groups and ad hoc groups) as the cycle nears its peak; (5) the broadening of 
grievances and demands from concrete, direct popular interests toward the reconstruction of society's overall 
concept of popular contention; and (6) repertorial evolution from more institutional and patterned behaviour to more 
confrontational and tactically versatile activities and back.‘ According to White (1993: 430), ‗Tarrow sees cycles of 
contention as leaving behind three probable and one possible residues: (1) an expanded space in which people feel 
that they can effectively and/or legitimately express grievances; (2) expanded opportunities for collective action 
organisers and organisations; 3) expanded opportunities for social groups to increase their influence and achieve 
their goals, and perhaps; 4) policy reform, the likelihood of which depends on the presence within the elite of 
minorities whose own interests are served by reforms responsive to the wave of contention.‘ 
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nor are specific movement techniques or methods universal. A key task set for this chapter 
therefore, is to analyse the shifting political opportunities and constraints in the contention for 
constitutional reforms in Kenya that allowed the different actors to congeal as the Ufungamano 
Initiative. 
 
While earlier versions of political opportunity model did not pay much attention to leadership, 
recent political opportunities literature has paid greater attention to the ‗role of leaders in 
recognizing and acting on opportunities‘ (Morris and Staggenborg, 2004: 173). In addition to 
political opportunities, the political process theory also identifies two other vital components for 
movement formation. The first borrows from the relative deprivation theory (already dealt with 
earlier), but framed under the political processes model as insurgent consciousness. This is 
defined as a collective sense of injustice felt by certain members of society that they are 
mistreated or that somehow the system is unjust and with it, a sense of cognitive liberation from 
the potential movement participants (McAdam, 1982). The second is organisational strength, 
which is based on strong leadership and sufficient resources (Tilly, 2004; Osaghae, 2008). 
Charles Tilly (2004) a leading proponent of the political opportunities model-provides a useful 
analysis to show how disaffection and contention transforms into social movement organisation 
through a synthesis of three main elements – campaigns, repertoires of contention, and WUNC 
displays.  
 
1) Campaigns result from organising efforts whereby discontent is initially channelled through 
an organised and sustained public effort to making collective and contentious claims on targeted 
authorities. As a result of this organisation, protests are self-directed with a clear leadership and 
therefore assume their own lives as campaigns.
8
 In a campaign, core actors mobilise others and 
initiate the task of structural integration and negotiations among the groups in the network for the 
purposes of building coalitions. Campaigns manifest some centralisation at least of ideas in 
mobilisation for actions in the arena of struggles. Keck and Sikkink (1998: x), explain that the 
core aim of a campaign is to ‗multiply the voices […] by overcoming … deliberate suppression 
                                                 
8
 A campaign according to Keck and Sikkink (1998: 17) is a ‗set of strategically linked activities in which members 
of a diffuse, principled network develop explicit visible ties and mutually recognised roles in pursuit of a common 
goal and generally against a common target.‘ 
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of information‘ thereby helping reframe debates, changing their terms, their sites, and the 
configuration of participants (Mati, 2008).  
 
According to Tilly, (2004: 4): 
A campaign always links at least three parties: a group of self-designated claimants, some 
object(s) of claims, and, a public of some kind. The claim may target ―authorities‖ [that] may 
include government officials, owners of property, religious functionaries, and others whose 
actions (or failures to act) significantly affect the welfare of the citizens [in general and the 
claimants in particular].  
For Tilly (2004: 4), it is not the single ‗action of claimants, object(s), or public, but intentions 
and interactions among the three that constitute a social movement.‘  
 
2) Repertoire of contention refers to how an emergent campaign employs a combination of the 
following forms of political actions: ‗creation of special-purpose associations and coalitions, 
public meetings, solemn processions, vigils, rallies, demonstrations, petition drives, statements to 
and in public media, and pamphleteering‘ (Tilly, 2004). According to Tilly (2004: 4), ‗social 
movement repertoires of contention overlap with repertoires of other political phenomena.‘  
However, it is the integration of most, or all of these performances into a sustained campaign, 
that is the mark of social movements from other varieties of politics. 
 
3) Worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment (WUNC) displays. These involve 
participants‘ concerted public representation of:  
a) worthiness which involves sober demeanour; neat clothing; presence of clergy; dignitaries; 
and mothers with children);  
b) Unity , which involves marching badges, headbands, or costumes; marching in ranks; singing 
and chanting; 
c) Numbers which involves headcounts, signatures on petitions, messages from constituents, 
filling streets; and  
d) Commitments which included braving bad weather; visible participation by the old and 
handicapped; resistance to repression; ostentatious sacrifice; subscription; and/or benefaction 
(Tilly 2004: 4). 
WUNC displays take the form of statements, slogans, or labels that imply worthiness, unity, 
numbers, and commitments (Tilly, 2004).  
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The relationship between the three aspects (campaigns, repertoires of action, and WUNC 
displays) of a social movement are made clear by Tilly‘s (2004) typology of claims that resultant 
social movements make. The first is ‗program claims, involv[ing] stated support for or 
opposition to actual or proposed actions by the objects of movement claims‘ (Tilly, 2004: 12). 
The second is ‗identity claims consist[ing] of assertions that ‗we‘-the claimants- constitute a 
unified force to be reckoned with‘ (ibid).  The third is ‗standing claims [which] assert ties and 
similarities to other political actors...‘ (ibid). It follows then, that there is a conscious planning on 
the part of movement entrepreneurs who figure out the need to organise a sustained campaign. 
This sustained campaign utilises repertoires of action while actively buying public support and 
allies through WUNC displays.    
 
A clear advance of the political opportunity model therefore is in further explaining the linkages 
between campaigns repertoires and WUNC displays, in the timing of emergence and success of 
social movements.  The political context (opportunities and constraints) faced by movement 
actors, therefore intersects with strategic choices made in mobilising support and utilise existing 
or create new opportunity structures, to determine the emergence and success or failure of 
movements.  
 
Having laid the theoretical background to the emergence of movements, the chapter turns to 
analysing the emergence of the Ufungamano Initiative with a view to demonstrating the critical 
question of political opportunity theory‘s relevance in the Ufungamano Initiative‘s emergence. 
Specifically, how does the theoretical model link to the empirical in the emergence of the 
struggles that converged under the Ufungamano Initiative? To answer this question, the next 
section looks at the precipitating factors that created a sense of deprivation, denial of rights, and 
injustice among the different groups that coalesced together to form the Ufungamano Initiative.  
The emergence of the Ufungamano Initiative: the why and the how 
Two broad but intimately interwoven explanatory variables are used to explain why and how the 
Ufungamano Initiative evolved. The first is structure, i.e. existing and evolving political 
opportunities and constraints.  The second explanatory variable is agency, i.e. the role of 
leadership, in mobilising discontents among various previously organised but disparate actors 
(see chapter four) to respond to the changing political conditions by carefully building and 
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utilising new structures that incubated a movement within the existing political opportunities and 
constraints. The two variables reinforce each other in explaining the emergence of the 
Ufungamano Initiative. The central thesis here is that political opportunity structures on their 
own would not transform discontent over denied rights into a movement. Likewise, the 
movement entrepreneurs needed the opportunity structure within which to mobilise discontents 
into a movement with a sustained campaign, repertoires of actions/contentions as well as the 
WUNC displays that became the Ufungamano Initiative. The chapter first empirically examines 
the political opportunities and constraints and the role of leadership in the emergence of the 
Ufungamano Initiative.  
Structural context of the emergence of the Ufungamano Initiative  
The Ufungamano Initiative emerged in a context of expanding political opportunities that various 
civil society groups and political parties utilised in its formation. These opportunities were the 
result of earlier cycles of contention (discussed in the previous chapter) that had managed to 
expand spaces for more contestations. Specifically, the Ufungamano Initiative emerged from 
discontents emanating from the Moi/KANU regime‘s intransigence to allow the Ufungamano 
Initiative actors (movement entrepreneurs and members), to take part in the constitution making 
process despite the October 1997 Inter Parliamentary Parties Group (IPPG) agreements between 
the opposition political parties and KANU, having promised the same.   As such, the narrative 
below picks up from where the last chapter ended. It treats developments in the aftermath of the 
IPPG package, as the political opportunities that allowed collective grievances (read relative 
deprivation) to emerge and be channelled through a collective action that incubated the 
Ufungamano Initiative. The developments included the Constitution of Kenya Review Act of 
1997; outcomes of the 1997 general election, and the subsequent negotiations that came to be 
known as the Safari Park Process that the Moi/KANU regime later reneged  (interviews: Apiyo, 
16/09/2009; Wandati, 17/09/2009; Gitari, 21/09/2009; Kihoro, 23/09/2009; Ndubi, 24/09/2009; 
Kuria, 26/09/2009; Mwachofi, 27/09/2009; Gathaka, 29/09/2009; Waruku, 29/09/2009; Njoya, 
29/09/2009; Churchill, 02/10/2009; Ocholla, 06/09/2009; Onyango, 07/10/2009; Wambugu C., 
09/10/2009; Ong‘wen, 09/10/2009; Athman, 12/10/2009; Kibara, 15/10/2009; Aukot, 
19/10/2009; Kibwana, 21/10/2009; Lamba, 23/10/2009; Nyokabi, 31/03/2010; Odhiambo M., 
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01/04/2010; Nyabinda, 25/03/2010; Mwalulu, 01/04/2010. See also Mutua, 2008). These 
political opportunities are considered in the section below.  
October 1997 IPPG package; December 1997 general election; and the aftermath 
Among many other analysts, Oyugi (2003), and Mutua (2008), offer insights into the general 
political climate that the 1997 general election generated. They converge in their argument that 
KANU‘s political behaviour towards the opposition did not necessarily change even after the 
1997 IPPG package of reforms. This is corroborated by several of this study‘s participants (e.g. 
Apiyo, Wandati, Gitari, Kihoro, Ndubi, Kuria, Mwachofi, Gathaka, Waruku, Njoya, Churchill, 
Ocholla, Onyango, Wambugu C., Ong‘wen, Athman, Kibara, Aukot, Kibwana, Lamba, Nyokabi, 
Odhiambo M., Nyabinda, Mwalulu). Through the IPPG reforms of 1997, the Moi/KANU regime 
agreed on some minimum administrative reforms to electoral laws but dissolved parliament 
before these reforms could be anchored in the constitution (interviews: Athman, 12/10/2009; 
Onyango, 07/10/2009; Wambua, 13/10/2009).  
 
Nonetheless, some of the more significant of these administrative reforms that had an impact on 
the expansion of political opportunity structure included the expansion of the electoral 
commission by ten new members to be nominated by opposition political parties.
9
 The others 
were: 1) an agreement that the twelve specially nominated members of the Kenyan parliament 
would, after the 1997 election, be allotted to political parties on the basis of the strength of seats 
they would win in parliament; 2) the abrogation of the Sedition Act to enable freedom of 
expression; 3) purging of powers of chiefs through an amendment of Chiefs’ Authority Act; 4) 
last but most importantly, the enactment of Constitution of Kenya Review Act of 1997 (here after 
1997 Review Act) (interviews: Onyango, 07/10/2009; Ochanda, 22/09/2009. See also Badejo, 
2006; Lumumba, 2008; Mutunga, 1999).  While most opposition political parties saw these as 
positive developments, a few political parties, including a section of Ford Asili and National 
Development Party sided with the National Convention Executive Council (NCEC), to dismiss 
the IPPG package as inadequate and argued that without a constitutional anchorage, it would be 
open to manipulation by President Moi (Oluoch, 1997; Lumumba 2008; interviews: Kuria, 
26/09/2009; Kibwana, 21/10/2009). Indeed, ten years later (in 2007), President Kibaki‘s flouting 
                                                 
9
 This number was however a minority compared to the number of commissioners nominated by KANU. 
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of the administrative reforms and the electoral process as agreed through the IPPG in 1997, was 
cited as a major cause of the post-election violence that brought Kenya on the brink of a 
precipice (The Standard, January 9, 2007; January 12, 2007; Kenya National Commission on 
Human Rights, 2008).  
 
Despite misgivings by the NCEC allied groups, the IPPG did offer new political opportunities 
that would be crucial in the post-1997 general election mobilisations.  One of the most ardent 
critics of the IPPG and a former NCEC leader, Kivutha Kibwana (interview, 21/10/2009) for 
instance, argued: 
IPPG emerged as a response to a politically charged environment that had radicalised demands by 
the NCEC. The state responded in trying to address these demands through the IPPG, which, even 
though rejected by NCEC, weakened Moi‘s power. Things we were not aware of before, started 
happening, his way of running everything, guarding turf etc. was weakened. 
A prominent figure in the pro-reform movement since his days as a student leader at the 
University of Nairobi and current leader of the Citizens Coalition for Constitutional Change, 
Paddy Onyango (interview, 07/10/2010) similarly captured the impact of the IPPG on the pro-
constitutional change struggles when he argued:  
The IPPG was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it gave us a window of opportunity. For 
example, the Preservation of Public Security Act was reviewed and therefore the right to 
assemble was made easier because what we needed to do now was notify the police of the same. 
Secondly, the knowledge that you could demonstrate without being taken to the Nyayo House
10
 
was in itself liberating and gave us a good opportunity to mobilise.  
 
However, the IPPG deal, it has been argued, also ‗punctured the reform momentum in the sense 
that with the 1997 election approaching, the actual interest of the opposition was exposed as they 
crossed over to make deals with KANU‘ (Onyango, interview 07/10/2010). 11  Onyango 
(interview, 07/10/2010) argued that this had resulted from a monumental failure on their part as 
‗leaders of this process to acknowledge early enough, that the political interests of our political 
                                                 
10
 During the single party rule era, Nyayo House was home to the notorious chambers where political prisoners were 
detained without trial in solitary confinements and were tortured by the state intelligence agencies.  
11
 Many other participants from a spectrum of constituencies and social classes in the Ufungamano Initiative 
including Apiyo, Gitari, Kihoro, Ndubi, Kuria, Mwachofi, Waruku, Njoya, Muihia, Suba, Ocholla, Wambugu C., 
Ong‘wen, Athman, Wambua, Kibara, Aukot, Kibwana, Lamba, Nyokabi, Odhiambo M., Wanga, and Mwalulu had 
similar views. Mwalulu for instance argues that ‗IPPG literally robbed the movement of its political wing.‘  
Wambua (13/10/2009) adds that ‗the 1997 IPPG deal and the rapidity with which the opposition politicians agreed 
to the deal with KANU left many in civil society feeling wounded, but most importantly, deflated.‘ 
 179 
colleagues were not necessarily in consonance with the aspirations and the spirit of the rest of 
us.‘ However, others see it differently. Kibwana (interview, 21/10/2009) for instance, supports 
the view that political elites uncomfortable with the civil society led mass actions of 1997, 
needed an excuse to clip civil society‘s growing power and designed the IPPG principally to do 
exactly that (see also Mutua, 2008 for similar conclusions). For Kibwana, during the height of 
the 1997 civil society led mass action, ‗politicians realised that civil society people were getting 
too much limelight, and becoming too popular. That is how they went to Moi and hammered the 
IPPG deal because they were afraid of a NCEC led radical agenda‘ (Ibid. See also Mutua, 2008; 
Murungi, 2000; Misoi, 2007; Nasong‘o 2007 for similar conclusions). Nonetheless, Ochanda 
(interview, 22/09/2009), as did Gitari (interview, 21/09/2009), read the IPPG as an expression of 
some ‗goodwill coming in from the political side, particularly the ruling party.‘  
 
As already mentioned, one of the significant outcomes of the IPPG agreements, albeit dismissed 
by some participants of this study (for instance Lethome, Wandati, Kibwana, Ong‘wen) as a red 
herring by politicians to steal the thunder from civil society on the constitutional reforms in the 
country, was the 1997 Review Act (Mutua, 2008; Mutunga, 1999; Oyugi, 2003; Nzomo, 2003; 
National Convention Executive Council, 1997; 1998; East African 3-9 November, 1997; 10-16 
November, 1997; The Economic Review November 3-9, 1997). The 1997 Review Act created a 
sort of reference point that became significant in the post-1997 election mobilisations. 
Nonetheless, the haste with which it was expended with in the process of its enactment, having 
been negotiated outside of parliament and only taken to parliament for enactment just before 
parliament dissolved, meant there was not much space to debate the bill (interviews: Ochanda, 
22/09/2009; Wandati, 17/09/2010).  However, the 1997 Review Act was good enough for many 
of the stakeholders for a number of reasons.  
 
First, the 1997 Review Act spelt out how the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (here 
after the Commission) was to be constituted to carry out constitutional reviews for the country. 
The 1997 Review Act also acknowledged the need for popular involvement of the citizens of 
Kenya. This had been a key demand of the NCEC allied civil society. In responding to this 
demand, the 1997 Review Act endeared itself to a good number of contenders who now thought 
that they would have space to participate (Ochanda, interview 22/09/2009). Specifically, the 
1997 Review Act‘s First Schedule listed the following as the stakeholders with legitimate 
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representations in the Review Process: 1) Political parties; 2) Religious organisations; 3) Women 
organisations; 4) Civil society, and 5) the Attorney General. Nonetheless, the 1997 Review Act 
fell short of spelling out how the actual process would happen. Its main undoing was its 
exclusivity in the definition of the stakeholders to the process. This was compounded by the lack 
of clarity on the formulae to be used in constituting the Commission. All the same, the IPPG and 
the resultant 1997 Review Act, broadened access to institutional participation in the 
constitutional making process. Moreover, it served to confirm that with greater pressure, the 
Moi/KANU regime was vulnerable and open to negotiations. In the end, as I shall later discuss, 
the 1997 Review Act despite its flaws, was utilised as an important rallying point in the 
accountability politics and protests against the Moi/KANU regime after KANU reneged on the 
promises made in it, and led to the emergence of the Ufungamano Initiative. Below is a narrative 
analysis that helps explain how this happened.   
  
Kenyans went to the polls at the end of 1997. The Moi-led KANU yet again, defeated a divided 
opposition that ‗had ignored pleas from their supporters to unite.‘ But KANU won with only a 
slim majority (i.e. 108 KANU MPs against opposition‘s 102) in parliament (Weekly Review, 
09/01/1998: 5). According to the Weekly Review, Moi‘s performance in the polls was not 
unexpected as:  
Each of the major presidential candidates from the majority ethnic communities in the country 
[had] count[ed] on their tribal arithmetic to upset KANU. This was not to be and in fact, …as 
Luoland voted overwhelmingly for Mr. Raila Odinga, Kalenjinland for Moi, Luhyaland for 
Kijana Wamalwa, and Kikuyuland for Kibaki many of the smaller of the 42 Kenyan tribes sided 
with Moi (Weekly Review, 09/01/1998: 5).  
In the election month (December 1997) and the immediate months following elections (January 
through March 1998), politically instigated ethnic violence broke out in various multi-tribal 
districts of the country especially in Rift Valley and Coast provinces, just as had happened in the 
1992 general election. This violence was specifically targeted at ethnic groups seen to be 
predominantly pro-opposition (Weekly Review, 09/01/1998; 16/01/1998; 23/01/1998; 
30/01/1998; 06/02/1998; 27/02/1998). These attacks seen as state sponsored, united a collection 
of the leadership of the various opposition parties, civil society and the religious groups in 
condemning them (Weekly Review, 09/01/1998; 16/01/1998; 23/01/1998; 30/01/1998; 
06/02/1998; 27/02/1998). However, the divisions within the political opposition elite continued 
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to play out when Raila Odinga and Kijana Wamalwa accepted the 1997 elections and 
congratulated the winner, Daniel arap Moi of KANU while Kibaki, the first runner-up, rejected 
the election results and called for a re-run  (Weekly Review, 09/01/1998). This division served to 
further fragment the political opposition.  
 
The year following the 1997 general election (1998) began on a low note. As a divided 
opposition licked its wounds in defeat, a bitter National Convention Executive Council seemed 
to have been telling the opposition ‗we told you so.‘ The speed with which opposition political 
parties and religious leaders pushing for reforms fell for the Moi/KANU bait through the IPPG 
deal, left some egg on the face of the radical elements in National Convention Executive Council 
(Mutua, 2008: 109; Katumanga, 1999). Indeed, some politicians and journalists, weary of the 
growing influence of National Convention Executive Council through the mass protests were 
already calling for the disbandment of National Convention Executive Council arguing that it 
had exhausted its mandate and should be wound up (Kibwana, January 2000). The National 
Convention Executive Council‘s saving grace, paradoxically, came almost immediately after the 
1997 general election as Moi yet again, started reneging on the very promises he had made to 
other politicians through the IPPG.   
 
The Moi/KANU strategy post-1997 general election was multi-pronged. With a reduced majority 
in parliament, Moi, always ahead of the pack in the political game, started calculating on how he 
would dilute the opposition in parliament. Immediately after the 1997 general election, Moi 
surprised many after he reached out to one of his erstwhile nemeses, Raila Odinga and his 
National Democratic Party (NDP), which was the third largest party in parliament, for 
cooperation. This cooperation ultimately led to a merger of KANU and NDP under the name 
KANU with Moi as the President of the party and Raila Odinga as the Secretary General on 
March 18,
 
2002. Even before the actual merger happened, the Moi/KANU regime, with Raila 
Odinga‘s NDP support, started a process of mutilating the 1997 CKRA and in effect, some of the 
IPPG agreements.  
 
Moi‘s actions to reach out to Raila Odinga and their subsequent manipulation of the Review 
Process, became the reference point upon which anger and a sense of bitterness over denied 
rights to participate in the constitutional Review Process emerged. The seemingly strange 
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bedfellows of opposition politicians, religious leaders and the radical National Convention 
Executive Council allied civil society groups were forced to the same side and became allies. In 
the event they started seeking collective action solutions. Many people including civil society, 
opposition political parties and religious leaders who had invested their faith and hope in the 
IPPG process felt cheated and betrayed. It was now the opposition politicians and the religious 
leaders‘ turn to be embarrassed by the turn of events. Moi‘s behaviour also served to vindicate 
the National Convention Executive Council‘s stance which had opposed the IPPG deal 
vehemently with arguments that Moi and KANU could not be trusted to implement the IPPG 
agreements given a past history of broken promises to the nation (Mutua, 2008; National 
Convention Executive Council, 1998).  
Post-1997 general election cooperation and conflicts and emergence of religious 
community’s leadership 
To appreciate the intricacies in the struggles over the constitutional reforms post-1997 general 
election, one needs to look at the dynamic and fluid composition and relationships between the 
claimants and targeted objects of claims. This fluidity was reflected in secular civil society, the 
religious community and a section of opposition political parties on the one side, with the 
Moi/KANU regime and sometimes the entire political elites including opposition invariably 
being the targets. The nature of this relationship goes a long way to explain the emergence of 
religious leadership of the Ufungamano Initiative as a mediating force between different 
competing interests and positions within the pro-reform actors. Overtime, their mediating role, 
read together with the continued frustrations with Moi/KANU regime‘s intransigence and 
contempt for other constitutional review contenders, together with widespread socio-economic 
and political dysfunctions in the country, metamorphosed into discontents that incubated the 
Ufungamano Initiative. The narrative below explains exactly how this happened. The core of 
contention was the operationalization of the 1997 Review Act.  
 
In the aftermath of the 1997 General Election, National Convention Executive Council in its 
characteristic radical/progressive tendency as discussed earlier in this chapter, while 
acknowledging modest gains made through the IPPG, continued trashing the deal arguing that it 
was fundamentally flawed and most importantly, despite its flaws, KANU could not be trusted in 
its implementation (Kibwana, January 2000; Mutua, 2008). NCEC cited a long history of the 
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Moi/KANU regime in systematically undermining constitutional stability through partisan and 
oft hurried adverse amendments aimed at curtailing people‘s freedoms and democratic rights, to 
shepherd a process that would be pro-people (Ufungamano Initiative, September 2000). The 
fullness of time proved National Convention Executive Council right. This came through efforts 
to redress what most actors saw as fundamental flaws of the 1997 Review Act (Mutua, 2008; 
Ochanda, interview 22/09/2009) through a series of consultations aimed at agreeing on the 
norms, institutions, and processes for the constitutional reforms (Mutua, 2008).  These talks were 
dubbed the Bomas, Safari Park I, Safari Park II and Safari Park III processes (Lumumba, 2008; 
Nasong‘o 2007; Mutua 2008; Wandati, interview 17/09/2009). The initiation of these talks 
revealed deep divisions within civil society and other actors within the pro-reforms camp. I argue 
here, that the cracks served to derail, albeit temporarily, the reform train but more fundamentally, 
it served as an opportunity for Moi/KANU regime to try to permanently wrestle the control of 
the reform process from the people.  
 
Specifically, political opposition parties seemed to be torn between supporting either civil 
society ‗positions‘ that they did not fully embrace given the fact that the nature of their reform 
interests were not synchronised, or to continue in the IPPG spirit of cooperation with KANU 
despite the fact that they did not trust Moi to implement the letter and spirit of the 1997 Review 
Act (Kibwana, January 2000; Mutua, 2008).  In mid-1998, opposition political parties chose to 
support the latter when they joined the regime to form the Inter Parties Parliamentary 
Committee. It was the Inter Parties Parliamentary Committee that invited other key stakeholders 
identified in the 1997 Review Act to the Bomas and Safari Park talks. This support on the part of 
parliamentary political parties was illusory. It was based on the political opposition‘s argument 
that parliamentary processes were superior and had the legal imprimatur as opposed to an extra-
parliamentary one that the NCEC-led civil society had been advocating for. Moreover, the 
opposition felt that in placing the Review Process in parliament, they were firmly in the driver‘s 
seat and civil society was now playing a peripheral role (Wambua, interview 13/10/2009).    
 
Reality however dawned on opposition political parties as the year progressed. By mid-1999, 
they had to turn to the very civil society they had shunned, for support in wresting the control of 
the process from the Moi/KANU regime. This happened because political parties ‗technically‘ 
allowed the stakeholder consultations that started in mid-1998 to be convened by the Attorney 
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General. This was ostensibly meant to cure the defects of the 1997 Review Act due to the 
incessant criticism by a majority of the stakeholders. Specifically, as confirmed in Njoya and 6 
others vs. Attorney General & 3 others that indeed, under section 27 of the then constitution, 
Parliament‘s Power was limited to only alterations of the existing constitution and it ‗had no 
jurisdiction or power … to abrogate the existing constitution and enact a new one in its place‘ 
(Kenya Law Reports, 2004: 262).  The real power to make a new constitution belonged to the 
people of Kenya as a whole.  Save for KANU and National Development Party members of 
parliament, other stakeholders to the Review Process argued that parliament was itself, a creation 
of the constitution and it was improper for parliament to review itself or define what its role in 
the Review Process was to be. Only the Kenyan people could review the constitution and define 
the role of various actors in reviewing the same (Ufungamano Initiative, 04/01/2000; Kenya Law 
Review, 2004: 262). As such, ordinary Kenyan people‘s involvement in radically reviewing the 
constitution was a key demand that radical civil society groups allied to National Convention 
Executive Council had stuck to during the Safari Park negotiations. 
 
Before the first stakeholder consultative forum at the Bomas of Kenya in May 1998, the Attorney 
General solicited, through the press, views to be used to review the 1997 Review Act. These 
views formed the basis for deliberations and negotiations that continued during the series of 
Safari Park Meetings in 1998 (Kibwana, January 2000; Mutua, 2008). That KANU wanted to 
out-manoeuvre other players, became apparent when it sought to exclude National Convention 
Executive Council and other radical civil society groups from the Safari Park talks because they 
were insistent on an extra-parliamentary national convention to write the country‘s constitution 
(Mutua, 2008). KANU insisted on only having groups earlier identified as the ‗middle or 
indifferent‘ on the negotiating table. It also proposed, against the grain of the 1997 Review Act, 
that appointments to the Review Commission, be along district lines (Mutua, 2008; Weekly 
Review, 26/06/1998; 24/7/1998). Opposition political parties, National Convention Executive 
Council, Law Society of Kenya, and religious groups identified as stakeholders in the 1997 
Review Act vigorously opposed this, terming it an effort at ethnicising the constitutional Review 
Process (Weekly Review, 26/06/1998).
12
 KANU relented under pressure and what was then seen 
                                                 
12
 It is my considered opinion that while KANU proposal to recruit the constitution making stakeholders along 
district lines had some merit given these have for long been ethnic and at least guaranteed representation of all 
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as a genuine consensus to allow for cooperation of different stakeholders in the reform process 
was reached at through the Safari Park negotiations (Weekly Review, 26/06/1998).  
 
The Safari Park III agreement in October 1998 contained several vital features and a number of 
amendments to the 1997 Review Act that later defined the nature of the grievances that informed 
the emergence and operations of the Ufungamano Initiative. This was because the Moi/Odinga 
alliance reneged on these agreements in 1999. The most significant agreements of the Safari Park 
process in 1998 included:   
1. The constitution would be comprehensively reviewed and not simply amended;  
2. The people of Kenya, as a whole, would be involved in the review through: (i) civic 
education, (ii) expression of their views on desirable alterations and additions, (iii) 
appointment of representatives to the District Forums and in addition to already elected 
councillors and MPs, and (iv) nominating three persons from each District Forum to 
represent them at the National Forum which would debate, negotiate, and approve changes to 
the present constitution;  
3. An independent 25 member Commission, appointed by the 54 named stakeholders, would 
oversee the entire process;  
4. The day-to-day management of the process would be undertaken by a Chairperson appointed 
by the Commission while secretarial and practical responsibilities would be exercised by 
Commission-appointed Secretary and staff both at the Commission headquarters and at the 
District Forums;  
5. A time table which envisaged that a comprehensively revised constitution would be ready 
and in place some 31 months after the commencement of the Review Process as provided for 
in the Act, suggesting that a new constitution would be ready about July/August 2001; 
6. Financing of the process would be a charge on the state funds in the Consolidated Funds, 
and; 
7. The role of Parliament in the process was clearly stipulated to be (i) to pass into law, a bill 
giving effect to the above six agreed considerations, (ii) to pass un-amended, a bill agreed to 
by the National Forum to alter the Constitution of Kenya as an Act of Parliament. The 222 
MPs were expected to participate in the formulation and approval of the bill to alter the 
                                                                                                                                                             
ethnicities in Kenya, the then gerrymandered districts would end up with some ethnic groups being dominant over 
others as districts were not fairly distributed on one ethnic group one representative formulae.     
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constitution. MPs were also expected to form a third of the 600 or so members of the 
National Constitutional Forum.  
 
The above seven points constituted what most stakeholders took to be a contract between the 54 
stakeholders, parliament, and the government of Kenya, to review and alter the Constitution 
legitimately and within the law. This agreement and the subsequent ‗Constitution of Kenya 
Review Commission Amendment Act of 1998 yet again, was interpreted as a sign of good will 
from political elites in taking the review forward‘ (Ochanda, interview 22/09/2009). The 1998 
Constitution of Kenya Review Amendment Act was negotiated outside parliament by a majority 
of stakeholders who were not parliamentary political parties. The 1998 Amendment Act was to 
be taken to parliament to be enacted without any amendments (Wandati, interview 17/09/2009). 
The agreement suggested that the actual process was to be divorced from Executive and 
Parliamentary control as much as possible.  
 
However, if opposition political parties, secular civil society and religious civil society retreated 
to the comfort of having secured an agreement, there was a rude awakening in store for them. 
The consensus bliss was short-lived. An element of confusion was deliberately added by KANU 
at the end of the final drafting process by adding new clauses to the Act that made its 
implementation problematic (Kibwana, January 2000). This was specifically in the schedule that 
named the so-called stakeholders. The list was exclusionary. Moreover, as Mutua (2008: 111) 
notes:  
The bane of the Safari Park compromise was the composition of the CKRC [Constitution of 
Kenya Review Commission]. Although the forum agreed that the CKRC would be composed of 
twenty-five commissioners – thirteen from parliamentary political parties and twelve from 
stakeholders outside Parliament – the formula for doling out the slots among political parties was 
not written into law.    
 
In February 1999, the process for appointing the commissioners stalemated one step from the 
constitution of the Review Commission. This stalemate resulted from KANU and opposition‘s 
failure to agree on how to share 13 slots that were allocated to political parties in a 25 member 
Review Commission. ‗KANU walked out of a meeting called by religious leaders to mediate an 
agreement between the political parties on the sharing of the 13 slots and in the process created a 
crisis between it and the opposition parties‘ (Athman, interview 12/10/2009). The stalemate 
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revealed that the terms of the Safari Park Agreement would not be translated into a properly 
enforceable contract (Kibwana, January 2000). Moreover, the desire by the various groups, 
particularly political party formations to secure their interests only through nominating 
commissioners from their own lot as prescribed under the 1998 Amendment Act, undermined the 
principle of neutrality deemed necessary for the execution of the duties of the commission. This 
lent credence to the grievances of those who felt left out of the list of stakeholders (Ufungamano 
Initiative, 27/01/2000).  
 
As only a few stakeholders had been expressly identified, the 1998 Amendment Act locked out 
from the process, many Kenyans and large numbers of other groups that had equal or superior 
claim of legitimacy (Ufungamano Initiative, 27/01/2000). For instance, grassroots groups of 
urban poor such as the Muungano wa Wanavijiji were left out, as were, youth groups like the 
National Youth Movement, National Youth Lobby for Reforms, among many others (interviews: 
Rema, 22/03/2010; Khairallah, 26/09/2009; Waruku, 29/09/2009).  To the excluded claimants, 
this exclusivity, ‗seriously undermine[d] the credibility and legitimacy of the process prescribed 
under the Safari Park agreement‘ (Waruku, interview 29/09/2009). For many, it amounted to 
elite pacts given that only exclusively middle class organisations were identified as stakeholders 
with legitimate claim to representation (Odhiambo M., interview 01/04/2010). This exclusion 
created further cleavages and feelings of betrayal that incubated grievances against elites within 
the reform movement. A youth participant in the Ufungamano Initiative captured this clearly 
when he argued:  
The constitution making has taught me a lot...in this process you think that you are together 
kindred spirit... some took off to the other side when they were assured of something. Take 
Honourable Phoebe Asiyo for example. At Safari Park we were together, as youth and women 
negotiating together. In Ufungamano we were together, agitating and piling pressure on KANU 
and NDP to come and negotiate and move the country together. But when women were assured 
of more slots through the Kenya Women Political Caucus, Phoebe Asiyo, I remember one 
morning she was with us at the Ufungamano, and in the afternoon, was being interviewed by 
Raila Odinga to be a commissioner.... It taught me a lot that there are people furthering certain 
self-interests only. The political elite mistake however was to think they could take the youth for 
granted and so nobody was keen on getting their youth participation (Waruku, interview 
29/09/2009). 
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Under the circumstances, it was not surprising that the Ufungamano Initiative entrepreneurs 
utilised the very exclusionary 1998 Amendment Act as an opportunity to frame contention and 
the entire enterprise of the resultant Ufungamano Initiative, came to be based on this 1998 
Amendment Act.  
The role of the Kenya Women Political Caucus leadership in incubating the 
Ufungamano Initiative 
Immediately after the enactment of the 1998 Constitution of Kenya Review Commission 
Amendment Act, squabbling over the number of positions apportioned to each political party 
started as each political party insisted on nominating more of its own to the Commission
13
 and 
intensified in early 1999 (Mutua, 2008). This threatened to get out of hand before two women, 
described by one of the participants in this study as ‗the unsung heroines behind the 
establishment of the Ufungamano Initiative – Honourable Dr. Phoebe Asiyo and Honourable Dr. 
Julia Ojiambo
14
 approached various religious organisations to mediate a political parties 
stalemate‘ (interviews: Athman, 12/10/2009; Ocholla, 06/10/2009; Wandati, 17/09/2009). These 
women leaders further urged the religious leaders to seize the moment to unite the different 
fragmented constitutional reforms and generic democratisation initiatives. This led to the birth of 
what came to be the first clear immediate predecessor to the Ufungamano Initiative known as the 
Religious Community Coordination Team. According to Athman, who served as a commissioner 
in the Ufungamano Initiative‘s People‘s Commission of Kenya and a member of the Executive 
Council of the Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims (SUPKEM) at the time, and who was privy 
to the behind the scenes dealings: 
They [Dr. Julia Ojiambo and Dr. Phoebe Asiyo] quietly went behind the scenes to different 
religious leaders and talked to them individually and said: ‗we have a problem in this country and 
you must intervene.‘ They went to Archbishop Gitari, they went to Archbishop Ndingi, they went 
to Shashi Raval (the head of the Hindu Council at the time), they went to the Muslim Council.... 
Primarily, those were the initial leaders involved in these discussions, but were later on joined by 
                                                 
13
 Political parties had collectively nominated 21 commissioners instead 13 allocated to them because they could not 
agree on a formulae to determine each party‘s worth. 
14
 Both Dr. Phoebe Asiyo and Honourable Dr. Julia Ojiambo were key leaders of the original Women Political 
Caucus but it later split into two grouping and later separate organisations –The Kenya Women Political Caucus and 
the League of Kenya Women Voters - specifically over what side of the constitutional reform contention i.e. 
Ufungamano Initiative or the Parliamentary select Committee to support. Dr. Phoebe Asiyo later abandoned 
Ufungamano Initiative to become a commissioner in the Parliamentary Select Committee‘s Commission long before 
the merger (Waruku, interview, 29/09/2009; CKRC, 2005).   
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NCCK who had been initially opposed to the idea.... Gitari ...gave it quite a bit of thrust 
…(Athman, interview 12/10/2009). 
 
More interviews with the Ufungamano Initiative insiders (e.g. Wandati, 17/09/2009; Gitari, 
21/09/2009; Ocholla, 06/10/2009 among others) as well as reviews of various internal 
Ufungamano Initiative documents reveal that the two key members of the Kenya Women 
political Caucus played a significant role in the movement‘s emergence. Ocholla (interview 
06/10/2009) for instance revealed:  
With the political parties at a stalemate, it was realised that we were going nowhere, and given 
the fact that the will and desire of the Kenyan people for a new constitution was far greater than 
the interests that were sabotaging the process … the Caucus led by Hon. Asiyo decided to put the 
parties down to sit and talk…. She even called the then president and asked him for a specific 
audience … because the then political atmosphere in the country was very tense.  
A confidential document by the Religious Community Coordination Team dated September 28 
1999 titled ‗Strategy For The People-Based Constitution of Kenya Review Process by the 
Religious Community in the Republic of Kenya’ provides further evidence of the role of the 
Kenya Women political Caucus. Specifically, the presence and contributions of Dr. Julia 
Ojiambo, recorded in various minutes of meetings and internal documents confirm the key role 
of these two women in these developments.
15
  
 
The initial activities of the Religious Community Coordination Team were crafted as mediation 
intervention by religious leaders to break the political parties‘ stalemate over the sharing of their 
13 slots in the review commission.  The first meeting that took place in April 1999 was chaired 
by then head of the Anglican Church in Kenya - Archbishop David Gitari (Religious Community 
Coordination Team, 28/09/1999). All parliamentary political parties, including KANU attended 
and made what appeared to be substantial concessions as KANU‘s representatives in the 
meeting, its Secretary General and cabinet minister, Julius Sunkuli ―gave up one of their seats,‖ 
from seven to six. National Development Party and Ford Kenya followed suit to drop ―their‖ 
respective one slot claim to the commission (Gitari, interview 21/09/2009; Religious Community 
Coordination Team, 28/09/1999). It appeared that the Religious Community Coordination Team 
                                                 
15
 For instance minutes of Religious Community Coordination Team Silver Springs Hotel meeting on April 1999; 
Religious Community Coordination Team Strategy for the People-based Constitution of Kenya Review Process by 
the Religious Community in the Republic of Kenya (28/09/1999); Minutes of Religious Community Coordination 
Team at the Machakos Garden Hotel meeting 13th and 14th October 1999 to mention but a few. 
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effort was gaining some grip. However, agreements reached at this meeting still needed to be 
reconfirmed by president Moi (Gitari, interview 21/09/2009). The supposed concessions turned 
to be smokescreens meant to hoodwink the Religious Community Coordination Team and the 
rest of the stakeholders. Moi dismissed agreements reached by other stakeholders including 
KANU in open discussions and even refused to meet the Religious Community Coordination 
Team leaders despite their pleas (Gitari, interview 21/09/2009).  
Shifting gears and heightening of contention 
In May 1999, amid the political parties‘ acrimony, President Moi buoyed by his newfound 
strength that the KANU cooperation with the Raila Odinga-led National Development Party had 
given his party, announced a major assault on the Review Act and as well as the 1998 Safari 
Park stakeholder agreements. Moi re-launched an old debate to the contention when he 
authoritatively stated that parliament would be the sole and appropriate body to review the 
constitution at the exclusion of other stakeholders. He further argued that a people-centred 
process was not necessary. Instead of using the 4.5 billion Kenya shillings set aside in the budget 
for the review, Moi stated, this money would be used for poverty eradication programs. He 
further stated that two good foreign lawyers would be invited to write the constitution, and pass 
it over to parliament for debate and ratification (Wandati, interview 17/09/2009).   
 
In Moi‘s reasoning, ‗Wanjiku (denoting an ordinary Kenyan female) was not interested, nor 
qualified to participate in the comprehensive reforms.‘ For him, it was only the busy bodies in 
NGOs who had been masquerading as the people, who wanted a new constitution when they had 
not been elected by anybody (Mutua, 2008; Wandati, 2009; interviews: Wandati, 17/09/2009; 
Zein, 07/10/2009; Ombok, 24/09/2009; Chitinis, 20/10/2009; Aukot, 19/10/2009; Kibwana, 
21/10/2009). Of significance here is the fact that this was not the first time Moi was reneging on 
the promises he had made to the country regarding his commitment to ensuring a new 
constitution.  As such, it was not lost on the Religious Community Coordination Team that the 
same institution – parliament, through parliamentary political parties that Moi and his 
sympathizers were rooting for, had created the stalemate. Moreover, other stakeholders 
especially those allied to NCEC were already opposed to parliament as it was heavily controlled 
by a one-party executive which was not keen on consensus but on dominance (Njoya, interview 
29/09/2009). 
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Secular civil society (mainly NGOs and grassroots movements), religious organisations and what 
remained of political opposition parties were alarmed by Moi‘s May 1999 pronouncements. 
Immediately after Moi‘s pronouncements, stakeholders except KANU and NDP, who had been 
meeting under the mediation of religious leaders, also shifted gear when it became apparent that 
Moi was not relenting. Indeed, the May 1999 pronouncements and developments leading to, and 
after it, added to a long litany of broken promises by the Moi/KANU regime and served as the 
wakeup call for those opposed to Moi and KANU – that if things were to change, unity was 
paramount (interviews: Omtatah, 31/03/2010; Athman, 12/10/2009; Wambua, 13/10/2009; 
Wandati, 17/09/2009).  
 
The pronouncement, seen as a diversion by Moi, led to the hardening of positions by the 
contending actors (civil society and opposition political parties) who identified Moi‘s chicanery 
as the single most threat to a comprehensive Review Process (Mutua, 2008). These groups also 
wondered why foreigners would be involved in a process that was purely a Kenyan affair and 
whose process and stakeholders had been agreed upon in open negotiations, enacted by 
parliament, and assented to by Moi himself  (interviews: Gitari, 21/09/2009; Kuria, 26/09/2009; 
Ombok, 24/09/2009; wa Gathaka, 29/09/2009; Beatrice, 30/09/2009; Lethome, 02/10/2009; 
Kamau, 13/10/2009; Ghai, 23/10/2009; Omtatah, 31/03/2010; Mwanyumba, 07/04/2010; 
Mwachofi, 27/09/2009). In opposing Moi‘s position, the Religious Community Coordination 
Team further argued that his proposed formulae amounted to breaking the law, and that they 
‗could not, in conscience, sit by and continue to watch the flagrant disregard of the law by the 
law makers and parliament… [and therefore] moved in to fulfil the law, not to break it‘ 
(Ufungamano Initiative, 28/09/2000). They further framed their contention as based on ‗justice 
and fairness founded on morality and the will of the people’, which in their view was, ‗the 
highest law‘ (ibid).  
 
The Religious Community Coordination Team together with Kenya Women Political Caucus 
now started reaching out to civil society and like-minded opposition political parties to build 
consensus on the need to salvage the process and allow popular participation in the constitutional 
reforms (Religious Community Coordination Team, 28/09/1999; Athman, interview 
12/10/2009). The Religious Community Coordination Team met again in June 1999, this time 
alone with the Kenya Women Political Caucus to plan a way forward to take Kenya out of what 
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they framed as a ‗deep crisis [epitomized by]… the slime of corruption, environmental 
degradation, robberies, murders, family violence, ethnic violence, general insecurity, land 
grabbing and many other vices‘ (Religious Community Coordination Team, 28/09/1999: 4). 
They posited comprehensive review of the basic rules of governance as the only antidote for this 
malaise.  
 
Possibilities of the religious community taking over the stewardship of the constitutional Review 
Process in line with the spirit of the 1997 Act and as amended in 1998 also emerged during this 
June 1999 meeting (ibid). The proposal was for other stakeholders from secular civil society and 
opposition parties under the stewardship of religious organisations, now seen as neutral 
arbiters,
16
 to lead the people of Kenya in an extra-parliamentary Review Process (ibid). Further, 
a vocabulary of claims to rights of the Kenyan people to make their constitution was further 
entrenched in the reform struggles during this meeting. Specifically, the argument was that ‗a 
country‘s constitution is a covenant which all people of a nation commit to govern themselves in 
justice, peace and prosperity for all…and all the people of Kenya should be fully involved (ibid: 
5; interviews: Wandati, 17/09/2009; Athman, 12/10/2009).   
 
At the same June 1999 meeting, a leaner taskforce made up of four persons (that included Dr. 
Julia Ojiambo of the Kenya Women Political Caucus, Said Athman of Supreme Council of 
Kenya Muslims, James Mageria and Rev. Harold Mwang‘ombe of the Anglican Church) was 
established to think through a strategy to make a ‗people-based constitutional Review Process by 
the religious community possible‘ (Religious Community Coordination Team, 28/09/1999). This 
taskforce continued working on the strategy, which was presented to Religious Community 
Coordination Team on September 3, 1999 as Strategy for the People-based Constitution of 
Kenya Review Process by the Religious Community in the Republic of Kenya (ibid).  
 
The strategy had a clear plan on the need to establish a parallel process complete with timelines 
for doing so. A key recommendation was for the Religious Community Coordination Team to 
retreat on October 13 and 14, 1999 to review and approve the strategy and make a covenant 
                                                 
16
 Note the fluidity in the position of religious institutions in this case to confirm Gramsci‘s (1971) view that civil 
society, of which the religious institutions are part of, as intertwined in a hegemonic historic bloc and can serve as a 
stabilizing, conservative force that ensures popular consent (Katz, 2006; Bond, 2006; Price, 2003); or, can be a 
transformative anti-systemic force of counter hegemony in the economic, political, social, and cultural spheres (Mati, 
2008). 
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among the actors. As the development of the strategy continued (between June and September 
1999), the Religious Community Coordination Team together with the Kenya Women Political 
Caucus continued ‗reaching out to individual political parties including Democratic Party, Ford 
Kenya, Social Democratic Party and also smaller parties, as well as NCEC and many other civil 
society and social movement organisations on the need to agree to come together. It was after 
these stakeholders' agreement that the need to have in place a structure with specific leadership 
to give the emerging movement a shape and voice was deemed necessary‘ (Athman, interview 
12/10/2009).      
 
On 13th to 14th October 1999, the Religious Community Coordination Team leadership, 
representing most faiths in the country, retreated at the Machakos Garden Hotel ostensibly to 
‗pray for the country in the face of Moi and KANU‘s hard-line stance‘ (Religious Community 
Coordination Team, 14/10/1999). The retreat approved the strategy and further reinforced the 
need for a parallel process as a new repertoire of contention in the struggle for constitutional 
reforms in Kenya.  The formative framing of contention was that the religious community, 
besides being a majority of Kenyans, were also the voice of reason and had the moral authority 
to legitimately take a positive and redemptive action in conjunction with the will of the people of 
Kenya, to change the country for the better (ibid). The religious leaders gathered in Machakos 
saw themselves as ‗divin[ely] called and [with a] mission which ordains justice and dignity for 
all men and women […as well as] morally obligated to proceed with the stalled Constitution 
Review Process in the Spirit of the Constitution of Kenya Review Act, 1997‘ (Min 1/99 of the 
Machakos meeting of Religious Community Coordination Team Leaders, 14/10/1999).  In this 
meeting, the present religious leaders further argued that they needed to urgently do what was 
right to create a new, peaceful, prosperous and united Kenya (ibid).  
 
A key outcome of the Machakos meeting was a resolve to take the process forward in case the 
political parties refused to accede to the formula that the religious leaders had suggested i.e. 
‗KANU, 5 seats; Democratic Party, 3 seats; National Development Party, 2 seats; Ford Kenya, 1 
seat; Social Democratic Party, 1 seat; SAFINA, 1 seat‘ (Report of Machakos Meeting of RCCT 
Leaders, 13-14 October 1999: 6). Thereafter, the RCCT leaders wrote to the Attorney General, 
giving him a one-month ultimatum to convene a stakeholder consultative forum to confirm these 
configurations so as to redress the problems with the Act. Failure by the Attorney General to do 
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this, they warned, would result in the Religious Community Coordination Team leaders taking 
their own initiative and convene such a meeting (Athman, 12/10/2009).  
 
In the days following the Machakos meeting, a flurry of activities intensified consultations 
among many stakeholders. For example, there were religious leaders‘ meetings on October 26, 
1999 and again on November 2, 1999. These meetings continued strategizing on how to get other 
stakeholders, specifically political parties and secular civil society on board. A preliminary 
stakeholder‘s meeting on December 3, 1999 brought on board many of the secular civil society 
actors as well as most of the opposition political parties. Finally, on December 15-16
th
 1999, 
with the ultimatum on the Attorney General having lapsed, the Religious Community 
Coordination Team made true their threat. They convened a Stakeholder Consultation Forum at 
the Ufungamano House. It was this convention that launched a parallel Review Process.   
 
The declaration at the end of the two-day Stakeholder Consultation Forum meeting 
communicated a clear consciousness and a claim to sovereign rights of the Kenyan people to 
make their own constitution, and that they were doing it. Specifically the declaration stated:   
 KNOWING that a constitution is ultimately the expression of sovereign will of the people. 
CONSCIOUS of the fact, the right and wishes of the people of Kenya to make their own 
constitution through a people-driven Review Process has been compromised by certain sectors of 
the political class. 
WE the people of Kenya gathered here at the Ufungamano House in Nairobi, under the 
stewardship of the Religious Community DO HEREBY LAUNCH the Constitution of Kenya 
Review Process by the people of Kenya. 
The Mechanisms, procedure and timetable of the Review Process will be announced in due 
course under the guidance of the Steering Committee, which shall include women and Youth 
[Bold upper case emphasis in original] (Ufungamano Initiative, 16/12/ 1999).  
 
The Ufungamano Initiative‘s process, despite its lack of legal backing, did pose a crisis of 
legitimacy to the Raila Odinga-led Parliamentary Select Committee that was formally announced 
on the same day (December 15, 1999) to yet again collect views of Kenyans and propose 
amendments to the 1998 Constitution of Kenya Review Commission Amendment Act. The 
announcement of the two parallel processes heightened the stakes in the process and for a while, 
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there seemed to be no turning back for both groups. The game moved from the accountability 
politics usually played by social movements to each group competing to win Kenyans to its side.   
 
The relative success of the Ufungamano Initiative against its rival in this regard, lay in being the 
first constitutional reform Initiative in Kenya that had succeeded in fashioning a national 
framework that brought together nationally diverse groups. This begs the question, how did the 
Ufungamano Initiative succeed where similar attempts had failed in the past? Below is a 
summary of the explanatory factors.  
 
I argue here that a congruence between the May 1999 Moi pronouncement and his assault on 
both the earlier IPPG agreements and the subsequent CKRA 1997, which had further been 
polished through the Safari Park agreements and the subsequent Constitution of Kenya Review 
Commission (Amendment) Act of 1998, were the opportunities and constraints that profoundly 
shaped the next phase, pace and character of the constitutional reform struggles in Kenya. The 
Ufungamano Initiative utilised the same 1997 Review Act, and the 1998 Constitution of Kenya 
Review Commission (Amendment) Act as a political opportunity initially for the exercise of 
accountability politics, to galvanise different actors in forming the People‘s Commission of 
Kenya (PCK). As it was to be, it was only KANU and NDP that did not send their nominees to 
the Ufungamano Initiative‘s PCK. The centrality of the 1997 Review Act and the subsequent 
1998 amendments as a political opportunity is for instance underscored by one of the resolutions 
of the October 13 and 14, 1999 Machakos meeting. Minute 1/99, of this meeting for instance 
stated that ‗the Kenyan people were morally obligated to proceed with the stalled Constitution 
Review Process in the Spirit of the Constitution of Kenya Review Act, 1997.‘  
 
The second element of the political opportunities was the discontent borne out of broken 
promises by the regime. The narrative above has shown the existence of a convergence of 
opinion that the Ufungamano Initiative emerged out of frustrations with KANU‘s refusal to 
agree on a people centred and led process. The Ufungamano Initiative‘s constituent struggles 
were therefore joined together by a shared ‗systems of reference‘ (Melucci, 1989) in the form of 
a collective outrage over an anti-democratic state, which would not acquiescence to demands for 
a ‗people driven‘ comprehensive review of its contract with its citizens (interviews: Khairallah, 
26/09/2009; Lamba, 23/10/2009; Ndubi, 24/09/2009; Zein, 07/10/2009).  
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It is this collective sense of outrage and a common target that enabled people to initially self-
organise in confronting shared problems. To demonstrate this, a participant in this study for 
instance noted:   
It became clear that the problems we confronted were rooted in a bad constitution of the country. 
That is why we would go to court to seek redress but could not succeed. That is why we had the 
rich flashing out fake title deeds and would have the state on their side to oppress the poor. We 
started agitating not just against the evictions but also for changes in the basic law of the land. We 
started educating others and ourselves on the key fundamentals of the constitution (Rema, 
interview 22/03/2010).  
 
The emergence of the Ufungamano Initiative therefore confirms the centrality of cognitive 
consciousness in incubating protests and struggles as emphasised by scholars of different schools 
of thought and disciplinary orientations. Within social movement scholarship for instance, the 
new social movement theory scholars emphasise identity consciousness based on among other 
things, culture, status, ideology, generalised beliefs, values, ethnicity, gender, and sexual 
orientation of actors as the ultimate glue in the mobilisation of collectives (Buechler, 1995; 2000; 
Cohen & Arato, 1992; Escobar & Alvarez, 1992; Habib, 2008; Melucci, 1996; 1989; 1980; 
Pichardo, 1997; Touraine, 1981). The famous Nigerian writer Chinua Achebe (1989: 6-7) 
argues:  
To answer oppression with appropriate resistance requires knowledge of two kinds. Self-
knowledge by the victim means in the first place an awareness that oppression exists... secondly, 
the victim must know who the enemy is. He must know his oppressor‘s real name, not an alias, a 
pseudonym, or a nom de plume!  
A citation from a speech by the Burkinabe revolutionary, Thomas Sankara (1985) provides 
further arguments on what it takes for changes in society to happen. For him, ‗you cannot carry 
out fundamental change without a certain amount of madness. In this case, it comes from 
nonconformity, the courage to turn your back on the old formulas, the courage to invent the 
future.‘ In the Kenyan case, we showed in chapter four how much of such consciousness and 
courage initially emerged from the ranks of the elites. Such cognition was initially a product of 
intra-elite struggles. Over the years, this consciousness cascaded through advocacy and civic 
education to the general Kenyan population resulting in a consensus on the need for reforms, 
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albeit contestations remained on the nature and desired outcomes of such reforms by different 
groups of actors.   
 
The contested mandate of the religious community’s leadership 
Despite its success in bringing forth a diverse constituency together in the push for a people-
centred Review Process, the Ufungamano Initiative was riddled with many contradictions and 
cleavages, which served both as opportunities but also constraints in its work. Specifically, the 
existing mistrust between radical civil society and opposition political elites, offered an 
opportunity for moderation by religious leadership. However, this suggests an indictment on 
social movements‘ and other forms of civil society organisations‘ as well as the political elites‘ 
to offer leadership. The mistrusts, as already seen, had been occasioned by successive betrayals 
already highlighted.  
   
As such, while religious leadership came to be seen as ‗more trusted‘ under the circumstances 
(interviews: Apiyo, 16/09/2009; Ochanda, 22/09/2009; Odhiambo M., 01/04/2009; Ndubi, 
24/09/2009; Kibwana, 21/10/200; Omtatah, 31/03/2010; Athman, 12/10/2009; Wambua, 
13/10/2009; Wandati, 17/09/2009), it is instructive to note that there was cautious optimism, if 
not initial hostility from certain key players especially the National Council of Churches of 
Kenya, the National Convention Executive Council, and the Youth constituency. NCCK who 
later occupied pivotal positions in the movement, for instance, seemed unwilling to provide the 
required leadership at the time of the conception of the movement and failed to be the 
movements‘ entrepreneur. This is why the two most prominent Christian forces in Kenya – the 
National Council of the Churches of Kenya and the Catholic‘s Kenya Episcopal Conference – 
were both unrepresented in the first meeting even though they had been invited in the crucial 
October 13-14 Machakos meeting. While Archbishop Njue, the Kenya Episcopal Conference 
chair sent apologies on behalf of the Catholic Church, the National Council of the Churches of 
Kenya did not.  In fact, a key leader in the National Council of the Churches of Kenya (the then 
General Secretary) was said to be initially opposed to the idea and had not attended the series of 
retreat meetings that made the idea a reality (interviews: Athman, 12/10/2009; Wandati, 
17/09/2009).  
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According to Athman (interview, 12/10/2009), the supposed boycott by the NCCK should be 
understood in the context of ‗National Council of the Churches of Kenya defending their turf…. 
NCCK was used to leading and in particular the then General Secretary thought that it must be 
him leading the process.‘  Nonetheless, a series of behind the scenes negotiations persuaded him 
to join the bandwagon. Paradoxically, he became the leading voice in the Ufungamano Initiative. 
A respondent who attended these meeting argued that National Council of the Churches of 
Kenya‘s General Secretary Rev. Mutava Musyimi, only agreed to come on board after his 
demand to steer the process was agreed to by other religious leaders (Athman, interview 
12/10/2009). As such, one clearly sees that participation of National Council of the Churches of 
Kenya as an institution with a huge following in Kenya, pivoted on its General Secretary being 
allowed to control the process. This yet again further demonstrates how personal interests were 
at the centre stage of constitutional reform struggles in Kenya. Notwithstanding the above views, 
the National Council of the Churches of Kenya stance at the formative stages suggests the 
different roles that different forms of leadership, as cited earlier, play in the evolution and 
operations of social movements.  
 
There were also further quiet protests against the leadership of religious leaders. Specifically, the 
radical/progressive sections of civil society (mainly NCEC and the National Youth Movement) 
were also not keen on it. Some of those interviewed (for example, Wandati, Athman, Wambua, 
Waruku, and Khairallah) argued that similar to NCCK, the reasons for NCEC‘s initial discomfort 
with the religious leadership stewardship of the Ufungamano Initiative must be viewed in the 
context of hegemonic struggles for the control of the reform agenda.
17
 Others (e.g. Omtatah, 
Odhiambo M.), cited centralist tendencies highlighted earlier in this chapter as the reasons for the 
same. Indeed the clergy‘s role has, on the whole, been full of contradictions on many fronts. For 
example, within the Christian community, while mainstream churches‘ (mainly Catholics, 
Methodist, Anglicans and Presbyterians) leadership was at the heart of struggles for change, the 
evangelicals were on the state‘s side. This is not to say there was universal unity in the 
mainstream churches. Within the Methodists for instance, its retired presiding Bishop, Lawi 
                                                 
17
 The argument here is that NCEC which had started as a project of the Kenya Human Right Commission and 4Cs 
to serve as a political wing of civil society in pushing for a new constitutional framework though which Kenya 
would be governed, saw in Ufungamano Initiative, a threat to its hegemony in what it called citizens‘ struggles in 
constitutional reforms (interviews: Wambua, 13/10/2009; Waruku, 29/09/2009). 
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Imathiu supported Moi and KANU, while the then Presiding Bishop Nthamburi worked with the 
rest of the clergy in these struggles against KANU and Moi.  
  
The youth and students movement in a Constitution of Kenya Review Stakeholder meeting held 
at the Ufungamano house on December 3, 1999 had also warned that every time the religious 
community had been called to mediate between KANU and other Kenyan interests, the outcome 
had always been in KANU‘s favour. As such, the youth and students‘ movement questioned the 
impartiality of the clergy. This lends credence to Mutua‘s (2008) observation earlier in this 
chapter regarding the religious community leadership being pro-status quo.  The NCEC led by 
activist academics, shared with the students‘ movement, the scepticism over the clergy‘s 
impartiality. Some participants in this study saw a natural connection between the students and 
youth movements and their professors. Some respondents alluded to the fact that some of the 
most vocal student leaders were ‗mouthpieces‘ of some academics and politicians.  These claims 
notwithstanding, I submit here, that the contestation on the leadership by religious leaders in the 
Ufungamano Initiative was a manifestation of mistrust and fears of betrayal. Granted betrayals 
were not a new thing in Kenyan political struggles, as there are many examples to demonstrate 
betrayals of the popular will in Kenya,
18
 it is important to take these into account in the analysis 
of internal contradictions within the Ufungamano Initiative as a possible contributor to its 
ultimate decline.  
 
While it is not my intention to over amplify the role of the religious leadership as a key factor in 
the Ufungamano Initiative, there is evidence to suggest that for NCEC, it could have been a case 
of the pot calling the kettle black. Some of its leadership, especially in post-2002 Kenya, have 
done a great disservice to the reform agenda to the point of being labelled by the likes of 
Murunga (2009: 19), as ‗periodic democrats.‘ The common thing among both secular and faith 
based civil society was that there were profound class interests and a general shared uneasiness 
following the President‘s suggestion that the reform process being referred to Parliament would 
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 While the contemporary constitutional reform struggles in Kenya were reactionary forces to the avaricious 
political and economic elite, the leadership of these struggles in many senses have been at the very least non-
visionary and contradictory and to some, their behaviour is just history repeating itself as a theatre of the absurd 
(Phillip Ochieng 2006). There are many examples to demonstrate betrayals of the popular will in Kenya. For 
instance, in the immediate aftermath of Kenya‘s independence from Britain in 1963, the political leadership that had 
played a particularly crucial role in national liberation were disillusionment for many Kenyans.  It degenerated into 
an exploiting class a kin to colonial one that they had supplanted very much along the same lines as observed by the 
likes of Currie and Ray (1986) and Fanon (1967).   
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breed chaos in the country. Indeed, these contradictions may help unearth further value-based 
cleavages between this particular constituency (youth and the NCEC) and the religious groups. 
 
There was indeed an exhibition of such strong value-rational motivations among the members of 
the Ufungamano Initiative. Ombok (interview, 24/09/2009) for instance captures this well. When 
asked what his motivations to take part in these struggles were, he stated: 
My conviction is ideological.  Firstly as a Christian, I have a duty to challenge the powers that are 
oppressive to people…. I kept on asking myself why should there be so much poverty, and pain; 
who are the children in the streets... interrogating into these things, I came to understand that 
corruption was contributing into all this, and also greed from runaway capitalism.  I therefore 
identified with the poor, oppressed and I also identified with those who wanted to struggle for 
change because not all the poor were willing to be part of the struggle.  
 
However, it needs qualification that not all participants in this study felt that the religious 
institutions‘ theology was radical enough to motivate and mobilise people to act and liberate 
themselves. On this note, Omtatah (interview, 31/03/2010) argued that ‗there was no theological 
exposition of the struggle in the Ufungamano Initiative. It lacked a strong intellectual content, 
and a theological articulation of the problems.‘ Omtatah‘s position has some merit. Had 
theological questioning of hierarchy and power structures, driven the Ufungamano Initiative, 
there might have been the possibility of a people‘s movement and not just middle-class 
theologians, secular civil society and political self-preserving activists‘ movement. In this regard, 
Chitnis from the Hindu Council of Kenya offers some insight. He confirmed that the Hindu 
Councils‘ involvement in the constitutional reform struggles for instance, was more of a self-
preservation act, and not transformative in any way.  
 
Arguably, self-preservation was not unexpected given that in Kenya, the Hindu community is 
mainly associated with the class that owns capital and usually conservative. This is not to suggest 
that self-preservation is not an important basis for emergence of social struggles. On the 
contrary, as Tilly (1995) shows, massive changes across the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries Europe were 
initially met with defensive behaviour by large numbers of ordinary people. Subsequently, 
offensive forms of popular mobilisations popped up to preserve old customs or establish new 
rights (cited in Buechler, 2000: 4). Of relevance here therefore, is that different social 
formations, joined the Ufungamano Initiative for different, and usually self-interest reasons. This 
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would serve as a source as well as manifestation of the cleavages throughout the life of the 
Ufungamano Initiative. 
 
For the Kenyan Hindu Community, the declining economy, which they attributed to economic 
mismanagement and bad governance, and the turbulent reactions in the form of riots, 
demonstrations, mass action, and labour unrests, meant dwindling fortunes for its mainly 
business oriented membership (interviews: Lamba, 23/10/2009; Chitinis, 20/10/2009). They 
reacted by joining forces with those who wanted these trends reversed. Lamba (ibid), one of the 
co-conveners of National Convention Executive Council reveals that this response did not come 
naturally. Rather it took some persuasion:    
Knowing that these organisations are very timid, we knew that it would take a lot of persuasion to 
bring them in. We wrote to them, and promised to hold their hands and bring them into the 
convention and take away the fear, and finally to get them to sit down. It was a matter of principle 
and we walked them through this process, which initially terrified them, to get the confidence to 
engage with the other actors in the faith sector. 
 
Despite the initial protestations by different stakeholders, the Ufungamano Initiative was 
possible because religious leaders continued stressing the need for ‗unity if they [contenders] 
were to succeed in undertaking of the people-driven Constitution of Kenya Review Process‘ 
(Minute 38/99 of the minutes of the meeting of the Religious Leaders in Kenya discussing the 
Constitution of Kenya Review Process held on Monday the November 22, 1999 at the 
Ufungamano House, Nairobi; see also minutes of the meeting of the Religious Leaders in Kenya 
discussing the Constitution of Kenya Review Process held on Monday November 10, 1999 at the 
Ufungamano House, Nairobi). The rapidity with which the opposition politicians agreed to make 
deals with KANU also convinced many in civil society (both religious and secular) of the value 
of this unity of purpose.  
 
Indeed, by the time of the actual crystallisation of the movement towards the end of 1999 in what 
came to be called within the Ufungamano Initiative as the First Plenary or Ufungamano I 
(December 15-16
th
), the leadership of the religious community had become widely accepted 
among the different stakeholders. Participants were reminded of the fact that a segment of the 
religious leadership had been at the heart of struggles for political reforms in Kenya since late 
1980s and were among the first in the country to openly oppose and preach against the one party 
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dictatorship in the country (interviews: Ombok, 24/09/2009; Gitari, 21/09/2010; Njoya, 
29/09/2010; Njoya, 29/09/2010; Weekly Review 11/07/1997; 24/01/1997; 05/10/1990).
 19
 The 
clergy‘s role was particularly instrumental. Weekly Review (05/10/1990: 3) for instance, wrote of 
the current day Anglican Church in Kenya then known as The Church of the Province of Kenya: 
‗…the CPK as an institution remains the most resilient focus on dissent, with the political 
opposition largely having been silenced by the crackdown….‘ Arguably, it is from this that they 
received admiration from many Kenyans.  
 
Ordinary Kenyans have always looked to one or more forms of leadership for guidance. The 
highest trust for such guidance is on the religious leaders more than any other form of leadership. 
For example, data from Afrobarometer (2006) confirms that Kenyan people hold the religious 
leaders in high regard and often consult them on various issues more than they consult political 
leaders and bureaucrats combined.
20
  As such, during the Ufungamano Initiative crystallisation, 
the faith in religious leadership was invoked due to what some paradoxically argued was their 
neutrality. In the formative meeting (December 15 and 16, 1999), for instance, a leading 
opposition politician, Kenneth Matiba argued that religious organisations could ‗clearly give 
outlook of the views of Kenyans because they are neutral‘ (Minutes of the Ufungamano Initiative 
15 to 16/12/1999 Consultative Forum). He added that he had constantly advocated that the 
religious communities assisted by technical support should spearhead the review as happened in 
South Africa and Philippines. He stressed that religious leaders had a mandate from God to 
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 This notwithstanding, an analysis of the role of religious leadership in the constitutional reform struggles, indeed, 
reveals that they have perhaps been the force that has ensured the status quo. Whether this has been out of naivety or 
through calculated schemes is hard to tell. What is clear is that by late 1980‘s the clergy, especially from the 
mainstream churches in Kenya given their spread in most parts of the country, coupled with the Muslim clergy‘s 
mainstream presence in at least two of Kenya‘s eight provinces, had built a solid constituency that looked upon them 
for guidance and direction. Realising this, Moi and his KANU machinery recruited some of them into his schemes. 
A closer analysis of the role of even those who were not co-opted reveals that their actions at decisive moments in 
these struggles aided the status quo because many had an aversion for anything that would fundamentally unsettle 
their relative peace and comfort (refer to the middle tendency discussed earlier in this chapter). Their involvement in 
political struggles as such, can be seen as essentially to be a product of fear that the direction things were taking 
under Moi, were breeding perfect conditions for a revolution (interviews: Kibwana, 21/10/2009; Njoya, 29/09/2009). 
As such, theirs was to convince Moi to give room to his political detractors as well as do something to alleviate the 
social and economic suffering of the ordinary masses if he were to forestall a bloody revolution or a civil war as was 
happening elsewhere in the region and Africa in general (Ufungamano Initiative Report of the 15-16/12/1999 
consultative forum).  
20 
Data from the Afrobarometer data for 2006 reveals that a cumulative percentage of 61.2% of sampled Kenyans 
consult religious leaders on socioeconomic and political matters. Indeed, to paraphrase Mbiti (1969), Kenyans are 
‗notoriously religious.‘ 
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rescue the Kenyan people and were in a better position than the other actors (secular civil society 
and political parties) to steer a people driven constitution.  
 
In the same vein, Kivutha Kibwana suggested in the same meeting: ‗all people present be 
established as stakeholders so that the group can have legal standing …religious people who are 
people of God deal with matters of constitutional review meetings since the parliament has not 
succeeded‘ (Ufungamano Initiative, 17/12/1999). This was seconded by the then LSK chairman, 
Dr. Gibson Kamau Kuria (they were both NCEC co-conveners) arguing that the constitutional 
review impulse in the country needed direction and religious leaders should form a steering 
group to spearhead it. This suggests a complete change of position of the leadership lot in NCEC 
regarding the role of religious leaders.  The proposal was debated and agreed through a vote and 
a declaration that ‗this meeting is now the stakeholders‘ forum as has been elected until further 
notice‘ (Ufungamano Initiative 17/12/1999). In choosing to follow this path, those present 
argued that the religious community would give Kenya a reason to hope, and a sense of reason 
that set emotions aside.   
 
In the end, the religious leaders won the support of other constituencies and were therefore able 
to galvanize other actors under the Ufungamano Initiative. While to an outsider, the Ufungamano 
Initiative‘s formation may have appeared a radical departure from previous attempts at unity, I 
suggest here that it was only possible because it was a middle to conservative movement led by a 
clergy that was able to mediate between the extreme radicalism of the secular civil society on 
one hand, and the conservatism of the political elites on the other. The success of the 
Ufungamano Initiative in bringing these different forces together suggests that broad based 
movements are possible when the resultant movement or alliance can offer a middle ground 
coalition that has the ability to sponge up the various competing interests.  
 
Nonetheless, as I show in the next two chapters, the Ufungamano Initiative did provide a 
platform from which some demands were made on a rogue state and was able to force 
concessions. Moreover, the Ufungamano Initiative forced concessions that avoided a meltdown 
and checked Moi and managed to bring KANU to the negotiating table. Nevertheless, as 
revealed from the analysis in chapter six, the Ufungamano Initiative lacked clarity of issues. This 
was partly because the Ufungamano Initiative brought together radical groups as well as the 
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traditionally more conservative faith groups that did not necessarily have a common and 
coherent storyline or, common socioeconomic and political background. The different 
‗subjective elements of identity consciousness‘ (Melucci, 1989) within it, therefore imbued the 
movement with multiple contradictions that were reflected at several stages in the evolution and 
operations of the movement.
21
 Commentators predicted that its weakness would be its 
heterogeneity. Zein who served as a commissioner in the Ufungamano Initiative‘s People‘s 
Commission of Kenya and later in the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission after the 
merger of the Ufungamano Initiative process with the parliamentary led process, admits that such 
an initiative would indeed be beset with ‗principle-setting challenges‘ (interview, 07/10/2009. 
Kibwana, interview 21/10/2010; as well as Odhiambo, M., interview 01/04/2010 had similar 
arguments).  
 
To overcome such challenges, a clear set of principles were proposed, openly discussed, and 
accepted (minutes of proceedings of Stakeholder Consultative Meeting, 15-16, December, 1999). 
The main set of principles for operations and engagement included the fact that ‗the process of 
the constitutional review in Kenya [was to be] as important as the eventual content of the 
constitution and the integrity of the process was central to the legitimacy of the constitution‘ 
(minutes of proceedings of Stakeholder Consultative Meeting, 15-16, December, 1999). 
Moreover, it did stress the principles of openness and transparency; inclusivity, accessibility and 
non-discrimination; accountability, and cumulativeness and self-correction, as key and integral 
principles to be part of constitution making (ibid). However, there emerged clear contradictions 
worth highlighting. As shall become clear in chapter six, because of structural deficiencies, the 
main actors within the Ufungamano Initiative did not remain overly faithful to these principles. 
Nonetheless, the statements of the above principles are cited as some of the enduring 
contributions of the movement to the constitution reform project in Kenya (interviews: Zein, 
07/10/2009; Gathaka, 29/10/2009: Wambugu C., 09/10/2009; Lamba, 23/10/2009; Chitnis, 
20/10/2009; Lumumba, 01/10/2009). 
 
Another contradiction was that like its predecessors, the movement remained urban-based and 
middle class led. As such, it reflected more an intra-elite class struggle than a mass movement. 
                                                 
21
 As already noted, within the Ufungamano Initiative, there were all faiths, ethnicities and ideologies in the country 
(Ong‘wen, interview 09/10/2009) and these did not necessarily agree on the nature of the desired reforms.  
 205 
This is however not to obscure the role played by many other struggles as exemplified by groups 
such as Muunganao wa Wanavijiji, SEMA, ILISHE, or Matatu Touts Organisation (MATO) that 
emerged organically from the grassroots and were driven by people directly affected by state 
oppression at those levels. But these had remained single-issue movements until they linked up 
with the middle-class led democratisation struggles.    
Conclusion 
This chapter has identified the issues and principal actors behind the Ufungamano Initiative. It 
has outlined the historical specificities, which led to emergence of the Ufungamano Initiative. 
The chapter has underscored the social, economic and political disquiet in Kenya as a major 
factor in the emergence of the constitutional reform movements in Kenya. Examples of such 
dysfunctions have been enumerated and analysed.   
 
Specifically, the chapter has presented evidence to support the argument that the Ufungamano 
Initiative emerged as a counter to KANU‘s brinkmanship in the midst of its long history of 
misrule and the Executive excesses, which had irredeemably mutilated the constitution as a 
document and covenant defining the power of the people and relationships with their governors 
(Wambua, interview 13/10/2009). The Ufungamano Initiative became possible from the 
confluence of interests and frustrations from multiple betrayals by the political elites. It was also 
a product of a long history of the ‗bowling alone‘ of the different actors and struggles in the 
constitutional reforms forced into a marriage of convenience by political opportunities of the 
moment (interviews: Apiyo, 16/09/2009; Wandati, 17/09/2009; Gitari, 21/09/2009; Mwachofi, 
27/09/2009; Kibwana, 21/10/2009). The Ufungamano Initiative, the chapter has argued, was an 
effort to push for not only reviews, but more fundamentally, to reclaim and rewrite the Kenyan 
people‘s relationship with their leaders. However, as I show in next chapter, there was a great 
disconnect between word and deed especially in the framing of ‗the people‘s‘ agenda within the 
Ufungamano Initiative. As such, the Ufungamano Initiative only managed to be a people‘s 
movement insofar as it was an alliance of various civil society organisations, religious 
institutions, political parties as well as grassroots movements with a grassroots membership 
involved in constitutional reforms which had by then, become the rallying and mobilisation tool 
in Kenya. 
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The chapter has also argued that the fragmentation and differences between different 
constituency groups have continued to be replayed in the Kenyan constitutional reform process 
so much so that it is credible to conclude that politicians, whether in opposition or in power, have 
based their support or opposition to constitutional reforms primarily on their calculation of the 
extent to which such reforms would advance or curtail their chances of getting or retaining 
power. Under such political logic, it is plausible to note that no constitutional reform initiatives 
have been permitted that would threaten the political and economic interests of the political elites 
(Nzomo, 2003). As chapter seven shall show, activists and politicians who have positioned 
themselves as champions of democratic struggles have often times, turned against the very ideals 
they fought for. This has beset these struggles with selective and opportunistic politics that is 
devoid of any emancipative or transformative capacity.  
 
The chapter has also argued that despite the centrality of their common or shared grievances, and 
cognitive consciousness, such factors cannot on their own generate social movements. Instead, it 
takes resources key among them, social movement entrepreneurs, who ‗can channel their moral 
and philosophical worldviews and deeply felt convictions to stop threatening developments, 
redress instances of injustice, promote alternative options to the managing of social life and 
economic activity‘ (della Porta and Diani, 2006: 3). The following chapter analyses these 
qualities under the theme of leadership to show the role of such entrepreneurs in reaching out to 
each other, in directing mass discontents toward collective action in facing a common adversary 
– the Moi/KANU regime. However, the Ufungamano Initiative as the chapter has argued, was 
imbued with multiple contradictions that principally emanated from the broad based nature of the 
movement. The analysis of such contradictions in form (structure) and operational strategies, 
which ultimately defined its effectiveness, are the focus of the next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
207 
 
Chapter Six 
 
Getting Down to Work: The Power and Limits of the 
Ufungamano Initiative in Framing Contention and Mobilisation 
Strategies 
 
Introduction 
The following words of a leading social movements scholar, Charles Tilly, summarises the 
principal empirical concerns for the current chapter. According to Tilly (2004: 13): 
Social movements assert popular sovereignty. Although particular movements differ fiercely 
over who counts as ‗the people,‘ the whole apparatus of campaign, repertoire, and WUNC1 
displays embodies the more general claim that public affairs depends and should depend on 
the consent of the governed. The claim is not necessarily democratic, since ethnic, religious, 
and nationalist movements sometimes invest their powers in charismatic leaders rather than 
democratic deliberation yet still insist that those leaders embody the will of the people at 
large...the stress on popular consent fundamentally challenges divine right to kingship, 
traditional inheritance rule, warlord control, and aristocratic predominance. Even in systems 
of representative government... social movements pose a crucial question: do sovereignty and 
its accumulated wisdom lie in the legislature or in the people it claims to represent? 
 
Tilly is not alone in noting such tendencies in movements. Early in the 20th century, Robert 
Michels (1911) observed that organisations, including membership based, inevitably tend 
toward oligarchy, authoritarianism, and bureaucracy as top leaders, whether member 
controlled or not, develop a strong personal interest in maintaining their powers and 
privileges, thereby lessening members‘ influence. Enjolras and Waldahl (2008) citing Lipset, 
Trow, and Coleman (1962), state that three factors lead to the development of oligarchies in 
the governance of organisations: 
First, large-scale organizations give ... officials a near monopoly of power. Second, the 
leaders want to stay in office since they may get prestige and material benefits from their 
positions. Third, the member may be passive. Although high participation is not necessarily a 
sign of democracy, the maintenance of effective opposition to leaders requires membership 
participation (Enjolras and Waldahl, 2008: 1). 
 
                                                 
1
 WUNC refers to worthiness, unity, numbers and commitments. For a detailed explanation on this, please refer 
to chapter five. 
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This chapter analyses three key parameters within the Ufungamano Initiative: the role of 
leadership in issue framing, mobilisation, and structure, and the relationships among them. 
Specifically, the chapter analyses the role of leadership in decision-making, and the 
relationship between the Ufungamano Initiative and the Kenyan people. The chapter‘s central 
thesis is that Ufungamano Initiative had multiple internal contradictions especially between 
its rhetoric in framing contention (pushing for a people-centred and driven constitutional 
reform process) and its practice. The chapter argues that these contradictions were products 
of: 1) heterogeneity of actors and interests, which led to fragmentations in the struggle; and, 
2) the movements‘ mobilisation structures and strategies. The key argument advanced from 
the Ufungamano Initiative case therefore, is that leadership matters, particularly in decision 
making, in framing contention, as well as in establishment of movement structures. There are 
multiple cleavages emanating from the politics involved in the three aspects of the 
movement, but these must weave together to give a movement a purpose, structure and 
direction. 
 
From this analysis, the chapter argues that the Ufungamano Initiative‘s framing of contention 
was premised on Jean Jacques Rousseau‘s political philosophy whose democratic vision of 
community politics is enshrined in rights of citizens to direct democratic participation in the 
determination of the affairs of their own polity. In the case at hand, the Ufungamano 
Initiative framed its contention on an inalienable right of citizens to participate in writing 
their own constitution. However, as argued in the current and subsequent chapters, internal 
practices and decision-making powers and structures were deficient in ensuring maximum 
Kenyan people‘s participation. This is because decision-making powers concentrated on a 
few leaders. The chapter builds on Marx‘s criticism of liberal democracy which he argues is 
framed in the ‗language of equality, solidarity, emancipation, and the transformations of 
existing power relations‘ (cited in Held and McGrew, 2003: 114) to show that in the absence 
of sufficient dispersal of such authority, the movement depended heavily on a few leaders.  
 
Other aspects analysed in this chapter include: 1) the nature of resources mobilised to steer 
the movement; and, 2) linkages between the grassroots struggles and the Ufungamano 
Initiative as a nation-wide struggle, and especially, the nature of their participation in shaping 
the agenda of the movement. The specific questions answered include: what was the nature of 
participation, mobilisation and accountability (upward, horizontal and downward) within and 
between Ufungamano Initiative and its constituent groups? The chapter addresses the 
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question of how these contradictions contributed to, or hindered the Ufungamano Initiative‘s 
work. The chapter further elaborates on the argument in the previous chapter, that is: the 
Ufungamano Initiative was made up of strange bedfellows. The goals of the constituent 
struggles at the heart of the grassroots and the elite‘s movements were not always in 
congruence with each other. In fact, at times, certain goals were diametrically opposed to 
each other. This inevitably limited Ufungamano Initiative‘s effectiveness and ability to 
continue being a united force. This consequently suggests a reason for the ‗haste‘ with which 
many of the Ufungamano Initiative stakeholders succumbed to the overtures from the state 
controlled process to agree to a merger process.  
 
The chapter is organised into four main sections. The first section introduces the general 
analytic frame utilised in this chapter. Here the role of leadership is stated to be key in the 
action phase of the movement. The next section analyses how the Ufungamano Initiative 
framed demands and its strategies for contention. Further, the chapter deals with the 
questions of the institutional/organisational structures established to ensure that the 
Ufungamano Initiative achieved what it set itself to do as well as how these structures related 
to one another to ensure upward, horizontal and downward accountability within the 
movement. The critical question to address here is: how did structures contribute to, or hinder 
the Ufungamano Initiative‘s work? The section also deals with the question of the 
relationship between leadership and the structural context in mobilising capacities and 
resources to steer the movement in its constitution reform struggles in Kenya, before offering 
a conclusion.  
The role of leadership in the Ufungamano Initiative action phase 
The role of the Ufungamano Initiative leadership is analysed in this chapter as an explanatory 
variable for the movements‘ operations, in that it framed demands, determined strategies, 
mobilised structures and repertoires of action, which in turn had a bearing on the movements‘ 
internal coherence and effectiveness, and in effect, its power and limits, successes and 
failures (See Tarrow, 1998; Morris and Staggenborg, 2004 for similar arguments).  By taking 
into account the role of leadership in this analysis, the discussion here builds on the stages in 
social movement‘s existence – incubation, action and institutionalisation (Nasong‘o, 2007; 
Katumanga, 1999; Hoffer, 1958) – cited in the previous chapter, to argue that, as the 
Ufungamano Initiative moved to action phase, the framing of contention determined its 
action strategies as well as structures crafted to enable it to contentiously participate in the 
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politics of constitutional reforms in Kenya. As such, the role of leadership for the 
Ufungamano Initiative is analysed in relation to negotiating the ‗unfamiliar‘ path it chose to 
travel in the Review Process.  
 
As already stated in the last chapter, part of the criticism for earlier versions of the political 
process model was its neglect of role agency plays through leadership in movements‘ 
emergence and operations. This deficiency in the model has been redressed in works of 
scholars such as Goldstone (2001), Aminzade et al. (2001) and Morris and Staggenborg 
(2004), among others, who have emphasized the importance of leadership in social 
movements. Following Morris and Staggenborg (2004), I argue that movements‘ leadership 
matters. By performing various roles, movement leadership is critical at various stages of its 
development. According to Morris and Staggenborg (2004: 171), movements‘ leaderships 
specifically ‗inspire commitment, mobilize resources, create and recognise opportunities, 
devise strategies, frame demands and influence outcomes‘ (See also Blumer, 1951; Lang and 
Lang, 1961; Roche and Sachs, 1955; Wilson, 1973; Turner and Killian, 1987; Marullo, 1988; 
Staggenborg, 1988; Klandermans, 1989; Melucci, 1996; Robnett, 1997; Herda-Rapp, 1998; 
Aminzade et al., 2001; Goldstone, 2001 for similar arguments).    
 
Morris and Staggenborg‘s (2004) taxonomy of the role of leadership is attractive for this 
analysis for a number of reasons. First, Morris and Staggenborg (2004) clearly articulate the 
differences in the type of leader(s) a movement requires at different stages in its 
development. Second, they recognise the complex, evolving, dynamic, and sometimes 
conflicting, requirements for leadership function within movements and outside the 
movement. Within the movement, leaders mobilise and inspire participants while articulating 
and linking the movement to the larger society (Gusfield, 1966. See also Turner and Killian, 
1987; Marullo, 1988; Staggenborg, 1988; Klandermans, 1989; Melucci, 1996; Robnett, 1997; 
Herda-Rapp, 1998; Aminzade et al., 2001; Goldstone 2001 as cited in Morris and 
Staggenborg, 2004: 171). This means that leader(s) needed at the incubation phase, may not 
necessarily be the best leader(s) for the action phase, or the institutionalisation phase. This 
suggests that different leadership roles metamorphose over time in social movements. In 
some cases, the same person(s) can perform the different roles but in others, new leadership 
evolves to fill a need in the movement (Katumanga, 1999; Gusfield, 1966).  
 
I term such developments diffusion of social movement leadership among the different levels, 
members and structures. Such leadership diffusion served as a strategy that ensures that roles 
211 
 
and responsibilities are spread to many movement members. Such dispersal of leadership 
allows for greater influence and roles for various members of the movement. Indeed, within 
the Ufungamano Initiative, Kibwana (interview, 21/20/2009) alluded to such diffusion when 
asked to situate where the ultimate leadership of the movement lay. He argued:  
When social forces and citizens congregate for collective action, how do you define 
leadership? In the Ufungamano Initiative, one could say that the religious leaders who were 
the chairs were leaders. But then, within the leadership, there were so many components 
reflective of the many important things that were done so that things could go on. Therefore, 
maybe the leadership is embodied in the people that defined the agenda, because there were 
many leaders at different levels. So if really one wants to define a movement leadership, one 
has to look at what kind of influences different actors within the movement had (Kibwana, 
interview 21/10/2009). 
 
The Ufungamano Initiative narrative suggests that different leaders evolved at different 
stages in its development, to perform different roles especially between the incubation and 
action phase. As such, those who played a leading role in incubating the movement were not 
necessarily the leaders that led the action phase. Nonetheless, the performance of the different 
roles in movements is not necessarily mutually exclusive. Different roles can be performed 
concurrent to each other and by either same or different actors (Hoffer, 1958; Katumanga, 
1999; Nasong‘o, 2007). The dualism of these developments within the Ufungamano Initiative 
is analysed and explanations for the same offered below. The discussion is organised 
thematically by functions performed by the Ufungamano Initiative leaders. These included 
strategic decision-making (including creation and/or, recognition and utilisation of political 
opportunities) in emergence and operations; empowerment and inspiring commitment among 
followers; framing demands and strategies for contention and mobilisation; determining 
mobilising structures. 
The Ufungamano Initiative leadership and strategic decision-making  
Leaders are strategic decision-makers in emergence and operations of social movements. 
Through analysing the emergence of the Ufungamano Initiative in the previous chapter, I 
showed that leaders are the ‗political entrepreneurs who mobilize resources and found 
organizations in response to incentives, risks, and opportunities‘ (Morris and Staggenborg, 
2004: 171) while supporters make rational choices to follow effective leaders (McCarthy and 
Zald, 1973; 1977; Oberschall, 1973; Morris and Staggenborg, 2004). These aspects were 
displayed in the Ufungamano Initiative in various ways. From the very beginning the launch 
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of a parallel process by the Ufungamano Initiative was a strategic decision. As highlighted in 
chapter five, there were lengthy consultations and deliberations before the eventual action to 
launch a parallel process.   
 
The first meeting that hinted to a parallel Review Process after multiple betrayals by what 
respondents referred to as the ‗political class‘; was the meeting in June 1999 by the Religious 
Community Coordination Team with the Kenya Women Political Caucus cited in the 
previous chapter. As highlighted in the last chapter, the Religious Community Coordination 
Team invested in a leaner taskforce to develop a strategy that would make a parallel ‗people-
based Constitution Review Process‘ possible. This taskforce consulted widely in its 
development of a strategy document it called Strategy for the People-based Constitution of 
Kenya Review Process by the Religious Community in the Republic of Kenya (discussed in 
details in the last chapter). The merits for launching a parallel process as espoused in the 
strategy paper were presented and debated in numerous forums before formal adoption by the 
Machakos Garden Hotel meeting on October 13 and 14. The Machakos meeting did more 
that approve the strategy. It ‗made a covenant among the actors‘ (Religious Community 
Coordination Team, 14/10/1999). 
 
The analysis of the steps and processes leading up to the adoption of a parallel process (dealt 
with in detail in the previous chapter), suggests that all these steps were careful and strategic. 
Moreover, it also suggests that the religious leaders were more cautious than abrasive with 
the KANU regime. It required skilful and strategic leadership to realise that politics of the 
street – peaceful mass protests, that NCEC allied organisations, including Chemi Chemi ya 
Ukweli (part of the more radical faith based civil society) had been calling for – was not 
getting the Moi/KANU regime to break the stalemate deliberately created by political elites. 
As such, innovative ideas were needed to apply pressure and coerce the state into some 
compromise (minute 7/99 of December 3, 1999 meeting). 
  
Strategic decision-making required clarity of thought and ability to recognise and create 
opportunities. As highlighted in the previous chapter, this was evidently exemplified by the 
role played by the leadership of the different stakeholders during the Safari Park negotiations 
between May and October 1998. While these may not have been framed explicitly as political 
opportunities at the time, read conjunctively with later developments in 1999 that emphasised 
fidelity to the Safari Park and previous IPPG agreements in the face of Moi‘s obstinate 
resistance to a people-centred Review Process, one sees clear recognition of the Constitution 
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of Kenya Review Act 1997 and the subsequent 1998 Amendments after protracted Safari 
Park negotiations as political opportunities (interviews: Ndubi, 24/09/2009; Lethome, 
02/10/2009). This is because the Ufungamano Initiative entrepreneurs utilised Moi/KANU‘s 
infidelity to these agreements to incubate a movement and frame contention.  
 
As Ibrahim Lethome, a former People‘s Commission of Kenya and later Constitution of 
Kenya Review Commission commissioner pointed out, after Moi‘s May 1999 
pronouncement reneging on the promises of the 1997 Constitution of Kenya Review Act, 
other stakeholders, especially the Religious Community Coordination Team realised that 
there would be no progress.
2
 From then onwards, Lethome argued, they went back to the 
same Act that many had dismissed as unworkable: ‗all what we now wanted to do was just go 
on and implement the Act, collect the people‘s views and come up with the draft constitution 
as the Act had stipulated‘ (interview, 02/10/2009). This, I argue, was because the 
Ufungamano Initiative entrepreneurs recognised the 1997 Review Act, despite all its flaws, 
as an opportunity around which they could mobilise for accountability
3
 of the Moi/KANU 
state.  
 
But political opportunities were not present only in internal Kenyan politics. As Wandati 
(interview, 17/09/2009) noted, the ‗opportunities were also from the changes taking place 
globally at that time. Demands for accountability and transparency, and multi-partyism were 
supported by readily available cash from Western donors channelled to NGOs.‘  Building 
further on this, Wandati (ibid) stated: 
Because a majority of us in the Ufungamano Initiative were not your orthodox religious 
organisations, but rather quasi-religious NGOs, we knew the NGOs speak; we knew the NGO 
culture. So we wrote proposals and because the language and the demands could be paid for, 
it became easy for us to mobilise for donor funds for some of the activities that we wanted to 
do. 
The willingness of these Western donors to fund civil society activities must, as I indicated in 
chapter four, be seen within the broader context of the fiscal austerity reforms that the IMF 
and the World Bank had been pushing in Kenya.  By 1999, the effects of these Structural 
Adjustment Policies had made the Moi/KANU regime quite unpopular. The deep corruption, 
land grabbing, economic mismanagement, and blatant abuse of human rights added fuel to 
                                                 
2
 The full import of this pronouncement is discussed in chapter five. 
3
 This is discussed further in the section on framing demands and strategies for contention. 
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the discontents leading to greater pressure on the Moi/KANU government (Raiji, interview 
14/10/2009).  
 
As already seen in chapter four, the economic meltdown in Kenya in the 1990s, is widely 
acknowledged to be one of the main harbingers of contemporary constitutional review 
struggles (interviews: Odenda, 07/10/2009; Rema, 22/03/2010; Chitnis 20/10/2009; Kibwana, 
21/10/2009; Nyabinda, 25/05/2010. See also Mutua, 2008; Cottrell and Ghai, 2007; 
Murunga, 2007; Mutunga, 1999, Maina 1998; Ngunyi, 2001). These also ensured citizens of 
different social economic classes collaborated in collectively confronting the conditions they 
faced. Odenda (interview, 07/10/2009) advanced similarities with the rest of Africa at the 
time when he argued: ‗after 1990, there was a wind of constitutionalism going on in most of 
Africa. Regimes that had been draconian – the military type and other dictatorships were all 
going for new democratic or multiparty constitutions.‘4 Mkandawire (1999: 121), explains 
the then wind of change on the African continent as aided by  ‗liberalisation of the market 
[which] weaken[ed] the state‘s ... capacity to use patronage to keep its supporters in line or to 
buy off potential challenges...‘  
 
These new constitutional dispensations across many Sub-Saharan African countries served as 
reference points for the Ufungamano Initiative. According to Odenda, South Africa, the last 
of the Sub-Saharan African countries under minority white rule, 
…was at the time gaining independence [sic] in 1994 and drafting a constitution, which 
almost became a blue print to a number of countries especially due to the fact that it had 
eventually gone beyond entrenching civil and political rights to the socio-economic rights in 
its Constitution. It became an inspiration. A lot of constitutions that followed tended to 
borrow a lot from the South African 1996 constitutional framework (Odenda, interview 
07/10/2009). 
                                                 
4
 Indeed, countries such as Uganda, Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Africa, underwent constitutional reforms while 
others like Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia, DR Congo, Benin, Burundi, Congo, Namibia, and Nigeria among others, 
embraced political pluralism sometimes with substantial amendments to the existing constitutions (Cottrell and 
Ghai, 2007; Whitaker and Giersch, 2009). Mutua (2008: 141) talks of a ‗fever of regime change‘ in Africa in 
early 1990s noting that ‗the early 1990s saw many autocratic governments on the African continent ousted in a 
fever of regime change.‘ This fate befell Zambia, Mali, Benin, and Congo among others. In these countries, 
citizens‘ uprising forced the regimes to fall. This was followed by national constitutional conferences to 
negotiate new constitutional orders (Mutua, 2008; Zeleza, 2004). However, KANU managed to ‗avoid rout by 
prodemocracy advocates‘ because of Moi‘s ingenuity in speedily repealing the law that had prohibited 
multipartism (Ibid). Thereafter, he was able to ‗outmanoeuvre an immature opposition that mistakenly believed 
that it could beat him at the polls, absent [of] legal and constitutional reforms. That is how Kenya lost an 
[earlier] opportunity for a national conference, despite calls for such a forum‘ (Mutua, 2008: 141). Those that 
refused to accommodate popular demands ended up in great turmoil of military coup d'état and civil war – e.g. 
Somalia, Liberia, Nigeria, Algeria etc.  
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Ufungamano Initiative leaders also recognised and utilised ‗the International Human Rights 
Conventions that Kenya had signed, but was doing little to implement‘ as an opportunity to 
push for accountability on the same (interviews: Ndubi, 24/09/2009; Rema, 22/03/2010). 
Some of the most relevant of such Conventions included the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which Kenya had acceded to on May 1, 1972; the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which Kenya had acceded to on March 
23, 1976; the Convention on Discrimination Against Women which Kenya had acceded to on 
March 9, 1984; and the Convention against Torture, which Kenya had acceded to on 
February 21, 1997. The main thrust here, as shall become clear in the discussion under 
accountability politics, was to highlight the discrepancy between Moi/KANU international 
obligations under these conventions, and the domestic situation. As such, these conventions 
offered opportunities for activists to push the Moi/KANU regime to fully embrace these 
Conventions in the domestic legal system fashioned as accountability politics.  
 
Another opportunity bringing together the different and sometimes ideologically disparate 
groups that had singularly been struggling, was a common adversary to all of them – the 
Moi/KANU regime. Here, a Catholic theologian and the theological advisor to the Justice and 
Peace Commission, Reverend Peter Gichure, offered insights into how this was possible. He 
argued that as Catholics, they had been campaigning against the Moi/KANU regime‘s 
excesses for a while. But they discovered that by acting alone, there was no way they would 
win:  
It was very easy to be isolated because the state would frame your resistance as ‗Catholics or 
Protestants are against this, or that.‘ So it was a matter of saying here is a common problem, a 
problem that affects the nation. It is a cry about basic rights, about food, about clothing, about 
the country‘s wealth. So a collective national effort was required. And, because Moi had 
become very powerful and involved in a lot of impunity, he would hit back at any opposition 
either by killing or by bribing. But acting collectively we realised there was no way they 
could kill everybody as the outcry would be too much (Gichure, interview 12/10/2009). 
 
Notwithstanding the advantages the identification of a common adversary brought, as I shall 
show in chapter seven, this unity of purpose may also explain why groups under the 
Ufungamano Initiative held on together for as long as there was Moi as a common adversary. 
Indeed, as Odhiambo M. (interview, 01/04/2010), in referring to the merger between the 
Ufungamano Initiative and the parliamentary led process, speculated: 
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Had the People‘s Commission gone on for a few more months than it went [i.e. without merging], 
we would eventually have begun to see its tensions and cracks. It survived united because it was 
set against the Moi regime‘s Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC), which enjoyed 
less legitimacy. If we did not have CKRC at that point, then we might have seen more 
pronounced tensions within the Ufungamano Initiative‘s People‘s Commission. But that is 
something we probably will never know. 
  
A former chair of the National Council of NGOs of Kenya, Gichira Kibara, and at the time of 
interviewing him, the Constitutional Affairs Secretary in the PNU/ODM coalition 
government, added another dimension to the opportunities available after the 1997 general 
election. This was in the form of Moi/KANU‘s new vulnerabilities. Specifically, while ‗Moi 
had won the 1997 elections, he looked weak and vulnerable as he did not have as many MPs 
in parliament. He looked ―beatable‖. Ordinary Kenyans saw the moment as having a lot of 
hope of delivering them from Moi‘s malaise‘ (interview, 15/10/2009).  This explains why the 
movement was possible at that particular moment because the idea that Moi and KANU 
could be challenged had diffused more widely to the Kenyan people.   
 
The opportunities highlighted so far point to a fact that an existing order can only become an 
opportunity, when leaders make strategic decisions to utilise them to incubate as well as drive 
a movement. Indeed, as Morris and Staggenborg (2004: 171) argue, ‗movement leaders [are] 
strategic decision-makers who inspire and organize others to participate in social movement.‘ 
After hatching, a movement moves to action phase. As I argued in the last chapter, the action 
phase of social movements‘ leadership is steered by fanatics or cadres who translate 
discontents into comprehensible terms for the masses in distress and inspire commitment to 
collective action. Like Gusfield (1966: 137) I argue that in the Ufungamano Initiative, this 
happened in an environment where, 
The incumbent leadership [wa]s the center of demands… in both internal and external 
environments. [Leadership was] at the head of a hierarchy of authority and decision-making 
within the movement. At the same time, in the effort to affect change and to prevent the 
detrimental damage of a hostile environment, […leadership] operates in an environment of 
clients, enemies, adherents and potential recruits in which […they had] no authority ...  
 
Successful navigation of such hostilities depended on the leadership being able to make 
strategic decisions to guide operations, structures, framing of demands, mobilising resources 
and support, and even in agreeing to negotiate and ultimately merge with the state 
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led/controlled process. For instance, as I show in the analysis of the merger process in the 
next chapter, understanding the merger process and outcomes, required an interrogation of 
the role of the various leaders in the Ufungamano Initiative and their adversaries in these 
contentions. In this regard, it is imperative to consider the impact of both the appointment of 
Yash Pal Ghai, a renowned Kenyan legal scholar to chair the state led process, and his 
subsequent strategic interactions with some key leaders in the Ufungamano Initiative.  
The Ufungamano Initiative leadership and empowerment of followers 
A primary strategy of the Ufungamano Initiative leadership to win support and inspire was to 
first empower Kenyans through awareness-raising and citizen rights education (Cottrell and 
Ghai, 2007; interviews: Gitari, 21/09/2009; Kibara, 15/10/2009; Apiyo, 16/09/2009; 
Ochanda, 22/09/2009; Ombok, 24/09/2009; Khairallah, 26/09/2009; Kibwana, 21/10/2009; 
wa Gathaka, 29/09/2009; Wambugu N., 23/10/2009; Lamba, 23/10/2009; Runguma, 
13/03/2010; Rema, 22/03/2010; Odhiambo M., 01/04/2010; Mwanyumba, 07/04/2010; 
Shereta, 07/04/2010; Mwakio, 07/04/2010; Maganga, 07/04/2010; Ochieng, 08/04/2010). 
Such empowerment enabled ordinary masses of people to ‗move from a position of total 
subservience – accepting everything because you cannot deal with that power  to a level 
where people are able to stand up, question power and demand change through 
demonstrations in the streets‘ (Mwachofi, interview 27/09/2009).  
 
But how exactly did empowerment happen? Here Morris and Staggenborg (2004: 192), 
provide some insights arguing that organisational theorists ‗stress the importance of 
situational context, in the ways …leaders empower others to lead, and the dispersal of 
leadership in organizations.‘ As shall become clear from the analysis of the Ufungamano 
Initiative structures and relationships between the different components of the structure and 
desired outcomes, a formal committee responsible for civil education was formed. A clear 
role of leadership in ensuring certain outcomes through an established structure therefore 
becomes evident.  In this regard, many of this study‘s participants concurred with Cottrell 
and Ghai‘s (2007: 23) observation that ‗empowerment of the people, responsiveness to their 
aspirations, and a common process emphasizing national unity, were important goals‘ of the 
reform movement.  According to Cottrell and Ghai, the process,  
…succeeded in raising the political awareness of the people, and the results of that were already 
evident in the way they voted in the general elections of 2002. And it is evident in the way that, 
since then, people have demanded more accountability and government policies and acts are 
subjected to greater scrutiny…. By taking seriously the views of the people hitherto reduced to 
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passive submission, the review gave them a sense of their own worth and importance. It 
emphasized the character of a Constitution as a compact, not only between citizens and rulers, 
but also between people and communities. The process gave individuals, organized groups, and 
communities the incentive to study the ways in which public power can be organized and 
exercised. It increased their awareness of the structures of state (2007: 23).  
 
Civic education had a number of impacts on the constitutional reform struggles. First, it 
politicized the struggles of the subaltern classes by making them aware that the problems 
they confronted were rooted in a bad constitution governing the country. These people 
refused to take any more exploitation (Cottrell and Ghai, 2007; Interviews: Rema, 
22/03/2010; Gitari, 21/09/2009). A leading member of one of the subaltern movements 
explained how this happened when he stated that as Muungano wa Wanavijiji, they started 
agitating not just against the forced evictions in the Kenyan urban slums, but also for changes 
in the basic law of the land. To be effective, they realised there was a need to be conversant 
with fundamentals of the constitution.  
When we started educating ourselves on the constitution, we realised that the document did 
not protect us but only the wealthy and corrupt leaders who had title deeds to the land we 
squatted on in the slums. Then we started educating other people in the slums. Many people 
joined us. We had and still do have over 15,000 members from Kibera alone. At one point we 
had over 30,000 members. Anyone evicted would run to Muungano wa Wanavijiji and we 
would take up the matter (Rema, interview 22/03/2010). 
 
Secondly, civic education enabled the bridging of grassroots struggles with national 
struggles. In this regard, Rema (interview 22/03/2010) explained that the successful 
politicization of the subaltern struggles was possible, because of the support they received 
from national NGOs like Pamoja Trust, Shelter Forum, and Kituo cha Sheria among others. 
The interventions of these NGOs through civic education as well as solidarity (through for 
instance, participation in joint demonstrations) in the struggles, helped in building the 
confidence of grassroots struggles to join mainstream struggles for constitutional reforms. 
The civic education by the NGOs, according to Rema, highlighted weaknesses of the 
constitution but also the discrepancies in areas where the constitution required the 
government to act in a specific manner and it never did. Through participating in these civic 
education fora, members of Muungano wa Wanavijiji interacted with experts and gained new 
knowledge that cascaded further down to the communities and would be useful for 
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accountability politics (interviews: Apiyo 16/09/2009; Alloys, 21/03/2010; Rema, 
22/03/2010). In this regard, Rema (interview 22/03/2010) stated: 
We got skills that we used to create more awareness for people and tell them this is what the 
constitution of Kenya says about the land. We were able to talk confidently in our forums. If 
it is the issue of housing, it was very clear international treaties have been signed by the 
government, we were able to know that there is a convention where the government 
committed themselves that they would deliver this and that, and were not delivering. Such 
knowledge added a greater force to our struggle. In that process we were also able to interact 
with so many people who helped us in participating in demonstrations. When we wanted to 
demonstrate, you see we would have an MP in the protest. It was then not easy for a 
policeman to just start shooting or doing anything. They would start negotiating with us to 
stop protest. Then it was easy to engage them and get our voices as ordinary citizens to be 
also heard and amplified.  
 
Such interactions brought to the fore a third outcome of the civic education in these struggles. 
Specifically, solidarities were built across board that helped the middle class struggles ‗build 
their own legitimacy because they had ordinary people‘s movements like Muungano wa 
wanavijiji in or with them‘ (Rema, interview 22/03/2010). The Muungano wa wanavijiji case 
and its positive interactions with human rights NGOs therefore suggests an interdependence 
of the two levels of the struggle – i.e. grassroots and the national.  
 
The fourth product of civic education was the creation of widespread awareness that enabled 
citizens to be well-informed of their rights so much so that when the commissions (both PCK 
and CKRC) went round the country collecting the views of citizens, people had already 
developed their positions, and the level of manipulation was minimal (Interviews: Apiyo, 
16/09/2009; Gitari, 21/09/2009; Ochanda, 22/09/2009; Ombok, 24/09/2009; Khairallah, 
26/09/2009; Kibwana, 21/10/2009; wa Gathaka, 29/09/2009; Wambugu N., 23/10/2009; 
Lamba, 23/10/2009; Runguma, 13/03/2010; Rema, 22/03/2010; Odhiambo M., 01/04/2010; 
Mwanyumba, 07/04/2010; Shereta, 07/04/2010; Mwakio, 07/04/2010; Maganga, 07/04/2010; 
Ochieng, 08/04/2010; Wadenya, 09/04/2010). Julius Wadenya (interview, 09/04/2010), a 
resident of Kibera explained that the widespread awareness was a result of cumulative 
impacts of interdependent interactions that had started in the early 1990s with groups such as 
Citizens Coalition for Constitutional Change sensitising the community on the need to 
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overhaul the constitution.
5
 Such sensitization made the community ‗yearn for reforms 
because most of us were affected by adverse conditions in the country‘ (Wadenya, interview 
09/04/2010).  Indeed, the slum areas in Kenyan urban centres have remained hotbeds of 
struggles. At the time of collecting data for this thesis, I had the privilege to observe two 
public forums in some of Nairobi‘s slums, one in Kibera and another in Dandora, on 
participatory budgeting exercises where members of the Muungano wa Wanavijiji were 
active participants. This confirms that Muungano wa Wanavijiji has remained a vehicle for 
mobilising poor urban slum dwellers.    
 
The fifth impact of civic education was to strengthen the resolve and commitment of 
Kenyans to these struggles. Accordingly, some of the participants argued that such resolve is 
what ultimately led to citizens voting KANU out of power in 2002 because ‗for once 
Kenyans voted with a clear conscience and not along tribal lines nor did they vote those who 
had been bribing them with ill-gotten wealth‘ (interviews: Rema, 22/03/2010; Apiyo, 
16/09/2009; Alloys, 21/03/2010; Nyabinda, 25/03/2010; Odhiambo M., 01/04/2010; 
Mwalulu, 01/04/2010; Mwanyumba, 07/04/2010; Shereta, 07/04/2010; Wandati, 17/09/2009; 
Kaimba, 19/09/2009; Kibara, 15/10/2009). Cottrell and Ghai (2007) have posited similar 
reasons for the loss of KANU in 2002.
6
   
 
Clearly, civic education served more than immediate empowerment goals. The impacts 
enumerated above were not a happenstance, but a result of strategic calculations on the part 
of leadership. In this regard, Mutava Musyimi, a leading member of the movement who 
ultimately became its spokesperson, stated: ‗we believed that it was right that people be 
helped to understand why we were doing what we were doing‘ (interview, 09/10/2009).  The 
Ufungamano Initiative leadership was therefore acutely aware of the need to inspire 
Kenyans‘ faith and confidence that the contention would amount to better things for all. This 
was especially so, because, as Rashmin Chitnis, the Chair of the Hindu Council of Kenya 
argued, due to the kind of political environment Kenyans were subjected to at the time,  
                                                 
5
 Refer to chapter four for explanations of emergence of the Citizens Coalition for Constitutional Change and its 
work in mid 1990s.  
6
 Notwithstanding the post 2002 developments where the new political elite voted into power in 2002 behaved 
very much, if not worse than the Moi/KANU elite that they had replaced (Wrong, 2008) as internal 
fragmentations and sharing of positions in government along ethnic lines took centre stage and the new regime 
failed to deliver on the very basic promises they had made to Kenyans, it was an empowered citizenry that voted 
KANU out. It was out of such empowerment that a majority of citizens refused to endorse a new constitution 
that promised little transformation in the November 2005 referendum. These issues are the concern for the next 
chapter. 
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Most people had a resigned feeling that nothing would make a difference. However, some of 
the people did have some hope that constitutional reforms would eventually bring institutional 
reforms. But this was going to be a slow process and could not be done overnight. It therefore 
needed patience and longer term commitment for these things to go through (interview, 
20/10/2009).   
 
In January 2000, Kivutha Kibwana, a leading member of the NCEC and its spokesperson, in 
a memorandum to the Ufungamano Initiative, aptly captured the issues that the Ufungamano 
Initiative had to grapple with and the need to remain committed when he wrote:  
If the [Ufungamano Initiative] stands firm, the Raila Odinga-Moi route of constitutional 
reform will not succeed. It will not accrue the necessary countrywide legitimacy.... However, 
if they waiver, then MPs who are currently supporting the parliamentary initiative may trickle 
back to Raila.  
Furthermore, to counter the continued attacks by the state propaganda machinery on the 
legality of their process, the Ufungamano Initiative leadership argued that while the 
government process had the legality of law, it did not enjoy the legitimate support of Kenyan 
people (interviews: Lumumba, 01/10/2009; Musyimi, 09/10/2009; Ghai, 23/10/2009; 
Lethome, 02/10/2009). In this regard, Lethome stated:  
Our argument then was: ‗we might not have legal authority but we have the moral 
authority...‘ and we kept on repeating that. We had the moral authority because people wanted 
a constitution reform process that was people driven...and religious leaders, like Mutava 
Musyimi kept on reminding us: ‗we were the moral voice of this country. We have to give 
guidance to this country.‘ So we wanted to provide leadership in as far as the Review Process 
was concerned (Lethome, interview 02/10/2009). 
 
Besides, as I highlighted in chapter five, even though contested by some of the participants in 
this study, the Ufungamano Initiative leadership also saw a theological basis in their framing 
of the struggles (interviews: Gichure, 12/10/2009; Apiyo, 16/09/2009; Ombok, 24/09/2009; 
Gitari, 21/09/2009; Njoya, 29/09/2009).  Some religious leaders argued that it was the 
church‘s business to get involved in politics and that the church‘s leadership and mission is 
just not spiritual, but has in addition to the spiritual, political, social, and economic elements 
to it. As such, when the government failed, the church had a role to play to force it to respond 
to the demands of the citizenry (interviews: Gitari, 21/09/2009; Njoya, 29/09/2009; Gichure, 
12/10/2009). Gichure (interview, 12/10/2009) for instance argued that Catholics reached out 
to other faiths, because, besides the common problem facing the country, they were 
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spiritually convinced that the religious community should rise to the occasion and do 
something for the country. He commented:  
There was a universal spirituality geared towards the realisation of humanity. Such 
spirituality is present in all religions whether Muslims or Hindus or Buddhists or Christians or 
African indigenous religions. They all aim at that peace and harmony that the creator wanted. 
So religion is more of a vehicle to a higher human goal. And that was the goal that was being 
attacked from its roots by the Moi regime. So when you are preaching every day about people 
that they should not kill, and the murder still increases, you feel threatened (Gichure, 
interview 12/10/2009).  
Therefore, for the clergymen, their involvement in fighting injustices had a Biblical basis. 
Similar ideas were expressed by some clergy and lay people that I interviewed (for example 
Apiyo, wa Gathaka, Ombok) as well as in the various minutes of the Ufungamano Initiative 
stakeholder consultative meetings (for example the Machakos meeting; the December 3, 
1999 meeting; the December 15-16, 1999 meeting).  
 
Given the inspirations and commitments, whatever resistance and harassment the 
Ufungamano Initiative faced from the state, it countered them by promising Kenyans that 
nothing done by those who feared losing power as a result of the envisaged changes would 
deter them from pursuing their mandate. The Ufungamano Initiative kept on reminding the 
state that it was the one that had reneged on earlier promises. The Ufungamano Initiative also 
promised to do everything and as quickly as possible, to speed up the process so that wanton 
loss of human life was minimized or avoided, and the nation could start addressing other 
issues like the collapsed economy and the deep levels of poverty. They argued that these 
were critical issues affecting the country and could not be addressed within the framework of 
existing constitutional order and governance, which through concentration of power in a few 
hands, had encouraged appalling levels of corruption and shocking disregard towards human 
life (The Ufungamano Initiative Stakeholder Support Group, 27/1/2000).   
 
Despite evidence of theological framing, as already highlighted in chapter five, there were 
nonetheless, contradictions on the nature of the movement itself. Some participants disputed 
that the Ufungamano Initiative had any liberation theology within it (Omtatah, interview 
31/03/2010). The argument here is that if it did, it would have remained steadfast in its push 
for a new constitution as well as having participatory and emancipatory structures to ensure 
that the general masses of Kenya would participate and in the process made the Ufungamano 
Initiative a true people‘s movement. According to Omtatah, this was evidently not the case – 
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the Ufungamano Initiative was purely a battle between the elites. In this regard, Omtatah 
(interview, 31/03/2010) highlighted the contractions with the movement when he stated: 
It is true, the clergy had issues that it tried to address but they were not tactical, they were not 
radical enough. Moreover, because the Ufungamano Initiative was largely driven by the 
clergy, there is no way it could be a people‘s movement….But all in all it did provide a 
platform from which some demands were made on the rogue state. And they were able to 
force concessions that avoided a meltdown and checked Moi. They managed to bring us to 
some talking table of sorts. So it was a necessity. But it did not go far enough because it 
lacked clarity of issues. And that comes out when Moi goes and Kibaki comes in and then 
identities changed. You find that the Catholics now feel because Kibaki is a Catholic like 
them, they do not have to work against government. So the issue now becomes were they 
fighting Moi and his identity or were they fighting for an ideal? So you find that they were 
fighting against the oppression yes, but with no ideals to replace the problem they were 
dealing with. 
 
There is definitely some merit in the above criticism. As shall become clear in chapter seven, 
the clergy led the Ufungamano Initiative to a merger that greatly compromised chances of 
any radical reforms. In the section on mobilisation structures in this chapter, I draw attention 
to the full import of religious institutions in the movement, by showing that the movement 
depended heavily on existing structures, which were mainly religious institutions. As such, 
religious institutions‘ influence in the movement was disproportionate to all other actors. 
Nonetheless, Omtatah‘s views may appear to be overly critical and devoid of the realities that 
the clergy-led Ufungamano Initiative had succeeded where most other struggles and failed 
before. Besides, it fails to acknowledge the multiple nodes of leadership within the movement 
as highlighted earlier in this chapter, choosing, instead, to heap blame on the clergy for the 
movement‘s ideological indolence. Yes, the clergy were the most visible part of the 
movement leadership. But the critical question is why did other actors in the movement not 
push for the type of ideas that they wanted? Omtatah‘s view also betrays a valorised 
conception of the role of civil society. Specifically he treads a typical slippery path that leads 
to conception of African civil society as always in opposition to, and aimed at transforming 
the state. Omtatah‘s view of changing identities after 2002, nonetheless brings out the 
complex and fluid nature of state-civil society relations. He however falls short of 
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recognizing the means and ends congruence/divergence advanced by Najam (2000) as 
determinant for this nature of relationship.
7
 
 
Despite the above criticism, the Ufungamano Initiative was able to mobilise support, 
commitment as well as resources from many Kenyans that ensured an energised, solid and for 
once, what appeared to be a unified push for a new constitutional dispensation. As such, most 
of the groups pushing for a new constitution and opposed to state‘s hegemony in the project, 
bought into the Ufungamano Initiative idea of a parallel constitutional making project. They 
became willing participants and even promoted the idea. In this regard, Onyango (interview, 
07/10/2009) stated that ‗ordinary people in urban streets and village squares, in churches, 
mosques, and temples throughout Kenya, accepted and identified with the alternative vision 
that the Ufungamano Initiative was offering.‘ They showed their solidarity and commitment. 
They saw the Ufungamano Initiative leadership as partners in their ordinary struggles. People 
came out and personally sacrificed to this struggle (interviews: Onyango, 07/10/2009; 
Oganda, 26/03/2010; Raiji, 14/10/2009; Musyimi, 09/10/2009; Waruku, 14/10/2009; Musau, 
24/09/2009; Wambugu C., 09/10/2009; Onyango, 07/09/2009; Athman, 12/10/2009; 
Khairallah, 26/09/2009; Wanga, 08/04/2010; Ufungamano Initiative, 08/08/2000). Musyimi 
(interview 09/10/2009) for instance, highlighted a general, ‗public admiration‘ for the 
movement. In this regard, Musyimi stated: ‗I get the impression we had massive public 
support for the process because financially, we raised money from the public. We probably 
raised something like Shillings 600,000 to 700,000 directly from the public, which was a 
good indicator of public support.
8
  
 
These assertions find more empirical support from the words of another respondent – Wanga, 
an ordinary resident of Kibera, who when asked whether they supported the Ufungamano 
Initiative stated that he and others participated in the activities of the Ufungamano Initiative 
through its constituent organisations:  
                                                 
7
 Please see chapters two and five for a detailed discussion on Najam‘s Four-Cs (cooperation, complementarity, 
co-optation and conflict) model of state-civil society relations.  
8
 Minutes of the Ufungamano Initiative Stakeholder Council meeting held at the Mombasa Civic Education 
Trust on August 8, 2000 and a subsequent press statement specifically thanked the Kenyan public for ‗their 
support …especially in making cash donations‘ to the Ufungamano Initiative and hoped they would continue 
doing the same. For Musyimi (interview, 09/10/2009) the public liked the idea that there was a protest 
movement led this time, by the religious community, and arguably fairly stable, reasonable, and detested 
anything to do with violence -this was in relation to the militancy of the NCEC in 1997. Musyimi however 
expressed doubts that the public was fully convinced that the Ufungamano Initiative would get very far with the 
project.  
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Yes I participated in those struggles. There was the Saba Saba Asili, the NCEC, and even 
Muungano wa Mageuzi led by Orengo. We visited different areas, and attended different 
rallies by Muungano wa Mageuzi in Mombasa, in Kisumu, and here in Nairobi (interview 
08/04/2010).  
Another ordinary citizen in Kibera, Wandenya (interview, 09/09/2010) stated that as he grew 
up, the struggles continued. He ‗attended forums within the community that had to do with 
the struggle for constitutional changes and there were many local community initiatives that 
attracted support from the Ufungamano Initiative such as seminars and paralegal training.‘ 
The above suggests that indeed, there was some support for the movement through the 
various affiliates of the Ufungamano Initiative at the grassroots. 
 
Despite the generally positive response from Kenyans, the Ufungamano Initiative received 
mixed, if not open hostility in some parts of the country, specifically in Luo Nyanza. The 
reasons for this are found in the way the Ufungamano Initiative and its affiliate groups 
operated. Specifically, the avenues for participation were mostly more accessible to elites at 
different levels in society. This cut off some potential supporters who felt slighted and also 
gave their competitors (KANU and the National Development Party) some ammunition. For 
instance, when the Ufungamano Initiative‘s Peoples‘ Commission on Kenya went for a 
public hearing in Kisumu, a militia group allied to the National Development Party – The 
Baghdad Boys – attempted to petrol bomb the PCK commissioners. However, there was a 
general agreement by participants from that part of Kenya that the hostile reactions were a 
reflection of power struggles for the control of the reform movements‘ process and outcome 
as well as control of the subaltern classes in many parts of the country (e.g. interviews: 
Ochanda, 22/09/2009; Oganda, 26/03/2010; Nyabinda, 25/03/2010; Lethome, 02/10/2010; 
Zein; 07/10/2009).  
 
Oganda, a one-time leader of the Baghdad Boys militia group, for instance stated that the 
hostile reception the Ufungamano Initiative received was a reflection of an on-going battle 
for political supremacy that pitted Raila Odinga against James Orengo in Luo Nyanza 
(interview, 26/03/2010). This reveals the intra-ethnic cleavages within these struggles as 
highlighted in chapter four. Specifically, both Odinga and Orengo are prominent sons of the 
Luo community who had initially been part of what in Kenyan political parlance of the 1990s 
were called ‗Young Turks‘ of the second liberation. When the doyen of Kenyan opposition 
politics, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga (Raila‘s father) died, Raila contested the leadership of Ford 
Kenya, the political outfit that his father had headed. Orengo, who at the time was the 
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national vice chair of the party, supported Kijana Wamalwa, an ethnic Luhya in this contest. 
Raila lost the acrimonious battle for the chair to Wamalwa in an election marred by violence 
and bloodletting. Bad blood ensued. Raila ultimately left Ford Kenya in a huff for a little 
known National Development Party in 1997 (Badejo, 2006). He contested the presidency in 
the 1997 general election and came third. He surprised many when he started his cooperation 
with Moi, whose government had detained him without trial cumulatively for over seven 
years. It is from this cooperation that Raila was nominated Chair of the Parliamentary Select 
Committee on the Constitution (PSC), which was in direct competition with the Ufungamano 
Initiative.  
 
While Raila Odinga was executing the manoeuvres detailed above, James Orengo headed 
Muungano wa Mageuzi and was affiliated to the Ufungamano Initiative‘s stance. The chair of 
the Ufungamano Initiative‘s People‘s Commission of Kenya also happened to be an ethnic 
Luo and a former Ford Kenya parliamentarian, Dr. Oki Ombaka. It emerges that the 
Ufungamano Initiative was targeted in Kisumu, not so much because it was adversarial to the 
state-led process, which by then was chaired by Raila Odinga, but to embarrass Orengo and 
Ombaka in front of the Luo Nyanza people, a majority of whom have been fanatically 
sympathetic to the politics of the Odinga family since pre-independence days.  
 
Views from respondents such as Ochanda, Khairallah, Apiyo, Zein and Lethome as well as 
an article by Cottrell and Ghai (2007) and reports from the Weekly Review (23/04/1999) 
echoed the above narrative.
9
 Ochanda (interview, 22/09/2009) for instance stated:  
The PCK commissioners were seen as commissioners that were on the other side. This is 
exactly why they had a problem in Kisumu because the Ufungamano Initiative was already 
collecting views from people and were running ahead with their process. By then, Raila had 
joined Moi. In Kisumu, given that many times the demonstrators were ‗owned‘ by Raila and 
if you had opposing or different views, or you were appearing like you were against that, 
definitely the public would throw stones at you. That is what they did to Oki Ombaka on that 
day.  
                                                 
9
 On the Kisumu violence, Lethome (interview, 02/10/2009) noted: ‗I was the Master of Ceremonies and I was 
injured. I lost my jacket and my pager. I was with Justice Lenaola and Dr. Ombaka...the moment we landed in 
Kisumu, we met with Orengo who was flying back to Nairobi. Orengo was a veteran of these things and he 
realized something was wrong. He warned us that all is not well in Kisumu: ―boys have been hired to hit you. In 
fact, they are waiting for you on the way from the airport.‖ On asking him who had hired them? He responded 
that it was ―KANU, Raila and his group.‖ They are the ones who did that... stones and petrol bombs. And the 
first petrol bombs were hurled at us and landed under Ombaka‘s seat. Fortunately, Orengo had organized for 
some well-trained people to rescue Ombaka because we all ran away and left the poor blind guy. What saved us 
was the building that we retreated to. It was pelted with stones, petrol bombs were thrown in, our equipment 
was destroyed, our Land Rover was completely burnt.‘  
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Khairallah (interview, 26/09/2009) added another variable to this hostility. For him, it 
emanated from the fact that  
The powers that be, at that point in time, were very impatient and felt threatened by the 
activities of the Ufungamano Initiative because it had a very broad and popular support from 
the masses who felt the Ufungamano Initiative were actually articulating their collective 
aspirations. It was like the hope people were seeking. They seemed to say ‗we have been in 
many problems and in the Ufungamano Initiative, we see ourselves out of the problems that 
have for a long time afflicted the very heart and the very soul of society.‘  
Cottrell and Ghai (2007: 2) are more analytical and observe that the Kenyan constitutional 
reforms‘ tale has many morals: 
Perhaps the most critical and also the most obvious, is that constitution making is highly 
political, with high stakes for those who make a living out of politics, the politicians. The 
constitution is important for them primarily as the gateway to state power, and personal 
considerations dominate the national interest.   
 
This suggests existence of variations of opinion on the explanations of what was really 
behind the scenes in the hostile reception of the Ufungamano Initiative Commissioners in 
Kisumu. For instance, a former councillor in Kisumu Municipality, and who had been on the 
local political scene initially as a Trade Unionist since late 1980s – Samuel Nyabinda, had a 
different explanation. For Nyabinda (interview, 25/03/2010), the hostility towards the 
Ufungamano Initiative in Kisumu was because it was perceived as delaying real change and 
the will of the people: 
We had the second liberation heroes and some of the people in the Ufungamano Initiative had 
not been part of it. Many people could not understand how now, the Ufungamano Initiative 
could change the system whereas they had not done it when we wanted the repeal of Section 
2A. It was not just attacking the Ufungamano Commissioners here in Kisumu; it was their 
delaying of the process that we attacked. We were saying let us wait and vote this government 
out with the view that the government coming in had promised change and we knew them 
well. It was unacceptable for the Ufungamano Initiative to come here selling their ideas.  
 
Nyabinda added that he had witnessed NDP talking to KANU, and had seen agreements 
between the two parties to give the nation a new constitution. This made NDP support 
KANU because there was a supposed change of heart in politics. NDP had realised that they 
could not totally disregard KANU and started playing power games with it. Nyabinda added 
that ‗the parties at the Ufungamano Initiative saw their process as workable not knowing that 
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KANU had already put its machinery through the provincial administration to every corner of 
the country to prevent it from succeeding‘ (interview, 25/03/2010). While Nyabinda‘s views 
have their own merit, if one looks at the larger picture in the country and how the 
Moi/KANU regime was very determined to prevent the Ufungamano Initiative from doing its 
work, it is an argument that is difficult to sustain. The myopic conception of power and the 
momentary exigencies that many Kenyan politicians including Raila Odinga plays, further 
nullifies the claim that the hostile reception was in opposition to the Ufungamano Initiative‘s 
reform abilities or credentials. Odinga‘s own actions in leading his party, the NDP, into 
cooperation and eventual merger with KANU, and his complicity in derailing the reform train 
betray other intentions. It is difficult therefore, to see how any progressive change would 
have come from the Raila/Moi axis when all they had been interested in, was retention of 
power and dominance, so as to control the eventual outcome of the Review Process.  
 
These differences notwithstanding, there was however, a genuine disquiet even on the part of 
those who supported the Ufungamano Initiative in Kisumu. This was because the 
organisation and mobilisation for the Kisumu meeting was done exclusively from Nairobi by 
Chemi Chemi Ya Ukweli youths (interviews: Ombok, 24/09/2009; Lethome, 02/10/2009). 
Local supporters on the ground felt slighted by this and wondered why they could not be 
trusted with local organising (Oganda, 25/03/2010). This played a role in undermining the 
legitimacy of the Ufungamano Initiative at the local level (Oganda, interview 26/03/2010).
10
 
This happened despite the claim that the Ufungamano Initiative had representations or a 
presence in all parts of the country and that this meant that it had people‘s legitimacy 
(interviews: Ndubi, 24/09/2009; Musau, 24/09/2009; Lethome, 02/10/2009; Athman, 
12/10/2009; Raiji, 14/10/2009). Nonetheless, it also needs to be noted that in an environment 
highly charged with intimidation from the state, trusting a group close to the movement made 
sense to the Ufungamano Initiative leadership. Indeed, Zein (interview, 07/10/2009) credits 
Chemi Chemi ya Ukweli with a sterling job in protecting PCK: ‗if it was not for Chemi 
Chemi ya Ukweli some of the commissioners would have been killed in Kisumu.‘  
                                                 
10
 Ombok confirmed that the organisation of public hearing and security of the PCK commissioners was 
centrally coordinated by Catholic Church affiliated movement, Chemi Chemi ya Ukweli with local groups left 
only to do the mobilisations of the public to attend such forums. Even then, the religious institutions oversaw 
most of this work in various parts of the country and sometimes, the secular groups were totally left out. Indeed 
a former PCK commissioner, Riunga Raiji (interview, 14/10/2009) confirmed this when he stated: ‗whenever 
we travelled to a place where the Christians were the dominant section of the population the local Christian 
Council, NCCK, the Catholic Church would provide us with transport, accommodation, and generally take care 
of the expense of the commission, when we went to the Muslim dominated areas the Muslims were very useful, 
they again provided the facilities and that is how we operated.‘  
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In the end, as a result of this exclusionary behaviour as well as the vested competing interests 
of various actors, despite the popular support it enjoyed, the movement found it exceedingly 
hard to achieve universal purchase by the Kenyan people. This is not to say that it did not 
enjoy much support on the ground. On the contrary, there was strong support for the 
Ufungamano Initiative in the following provinces: Nairobi, Central, Coast, Eastern, Western 
and parts of Rift valley and Nyanza (see the Kenyan provincial map figure 6.1 below). The 
Ufungamano Initiative had a hostile reception in Kisumu in Nyanza province and to some 
extent, Garissa in the North Eastern Province. 
 
Figure 6.1. Map of Kenya Source http://www.worldofmaps.net/en/africa/map-kenya/political-map-kenya.htm 
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The Ufungamano Initiative and its framing of demands and strategies for 
contention 
Another key role of leaders at action phase is influencing, if not shaping demand frames as 
well as strategies for contention. The Ufungamano Initiative captured popular support of the 
Kenyan public which enabled it to pose substantial challenges to the state through a 
combination of strategies such as demonstrations, civic education, and public collection of 
views from Kenyan citizens, so much so that the state had no alternative but to seek ways to 
save face in light of a growing legitimacy crisis to its own Constitution Review Process 
(interviews: Ghai, 23/10/2009; Kuria, 26/09/2009; Kibwana, 21/10/2009; Lumumba, 
01/10/2009). Key to legitimacy of the Ufungamano Initiative, was its' framing of contention 
around the constitution making process.  
 
Keck and Sikkink (1998) argue that effective framing of demands must be clear, dramatic, 
powerful and appealing to shared principles. For Keck and Sikkink (1998: 20) framing ‗calls 
attention to issues, or creates them by using language that dramatizes and draws attention to 
their concerns.‘ They identify four key strategies used by movements for this purpose: 1) 
Information Politics: movements quickly and credibly generate politically usable information 
and use it where it has most impact; 2) Symbolic Politics: identifying and providing 
convincing explanations for powerful symbolic events; 3) Leverage Politics: mobilisation of 
targets to hold up to the scrutiny of peers, thereby exerting moral leverage on the assumption 
that governments and other targets, value the good opinion of others; 4) Accountability 
Politics: movements try to convince their targeted actors to publicly change their positions on 
issues. This happens through exposing the differences between the talk from the walk (Keck 
and Sikkink, 1998: 22-24).  
 
These four different types of politics in framing contention were evident in the Ufungamano 
Initiative in varying degrees. To begin with, even before the launch of the parallel process, 
the Ufungamano Initiative entrepreneurs had initially styled as a pressure group to force the 
state to acquiescence to what it framed as a people‘s fundamental and sovereign right in 
deciding the way they wanted to be governed (interviews: Apiyo, 16/09/2009; Kuria, 
26/09/2009). The Ufungamano Initiative entrepreneurs argued that the constitutional reform 
process should be people-centred, and the commission steering it had to be inclusive of all 
the social groups in Kenyan society (interviews: Wandati, 17/09/2009; Zein, 07/10/2009; 
Wambugu, 09/10/2009; Lethome, 02/10/2009; Odenda, 07/10/2009). The Ufungamano 
Initiative justified this framing by arguing that people were superior to institutions and that:  
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Constitutional making is a social, rather than a legal process. Therefore, parliament cannot 
engage in this process without violating the constitution…. Parliamentary intermeddling only 
makes the process unconstitutional...only Kenyans acting collectively as a people are above 
the constitution and therefore have the sovereign right to act outside the constitution while 
making a new constitution. No institution that is a creature of the constitution can act outside 
the constitution. It is not therefore any individual or group of individuals that wish to lock 
Parliament, the Presidency or the Attorney General out of the constitution making process – it 
is the current constitution itself that locks them out. The occupiers of the offices of the 
President, Attorney General, and Members of Parliament can only participate in this process 
as individuals like other ordinary Kenyans (Ufungamano Initiative, 27/01/2000).  
 
For the Ufungamano Initiative therefore, the power of the three arms of government 
(Judiciary, Parliament and the Executive), lay beneath the mandate of the people who held 
the ultimate constituent power. As such, the superiority of Parliament in the process of 
constitutional making did not arise (Kibwana, 2000; interviews: Kibwana, 21/10/2009; Kuria, 
26/09/2009). This framing reveals that the movement utilised as its strategy and in the 
framing of contention, the same constitution they wanted to re-write, to challenge the acts of 
other contenders. They did this by appropriating for themselves, the ‗we the people‘ tag and 
promised to carry out the Review Process with all other Kenyans. From a legal viewpoint, the 
Ufungamano Initiative was correct because the then constitution did not provide a 
mechanism for its own overhaul.  
 
As the Ufungamano Initiative noted in January 2001, Parliament could only exercise its 
legislative responsibility within parameters of the Constitution and not outside. As such, the 
Ufungamano Initiative argued that 
The Constitution of Kenya Review (Amendment) Act [of 2000 that Moi/KANU and 
Raila/NDP engineered] is clearly unconstitutional and the stakeholders are not legally bound 
to adhere to it…the stakeholders and the religious community have a moral obligation to 
ensure that it does not remain in our statute books. The constitutional defect is incurable and 
fatal to the Act and no amount of amendment or legislative manipulation can salvage it… the 
Act is terrible fraud on the people of Kenya (Ufungamano Initiative, 27/01/2000).  
As such, any attempts by parliament or the government to overhaul the constitution still 
needed the Kenyan people‘s participation. In any case, it also required a two-thirds majority 
of sitting Members of Parliament to even change a clause of the constitution, a number that 
the Ufungamano Initiative knew KANU and NDP would not marshal in Parliament.  
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But a critical question still needs to be answered regarding the framing of contention: how 
specifically did the four forms of politics identified by Keck and Sikkink (1999) empirically 
play out in the Ufungamano Initiative‘s framing of contention?  Below, I engage with each of 
them with a view to demonstrate their manifestations in the Ufungamano Initiative‘s work.  
Ufungamano Initiative’s symbolic politics 
The Ufungamano Initiative framed the constitution as a sacred covenant (symbolic politics) 
between the Kenyan people and their rulers (interviews: Gitari, 21/09/2009; Njoya, 
29/09/2009; wa Gathaka, 29/09/2009; Weekly Review, 12/02/1999). As a covenant, it 
required input from both the ruled and the rulers because, as reportedly put by the former 
head of the Catholic Church, Archbishop Ndingi Mwana a‘Nzeki,  ‗the constitution belongs 
to all Kenyans and not just to the political class [sic] in parliament‘ (cited in Weekly Review, 
12/02/1999: 8).
11
  Several key personalities echoed these sentiments during the two day 
stakeholder meeting on the 15
th
 and 16
th
 of December 1999 at Ufungamano House that 
launched the Peoples‘ Commission. Kenneth Matiba the leader of Saba Saba Asili party for 
instance argued:  
The real issue is how Kenya is going to be governed. Constitution writing should be with the 
people. Any attempts to abrogate the inevitable right of the people should be resisted. The 
President or Parliament cannot usurp the right of the people.... There is nowhere in the world 
that Parliament has been given the right to write the constitution. The people as a whole are 
superior to the legislature, executive and judiciary… (Minutes of December 15-16, 1999 
Ufungamano Initiative Stakeholder consultative meeting).  
 
In the same meeting, Kivutha Kibwana, the spokesperson for NCEC argued that as citizens, 
with or without the government, could write their constitution. He further contested the 
notion that the Ufungamano Initiative was a parallel Review Process, arguing that both the 
process and the country belonged to the people who were with the Ufungamano Initiative. He 
called for the rejection of the Parliamentary Select Committee on the Constitution, which was 
in competition with the Ufungamano Initiative, as it was an illegality under the then existing 
constitution. Kibwana however, stressed that they were not against Parliament as an 
institution, and ultimately, the constitutional enactment would end in Parliament as per the 
1997 Review Act. A leading female politician, Charity Ngilu, the first to contest for the 
                                                 
11
 The Archbishop was part of the religious leadership that was at the time (i.e. February, 1999) attempting to 
broker an agreement to break the stalemate over the political parties sharing of their 13 positions in the Review 
Commission.  This suggests an early attempt at framing contention. This is the position the Ufungamano 
Initiative took later when it was established. 
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Office of President in Kenya, and the then leader of the Social Democratic Party, eloquently 
argued that Kenya belonged to all and that they would not allow Parliament to abrogate the 
ultimate power of the Kenyan people.   
 
Such framing, in a political environment hostile to the same, confirms the nature of civil 
society as a scene of resistance. However, it is also either paradoxical, or tactical, that 
Kibwana saw a role for Parliament in the Review Process. Moreover, those gathered at 
Ufungamano for the December 15-16 meeting that launched the parallel process, still 
reserved seats for KANU and NDP (who had opted for Parliamentary Select Committee to 
lead the process).  This confirms that the Ufungamano Initiative indeed wanted an inclusive 
process; a process that would involve ordinary Kenyan people while giving parliament its 
space to participate as one of the key structures of the state.  
Ufungamano Initiative’s information politics 
Keck and Sikkink (1998) see information politics as the ability of a movement to quickly and 
credibly generate politically usable information and using it where it will have the most 
impact (cited in Mati, 2008: 71). Information politics are important for legitimacy of 
leadership and the demands of the movement. As already pointed out, the movement 
achieved this through massive civic education and sensitisation of citizens in an effort to win 
them to their side. As shall become clear later in this chapter, a specific organ within the 
Ufungamano Initiative was tasked with this role.  Another manifestation of information 
politics critical for framing of contention was in the Ufungamano Initiative‘s engagement in 
alternative analysis of the law. It is through such analysis of the 1997 Constitution of Kenya 
Review Act that they identified political and legal opportunities to utilise as well as the 
‗flaws‘ it contested. This was in view of the fact that the First Schedule of the Act had 
identified secular civil society, religious groups as well as opposition political parties, among 
the key stakeholders of the process who would be required to appoint some of their own into 
the Review Commission.  
 
Information politics were also manifested in the key messaging that capitalised on the 
anxieties created by Moi‘s refusal to accommodate other stakeholders. The Ufungamano 
Initiative argued that Kenyans had placed immense value on the envisaged process and that 
in reneging on earlier promises, the Moi/KANU regime was igniting chaos (Minute 6/99 of 
the December 3
rd
 1999 Stakeholders Consultative Meeting). In doing this, Ufungamano 
Initiative relied on alternative media like Royal Media Services‘ Citizen Radio and 
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Television, religious organisations‘ own communication channels/media, independent 
newspapers and magazines (Imanyara, interview 28/10/2009). The independent magazines 
that included Beyond, Finance, Nairobi Times, Nairobi Law Monthly, and Society together 
with an emerging cellular phone communication medium were also utilised as repertoires for 
mobilization and marshalling of support through amplification of the forces and voices as the 
state controlled public broadcaster, Kenya Broadcasting Corporation, remained hostile to the 
Ufungamano Initiative (interviews: Musyimi, 09/10/2009; Alloys, 21/03/2010; Raiji, 
14/10/2009; Wandati, 17/09/2009; Gitari, 21/09/2009; Ndubi, 24/09/2009; Ombok, 
24/09/2009; Musau, 24/09/2009; Lenaola, 03/10/2009; Churchill, 02/10/2009; Musyimi, 
09/10/2009; Athman, 12/10/2009; Raiji, 14/09/2009; Kibwana, 21/10/2009; Rema, 
23/03/2010; Imanyara, 28/10/2009).  
 
Media have always played an important role in what Strang and Soule (1998: 278) refer as 
‗discursive frames’ which ‗arise in the social movement arena [because they] apply 
characteristic modes of inquiry and representation. For example, newspapers editorialize 
while television is guided by a particular conception of balanced reporting where two sides of 
every issue are located and represented.‘ Citing Tarrow (1989) Strang and Soule (1998: 278) 
argue that ‗media's attention to the sensational produces spirals of more controversial action – 
and insight that might also be applied to organizational innovation.‘  Strang and Soule (1998: 
271) further state that ‗mass media plays a crucial role in amplifying and editing the diffusion 
of collective action, and much protest today is organized around that fact.‘ They further cite 
Spilerman‘s (1976: 790) explanations of ‗temporal clustering of urban riots in the US in the 
1960s by arguing that television drew national attention to riots in Newark and Watts, 
creating a "black solidarity that transcended bounds of communities."‘ Therefore, as 
Oberschall (1989) observes, there was a contagion effect as ‗sit-in tactic diffused via the mass 
media: students watched what other students were doing on the news and then staged their 
own sit-ins.‘  
 
Strang and Soule (1998: 271) citing Koopmans (1993) further argue that ‗news media do 
much of the job of social movement organizers during periods of heightened mobilization 
and conflict…. High levels of media attention speed the introduction of innovations.‘ For the 
Ufungamano Initiative, the existence of an alternative media that was not state controlled 
offered opportunities for mobilising and in ‗setting the agenda for change. This was 
especially true in urban areas where the high density of FM radio stations played a significant 
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role in enlightening the people and making them understand what was happening‘ (Alloys, 
interview 21/03/2009).  Arguing along the same line, Wandati (interview, 17/09/2009) adds 
that 
People in the rural areas tended to identify with what was reported. Media, in those days, 
played a crucial role in changing the perspectives of the Kenyans and even sowing some 
seeds of doubt in Moi and his men in terms of how they were running the country especially 
as it was not just highlighting the local aspect, but also showing what happened in the 
Philippines
12
 and the role the religious leaders played to bring about those changes. If the 
media had decided to give Ufungamano a blackout, we could not have done what we did.  
 
A former PCK commissioner, Isaac Lenaona (interview, 03/10/2009) explained that they 
strategically reached out to editors in various media houses where they explained that they 
were not anarchists as the government had been trying to portray them, and that on the 
contrary, all they wanted was in the best interests of the country. From then, media took them 
seriously and highlighted their work and strategies. Lenaola further stated:  
When for example we were attacked in Kisumu, the print media put it as front-page story. It 
also castigated the goons as well as their paymasters.... When the government in Garissa 
placed thorns on the airstrip where we were to land, we got information and our people on the 
ground cleared it [sic]. We also had another incident in Nakuru where they disrupted our 
meeting by using loud speakers in a place next to where we were meeting and tried to woo 
people not to come to our meeting. It did not work though as people still came. In Nairobi, we 
were attacked at Kamukunji. The unfortunate thing was that at the time, the general 
population took you even more serious when it saw that the government was trying to stop 
what you were doing. As such, state‘s harassment only added to our credibility in the eyes of 
the public (Ibid).  
 
Musyimi (interview, 09/10/2009) also offers a candid assessment of the role of media in 
aiding their struggle: ‗there was tremendous support from media which kept the Ufungamano 
Initiative very much in the public eye and therefore won a lot of sympathy ... Citizen for 
instance covered the proceedings live. They covered the Ufungamano Initiative work more 
than anyone else.‘ Nonetheless, Kibwana (interview, 21/10/2009) attributed such gestures 
from the Royal Media Services (the owners of the Citizen TV and radio) to media ownership. 
Kibwana held that from the Ufungamano Initiative interactions with the media, they ‗learned 
                                                 
12
 This is in relation to the popular people‘s power revolution in Philippine in February 22-25, 1986 which 
overthrew the dictatorial regime of Ferdinand Marcos. The role of the clergy in that uprising was being cited as 
critical and parallels were being drawn on the role the clergy were playing in Kenya.    
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that while media can be helpful on reform struggles, it unfortunately depends on who owns 
it‘ (ibid).   
 
Indeed, there was in many instances, selective coverage especially by print media, as 
journalists and editors considered what news would sell other than the merits of the struggle. 
On the whole, as Cottrell and Ghai (2007) argue, the reportage of these contentions helped 
boost newspaper sales. This consideration for sales as well as marginalisation of the agenda 
of the so-called non-prominent citizens has resulted in condemnation of media by some of the 
participants in this study who argue that media was being overly selective (interviews: 
Basole, 27/03/2010; Oganda, 26/03/2010; Odhiambo M., 01.04/2010). A tout at the Kisumu 
bus park, Basole, for instance stated: 
Media has blacked out issues pertaining to the poor while concentrating on issues of the rich 
and politicians. For example in July last year [2009] we heard a lot about the launch of Simama 
Kenya by Jimmy Kibaki [President Kibaki‘s son] for almost three months. The same media 
disregards all our problems. We are doing a lot but we rarely get to hear anything from the 
media about it. In fact if you want them to cover your issues, you need to bribe journalists.  
Oganda (interview, 26/03/2010) echoed similar sentiments when he commented: 
Media has not played a positive role especially after the 2005 referendum. Reporters want 
money to write stories about common people‘s struggles. Even if you pay them, the issues 
you raise, especially if touching on things political, the same journalist takes the story to the 
MP or such other political figure and says: ‗so and so told me this, but what is your position?‘ 
that is what they end up writing. Media has become extremely corrupted just like civil society 
here [Kisumu]. They must change the system of media in Kenya if we are to have a fairer 
society. 
 
Clearly, the analysis above points to a disagreement on the nature of the role played by the 
media. While those at the helm of the Ufungamano Initiative feel media treated their struggle 
positively, those at the bottom of the power hierarchy felt otherwise. These disagreements 
suggest that the media has been more concerned or sensitive to certain socioeconomic classes 
than others. Those in higher socioeconomic class enjoyed better media coverage than the rest. 
Indeed, Odhiambo M. (interview, 01/04/20010) a trained journalist who spent the late 1990s 
in journalism, confirmed this when he explained: 
For the Kenyan media, the news values and everything about our media, is a pro-status quo 
media. It values and promotes the interest of dominant groups. If you talk to any journalist 
who has been to the school of journalism [University of Nairobi] they tell you that the news 
value number one is prominence i.e. how prominent is the person speaking? So if Odhiambo 
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is speaking somewhere and Kalonzo Musyoka [the Vice President] happens somewhere 
nearby, Odhiambo never gets noticed. And this is Odhiambo sitting as the Chief Executive of 
CLARION. Imagine the man or woman sitting at the street corner, a vendor or a hawker 
selling cigarettes? They are totally marginalised. 
Following this, I argue that if the Ufungamano Initiative had been just an ordinary Kenyans‘ 
struggle, it is probable that it may not have received as much media coverage as it did. This 
in effect would have affected its ability to use information politics to endear itself to the 
Kenyan people.  
 
Having extensively analysed issues to do with information politics, the analysis turns to 
leverage politics that Ufungamano Initiative employed in its contentious politics.    
Ufungamano Initiative’s leverage politics  
Keck and Sikkink (1998) see leverage politics as emanating from a movement‘s mobilisation 
to hold targets up to the scrutiny of peers, thereby exerting moral leverage on the assumption 
that governments and other targets, value the good opinion of others (cited in Mati, 2008: 
71). Even though leverage politics was not as prominent, it was clearly discernible from the 
fact that in the course of its existence, the Ufungamano Initiative formed the People‘s 
Commission of Kenya (PCK) in 1999 to lead the Kenyan People in writing their own 
constitution when it became apparent that KANU was never going to allow popular 
participation. The PCK was the most potent of the movement‘s strategies and politics. While 
there were apparent self-doubts on the viability of an alternative Review Process (see Minute 
84/2000 of 3
rd
 April, 2000 Ufungamano Initiative Steering Council meeting), by launching a 
parallel constitutional reform process independent of the state, at a time when KANU‘s 
fidelity to the 1997 CKRA was in question, the Ufungamano Initiative managed to pose the 
greatest credibility and legitimacy challenge to the parliamentary led process. 
 
PLO Lumumba, who became the Secretary of the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission 
in the post-merger period argued:  
Any person who observed the process keenly must recognise a number of things. One was 
that the process led by Parliament and predicated upon a piece of legislation known as the 
Constitution of Kenya Review Amendment Act (2000) and on the basis of which 
Commissioners had been appointed to serve as the vanguard in the process of collection of 
views. But it was heavily challenged. The Ufungamano Initiative that had been initiated by 
civil society and a few individuals from the opposition and its People‘s Commission enjoyed 
a lot of legitimacy among Kenyans (interview, 01/10/2009). 
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I submit this legitimacy was possible because, to borrow the words of Downey and Rohlinger 
(2008: 23) Ufungamano Initiative consisted of actors that were ‗widely spread (as opposed to 
narrowly concentrated) across the political possibilities frontiers.‘ Such movements, Downey 
and Rohlinger (2008: 23) argue, are ‗generally more strongly articulate.‘ 13   Second, the 
leadership of the Ufungamano Initiative had mobilised sufficient numbers of Kenyans to 
actively support a people-led process (Shereta, interview 07/04/2010). As Ochanda 
(interview, 21/09/200) observes ‗Ufungamano Initiative succeeded because it demonstrated 
that things could be successfully done outside the arrangement of the state.‘ Arguably, it is 
such demonstration that enhanced the political opportunities for the Ufungamano Initiative 
and effectively reduced the power discrepancy between the parliamentary led process and the 
Ufungamano Initiative. The impact of the success of Ufungamano Initiative in effectively 
challenging the state, Lumumba argues, was a demonstration  
That if people want to achieve something, and they have captured the spirit of the nation, then 
there is no limit to what they can achieve, and that taking refuge in the Law, in and of itself, 
sometimes does not immunize a process from public scrutiny. If you look at the process that 
was led by Parliament, it had the imprimatur of the Law. But people did not believe in it. The 
Ufungamano process did not have the legal backing but they had the moral authority. There 
was a clear message that it is a combination of legal and moral authority that gives legitimacy 
14
 to any process. And that when you have moral authority on your side, you cannot be 
ignored even if the government wants or attempts to ignore you; they do so at their own peril 
(interview, 01/10/2009).  
 
It was because of the People‘s Commission of Kenya‘s challenge to the state process that 
even the appointed chair to the state-led Review Commission refused to take the position 
because the state-led process lacked legitimacy in the eyes of many, and thus his quest to 
                                                 
13
 Downey and Rohlinger (2008: 8-14) posit two terms to explain how movements achieve such strong 
articulation: ‗The depth of challenge promoted by an actor, and the breadth of appeal cultivated by that actor. 
The depth of challenge represents the extent to which a collective actor seeks incremental or fundamental social 
change. The breadth of appeal dimension represents the extent to which the collective actor comprises a 
relatively small core of activists with high levels of commitment, or a larger social base with generally low 
levels of commitment.‘ The Ufungamano Initiative, it seems, had managed this through opting to directly write 
the constitution, as well as the massive support they had mobilised for Kenyans to support their contentions. 
14
 Many respondents argued that the Ufungamano Initiative‘s legitimacy came directly from the people. Many 
of the actors within the Ufungamano Initiative had representations or a presence in literally all parts of the 
country. The NCEC for instance had people from all over the country, people with grassroots support from 
throughout the country. The religious groups like NCCK, Catholic Church as well as the Muslims are part of 
what Tarrow (1998: 128) calls ‗structures of everyday life‘ and have a presence in virtually all corners of the 
country and reach to a great majority of the population. These structures easily mobilise and demobilise 
supporters. Information from the Ufungamano Initiative percolated easily to the grassroots and people through 
these structures.  Interviewees argued that as a result, the entire nation was highly mobilised and this was how 
they managed to challenge KANU‘s machinery and its hold to power. 
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push for a merger between the two processes. Arguably, if it were not for the PCK, 
Ufungamano Initiative, just like its predecessors may have been totally ignored. But the 
alternate power that the Ufungamano Initiative wielded meant that it could not be ignored 
(Cottrell and Ghai, 2007; Chitere et al., 2006; CKRC, 2004; interviews: Ghai, 23/10/2009; 
Wandati, 17/9/2009; Ndubi, 24/09/2009; Lamba, 23/10/2009; Lumumba, 01/10/2009; 
Athman, 12/10/2009; Raiji, 14/10/2009).  I now move to analyse the accountability politics 
displayed in the Ufungamano Initiative. 
Accountability politics 
Keck and Sikkink (1998) see accountability politics as tied to a movement‘s effort in trying 
to convince their targeted actors to publicly change their positions on issues. This also 
happens through ‗exposing the differences between the talk from the walk‘ (cited in Mati, 
2008: 71). Here, we see Ufungamano Initiative‘s fidelity to the IPPG agreements, the Bomas 
of Kenya and the Safari Park agreements and the subsequent 1998 Constitution of Kenya 
Review Commission Act, as the first instance of accountability politics. Besides this, the 
utilisation of International Human Rights Conventions that Kenya had signed (cited earlier in 
this chapter) were also manifestations of accountability politics. Specifically, this meant that 
the Kenyan government would be called to account for its efforts towards adherence to the 
treaties it had signed.  
 
But there is also evidence to show that there were cleavages in the way different groups 
within the Ufungamano Initiative wanted to frame accountability politics. This had the effect 
of steering the nascent movement towards certain directions that diluted its agenda. More 
fundamentally, it exposed the recurring ideational polarities in the nascent movement, which 
were reflective of the diversity of actors.  These cracks were between those who wanted the 
framing of the parallel process to be divorced from the 1997 Review Act and those who saw 
the Ufungamano Initiative as implementing the mandate of the 1997 Review Act, irrespective 
of the flaws. Those opposed to the 1997 Review Act argued, it lacked 
… legal, social and political legitimacy… because the Act was ultra vires in the Constitution, 
as it ha[d] no support or basis in the Constitution… [and was] anchored on no known section 
of the constitution. There [was] no provision in the Constitution under which the Act [could] 
be made [because] the Constitution did not provide for its review, and any Act of Parliament 
that presuppose[d] to legislate for a process of the review of the Constitution [was] therefore 
unconstitutional, null and void (Ufungamano Initiative, 27/01/2000). 
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Accountability politics was also internally displayed in the movement through the creation of 
elaborate, albeit limited structures for participation. To a great extent, the Ufungamano 
Initiative operated an open-door policy that ensured that all reform minded activists and 
groups (social, cultural, economic and political) were welcome to join the Initiative. In the 
words of one respondent, the Ufungamano Initiative through its religious leadership used this 
strategy because the cardinal business of religious leaders is to deliver all souls to 
righteousness (Njoya, interview 29/09/2009). As such, it welcomed all that were willing and 
committed to take part in its process.   
 
Having dealt with issues of leadership and its role in strategic decision making and the 
framing contention for the movement, it becomes imperative to answer the question: what 
structures did the movement craft to ensure that it achieved what it set itself to do? I attempt 
to answer this question below while addressing the relationship between mobilising structures 
and leadership.  
Ufungamano Initiative’s mobilising structures  
Structures, strategies and resources, are the levers that drive movements‘ work. Tilly (1978: 
7) argues that a social struggle qualifies as a social movement if it has some degree of 
organisation, (ranging from loose, informal or partial level of organisation, to highly 
institutionalised and bureaucratised structures), is ‗durable, and pursues broad aims‘ and 
founded upon the conscious volition, normative commitment to the movement‘s aims or 
beliefs, and active participation on the part of the followers or members. The choice of a 
movement‘s structure nonetheless depends on the issue(s) as well as the diversity of its 
constituent parts.  Tarrow (1998) sees structures as resources which allow contentious acts to 
be sustained as social movements, and which ‗bring people together, shape coalitions, 
confront opponents, and assure their own future after the exhilaration of the peak of 
mobilization has passed‘ (Tarrow, 1998: 123). 
 
Structures therefore institutionalise collective action and are the engines and oil that sustain 
movements‘ actions (Mati, 2008). Every social movement, therefore, needs a structure that 
gives it agency, through which issues are pursued. Keck and Sikkink (1998) argue that 
structures are important in understanding and gauging the emergence, operations, and the 
nature of relations and interactions between the different actors and the success of 
movements. Keck and Sikkink (1998) further argue that issues determine the type of 
structures that evolve in a broad based alliance. For simpler issues, simpler structures evolve. 
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Conversely, complex issue movements require complex structures. Therefore, as Tarrow 
(1998: 137) argues, there are mainly two logics in social movement structures: hierarchical 
versus autonomous. Tarrow (1998: 137) further argues that there is ‗no single model of 
movement organization‘ that is suitable for all collective action forms. Nonetheless, the type 
of organisation that collective action takes has profound effects on success or failure of the 
movement.  
 
Tarrow (1998) explains that a formal hierarchically centralised structure may allow a 
movement to easily sustain interaction with allies, authorities, and supporters. Nonetheless, 
hierarchies can also lead to a loss of capacity or disconnects with the grassroots. 
Autonomous, horizontally organised structures, allow each actor freedom and participation 
access. However, a loose and autonomous structure may make coordination and continuity 
difficult. To redress the deficiencies of each of these models, Tarrow (1998: 124) suggests a 
delicate balance between formal organisation and autonomy to produce a hybrid bridged by 
strong, informal, non-hierarchical connective structures. It is such informal connective tissue 
operating within and between the movement‘s constituent groups and individuals, that is the 
mark of successful movements as these structures are ‗sufficiently robust to [ensure] structure 
sustained relations with opponents, but flexible enough to permit the informal connections 
that link people and networks to one another to aggregate and coordinate contention‘ 
(Tarrow, 1998: 124). 
 
But Tarrow (1998) is faulted for his failure to provide a mechanism and formulae for getting 
the right mix and what the actual ‗connective tissues‘ may be, as these are dependent on 
contexts as well as relational dynamics within movements, which are key determinants of 
movement‘s strategies and organisational structures (Downey and Rohlinger, 2008). Within 
the Ufungamano Initiative, proposals pushed by one of the organs – the Stakeholders Support 
Group, suggest that the movement was acutely aware of the need for such ‗connective 
tissues.‘ As such, a clear strategic framework to guide the Ufungamano Initiative in its work 
was put in place as a proposal for discussion. A strategic framework was drafted to facilitate 
the establishment of the structures and organs of the movement. This had an impact on 
resultant power and functions of the organs of the movement. The framework largely 
borrowed from the objectives and spirit of the 1997 Constitution of Kenya Review Act as 
negotiated at the Bomas of Kenya and Safari Park meetings and the resolutions of the 
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Ufungamano I & II Plenary of stakeholders respectively. The preamble to the framework 
structure read: 
We members of the Ufungamano Forum: Recognizing that an open, accountable and 
democratic system of government that promotes the respect for human rights and sustained 
economic and social development is a desire of the Kenyan People; Having regard to the 
valiant efforts and painful sacrifices that have been made by the people of Kenya, to establish 
such a system of government since the dawn of colonial invasion; Considering that a national 
consensus has emerged on the need to comprehensively review the Constitution of Kenya 
through an open, inclusive and participatory process as a critical measure in the establishment 
of a just and enduring democratic society; Recalling the numerous breaches of promises 
committed by the Government with regard to constitutional reforms;  Determined to secure 
for ourselves and for the future generations a just, peaceful and prosperous society, DO 
HEREBY ESTABLISH THIS FRAMEWORK FOR THE COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW 
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA BY THE PEOPLE OF KENYA (Ufungamano 
Initiative, Minutes of the December 15-16
th
 Stakeholders Consultative meeting: Emphasis in 
original).  
 
The December 15-16, 1999 meeting (hereafter Ufungamano I Plenary) therefore attempted to 
give a structure to the proposed Review Process. A Steering Committee made up of religious 
leaders was subsequently formed to steer the process. Its first task was to guide the creation 
of the other organs of the movement. Besides attempts to give the nascent movement a 
structure, the Ufungamano I Plenary also made note of preparations (psychological) required 
on the part of the gathered clergy, activists and opposition politicians to successfully embark 
on their own Review Process. In this regard, Kivutha Kibwana, a co-convener of NCEC, for 
example urged the religious leaders to be ‗steadfast and not to be moved by the government‘ 
(Ufungamano Initiative, minutes of the December 15-16th Stakeholders Consultative 
meeting). Kibwana is reported to have further argued that if Ufungamano Initiative did not 
move forward in the suggested parallel process, then the people of Kenya would feel 
dejected. This clearly points to an attempt at inspiring commitment already dealt with earlier 
in this chapter. 
 
The strategic framework prepared by the Stakeholder Support Group, went further to suggest 
that essentially, the Ufungamano Initiative needed a very loose structure that allowed 
constituent groups to carry on with their activities and feed into the larger movement. 
However, this framing displayed bureaucratic centralisation in some of its activities and 
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structure, thus displaying characteristics of an alliance/coalition than a unitary movement. 
The strategic framework suggested the following as part of the structure of the movement: a 
Stakeholders Forum; a Steering Council; a Commission (Peoples‘ Commission of Kenya) 
and Technical Committees in charge of communications and public; relations; legal and 
constitutional affairs; civic education; parliamentary and political affairs; Location Forums, 
Subordinate regional Conferences and a National Conference (Ufungamano Initiative 
Stakeholder Support Group (SSG), 27/01/2000). The strategic framework also proposed an 
elaborate timetable and a chronological order for establishing the organs of the review. 
 
The strategic framework proposal envisaged the entire process to take 17 months. As the 
Stakeholder Support Group‘s strategic framework proposals were being debated, with some 
groups arguing that the 17 months timeline was too gradual and expensive (interviews 
Mwachofi, 27/09/2099; Raiji, 14/10/2009) there was a near total breakdown in law and order 
in many parts of the country which were attributed to: 
Certain individuals within the ruling elite who [were] uncomfortable with the constitutional 
changes likely to be put in place by the people of Kenya were deliberately fanning insecurity 
across the country. […] in order to instil fear among people yearning for change, and to divert 
attention away from this important exercise (SSG, 27/1/2000).    
Ufungamano Initiative therefore had to act fast to ensure the process was not protracted. The 
Ufungamano Initiative Stakeholders Support Group‘s proposal was therefore further revised 
in a later memorandum presented to Ufungamano II Plenary by the Steering Council on 
27/01/2000 in which they recommended, on the basis of ‗a near universal agreement that the 
Review Act [was] un-implementable [and that] the Steering Council be given a clear mandate 
by the stakeholders to steer clear of the pitfalls of the Act.‘ The Ufungamano II Plenary 
further recommended that ‗the Ufungamano Initiative should not be held hostage to the 
structures, language or time frame prescribed under the Review Act‘ (27/01/2000).    
 
Resulting from both internal movement dynamic as well as a reaction to the hostile 
environment within which the Ufungamano Initiative operated, a leaner and more top down 
structure was adopted for political and economic expediency, while ensuring some high 
profile visibility which played well with the media (Ombok, interview 24/09/2009). The net 
effect was that the agreed structure made no conscious efforts to mobilise outside the 
institutions that had been identified as stakeholders. It is instructive to note here that the 
process of negotiating structures and process also revealed further cleavages between those 
who advocated greater people participation and therefore the need to ensure that Ufungamano 
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Initiative had a presence at the grassroots, versus those who saw no need to establish an 
elaborate structure for this.   
 
Morris and Staggenborg (2004: 171) in their study of ‗Leadership and Social Movements‘ 
observe a reciprocal relationship between leadership and structures. On the one hand, 
movement leaders may shape the nature of mobilising structures. On the other, structures are 
important situational contexts that influence how leadership evolves and how leaders 
empower others. Gusfield (1966: 137) also argues that ‗leadership changes through time as a 
function of different forms of structure and of different situations in which organized 
movements operate as they become large and institutionalized.‘  
 
Movements‘ mobilising structures may emerge, as the Ufungamano Initiative illustrates, as a 
reflection of a complex mix of actors, and especially because of sometimes opposing 
positions and deep mistrusts between them (interviews: Mwachofi, 27/09/2009; Lethome, 
02/10/2009; Wandati, 17/09/2009; Ochanda, 22/09/2009; Lumumba, 01/10/2009; Ocholla, 
06/10/2009).  In such an environment, there were many antinomies that made the ‗quest for 
constitutional reforms […reflect] a struggle over the formulation of the norms, structures, 
processes to govern the state‘ (Mutua, 2008: 117). The emergent structures therefore had to 
accommodate different leadership roles as well as competing interests of individuals, groups, 
regions, ethnicities, religions and institutions. Moreover, the heterogeneity of actors with 
different competencies and competing interests, as well as multiplicity of leaderships 
required by the movement, illustrates that the type of structure that evolved had to 
accommodate the supposed abundance of skills and competencies to be utilised by different 
structures (Lamba, interview 23/10/2009).   
 
What emerges from the analysis of the evolution of the structures in the Ufungamano 
Initiative confirms that the resultant structure reflected some consensus aimed at sharing and 
diffusing leadership roles in the movement at various nodes of the movement as well as to the 
different stakeholders involved in the movement. Borrowing from Tarrow (1998: 134), I 
argue that the ensuing mobilisation structure also had to be flexible enough to allow 
ideological, social, and political pluralism to flourish by having several activities that gave 
each group a chance to stress its particular interest without feeling ‗lost in the crowd.‘   This 
suggests that leadership within the movement was by far, pre-determined by pre-existing 
political and organisational structures.  Indeed, leaders from the already existing structures 
shaped the organisational structures in accordance with their backgrounds and previous 
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experiences, which in turn influenced the mobilisation, strategies, and outcomes of the 
movement. In the end the structure represented graphically in Figure 6.2 below was agreed 
upon. 
  
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: The structure of the Ufungamano Initiative (Source: Ufungamano Initiative 19/01/2000). The conveners, as the 
leaders were known, were part of the Steering council. However, there were multiple leadership roles within the movement.  
Stakeholders’ forum/Plenary of stakeholders  
At the top of the organs of the Ufungamano Initiative was the Stakeholders‘ Forum/Plenary. 
As already noted in the last chapter, one of the significant developments of the Ufungamano I 
Plenary, was a unanimous agreement (by a vote) to a proposal by Kivutha Kibwana of 
NCEC, that people present establish themselves as the Stakeholders‘ Forum with a legal 
standing and the need for action (Ufungamano Initiative, 15-16/12/1999).  
 
The principal purpose of the Plenary of the Stakeholders‘ Forum was to give general 
direction to the movement. It was the ‗ultimate policy and decision making organ of the 
movement‘ (interviews: Raiji, 14/10/2009; Kibara, 15/10/2009; Wandati, 17/09/2009; 
Ombok, 24/10/2009). It formally met every three months (interviews: Churchill, 02/10/2009; 
Kibara, 15/10/2009). The Plenary of Stakeholders was an open forum where everybody who 
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subscribed to the movement‘s ideas congregated. As such, it had representations from a wide 
range of actors from across all sectors of society. The open door policy of the Ufungamano 
Initiative Plenary of Stakeholders was a strategic move to ensure that all reform minded 
activists and groups (social, cultural, economic and political) were welcome to join the 
Initiative. It made decisions collegially. Issues were brought to the plenary, discussed and 
agreed upon mainly through consensus (Kibara, interview 15/10/2009). In cases of 
disagreements, a vote, as happened during the decision to merge with the parliamentary-led 
process (discussed in chapter seven), would be the decider (Raiji, interview 14/10/2009).   
 
At its formation, the Plenary of Stakeholders had at least 54 formal representations from a 
wide range of actors from across all sectors of society including ‗under class‘ movements 
such as the Muungano wa Wanavijiji. It also had religious organisations, such as Catholic 
Church‘s Kenya Episcopal Conference, National Council of Churches of Kenya, Supreme 
Council of Kenyan Muslims, Anglican Church of Kenya, Presbyterian Church of East Africa, 
the Hindu Council of Kenya, Muslim Consultative Council, and the Organisation of African 
Instituted churches. Others included NGOs and movements like National Convention 
Executive Council, Law Society of Kenya, Kenya Women Political Caucus, Kenya Law 
Students Association, All Kenyan Farmers, The National Council of NGOs of Kenya, the 
National Youth Movement, and Kenya National students Union. Political parties such as the 
Democratic Party, Uma Patriotic party of Kenya, Ford Asili, a faction of National 
Development Party (Wambui Otieno and Dr. Charles Maranga), Ford Kenya, SAFINA, 
Shirikisho and Saba Saba Asili among others, were also represented. It is interesting to note 
the fragmentation of the political elite within opposition political parties. While the 
opposition was generally represented, the National Development Party (NDP) leader Raila 
Odinga and most of his NDP parliamentary colleagues were working with the Moi/KANU 
regime. In fact, the Parliamentary Select Committee was the brainchild of and chaired by 
Raila Odinga. However, some of his party members and fellow leaders were opposed to this. 
This is exemplified by the words of Charles Maranga, the then Secretary General of NDP 
during the December 15-16 1999 Ufungamano I Plenary, who told the gathering the 
following:  
We are here to state we are for the people driven constitution. Most officials of NDP are 
present here and it is clear by the show of our presence, that we are here to defy the 
Parliamentary Select Committee, we opt for a people driven constitutional process. 
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Otherwise, we pass a vote of no confidence on all MPs supporting Parliamentary Select 
Committee (Ufungamano Initiative: Report of the Ufungamano I Plenary).  
In the end, the Plenary of Stakeholders brought together all who identified with the 
movement. The function of convening the Plenary of Stakeholders lay with the next structure 
in the movement: the Steering Council.  
Steering Council 
The idea of the Steering Council was first mooted during the Ufungamano I Plenary when 
John Michuki, a prominent Member of Parliament from the Democratic Party (DP) suggested 
that two committees be appointed to:  
i) Identify the methods to use to reach the population on civic education. He proposed 
the use of mosques, churches and temples in addition to other available resources 
such as civil society organisations. He argued for a need to identify other institutions 
that the Ufungamano Initiative would need to work with at the grassroots.  
ii) Propose to the Steering Committee how it can constitute its own Commission, to set 
up a parallel organisation to write the Constitution of Kenya. 
 
From the Ufungamano I Plenary deliberations, a Steering Council was established as the 
formal structures at the helm of the movement to captain the process. It was a natural 
successor to the Religious Community Facilitation Team cited in the last chapter that had 
initiated discussions that culminated in Ufungamano I Plenary on December 15-16, 1999. 
The Ufungamano I Plenary agreed that the Steering Council be composed of 36 members 
with four representatives drawn from each of the following religious groups that had been 
named in 1997 Constitution of Kenya Review Act and the 1998 Constitution of Kenya 
Review Commission Amendment Act as the key religious stakeholders in the constitutional 
reform process: The Kenya Episcopal conference; the Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims; 
the National Council of Churches of Kenya; the Hindu Council of Kenya; the Muslim 
Consultative Council; the Organisation of African Instituted Churches; the Anglican Church 
of Kenya; the Presbyterian Church of Eastern Africa; and the Methodist Church in Kenya.  
 
The Steering Council‘s role was to offer collegiate leadership to the movement (interviews: 
Wandati, 17/09/2009; Lethome, 02/10/2009; Musyimi, 09/10/2009; Kibara, 15/10/2009; 
Omar, 16/10/2009; Kibwana, 21/10/2009). In its formative stages, this allowed for wide 
ranging consultations and was a key strength of the movement as it generated consensus. The 
Steering Council, according to Musyimi (interview, 09/10/2009) was therefore like the 
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cabinet of the Ufungamano Initiative. It sought to hold the ‗political class‘ [sic] accountable 
(Lethome, interview 02/10/2009).  
 
The Steering Council was mandated as the official leader of the movement. As such, it was 
responsible for guiding and directing the movement on the policy and aspirations of the 
Kenyan people in the Constitutional Review Process. This was aimed at fostering dialogue 
and understanding among different sections of Kenya society. In order to determine such 
aspirations, the Steering Council would receive and deliberate proposals and reports of, or 
actions and decisions taken by taskforces they set, and then approve or modify them. As 
such, the Steering Council was also responsible for the setting up of other organs, including 
appointments of the People‘s Commission of Kenya Commissioners. Moreover, the Steering 
Council was also required to, in consultation with the Stakeholder Forum, establish Technical 
Working Committees in charge of communications and public; relations; legal and 
constitutional affairs; civic education; parliamentary and political affairs, in order to achieve 
goals and objectives of the movement (Ufungamano Initiative, 19/01/2000). A rotational co-
chair appointed at each meeting headed the Steering Council. 
 
Of significance here is that the various other contenders to the leadership of Ufungamano 
Initiative ceded the stewardship of the movement at the action phase to the clergy. This was a 
tacit compromise between sections of secular civil society led by NCEC that had been 
pushing for radical reforms of the state for over a decade, and the opposition political elites 
who always acted on the exigencies of the moment.  
 
I also find Gusfield‘s (1966: 137) observations on ‗the decline of enthusiastic, agitational 
leadership and the development of states-manlike, bureaucratic administrators as movements 
become formally organized into stable structures‘ to be particularly instructive in explaining 
the emergence of the religious leaders as the ultimate leaders in the Ufungamano Initiative. 
The point here is that the emergence of the religious leaders who were more dialogical and 
accommodating as the ultimate leaders should be read in the context of earlier ‗failures‘ of 
confrontational approach leaders within the more radical NCEC to make much progress (see 
also Downey and Rohlinger, 2008).
15
 This research established that Ufungamano Initiative 
                                                 
15
 Downey and Rohlinger  (2008: 11) identify different reactions and roles different types of social movement 
actors play. They argue that ‗radical/revolutionary groups may force group members to go underground because 
their activities invite government repression. ...Groups that situate themselves closer to the conflict end of the 
continuum, but are not revolutionary ...[on their part], may trigger countermobilization by other actors.‘ This 
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emerged in an environment of fear among religious leaders and the political elite that the 
radical NCEC stance and its leadership might plunge the country into chaos. This suggests 
that despite their social conservatism, a united religious leadership could still be trusted to 
play a constructive role in uniting different pro-reform forces in a fragile and deeply divided 
society. Indeed, one of the functions of the Steering Committee was to arbitrate in all disputes 
that would arise in the course of the review. This reveals that the movement leaders were 
realistically aware that the process would not be without internal conflicts and cleavages.   
 
As the Steering Council was responsible for overall leadership throughout the constitutional 
reform project, it was also tasked to receive the Commission‘s report on the proposals they 
would gather, disseminate the same to all Kenyans, and finally organise a National 
Constitutional Conference and later a referendum to enable all Kenyans to partake in its 
ratification.
16
 These activities required huge financial resources. The Steering Council was 
therefore responsible for mobilizing financial resources needed for the work of the 
Ufungamano Initiative. Individual religious groups such as NCCK and the Catholic 
Secretariat and other stakeholders committed to raising funds (interviews: Gitari, 21/09/2009; 
Wandati, 17/09/2009; Raiji, 14/10/2009; Khairallah, 26/09/2009; Athman, 12/10/2009).  
 
Resource mobilisation was however not as easy (interviews: Musau 24/09/2009; Wandati, 
17/09/2009; Musyimi, 09/10/2009). Part of the reason for the difficulty in fundraising, links 
to the ‗donor money addiction‘ that Maina (1998, cited in chapter four) highlighted. 
Specifically, most of civil society work in Kenya has over the years, been supported by 
external donors. But these same donors‘ (mainly western countries) commercial and 
economic interests were some of the things that some actors in the Ufungamano Initiative 
wanted radically transformed for the benefit of Kenyans. As such, donors were not overly 
enthusiastic about the Ufungamano Initiative‘s agenda. Only a few (mainly the Scandinavian 
                                                                                                                                                       
seems to be what befell the NCEC as other actors we now willing to trust religious leaders with the ultimate 
leadership than the more radical NCEC.     
16
 There was an emerging consensus that the institution of the referendum should not only be institutionalised, 
but also entrenched in the Constitution. For a start therefore, the new Constitution needed to be subjected to the 
sovereign will of the people of Kenya through a referendum. As shall become clear in the next chapter, this was 
a key thing that surfaced later in the form of a court case filed by Rev. Timothy Njoya and other leading figures 
within the NCEC and part of the Ufungamano Initiative when it became apparent that parliament and the 
National Constitutional Conference had abrogated the rights of Kenyans to participate in a referendum to make 
their own constitution. The ruling in this case was determined that: ‗parliament had no jurisdiction or power 
under section 47 of the Constitution to abrogate the existing Constitution and enact a new one in its place, ...and 
that power to make a new Constitution (the constituent power) belongs to the people of Kenya as a whole...In 
the exercise of that power…Kenyans were entitled to a referendum on any proposed Constitution‘ (Kenya Law 
Reports 2004: 262. Njoya & 6 others vs. the Attorney General and 3 others). 
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countries) remained committed to funding Ufungamano Initiative‘s activities. As it turned 
out, stakeholders with a wide traditional indigenous support base such as NCCK and the 
Catholics were the best mobilisers of financial resources. As such, they bore much of the 
burden of raising funds. Most of the bills were paid by NCCK. The Catholic Secretariat also 
played its part as did the Hindu Council and the SUPKEM, though to a lesser extent but 
commensurate to their numbers in Kenya. Politicians who joined Ufungamano also 
contributed (Gitari, interview 24/09/2009).  
 
Some respondents (for example Musau, Beatrice, Raiji, and Athman) argued that the saving 
grace for Ufungamano was people‘s commitment and the volunteer spirit within the 
membership/followers. People made ‗personal contributions and volunteered their time and 
services in for example, the distribution of fliers. People also donated whatever money they 
had to support various efforts. Every Sunday, people contributed ‗sadaka‘ (offerings and 
tithes) (Musau 24/09/2009). Understood within the context of hard economic times that the 
country was going through, this was truly a great commitment.  
 
Athman (interview, 12/10/2009) as well as Raiji (interview, 14/10/2009) reported weaknesses 
in this model because those at the heart of the movement had given up their gainful 
employment and went through the whole period without any salary. Athman (interview 
12/10/2009) wondered how they survived without even money for transport to move around. 
These sentiments are corroborated by minutes of the Steering Council meeting on August 8
th
 
2000 held at the Muslim Civic Education Trust in Mombasa. In this meeting, James Mageria, 
the Ufungamano Initiative secretariat coordinator, was by that date, owed some substantial 
amounts of money by the Ufungamano Initiative. While the Steering Council scratched their 
heads wondering what to do, he indicated to them that ‗the attitude he had taken was that 
since he was serving God by serving the nation Kenya through the Steering Council, and 
since God was nobody‘s debtor, he was certain that all his expenses would be fully 
reimbursed when the Council raised funds‘ (Minute 177/2000 of the Ufungamano Steering 
Council meeting, 08/08/2000).  Not everyone had such a commitment though. Some people, 
according to one PCK and later CKRC commissioner, found it hard to continue and opted not 
to serve in either the Secretariat or Commission (Raiji, interview 14/10/2009). Nonetheless, 
all of the Ufungamano Initiative‘s debts were paid off by NCCK and the Catholic Secretariat 
after the merger with the State-led process had been concluded (Musyimi, interview 
09/10/2009).   
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What is interesting to note from the citation attributed to James Mageria above, is that a lot of 
volunteerism went into making Ufungamano Initiative a success. This suggests that the 
movement had a good mix of both ‗―insular‖ orientation (...comprising relatively higher 
numbers of more committed activists) [and] a ―mass‖ orientation (comprising a relatively 
high number of less-committed participants, and more appeal to outsider support)‘ (Downey 
and Rohlinger, 2008: 13).  In sum, the movement had a diversified base of material and 
human support that gave their time and resources towards the success of the movement.     
  
Through a diversification of funding sources, Ufungamano Initiative also managed to 
mobilise resources at different levels and different forms of contributions were made. For 
instance, Raiji (interview, 14/10/2009) indicated that there were also lot of in-kind 
contributions by constituent members through offering spaces for meetings, food, 
accommodation and even volunteering time. Besides individual citizen donations, there were 
also a few supportive donors, who constituted themselves into what was called the Friends of 
Ufungamano that generated a supportive fund (interviews: Musau, 24/09/2009; Khairallah, 
26/09/2009; Wandati, 17/09/2009; Musyimi, 09/10/2009; Athman, 12/10/2009).  
 
For Athman, the credit for dealing with the donor world in raising funds for Ufungamano 
Initiative should go to Mutava Musyimi, whom he described as ‗a very brilliant person who 
will sit and think through an issue and see what will this do?‘17 But this had the effect of 
giving NCCK and specifically its Secretary General, more leverage in the decision-making 
process. The net result thus ‗turned out to be not as equalizing as it ought to have been... 
because he who pays the piper, chooses the tune‘ (Wandati, interview 17/09/2009). This 
dominance of NCCK and its leader in the movement was further compounded by the failure 
of the collegiate leadership to function effectively. With time, a ‗first among equals‘ emerged 
from the leadership. Morris and Staggenborg (2004: 173), argue that 
A key theoretical issue is the extent to which the characteristics and actions of leaders, as 
opposed to structural conditions, matter. Collective behavior theorists have argued that social 
structural conduciveness is necessary but not sufficient for movement mobilization; leaders 
                                                 
17
 Rev. Dr. Mutava Musyimi resigned as the Secretary General of NCCK in 2007 and went into elective politics. 
He was elected the Member of Parliament for Gachoka constituency in Eastern Province. As a result, Athman 
lamented that the ‗religious community had lost a great person with such deep reflective thinking through issues. 
Most of the reactions in the religious sector are today knee jerk. The religious leadership has transformed these 
institutions into NGOs. As a result this ‗conversion‘ the NGO workers in religious institutions have gained more 
strength that the religious workers.‘   
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create the impetus for movements by providing examples of action, directing action, and 
defining problems and proposing solutions (Lang and Lang, 1961: 517-524).  
 
For the Ufungamano Initiative, the emergence of a ‗first among equals‘ as well as the 
legitimacy he came to enjoy in the movement as the de facto leader is attributable to a 
combination of factors such as 1) charisma – explained by individual characteristics and 
actions of leaders, as opposed to structural conditions; 2) structural vacuum, and 3) the 
financial resources and connections commanded. To understand how these played out to 
propel Mutava Musyimi to be the ultimate leader, I invoke Max Weber‘s theory of 
charismatic leadership which over the years, has ‗immense[ly] influence[d] the thinking of 
sociologists about the sources of authority and dominance in changing political life‘ 
(Gusfield, 1966: 137. See also for example Morris and Staggenborg, 2004; Platt and Lilley, 
1994).   
 
Research on how leaders gain legitimate authority in social movements draws heavily from 
Weber‘s theory. However, some of the approaches utilising this theory have been castigated 
for missing Weber‘s insight on the effects of the interactional nature of leadership on 
movement characteristics (Morris and Staggenborg, 2004). For instance scholars such as 
Eichler (1977), Wilson (1973; 1999) use the ‗notion of charisma …to refer to a personality 
type... while others [see for example Platt and Lilley, 1994] treat charisma as a relational 
approach that assigns a key role to followers in imputing charisma to leaders‘ (Morris and 
Staggenborg, 2004: 172). Following suit, Melucci (1996: 336) concludes that the ‗Weberian 
theory of charisma neglects the social relationship between leaders and followers who are 
viewed as giving themselves up to a charismatic leader and therefore lacking agency‘ (as 
cited in Morris and Staggenborg, 2004: 172).  
 
But the emergence of Ufungamano Initiative‘s ultimate leader demonstrates an interactional 
relationship between leadership and followers as observed by Weber. Followers did not 
necessarily lack agency. On the contrary, as the analysis of the merger process in chapter 
seven shall show, some members and followers fiercely fought against the usurpation of 
decision-making power in the movement. The role of some of the followers in contesting the 
merger between the People‘s Commission of Kenya and the CKRC will be used to illustrate 
this later in the next chapter. On the whole, this leader emerged from the structural nature of 
the movement and especially from a vacuum that the structure of a collegiate leadership 
offered especially given that not all religious leaders under the Steering Council had easy 
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access to the movement as NCCK and its then Chief Executive did. This arose from the fact 
that the movement‘s Secretariat was indeed located at Ufungamano House, a building jointly 
owned by NCCK and the Catholic Church in Kenya.  It was not just the Secretariat that sat at 
the Ufungamano Initiative. The People‘s Commission of Kenya (PCK), one of the other most 
important organs of the movement was also housed there. I now turn to analyse this organ 
(PCK), its functions with a view to showing its relationship with other organs of the 
movement.  
The People’s Commission of Kenya (PCK)  
The PCK was the technical and professional organ of the Review Process. Structurally, it was 
subordinate and answerable to the Stakeholder Forum and the Steering Council. In theory, the 
Steering Council determined the number and qualifications of the commissioners. The PCK 
was tasked with collecting and collating views from the Kenyan public. In the December 15-
16, 1999 Ufungamano I Stakeholder Forum, each organisational stakeholder was asked to 
nominate a specified number of commissioners to the PCK. As such, nominations to the PCK 
were constituency based. The Steering Council inherited the numbers that the Religious 
Community Facilitation Team had earlier proposed for determining how many people each 
constituency would bring (Musyimi, interview 09/10/2009).  
 
Most of those who took up positions in the PCK were from the various constituencies and 
their names had already been submitted to parliament in line with the provisions of the 1997 
Review Act and the 1998 Constitution of Kenya Review Commission Amendment Act as 
part of the initial Review Process before KANU scuttled the process (Ong‘wen, interview 
09/10/2009). It was these that formed the PCK as they were already nominated and had been 
appointed to represent different constituencies. However, additional Commissioners came in 
to fill the slots that had been reserved for KANU and NDP as they were leading a competing 
process. By sticking to earlier nominations from the already existing process that had been 
derailed, the Ufungamano Initiative partly lends further credence to the assertion that all that 
Ufungamano wanted was in tandem with the 1997 Review Act (Lethome, interview 
02/10/2009). The Commissioners were sworn in at a Plenary of Stakeholders session and 
started their work in April 2000. 
 
The Commission was specifically tasked with working with the Technical Committee in 
charge of civic education to ensure coordinated civic education and that all parts of the 
country were fairly accessed.  The Commission also collected, received, collated and 
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analysed public views and materials in order to design constitutional issues for debate and 
negotiations by the stakeholders of the process. This was to ultimately lead to the preparation 
of a draft constitution based on the materials received (SSG, 27/01/2000). The People‘s 
Commission of Kenya also developed technical instruments and papers and positions that 
were considered by religious leaders and others in the movement and to came up with 
decisions through debates (Zein, 07/10/2009). 
The Secretariat  
The Steering Council was also responsible for the running of a small Secretariat that dealt 
with the day-to-day running of the movement. The Secretariat had 14 staff to support the 
work of the Steering Council and the Commission. It had three joint secretaries from the 
Catholics, Protestants and Muslims as Heads. There were a further seven specialists covering 
areas such as constitution, communications, logistics, finance and administration.  There were 
three office secretaries, two office assistants and two drivers. The Secretariat‘s role was to aid 
the operations of the movement by implementing decisions and mandate of the Steering 
Council and to generate and process proposals, plans and actions, for approval of the Steering 
Council. 
The Specialised Technical Committees 
There were also specialised technical committees that included mobilisation, civic education, 
fundraising, media and publicity and finally, constitutional and legal affairs. The committees 
were set in a manner that aided the movement in its key functional areas so that it would 
achieve the larger goal of giving Kenyans a new constitution. In terms of 
representations/distribution of positions in the committees, nothing was fixed. It was a 
voluntary process where people took committee positions according to their strengths and 
expertise (Ombok, interview 24/09/2009). The functional areas within which these 
committees were formed are discussed below.  
 
Finance Committee 
This committee was tasked with assisting the Steering Council in mobilising financial 
resources for the movement. To do this, the committee had to prepare necessary budgets and 
financial statements and table the same to the Steering Council. The Finance Committee 
therefore assisted in raising necessary funds and other material resources for the successful 
implementation of the Constitutional Review Process. It was also responsible for ensuring 
that audited financial reports were presented to the Steering Council. 
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Communications and Public Relations Committee 
This committee assisted the Steering Council in effectively communicating within and 
outside the movement. Specifically, this Committee was responsible for designing and 
proposing to the Steering Council an effective communication strategy that would speedily, 
accurately and adequately respond to questions or issues raised by the public on the 
Constitution Review Process and explain the Initiative‘s standpoint on key issues of the 
review. The Communications and Public Relations Committee was also responsible for 
advising the movement generally and the Steering Council in particular, on the suitability of 
materials, press statements and releases, and other written communications to the public. This 
Committee also served as the organisation‘s spin-doctor and therefore needed to make 
proposals on ways of maintaining positive media coverage and favourable public image of 
the Ufungamano Initiative.  Internally, the Committee also helped in developing a 
mechanism for corresponding with members of the Stakeholder Forum and other allies.  
 
Constitutional and Legal Affairs Committee 
 This was the legal think-tank of the movement. It advised the movement on ways to adhere 
to the consensuses arrived at the Bomas of Kenya and the Safari Park Forums, whose 
essential principles were contained in the 1997 Constitution of Kenya Review Act. It 
therefore provided technical guidance on the constitution making process based on Kenya‘s 
history, social, economic and political experiences. One of the most visible works of the 
Constitutional and Legal Affairs Committee was alternative analysis of the Law. Through 
this, they pointed out the flaws in the Law as well as the opportunities therein. It was through 
such analysis of the 1997 Constitution of Kenya Review Act that they identified political and 
legal opportunities to utilise. This was in view of the fact that the 1997 Review Act had 
identified civil society and religious groups as critical stakeholders of the process who would 
be required to appoint some of their own into the Review Commission. When KANU and 
their Raila Odinga led Parliamentary Select Committee on the constitution changed this, civil 
society and religious leaders mobilised other stakeholders to constitute a Review Commission 
faithful to the 1998 Review Commission Amendment Act. 
 
Civic Education Committee 
The Technical Committee on Civic Education was charged with reaching out to Kenyans to 
rally them behind the Constitution Review Process.  To do this, it worked out guidelines that 
helped optimise the nationwide use of available civic education resources. It worked closely 
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with other organs, especially the PCK and other organisations involved in civic education so 
as to enhance their work through cooperation.  
 
As already highlighted, civic education was one of the key strategies for the Ufungamano 
Initiative and its contributions were tremendous. Civic education facilitated a nation-wide 
awareness creation in a coordinated and collaborative manner for a people-driven 
Constitution Review Process. It ensured meaningful, effective and efficient participation by 
ordinary Kenyans in the Review Process. The Civic Education Committee ultimately devised 
a system that would ensure that civic education was undertaken throughout the country using 
seminars, workshops, debates, forums, conferences, publications, and use of various 
organisations throughout the country (interviews: Mwachofi, 27/09/2009; Gitari, 21/09/2009; 
wa Gathaka, 29/09/2009). Mwachofi (interview 27/09/2009) for instance stated that through 
Shirika la Elimu na Maendeleo (SEMA) in Taita Taveta district, they 
…reached every sub-location and got people to discuss the constitution from the lowest level 
possible. We innovatively covered all socioeconomic and political aspects required for a 
comprehensive constitution. In every place we began by enabling the community to analyse 
their situation. They would come out with all their issues and finally decide the root cause of 
all their problems....We would follow that, and ask what is the solution for poverty, is it hard 
work, or it is use of resources?  Do we have resources in this area? They would answer in the 
affirmative and we would ask: why don‘t we use them? This way, we were able to address the 
relationship between the people‘s conditions and the existing constitution and governance 
systems and institutions in place...and people were able to see that if we change this 
governance structure, if we had a different constitution, things would change.   
 
This demonstrates the revelatory nature of civic education, which was widespread in the 
entire nation. Indeed, the Moi/KANU regime was also aware of the potency of these civic 
education programmes, hence its continued attack of the same. Nonetheless, civic education 
continued and was responsible for the successes cited earlier in this chapter. So effective was 
civic education that by 1998, the Moi/KANU regime issued a circular to the NGO council 
banning civic education. The ‗President also attacked the NGOs' concept of civic education, 
which he claimed was unnecessary in Kenya [and] that NGOs sponsoring civic education 
[were] a threat to the security of the state and their activities must be curtailed‘ (van Beurden, 
2000; Ghai and Galli, 2006). Moi was not alone in condemning civic education.  Indeed, as 
the citation below, taken from Wanbali (2001) attests, even journalists and other members of 
society started questioning the value of civic education. Wanbali (2001) specifically wrote: 
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Civic education] is puerile nonsense that opportunist traders masquerading as principled civil 
society activists have used to cheat millions of dollars out of the gullible wallets of well-
funded groups in Western countries.… The concept of civil society in Kenya … is a 
misnomer extracted from the liberal tradition.… The claim that [civil society] can transform 
Kenyans through civic education is a brazen NGOs lie.… The bifurcated nature of the state 
… rubbishes any claim these ‗civil society crusaders‘ may have to legitimacy. Their very 
existence as the better-off, affluent, urban dwellers, somewhat spared the tyranny and poverty 
of the rural tribal existence, undermines their posture as knights bringing the liberating 
philosophy of ‗civicness ‘ to the rural masses.   
 
Public Mobilizations Committee 
This Committee was responsible for mobilisation of the public in support of the Ufungamano 
Initiative‘s Constitution Review Process. It was also responsible for logistical preparations 
for public events such as meetings, rallies and tours of both the Steering Council and the 
Commission. The Committee also assisted the Steering Council in developing a strategy for 
coordinating participation of various communities in the Constitution Review Process.  
 
The Ufungamano Initiative engaged multiple strategies in its mobilisation. The Public 
Mobilization Committee advised on the need to utilise effective and existing institutions. As 
such, to reach out to the Kenyan people and in mobilising popular support, the pulpits were 
the main avenues. This enabled the Ufungamano Initiative to ensure that what they came up 
with had some support of Kenyans at the grassroots. As already highlighted, the Ufungamano 
Initiative packaged its messages capitalising on the anxieties that exclusion of popular 
participation would ignite chaos. In this regard, minute 6/99 of the December 3
rd
 1999 
Consultative Meeting at Ufungamano House for instance noted, ‗combined with the general 
economic situation, it will only take little persuasion for Kenyans to take to the streets.‘  The 
minutes further noted that all stakeholders ‗must therefore strive to create an environment of 
trust by facilitating for an understanding that there is immense value in people‘s participation 
in the Review Process. This participation must be qualitative, quantitative and continuous for 
this country to cultivate a constitutional culture‘ (Minutes of December 3 1999 meeting). 
 
Parliamentary and Political Committee 
 This organ was responsible for mobilising political actors to support the Constitution Review 
Process. It worked closely with the Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee in carrying 
out regular reviews of the political environment and advising the Steering Council on 
258 
 
evolving political trends and their impact and relationship to the Constitutional Review 
Process. This committee also liaised with political parties to ensure effective communication 
and representation of the Ufungamano Initiative‘s contention in political debates of the day.   
 
All these committees worked under the direction of the Steering Council. Looking at this 
structure closely, one sees a well-oiled machine responsible for running the movement.  But a 
question then emerges: what was the relationship between different structures? Did the 
overall structure ensure sufficient participation and accountability of the movement? In the 
paragraphs that follow, I address these questions.      
 
For starters, most of the people occupying positions in these structures were mostly elites at 
different levels. For example, Bishop Kairu chaired the Communication Committee while the 
legal affairs was chaired by Mutasa Jarfa, a legal expert. There was however, generally a 
collegiate form of decision making in Ufungamano. Issues were brought to the Plenary, 
discussed and agreed upon through consensus (Kibara, interview 15/10/2009). With reference 
to accountability, Ufungamano Initiative relied on existing structures (such as the NGOs and 
social movement organisations like NCEC, churches, mosques and temples) for connections, 
communications as well as to reach out generally to the stakeholders and Kenyans in general 
(interviews: Raiji, 14/10/2009; Kibara, 15/10/2009). 
 
The usage of existing structures was rationalised in various ways. According to Churchill 
(interviews, 02/10/2009), for instance, the combination of expertise, an elaborate network 
through constituent groups and the fact that the Ufungamano Initiative held regular meetings, 
ensured people participated effectively and there was therefore no need to create more 
structures. Moreover, ‗occasionally people would be asked to volunteer to develop certain 
papers or positions and concretize certain ideas into actionable work‘ (ibid).  Churchill 
nonetheless conceded that there was tension within because some people especially those 
who had come from the NCEC had been used to the limelight and addicted to visibility and 
publicity in the media. 
Such people could not face a situation where they were being put in a position to sit alongside 
ordinary mortals, who initially used to look to them as leaders of the reform movement. 
Despite the tensions, the Ufungamano Initiative resisted the move to create any other 
structures  (Ibid).  
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 But the loose structure was ultimately the Ufungamano Initiative‘s weakness. First, despite 
the presence of clear accountability lines between the different structures, some personalities 
within the Steering Committee were too overbearing on the other actors and structures. This 
resulted in several substantive contradictions. Moreover, some respondents speculated that 
political elite might have been working behind the scenes with some in the movement, to 
steer it in certain directions. In the process, these ‗collaborators‘ benefitted from ‗new‘ 
outcomes and directions. The merger is cited as case to support this view.
18
 It is however 
difficult to be definitive on this as only those who may have played this role know the truth. 
Second, the net result of this great array of actors‘ collaborations was the emergence of a 
movement with multiple internal cleavages.  
 
Such internal contradictions served to amplify tensions on what a ‗people-led process‘ meant 
for the different groups in the movement. The earlier divisions within the pro-reform 
movement cited in the last chapter were therefore inherited by the Ufungamano Initiative. 
Despite these cleavages, Zein (interview, 07/10/2009) argues that credit needs to be given to 
the Ufungamano Initiative because it managed to 
 …run a movement that allowed for interrogation of ideas and allowing for space for people 
who had very divergent views and forge agreements. It is the values that the people were 
fighting for, that guided Ufungamano. We did not have to take a common stance but people 
agreed on a framework that allowed for consensus building.  
 
A key question then is: how did the structure ensure accountability between the different 
structures? How did they ensure that whatever they did had the mandate or at least the 
blessings of the representations from the other classes and constituencies especially given 
that accountability can be elusive between a movement and its members as ‗iron law of 
oligarchy‘ (Michels, 1911) pressurises movements to bureaucratise and decision-making 
power ends up at the centre?  A review of literature on movements with multiple actors (see 
for example Mati, 2009, 2008; James and Malunga, 2006; Tarrow, 1998) reveals that while 
movements get their strength from such numbers and diversity it can also be a source of 
operational challenges.  
 
For the Ufungamano Initiative, the utilisation of the elaborate infrastructure offered by 
religious institutions that spread across all parts of Kenya definitely enabled it to substantially 
rival the state‘s processes. Utilising already existing structures, the high pitch of the 
                                                 
18
 I deal with this aspect in greater details in the next chapter. 
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constitutional reform struggles came to be heard in all corners of Kenya. Arguably, without 
such, it is probable that the Ufungamano Initiative may not have become as successful as it 
did. Indeed, its predecessors, especially NCEC were unable to achieve as much as the 
Ufungamano Initiative. However, the Ufungamano Initiative had few avenues for citizens‘ 
participation especially in the key structure as the Plenary.  Even though citizens were always 
free to air their views as well as attend the Plenary, the formal designation of some 
organisations as stakeholders was in itself limiting as it left out many others.  
 
As such, there were shortfalls in this strategy as it resulted in a great disconnect between 
rhetoric of framing its contention with the state as a people-led constitutional reform process, 
and the internal practice in the movement. This disconnect emanated from the absence of an 
enabling structure for direct participation of citizens in directly making the most important 
decisions at the Plenary of Stakeholders. One therefore reads contradictions between 
Ufungamano Initiative‘s rhetoric in framing of contention along the Rousseau decentralized 
and strong anti-bureaucratic impulses and direct democracy, with the actual practice and intra-
elite contestation within and outside the Ufungamano Initiative that continuously 
characterised the constitutional reform process. As such, despite its self-styling as a peoples‘ 
movement and the fact that it indeed had the participation of ordinary peoples‘ struggles and 
movements (e.g. Muungano wa Wanavijiji i.e. Slum Dweller Federation, the hawkers, the 
landless etc) the Ufungamano Initiative remained largely an elite movement. In practice, it 
lacked an elaborate decentralized structure as had been suggested by some of the actors, to 
enable direct citizen participation and democracy. Instead, it had strong bureaucratically 
centralised leadership and inclinations.  
  
The token visibility of ordinary people‘s struggles and mediocre participation avenues 
undermined the claim that the Ufungamano Initiative was a ‗peoples‘ struggle. It remained 
largely elitist and in many instances, an urban movement albeit with some representations 
from rural Kenya. There is indeed evidence to support a claim that even in rural places, 
representation occurred mainly through local elite who had greater access to the Ufungamano 
Initiative leadership. This is perhaps explained by the networked nature of civil society.  
 
It is paradoxical that the Ufungamano Initiative failed to do enough to create structures to 
reach out to a greater majority of Kenyans despite the support it enjoyed. This left the 
Ufungamano Initiative essentially a vehicle serving to win the control of the under classes 
with the leadership of local grassroots movements being the only people finding a seat at the 
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decision-making table.  In the end, the Ufungamano Initiative stakeholders essentially 
advocated a position on the table of the processes and decision making in the constitutional 
reform agenda while arrogating themselves the representation of Kenyans without any clear 
mandate from them. This points to tensions between representative claim-making and 
‗democracy of the affected‘ (Marochi, 2011). Even though the youth and the students‘ 
movements as well as Muungano wa Mageuzi fiercely contested the narrow interpretations of 
a people led process, they were unsuccessful (interviews: Hassan, 16/10/2009; Churchill, 
02/10/2009). This becomes clear especially during the merger negotiations with the state-led 
process discussed in the next chapter. 
 
The movement countered the accusation of its elitism with arguments that issues of 
representation were questionable in Kenya. In the December 15-16, 1999 Ufungamano I 
Plenary, Matiba captured this well when he argued, ‗since 1983, elections have never been 
free in Kenya and therefore people do not trust most parliamentarians.‘  At least five 
respondents corroborated this view (interviews: Kihoro, 23/09/2009; Ndubi, 24/09/2009; 
Mwachofi, 27/09/2009; Onyango, 07/10/2009; Omtatah, 31/03/2010). These were valid 
observations. Moreover, given the hostility from the state, it is possible that it would not have 
been easy to get the popular mandate from the people of Kenya through what the 
Ufungamano Initiative attempted to do. Moreover, as Ndubi argued, the question of 
representation  
Probably presupposes that elections are in themselves democratic. There is representation at 
two levels: 1) process representation where you have to be elected by somebody as argued in 
the Njoya case.
19
 2) Substantive representation in terms of issues. The issues we represent are 
the issues out there. They are the issues that people relate with.… Even today, because of the 
nature of work that we do in activism as well as litigation and going through the media, I 
meet people in the streets, who tell me thank you very much… [and that I] should not stop.… 
So they connect with what we are doing (interview, 24/09/2009). 
 
Notwithstanding these claims, as well as the fact that many of the actors within the 
Ufungamano Initiative had representations or a presence in all parts of the country and that 
this meant it had people‘s legitimacy (interviews: Ndubi, 24/09/2009; Musau, 24/09/2009; 
Lethome, 02/10/2009; Athman, 12/10/2009), this arrogation played a role in undermining the 
                                                 
19
 The Njoya case, already cited was a constitutional challenge filed by Rev. Njoya and others against the 
Attorney General to force the draft Constitution to be ratified by Kenyans through a referendum before it could 
be enacted. 
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legitimacy of the Ufungamano Initiative (Oganda interview, 26/03/2010). Indeed, even the 
worst dictators use similar words and define and frame their legitimacy in terms of 
representing and protecting their people. Second, notwithstanding claims that both 
participation and legitimate representation of Kenyans has been contested on the basis of lack 
of free and fair elections since 1983 (Ufungamano Initiative Stakeholder Consultative 
Meeting 15-16, December 1999 minutes; Ndubi, interview 24/09/2009), little was done to 
ensure popular participation of the masses at all levels in the Ufungamano Initiative process. 
Participation avenues remained largely limited to certain elite formations (Odhiambo M., 
interview 01/04/2010). As such, ‗while the Ufungamano Initiative appeared to be a popular 
movement and the Peoples‘ Commission particularly gave some sort of institutional face to 
that, it is not true that the main goal of the Ufungamano Initiative was to ensure that space for 
the ‗under classes in constitution making‘ (Ibid).  
 
This is in no way to discount the fact that whatever the Ufungamano Initiative stood for 
resonated with many Kenyans. Rather, it is to demonstrate operational challenges in ensuring 
popular direct participation in key decision-making organs for a movement of the kind that the 
Ufungamano Initiative was. As such, in spite of its defects and challenges, the Ufungamano 
Initiative did transparently lay the principles for operations and engagement. These included 
‗the process of the constitutional review in Kenya [was] as important as the eventual content 
of the constitution and the integrity of the process [wa]s central to the legitimacy of the 
[resultant] constitution‘ (Ufungamano Initiative December 15-16th 1999). Moreover, it 
adopted the following principles as key and integral of constitution making: 
a) Openness and transparency: each stage and organ of reform was to be open to public 
scrutiny, evaluation and critique and that the review would announce and adequately 
publicise in public and private media in advance of their work, the formal criteria and 
decision rules for carrying out their respective mandates under the Review Act;  
b) Inclusivity, accessibility and non-discrimination: i.e., it would not exclude any group 
on account of race, religion, ethnic origin, sex, local connections, occupation and 
status. The review organs would in particular, provide adequate opportunity to the 
disadvantaged groups to participate in the constitutional reform; 
c) Accountability: The organs and the constitutional reform process would at all times 
be accountable to the people of Kenya. In particular, the organs of the review should 
ensure that in translating memorandum into a draft, the views of the people are 
meaningfully taken into account; 
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d) Cumulativeness and self-correction. 
While there was no fidelity to the letter on these principles by the Ufungamano Initiative in its 
operations and structures, the statement of these principles as inalienable rights of Kenyans 
has been its enduring contributions to the constitution reform project in Kenya. 
Conclusion 
Through a combination of leadership and effective strategies within the above-discussed 
structures, the Ufungamano Initiative arguably achieved a lot. It was able to mobilise the 
citizenry, facilitated civic education, as well as started collecting views from the public on 
aspirations of a constitution they desired. The Ufungamano Initiative was able to capture 
popular imagination of the Kenyan public and in the end, posed a substantial challenge to the 
state. Nonetheless, the movement and its leadership faced numerous challenges. First, the re-
writing of the constitution required massive human and financial resources that were not easy 
to mobilise. Second, the Ufungamano Initiative‘s actions to form a Commission to write the 
constitution outside of the state established structures, as shown variously in this chapter, 
elicited strong reactions from the Moi/KANU regime and his NDP allies. The Government 
publically condemned the Ufungamano Initiative activities and even threatened and used 
violence in some cases. However, there were other covert reactions/responses from the state. 
The state security infiltrated the movement and started sowing seeds of distrust and suspicion 
among different faiths as well as leaders. A typical case here was the example of Honourable 
Phoebe Asiyo, the leader of the Kenya Women Political Caucus, who, despite positioning 
herself and the group she led as a sympathiser of the Ufungamano Initiative was interviewed 
by the Parliamentary Select Commission, and accepted a position of a Commissioner in the 
government-led process (Waruku, interview 29/09/2009).  
 
Such actions by some of the Ufungamano Initiative leaders, seen as selfish by some, were 
energy sapping for the movement. The State continued its pressure but the Ufungamano 
Initiative was unrelenting. A former Secretary to the merged Constitution of Kenya Review 
Commission, Lumumba (interview, 01/10/2009) pays tribute to what the Ufungamano 
Initiative was able to achieve. The Ufungamano Initiative had against many odds, managed to 
‗push‘ and create a certain level of substantive uncertainty that the government secretly 
started looking for a way out of a stalemate it had engineered. It did help the Ufungamano 
Initiative that the government‘s own credibility was getting a heavy beating from many 
quarters especially from donors. But even then, there were uncertainties on how far the 
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Ufungamano Initiative would go. As such, when a desperate Moi regime tried to hire a 
renowned Kenyan constitutional Law scholar, Professor Yash Pal Ghai to steer the 
Government process in the face of a growing legitimacy crisis to its legally sanctioned 
process, a ray of opportunity beckoned. Ghai succeeded in convincing the Ufungamano 
Initiative to agree to a common process. The next chapter analyses how this was approached 
and why it became possible. 
 
As shown in this chapter, key to the Ufungamano Initiative‘s success was the way it framed 
the issue at hand: constitution making as crucial to the lives of all Kenyans and that it should 
never be left to politicians alone. As such, the Ufungamano Initiative placed the centrality of 
the citizen (the Wanjiku) in this process, arguing that the people were sovereign and had 
inalienable rights in deciding the type of constitution they wanted. Second, we have seen that 
it framed the constitution (in my view rightly so), as a sacred covenant between the people 
and their rulers that required the input of both. From the above, we have also discerned that 
while the Ufungamano Initiative fashioned itself as an effort to push for reviews and more 
fundamentally, to reclaim and rewrite the Kenyan people‘s relationship with their political 
leaders in a participatory way, its structures ensured that it remained an instrument of elites to 
bargain a place for themselves at the decision-making table. In its contention, the 
Ufungamano Initiative chose a simple but nested structure that relied more on the 
constituent/member organisations to mobilise resources and support. It was an effective 
structure but nonetheless, one that exposed more cleavages in the movement as it was riddled 
with many contradictions that fundamentally challenged its standing as a true mass 
movement.  
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Chapter Seven 
 
The merger and after: A dream deferred? 
 
Introduction 
 
Social movement organisations might not always achieve what they set for themselves within 
the duration of their existence. In some instances, movements die or metamorphose into 
different organisations and forms (e.g. NGO-ise or sometimes go underground as 
terror/militant group).
1
 Sometimes, issues at the heart of social movement‘s contention may 
also evolve and mutate through cycles of protest/contention (Tarrow, 1998; Strang and Soule, 
1998; Koopmans, 2004; Oliver and Myer, 2003). Cycles of contention ensure continuity of 
social struggles as they allow frustrations, failures, missed opportunities, and false dawns of 
transformations, to find expressions and a home in new waves that pick up and continue the 
struggle from where their predecessors left. This happens because of ‗diffusion of collective 
action from more mobilized to less mobilized sectors‘ (Tarrow, 1998: 142). Such diffusion 
and interactions give rise to higher frequencies of protest events across the population, 
leading to the rise of successor social movements (Oliver and Myer, 2003). In the case at 
hand, I argued in chapter five that even with the IPPG reducing the NCEC tempo, the 
Ufungamano Initiative took over from NCEC because different stakeholders agreed to work 
together to offer continuity by taking the fight for a new constitution forward. 
   
Such continuity, as Strang and Soule (1998: 280) argue, reflects ‗complex webs of action and 
reaction‘ by the state or groups targeted by social movements and are defined by the nature of 
relationships between initial movements and their spin-off successors (see also McAdam, 
1995). This is because ‗for social movements, the tendency of diffusion dynamics to spread 
and amplify protest is opposed by increasingly strong responses by the state‘ (Strang and 
Soule, 1998: 280).  The responses of the state therefore act as instigator or inhibitor of 
subsequent collective action as movements take lessons from such reactions (Pitcher et al., 
1978 cited in Strang and Soule, 1998; Meyer and Staggenborg, 1996; Oliver and Myers, 
2003).  Such lessons and experiences determine further actions and counteractions by 
movements and the state. 
                                                 
1
 There are many examples in Kenya of such organisations such as Mungiki, which went underground due to 
continued state repression, or Release Political Prisoners which transformed into an NGO, to mention but two. 
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As such, the ‗rise‘ and ‗fall‘ as well as diffusion of social movement contention, are 
reflections of both fluidity and innovations of actions and counter-actions and struggles for 
hegemony. The diffusion of struggles co-evolves as both social movement contenders and 
their antagonists, learn and adjust in response to each other‘s actions in an effort to 
outmanoeuvre each other (Oliver and Meryer, 2003; Chan and Zhou, 2009). Diffusion 
enables social movements to ‗produce general outcomes that are more than the sum total of 
the results of an aggregate of unconnected events‘ (Tarrow, 1998: 142). But the succession of 
one cycle of contention with another is also a testament to the undying faith that it is still 
possible to change the status quo. For the Ufungamano Initiative, Apiyo captures such faith: 
‗a good idea cannot be killed. Ufungamano was a good idea and so, its dream still lives on 
until we see the success of a constitution every Kenyan yearns for‘ (interview, 16/09/2009).  
 
This chapter utilises Gramsci‘s (1971) concept of hegemony to analyse and explain the 
contributions of the Ufungamano Initiative to the constitutional reform struggles in Kenya. 
Hegemony for Gramsci is constructed as the ability of the dominant class or social force to 
make their interests, the dominant interests over all others through a combination of force, 
concessions and organisation of consent of the masses of people to their dominant social 
order. To understand how this works, Gramsci‘s concept of hegemony follows Marx and 
Engels‘ (1846[1970]: 64) writings from The German Ideology: 
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the 
ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class, 
which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time, over 
the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who 
lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than 
the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material 
relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling 
one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess 
among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a 
class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in 
its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and 
regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling 
ideas of the epoch.  
 
But for Gramsci, hegemony is also a space that through contestations may allow for 
alternative hegemonies to emerge. As such, hegemony is ‗dialectically where the existing 
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hegemonic social order is maintained but also [a] realm of social creativity [where 
contestations within it, can lead to an emergence of] a new social order‘ (Katz, 2006: 334-5).  
Commentators of contemporary Kenyan constitutional reform struggles have long argued that 
the constitutional reform movement brought together ‗disparate criticisms of, and advocacy 
against the status quo, of several rather different stances, combining reasoned thought and 
political activism‘ in the face of a common enemy (Omtatah, interview 10/06/2011).  This 
combination of what is loosely termed the pro-reform movement in Kenya meant that the 
constitutional reform agenda was reflective of a war between the different ‗interests of 
Kenyans – class, religious, gender, ethnic, racial, political, and social…‘ (Mutua, 2008: 117). 
In this regard, the Ufungamano Initiative was not any different from its predecessors or 
successors as it operated in a similarly polarised environment. 
  
Given the foregoing, this chapter seeks to provide answers to the following questions: how 
viable can a movement with such a wide and varied constituency, competing interests and 
strictures as the Ufungamano Initiative remain united and achieve the goals it set? 
Considering that the Ufungamano Initiative operated at the level of improvised unity, was it 
destined not to last long as a united force? The analysis of various actions, evolutions and 
outcomes of the constitutional reform contention, leads to a conclusion that the Ufungamano 
Initiative was yet another narrative of what Muluka (2011a) summarises as a ‗false dawn 
that did not blossom into mornings of salvation and fulfilment‘ in transforming the Kenyan 
state, because it did not achieve a new constitutional order. Nonetheless, this chapter argues 
that despite its limitations, the Ufungamano Initiative was an important cog in the drive that 
ultimately gave Kenya a new constitution in the August 4, 2010 referendum after two 
decades of struggles and multiple waves of contention. 
 
The protracted contention over the contemporary constitution reform project in Kenya, also 
points to an ‗organic crisis‘ of the hegemony in the Gramscian sense. This crisis resulted 
from two factors. First, was the mobilisation of large numbers of the subordinate classes into 
the struggle that continued piling pressure on the dominant social forces. Second, it resulted 
from the State‘s inability to accommodate or mediate different ‗competing interests of 
individuals, social groups, regions, ethnic groups and institutions‘ (Mutua, 2008: 117). The 
Kenyan case specifically speaks to Gramsci‘s (1971: 178) argument that:  
A crisis occurs, sometimes lasting for decades. This exceptional duration means that incurable 
structural contradictions have revealed themselves (reached maturity) and that, despite this, 
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the political forces which are struggling to conserve and defend the existing structure itself 
are making every effort to cure them, within certain limits and to overcome them. These 
incessant and persistent efforts…form the terrain of the ‗conjunctural‘ and it is upon this 
terrain that forces of opposition organise. These forces seek to demonstrate that the necessary 
and sufficient conditions already exist to make possible, and hence imperative, the 
accomplishments of certain historical tasks (imperative, because any falling short before an 
historical duty increases the necessary disorder and prepares more serious catastrophes). 
 
The significance of the above citation will become clear in the discussion of the aftermath of 
2002 general election under what I term a transition without transformation that arrested 
change. This was because of realignment of political forces and interests to forestall any 
radical transformations of the Kenyan state. Specifically, two elite forces were at play. On the 
one hand was the group led by National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK), part of the National 
Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC) led by President Mwai Kibaki. The NAK group altered 
certain proposals in the draft of the proposed constitution in order to evade dilution of 
Presidential powers. On the other hand was the Liberal Democratic (LDP) brigade formed by 
renegade KANU bigwigs led by Raila Odinga and included most of the most-senior KANU 
leaders such as Kalonzo Musyoka and George Saitoti and Joseph Kamotho among others. 
The members of this group had defected from KANU two months to the 2002 general 
election to form LDP after Moi had overlooked them in his choice of a successor. This group 
re-constituted itself and formed an alliance yet again with what had remained of KANU to 
lead a majority of Kenyans in what they framed as a resistance to the abortion of the popular 
will by rejecting the ‗government‘2 authored draft constitution in a referendum in November 
2005.  
 
The 2005 referendum also brought further cleavages within one of the most important 
constituencies of the Ufungamano Initiative – the religious groups. In the end, deep division 
ensued and high parochial stakes, as opposed to the content of the proposed constitution, 
came to play a decisive role in the referendum outcomes. The cataclysmic post-election 
violence in late 2007 to early 2008, resulting from the 2007 disputed presidential election, 
served as a turning point. The violence witnessed in 2008 in Kenya resulted in what Fowler 
(2011a: 2) refers to as ‗civic energy that is ―uncivil‖ and potentially destabilising‘ but which 
                                                 
2
 I use quotation marks here to denote that the draft that was subjected to a referendum in November 2005 was 
acrimonious as one side of the ruling coalition disowned and campaigned against it while the then Justice and 
Constitutional Affairs Minister in the NARC regime – Hon Kiraitu Murungi – and who had been from the NAK 
part of the coalition, continued insisting that the draft constitution was a government project.   
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is useful to the achievement of civil ends. Such uncivil energy according to Fowler, results 
from deep-seated cleavages in society especially when elites unsuccessfully try to bury or 
suppress them.  
 
Regarding the Kenyan case, one of the outcomes of the 2008 post-election violence (uncivil 
energy) was a forced political marriage between Raila Odinga‘s Orange Democratic 
Movement (ODM) and Mwai Kibaki‘s Party of National Unity (PNU). As part of the 
National Accord (the political settlement that got Kenya from the brink of an all-out civil 
war), a raft of conditions termed Agendas for Reforms, were set for the new coalition 
partners by the Panel of Eminent Persons that mediated the settlement. One of the principal 
agreements under Agenda 4 was the need for comprehensive constitutional reforms to save 
the country from further self-destruction.
3
 This forced a majority of politicians on both sides 
of the political divide to momentarily agree to give Kenyans a new constitution. This is what 
made the realisation of a new constitution possible in 2010.  
 
The new constitution was therefore a concession by hegemonic political forces. In the face of 
collective threats that the post-election violence imposed on economic and political elites, 
political elites acted to preserve and reproduce their own position in the Kenyan society by 
conceding to a new constitution that in so many ways, was not radically different from the 
one rejected in 2005. The realisation of a new constitution in August 2010, born out of the 
ashes of the 2008 post-election violence, confirms that ‗uncivil energy‘ can be a means for 
achieving civil ends.   
 
Gramsci‘s concept of hegemony helps us understand how domination and its reproduction 
have occurred throughout the Kenyan constitutional reform struggles. Specifically, it helps in 
advancing a thesis that different elite contenders in the Kenyan constitutional reform struggle 
i.e. those for transformation (in their many hues), and those for status quo, have managed to 
turn popular constitutional review contentions into intra-elite (i.e. political-economic, 
academic and religious) struggles by reproducing their domination of the subaltern classes 
thereby undermining the transformation of the existing order. Here I borrow from Sassoon 
(1982 as cited in Katz, 2006: 335) to argue that struggles for a new constitutional 
                                                 
3
 The agenda 4 items of the Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation (2008) were geared towards 
addressing long term issues that included: constitutional, legal and institutional reforms, undertaking land 
reforms, tackling unemployment, particularly among the youth, tackling poverty, inequity and regional 
development imbalances, consolidating national cohesion and unity, and addressing impunity, transparency and 
accountability. 
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dispensation in Kenya became a strategy to diffuse ‗a certain way of life and 
thought...throughout society to inform norms, values and tastes, political practices, and social 
relations.‘ The result was ‗a specific organization of consent...result[ing] from a combination 
of coercion and consent, the latter achieved through the hegemonic co-optation of groups in 
civil society resulting in ―coercive orthodoxy‖‘ (Persaud, 2001: 65 cited in Katz, 2006: 335) 
that ultimately led to ‗a dream deferred.‘  
 
The postponement of the realisation of a new constitution emanated from cleavages within 
the different elite formations and their misadventure in desperately trying to preserve an 
inevitably dying order. While some scholars within the political opportunity structure 
paradigm (for example Chan and Zhou, 2009) see such elite fragmentation as an opportunity 
for social movements as these offer vanguards to struggles, the Ufungamano Initiative 
narrative shows that fragmentation within the elite was one of the principal causes for the 
derailment of the constitutional reform train. The sources of such fragmentation within the 
Ufungamano Initiative included: 1) the effects of the merger of the Ufungamano Initiative 
with the Parliamentary Select Committee led process; 2) continuation of the centrality of 
ethnicity in Kenyan politics and struggles (discussed in detail in chapter four); 3) 
disagreements over the content of the proposed draft constitution which were products of 
mistrust among leaders, personality power plays, and struggles over different interests, and 4) 
resource limitations. This chapter demonstrates how these mutually reinforcing factors were 
the force fields of both driving and countervailing forces that worked for, and opposed the 
merger, and why the countervailing forces triumphed and frustrated the democratic 
constitution making experiment under the Ufungamano Initiative in Kenya.  
The merger: motivations, process, and effects 
Social movements have many dynamics. Their protest cycle dynamics involve shifts in the 
action repertoires across time. For example, overtime, movements may move from utilising 
confrontational strategies such as mass demonstrations to institutionalised politics (Tilly, 
1978 cited in Oliver and Myers, 2003).  The nature of relationships between structures, 
leadership and followers, resources and frames, determine the path undertaken by a 
movement. Therefore, like Oliver and Myers (2003: 1), I argue that ‗movement trajectories 
evolve through stochastic processes and are constrained, but not determined, by structures.‘  
This is because, frictions between structures may, for example, be a movement‘s death knell, 
or force it to metamorphose into something else. As already pointed out in the last chapter, 
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there were multiple structural and leadership conflicts within the Ufungamano Initiative that 
made hegemonic co-optation and organisation of consent through a merger more possible. I 
analyse the motivations for the merger between the Ufungamano Initiative‘s People‘s 
Commission of Kenya and the government led process with a view to offering further support 
for this claim. It is also important to note, as Oliver and Myers (2003: 1) stress, that 
‗stochastic thinking is essential for recognizing both the volatility and path dependence of 
collective action and its underlying structural constraints... movement dynamics are [also] 
shaped more by interactions with other actors than by processes internal to a movement.‘  
Following this, I argue that analysing interactions between the Ufungamano Initiative and the 
state is equally important in determining reasons for the merger.   
 
Such analysis reveals that the merger was influenced by a number of factors. Chief among 
these was the role of leadership both within the movement and its competitor (the 
Parliamentary Select Committee). This is especially exhibited by the leadership role played 
by Mutava Musyimi in the Ufungamano Initiative, and Yash Pal Ghai in the Constitution of 
Kenya Review Commission. The nomination of Ghai to lead the Constitution of Kenya 
Review Commission had a tremendous impact on the nature of strategic interactions between 
the Ufungamano Initiative and the state. Ghai‘s role corroborates Tarrow‘s (1998: 142) 
argument that ‗widespread contention produces externalities that give challengers at least a 
temporary advantage and allows them to overcome the weaknesses in their resource base.‘ 
Specifically, as the analysis below reveals, Ghai‘s role as a new external force in relation to 
his strategic interactions with the Ufungamano Initiative leadership provided possibilities that 
made the merger an attractive option. Together with Ghai‘s influence, the other major factors 
contributing to a merger were resource constraints, as well as outright intrigues on the part of 
some of the actors within the Ufungamano Initiative, and the role of the donor community. 
 
The nomination of Ghai to lead the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission process by 
the Moi/KANU regime was hailed as a stroke of genius on the part of the regime by many 
commentators of the Kenyan Review Process (see for example Mutua, 2008; Lumumba, 
2008; interviews: Apiyo, 16/09/2009; Gitari, 21/09/2009; Kihoro, 23/09/2009; Ghai, 
23/10/2009; Ombok, 24/09/2009; Khairallah, 26/09/2009; Ndubi, 24/09/2009; Odenda, 
07/10/2009; Zein, 07/10/2009). Ghai‘s appointment as this analysis shall reveal, pushed for 
conditions that would enable what Oliver and Myers (2003: 1) call ‗strategic interaction‘. 
This refers to how the process and outcomes of actions of movements and their opponents 
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(regimes or counter-movements) affect each other‘s actions and counter actions.  Oliver and 
Myers (2003: 1) observe that: 
In social movements, actions affect other actions: Actions are not just isolated, independent 
responses to external economic or political conditions—rather, one action changes the 
likelihood of subsequent actions. This broad understanding of inter-action effects 
encompasses relations often seen as qualitatively distinct.  The term ―diffusion‖4 is used when 
prior actions affect the future probability of similar actions, including the spread of ideas or 
language.  
Strategic interactions are therefore products of movement‘s co-evolutionary and diffusionary 
developments with regimes (Oliver and Myers, 2003). 
  
The biological analogy of ‗diffusion and co-evolution‘ (Oliver and Myers, 2003: 2) model in 
the study of strategic interaction between movements and the their targets, offers a useful tool 
for understanding how both the Ufungamano Initiative and the state co-evolved in this 
contention to a point where a merger was, albeit not publicly declared, an attractive option for 
both parties. Oliver and Myers (2003: 2) write that: 
Diffusion and coevolution are closely related. Species which adapt well tend to diffuse, and 
so do successful actions. Conversely, species can be driven to extinction (negative diffusion, 
if you will) by the actions of other species. Diffusion processes change the environments to 
which actions and species adapt. In fact, coevolutionary relationships can most often be 
conceived as relations between diffusion processes. Coevolutionary relationships may vary in 
their forms, including predator-prey, niche competition, and symbiosis, as well as the indirect 
relations that arise from sharing a common environment (e.g., habitat destruction). There are 
limits to the biological analogy, specifically because the core mechanisms for selection are 
learning and decision rather than mortality and sexual selection, although chance events play 
key roles in both. Nevertheless, the insight that movements co-evolve with other actors 
permeates movement scholarship even when that language is not used. Serious attention to 
the underpinnings of co-evolutionary theory provides new and powerful ways of theorizing 
relations among social movements and other actors. 
 
Rev. Timothy Njoya, a participant of this study, also used a biological analogy to express the 
need for change, arguing: 
Every living organism adjusts to changes in the environment. It is innate in every living 
organism to adjust to changing environment as best as they can. Human political behaviour is 
                                                 
4
 Indeed, Ufungamano Initiative was somewhat a new wave of protest from the diffusions of the earlier NCEC 
struggles. Chapters four and five dealt at length with this. 
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no different. As Charles Darwin argues, it is not the strongest species that survives; it is not 
the most intelligent species that survives. Rather, it is the one that is most adaptable to 
change. But the most genuine change is not one based only on the need to adapt but also on 
the believe that it is the only way to better creatures and the survival of that particular species 
especially when it is about the ‗rational‘ human being. For genuine change in political 
behaviour, new ideas are needed and these need to operate at a different level. This is what 
will motivate real change. It has to be internal and not externally driven (interview, 
29/09/2009). 
Using this logic, it is fair to argue that it is pressure on politicians that forced them to change. 
The key question is whether they changed for better or for worse. Nonetheless, whatever 
direction change may take, it results from pressure that forces negotiations and concessions.  
 
To understand the significance of the biological analogy for the Kenyan case, one needs to 
explain the circumstances surrounding the recruitment of Ghai by the state. Ghai had been 
picked to chair the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission out of desperation on the part 
of Moi‘s government. As pointed out in chapter six, while arguably the Ufungamano 
Initiative did not do enough to create necessary structures to enable direct popular 
participation, the movement sensitised and mobilised sufficient support to its cause to a level 
of upsetting the state process (interviews: Kibwana, 21/10/2009; Gitari, 21/09/2009).
5
 In the 
process, the Ufungamano Initiative created a substantive challenge to the legitimacy of the 
state-led process. The Moi/KANU regime was forced to seek ways to save face by appointing 
someone who, in the eyes of Kenyans and the international community, appeared to be 
credibly independent and highly regarded (interviews: Ghai, 21/09/2009; Ochanda, 
22/09/2009, Ombok, 24/09/2009; Ndubi, 24/09/2009; Kihoro, 23/09/2009). Ndubi (interview, 
24/09/2009) for instance, offers clear evidence for this with his argument that:  
Moi was desperate for international acceptance because he had lost a lot of ground.  As such, 
one of the results he hoped to reap from getting Yash Ghai on his side was that he would be 
seen as a serious person who was ready for reforms because Yash Ghai had an internationally 
credible record and reputation.
6
  
 
                                                 
5
 Gitari (interview, 21/09/2009) attributes this to the fact that the Ufungamano Initiative used organised religious 
institutional structures, ‗probably the best grassroots network for communicating‘ in the country, and the fact 
that they ‗command a very high following, because they were bold and prophetic.‘ With such a dedicated force 
of followers it meant they were a voice that could not be ignored. It is such that brought pressure to bear and 
might have realistically ‗forced‘ Ghai to seek a merger.   
6
 Mutua (2008: 128) argues along the same line when he wrote: ‗For the Moi regime, Ghai would lender the 
process his enormous prestige, making it virtually unassailable as another Moi/KANU sham.‘ 
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The significance of Ghai‘s entry into the picture, and his eventual success in negotiating a 
merger, corroborates the observations by Oliver and Myers (2003: 3) that: 
Social movements are always shaped by the actions of opponents and bystanders. Actors not 
only interact strategically at each point in time, they learn over time from past interactions 
and from information communicated to them by other actors. New dissident tactics diffuse 
through dissident networks, and new regime responses diffuse through regime networks. 
These new forms of action influence subsequent interactions.   
Specifically, I argue here that the same traits that made Ghai a good candidate for the Moi 
regime worked to ensure he successfully negotiated a merger between the two competing 
processes. These traits were Ghai‘s fortitude – personal integrity and credibility, a personal 
touch, a reputation both locally and internationally and a sharp and strategic intellect in 
identifying opportunities for easing tensions within the different elite formations, which 
created some level of confidence and endeared him to the Ufungamano Initiative without 
necessarily alienating him from a government that was desperately clutching at straws. 
Moreover, as Mutua (2008: 128) has argued:  
Ghai seemed to have accepted the appointment well aware that from the start, the Moi 
government intended to use him for its own political purposes. What Moi did not anticipate, 
however, was Ghai‘s political acumen and determination to give Kenya, the country of his 
birth a modern democratic constitution. For Ghai, such an accomplishment would have been 
the most fitting epilogue to a distinguished career. 
These aspects, I posit, dictated the character of Ghai‘s well-calculated actions in his dealings 
with the Moi regime and other contenders in the process as these forces saw Ghai‘s utility to 
them, as pegged only on his ability to help them overcome the other side.  
  
To understand Ghai‘s impacts in these contentions, I digress a little to trace how Ghai was 
recruited by the state. In his own words, Ghai was reluctantly pulled into the constitutional 
contestation by the then Kenyan Attorney General, Amos Wako, who is a former student of 
Ghai from the latter‘s days as a professor at the University of Dar-es-Salaam (Ghai, interview 
23/10/2009). Wako had approached Ghai in September 2000 while he (Ghai) was on 
sabbatical leave, away from Hong Kong, where he was a law professor. Ghai was spending 
sabbatical time at the University of Wisconsin-Madison in the United States of America.  
Wako paid Ghai a visit at Madison to talk him into accepting to be a Commissioner and Chair 
of a government-led Constitution of Kenya Review Commission.
7
 Ghai held that he initially 
                                                 
7
 Ghai‘s own narrative in this interview is corroborated by Mutua (2008) accounts of how Ghai was wooed into 
accepting to get into the Commission and chair it.  
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flatly turned down the offer arguing that he had been ‗exiled for a long time and did not 
follow politics that closely‘ (interview, 23/10/2009).  
 
Ghai also stated that even then, he was acutely aware of the deep divisions in the Kenyan 
society coupled with intense political oppression that had led to the emergence of two parallel 
constitutional reform processes. Knowing a little bit about the Ufungamano Initiative 
contentions, Ghai naturally identified with it because of the acquaintances driving it. 
Moreover, Ghai indicated, he had been working with civil society all his life, believed in civil 
society, and in human rights, and had suffered in his own ways, from the arbitrariness of the 
Kenyan state.
8
 As such, Ghai stated that he did not ‗certainly want to be associated with what 
was seen at that time, as a rival government body‘ because he was troubled by the deepening 
cleavages in the Review Process (interview, 23/10/2009), a process he considered essential to 
the reinforcement of national unity and to move the country forward.  
 
However, Ghai also read Wako‘s or rather the entire government‘s desperation to have him 
on board. This is captured by the fact that Wako, in Ghai‘s words, urged him to accept the 
appointment because everybody would accept him: ‗you are respected and can play a very 
constructive role‘ in the process (Ghai, interview 23/10/2009).9 Ghai was nonetheless very 
obstinate and stated clearly that he did not want to be ‗associated with the Moi government 
commission.‘ Nonetheless, after four days of prodding from Wako, Ghai said, he decided to 
talk to some of his friends at the heart of the Ufungamano Initiative struggles back in Kenya. 
These included Willy Mutunga, an old friend and student, Fidelis Nguli and Gibson Kamau 
Kuria among others, whom Ghai had been meeting and working with over the years he had 
been in exile. Ghai stated that he got mixed views from his confidants: 
Some said no. Willy said, I think you should come, do not commit yourself, you have not 
been back for a while. Come, see, meet people and make up your mind.  And do not say no 
just yet, because we are in a crisis and the Ufungamano Initiative cannot go that far. There is 
a limit.  Murungi said the same thing as Willy, but adding that, do not come and add 
legitimacy to this process.... In the end, I was very torn. I did not know what to do.
10
 
                                                 
8
 This was with regard to a detention order arbitrary placed on him by the Kenyatta regime, which forced him to 
flee the country in the 1960s.  
9
 Indeed, Ghai‘s resume shows that he has been involved in helping a number of countries in the region as well 
as globally in constitution making. These include: Zambia, Seychelles, Mozambique, Fiji, Samoa, Sri-Lanka, 
Cambodia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and more recently Nepal and Somalia. 
10
 Gibson Kamau Kuria, a prominent member of NCEC and a former Law Society Chair corroborates these 
discussions with Ghai. He stated: ‗I remember talking to Ghai. I told him: ―Prof. Ghai, you can help Kenya: But 
you cannot help Kenya by serving in that Commission. Moi is not ready to have a democratic constitution‖‘ 
(interview, 26/09/2009). 
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These different opinions show clear cleavages in the opinions of people associated with the 
Ufungamano Initiative process. While some saw Ufungamano Initiative as limited, others 
thought Ghai would only be adding weight to the government process if he accepted the 
nomination. Under the circumstances, Ghai decided to continue consulting with more people. 
After those initial phone calls, Ghai agreed to go to Kenya but with the understanding that he 
was not accepting any appointment yet. Ghai demanded, as a condition of his acceptance to 
go to Kenya, a free hand to consult widely with the government, members of civil society and 
opposition politicians, and others who were not part of the government but were central in the 
making of a new constitution, with a view to exploring possibilities of reconciling the two 
processes (interviews: Ghai, 23/10/2009; Musyimi, 09/10/2009; Ndubi, 24/09/2009; 
Ong‘wen, 09/10/2009; Raiji, 14/10/2009; Lumumba, 01/10/2009; Odenda, 07/10/2009; 
Wambua, 13/10/2009;  Athman, 12/10/2009; Churchill, 02/10/2009; Zein, 07/10/2009;  
Wambugu C., 09/10/2009).  
 
Ghai made it clear to Wako that he was not going to lead a process that would further divide 
the country and that it was not in Kenya‘s national interest that the country had two rival 
processes, given the already deep divisions in society (interviews: Ghai, 23/10/2009; 
Waruku, 29/09/2009). Ghai opined that so long as these divisions continued, there was no 
prospect of a new constitution. Under the circumstances, Wako assured Ghai that Moi was 
very keen to have him on board and he was free to negotiate a merger (Ghai, interview 
23/10/2009). As we shall see later in this chapter, Ghai‘s efforts at reconciling the two 
processes, backed by strong public pressure, succeeded in a merger agreement in March 2001 
(Cottrell and Ghai, 2007).  
 
When Ghai finally arrived in Kenya, he met leading political leaders and the different 
Ufungamano Initiative religious leaders – Christians, Muslims and Hindus and explained to 
them his mission. Ghai also attempted to sway the Ufungamano Initiative in a similar way he 
had done with the government by advising the leaders he was meeting to consider a merger 
with the State-led process for the sake of the country. He also made it clear to them that he 
had not accepted his nomination but would be willing to chair the Commission if the two 
processes merged. According to Ghai, most of the people he talked to were opposed to the 
idea: 
Everyone said no. Kibaki said no, Nyachae said no, all the civil society organisations said no. 
Even Musyimi was not keen. I was almost giving up and about to go back, when I received a 
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message from Archbishop Ndingi requesting that we meet again. So I met with the 
Ufungamano Initiative a second time (Ghai, interview 23/10/2009).  
 
In this second meeting, some progress was made. The clergy agreed to at least, explore 
possibilities of a merger if the government was willing. From these consultations, Ghai 
realised that even though the Ufungamano Initiative had managed to create substantive and 
procedural challenges to the state in the reform process, there were a lot of limitations and 
uncertainties (Mutua, 2008; interviews: Ghai, 23/10/2009; Kibwana, 21/10/2009; Musyimi, 
09/10/2009).
11
 The internal limitations for the Ufungamano Initiative were already a growing 
concern for the movement. Mutua (2008: 119) reveals this when he writes: ‗even as the 
Ufungamano leaders, most notably Oki Ooko Ombaka and Mutava Musyimi, engaged in 
brinkmanship with KANU, they hoped that the work of the PCK would force the government 
to agree to a single national process....‘ Abubakar Zein, a former Commissioner of the PCK 
and later the CKRC elaborates further on what was happening: 
We took cognizance that the government side had a critical sector that they were representing. 
For the well being of the nation, it was important to have a common process that would give 
birth to one constitution rather than have two processes that would give birth to two 
constitutions and ultimately lead to further conflict and possibly violence. Secondly, there 
was a debate that was going on within the Ufungamano Initiative fraternity and especially 
outside the technical work being done by the Peoples‘ Commission of Kenya. This was in an 
attempt to answer some fundamental questions. One of the fundamental questions was how 
do you bring into being a constitution that would be prepared under Ufungamano? The debate 
went from: it will be a moral document that would act as a beacon of a possible future for 
Kenya that people can work with as a vision, to that we can use an armed struggle to bring a 
revolution in the country.... Many people recognised the value of a common process. If you 
use hindsight, every time we have worked together for a cause, we have reached very high 
heights in this country, including the independence struggle and every time we pulled in 
different directions, it has always led to violence (interview, 07/10/2009).
12
  
                                                 
11
 Ghai (interview, 23/10/2009) summarized his assessment as: ‗I felt that Ufungamano was running out of 
steam because they did not have much money for their work and travels, their commissioners were complaining. 
I also knew Oki [Ombaka, the Chair of the People‘s Commission of Kenya] a little bit before though not very 
well. When I came here [Kenya], I had two or three one-on-one meetings and I liked him very much.  I thought 
he had a lot of vision, he had a lot of skills and that he should be playing an important role. But I also thought 
Ufungamano Initiative would fizzle out, I did not think they could sustain it much further because of the 
intimidation from the government, lack of police protection, and they were running out of money. I felt this was 
an opening to rescue them in a way ... and Oki was extremely keen on a merger.‘ These words corroborate 
Mutua‘s (2008) observations that Ghai was naturally allied to civil society and openly sympathized with the 
opposition leadership. 
12
 Interviews with Ombok (24/09/2009), Wandati (17/09/2009) as well as Gitari (21/09/2009) yielded similar 
views. 
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Understanding all these dynamics within the Ufungamano Initiative, Ghai was convinced 
there was a clear opportunity to negotiate a merger between the two competing processes. 
Indeed, Ghai recognised that CKRC represented a minority position as government‘s position 
had been marooned. It was such a big challenge to have the legality but lack the legitimacy 
(interviews: Ombok, 24/09/2009; Waruku, 29/09/2009; Hassan, 16/10/2009).
13
 Ghai 
therefore recognised that the Ufungamano Initiative had a major role to play in the whole 
process. Its goodwill was paramount to the fruitful continuation and conclusion of the 
government led process. As such, the state would ill afford to ignore the Ufungamano 
Initiative (Chitnis, interview 20/10/2009).  
 
At the same time, Ghai‘s credibility in the eyes of many actors within the Ufungamano 
Initiative, western donor community, as well as the government, worked in favour of his 
attempt to get the Ufungamano Initiative to agree to explore a merger (interviews: Ndubi, 
24/09/2009; Khairallah, 26/09/2009. Most people expressed faith in him and some were 
willing to give him the benefit of the doubt.  According to a former Coordinator of the 
National Youth Movement who represented the youth movement in both the NCEC and the 
Ufungamano Initiative - Ochieng Khairallah, ‗people, even the Ufungamano community, 
expressed very strong confidence in Yash Pal Ghai.  To [them] Yash Pal Ghai occupied the 
position of the people. We felt that with him there, he will be able to articulate the collective 
aspirations of the Kenyan people‘ (interview, 26/09/2009). Ndubi (interview, 24/09/2009) the 
then Vice Chair of the influential Law Society of Kenya reinforced this idea when he stated: 
What influenced the half-hearted acceptance of talks about a merger, was the acceptance of 
Professor Yash Ghai; his personal reputation because people knew him... people said okay, 
Wako may be devious but Yash Ghai is a steadfast person, let us give him a chance. As the 
Law Society, we actually feared and wondered whether we could be assured that Ghai could 
deliver a constitution.
14
 And because of the IPPG manipulation, that fear was seen to be 
                                                 
13
 See also Mutua (2008) who provides evidence of the challenge Ufungamano had posed to the state process 
and why it was increasingly difficult for it to ignore Ghai‘s call for a merger. Using an article in the East Africa 
Standard (November 24, 2000) titled ‗Ufungamano Initiative Illegal‘, Mutua highlights how ‗the daily attacks 
on the PCK by the KANU-NDP officials betrayed their fear of the Ufungamano Initiative. Musalia Mudavadi, a 
senior minister asserted that the PCK was illegal. Raila Odinga and other pro-KANU leaders continuously 
attacked the PCK to discredit it. But the attacks served to enhance the legitimacy‘ (2008: 119). 
14
 Oduor Ong‘wen, the then Chair of the National Council of NGOs also stated that they were at first a bit 
sceptical about Ghai‘s intentions and whether he would deliver on a common process given the existing 
acrimony in the country. These fears are also captured by Mutua (2008: 120) who writes: ‗even though NCEC 
thought well of Ghai, it could not separate him from Wako, Moi, and Odinga- the triumvirate that had appointed 
him chair of the CKRC. The NCEC believed that Ghai would end up a Moi dupe.‘ 
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legitimate.
15
 But there was also fear that if we rejected engagement completely, government 
had the capacity to pretend and run away with it and then they would discredit and brand us 
as the people who want a constitution yet when they [government] have conceded space, we 
do not want to engage.  
 
On account of Moi/KANU‘s desperation despite the public show of might, coupled with the 
self-awareness on the limitations of the Ufungamano Initiative, and the fact that most people 
on both sides of the contention had some confidence in him, Ghai sensed he had a certain 
level of control and an opportunity to negotiate a merger.  He offered to mediate between the 
two processes up to a point where each side was comfortable to meet and negotiate face to 
face. The clergy agreed to this. He passed on this message to both Raila Odinga and Moi. The 
two liked the idea of a merger too, but Moi sought to know from Ghai how he would work 
with the Ufungamano Initiative people considering that they were set on creating their own 
order. Ghai opined that all actors being Kenyans, if the merger succeeded, three months after 
the merger no one would remember who came from Ufungamano and who came from the 
Government Commission (Ghai, interview 23/10/2009). This, as shall become clear later, 
was prophetic.  
 
Having won some interest from both sides on the need for a common process, Ghai embarked 
on getting the two sides to directly talk to each other so as to break the hostilities the 
leadership of the two processes had for one another. To make this happen, Ghai invited Raila 
Odinga and Mutava Musyimi for a chat over drinks at his home, but unbeknown to either. 
According to Ghai, ‗they were both quite surprised and not very happy to see each other. But 
at least they had met. In this meeting, Ghai drove home the importance of both of them 
talking to each other directly: ‗I said to them: ―come on: if we cannot talk to each other, how 
then are we going to make this process happen? We have to start building some trust‖‘ (Ghai, 
interview 23/10/2009).  
 
In conceiving political opportunity for social movement‘s work/operations, Oliver and Myers 
(2003: 4) argue that: 
Political opportunity is best understood as a multidimensional space in which some groups or 
actions are facilitated or responded to by political elites or institutions, while others are 
                                                 
15
 Mutua (2008: 120) also reveals the existence of such fears within the NCEC allied groups who ‗cited rigged 
[1997] elections, and broken pacts, such as the Inter Parties Parliamentary Group (IPPG) and Safari Park 
compromises, as ample proof that Moi could not be trusted to create a process to return sovereignty to the 
people.‘ 
280 
 
repressed or ignored. For this reason, it is best to think of political opportunity as a matrix of 
probabilities, where each element is the probability that a particular kind of action will meet 
with a particular kind of response or action from particular kinds of other actors.  
For the case at hand, a key act was Ghai‘s refusal to take the oath of office as commissioner 
and Chair of the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (even after accepting 
nomination) until there was a joint commission between the parliamentary-led process and 
the Ufungamano Initiative. This became a great catalyst for the series of events that opened 
further political opportunities for the Ufungamano Initiative to directly engage the state 
(Mutua, 2008; interviews: Ndubi, 24/09/2009; Ghai, 23/20/2009; Zein, 07/10/2009). 
According to Churchill (interview, 02/10/2009) the fact that the state did not see it fit to 
replace Ghai was read as tacit support for the merger efforts by the state. This proved to be a 
seismic political opportunity boost for the Ufungamano Initiative‘s reform armada because it 
effectively reduced the power discrepancy between the Ufungamano Initiative and the 
Parliamentary Select Committee. This also precipitated the softening of hearts within the 
Ufungamano Initiative, and corroborates the co-evolutionary approach.
16
  
 
But a critical question still is: why was Ghai keen on a merger? Ghai (interview, 23/10/2009) 
argued that the main reason he was keen on a merger was to ‗strengthen integrity and honesty 
of the Commission in the service to Kenyans given the heavy polarization of the country 
along shades of religion, ethnicity, generation, class etc.‘ Besides refusing to take the oath of 
office, Ghai also refused to take/use any government money or resources unless the two 
processes were merged stating that he would only use public resources when all organs, 
including the Ufungamano, were together (Ndubi, interview 24/09/2009). These 
conditionalities helped Ghai navigate the merger process without necessarily appearing to be 
siding with the Parliamentary Select Committee. Ghai opted for the negotiations to happen at 
the political organs level by dealing directly with the Parliamentary Select Committee on the 
Constitution and the Ufungamano Initiative Steering Council rather than with the respective 
implementing arms i.e. the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission and the People‘s 
Commission of Kenya. This was because Ghai understood clearly that it was the poisoned 
nature of politics that had created the polarised environment in the first instance.    
                                                 
16
 Some of the participants to this study (for example Apiyo) also pointed to the fact that the Chair of the 
Parliamentary Select Committee at the time, Honourable Raila Odinga was a reformist and this also helped in 
the warming of the frosty relations between the Ufungamano and the state led process. It is nonetheless a 
difficult line of argument to sustain. In the ‗big man‘ nature of Kenyan politics, it needs to be remembered that 
Odinga had broken ranks with his political opposition peers to join hands with Moi after the 1997 general 
elections. Indeed, at the time, Raila was so hawkish and was constantly trashing the Ufungamano Initiative 
(Mutua, 2008).   
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But how exactly did the different actors in the contention react to a merger proposal? This 
study established at least three distinct positions within the Ufungamano Initiative 
immediately Ghai reached out to Mutava Musyimi, the de facto leader of the Ufungamano 
Initiative to explore possibilities for a merger. These were: some fully embraced the merger 
proposal and worked towards its achievement; a second group was more cautious and 
advocated principled negotiations; while the last group was totally opposed to the merger.
 17
 
Their differences, analysed below, serve to illuminate cleavages within the movement that 
ultimately led to its demise.   
Those who embraced the merger proposal 
This was a position shared by a group who supported the merger idea for a variety of reasons. 
It was comprised mainly of what is seen in Kenyan politics, as reactionary conservative 
forces in opposition political parties, NGOs and religious groups (Mutua, 2008; Imanyara, 
interview 28/10/2009). Worth noting here is that this group comprised the most dominant 
forces in the reform movement that had always been pushing for inclusion. It consisted of 
actors who were the last to embrace the idea of a parallel process. It was the same group of 
actors that had abandoned NCEC in 1997 to join KANU in the IPPG process. As such, by 
embracing the possibilities of a merger, it was history replaying itself. Their actions also 
confirm that whenever they joined KANU in elite bargains, they were able to push forward 
some space for change, however minimal.  
 
This group also included the Ufungamano Initiative Commissioners whose key motivation 
for a merger was based on the political economy of carrying out the reforms. Specifically, 
according to Ghai (interview, 23/10/2009) ‗the big money‘ that was being given to the CKRC 
Commissioners made a merger attractive to the Ufungamano Initiative because they were not 
really getting anywhere themselves and they yearned for similar economic benefits. Ombok 
(interview, 24/09/2009) also points to resource constraints within the Ufungamano Initiative 
as a key factor that made a merger attractive. This suggests that while Ufungamano Initiative 
arguably achieved a lot in terms of mobilising the citizenry through civic education, as well 
as starting the collection of views and aspirations of a constitution they desired, the 
movement faced numerous challenges. The massive human and financial resources required 
for the process for re-writing of the constitution were not easy to mobilise. This evidently 
                                                 
17
 This is not to suggest that the three identified positions or groups were homogeneous in their reasons for 
embracing or opposing the merger proposal.  
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added to the strains within the movement (interviews: Ombok, 24/09/2009; Hassan, 
16/10/2009).  
 
The resource dearth also dictated that the Ufungamano Initiative was amenable to the lure of 
money if indeed it needed to continue its work. As such, for Ombok (interview, 24/09/2009), 
there was therefore pragmatism in agreeing to the merger because while 
…some groups like SDP led by Apollo Njonjo and Ayang‘ Nyong‘o among others, did not 
want a merger; they were not bringing in even a single penny to the process. We were really 
straining. By the time of the merger, the Ufungamano Initiative had a debt of around Ksh.14 
million which NCCK and Catholic Church devised a way of settling in bits.  
 
As such, resource constraints coloured the nature of relationship between the different actors. 
For instance, Ombok (interview, 24/09/2009) pointed out that ‗Musyimi, the NCCK General 
Secretary did not like the fact that the Muslim community did not mobilize much financial 
support.‘ NCCK‘s bearing of the huge financial burden of the movement therefore ‗made 
Musyimi big-headed.‘ Wandati (17/09/2009) of the Muslim Consultative Council, who 
served in the fundraising Committee of the Ufungamano Initiative, supported this view but 
argued that information asymmetries were the reasons than failure of other actors to try and 
mobilise resources when he stated: 
There was always this feeling that some of the partners had more information than others. For 
example, by default, the then Secretary General of the NCCK became the convener and he 
always sprung a fast one on all of us because every time we sat down to write a fundraising 
proposal or even before we presented it, he turned back and said ‗look I have already 
submitted a proposal.‘ So it was easier for him to mobilise funding, and that gave him more 
leverage because, as you know, who pays the piper, chooses the tune. 
 
Njoya (interview, 29/09/2009) took a similar position when he stated that ‗Musyimi bought 
us by paying for the process through providing funds for the initiative to meet, produce 
papers, the Secretariat, etc. He bought us and sold us to Yash Ghai.‘ A former staff member 
of the Ufungamano Secretariat, Suba Churchill (interview, 02/10/2009) is also of the view 
that there was a perception that Mutava Musyimi was becoming a little bit pushy, intolerant 
and dictatorial because,  
Issues were not exhaustively discussed before decisions were made. I remember in particular 
some press conferences the Ufungamano Initiative held in which the press statement had been 
prepared earlier. It was the religious community especially Mutava Musyimi, coming from 
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religious background where consultations are not so exhaustively done, that came up with the 
practice. The practice offended a number of people.  
This also created further cleavages as it was reported that the Catholic Church at one point 
threatened not to contribute any of their resources unless the leadership of the Ufungamano 
Initiative changed. But such cleavages were kept hidden within the movement ‗so that 
everybody out there would not get to know about them. These are the things that I would call 
the sizzling out of the Ufungamano Initiative‘ (Churchill, interview 02/10/2009). As such, the 
nature of its funding sources rendered it vulnerable to State machinations and allowed the 
constitutional reform agenda to be hijacked for sectarian and political ends. 
 
Hassan (interview, 16/10/2009) added that an element of general fatigue on the part of the 
Ufungamano Initiative was also setting in because the ‗reform process was a very arduous 
one that required a lot of sacrifices, and resources to drive it forward.‘ While Ufungamano 
Initiative‘s resources were low, the government had massive public resources to drive its own 
process. As such, when the opportunity for a merger came, the Ufungamano Initiative took it.    
 
Ombok (interview, 24/09/2009) continues to argue that since the Ufungamano Initiative‘s 
principal point of contention was for the process to be inclusive, he saw no reason why the 
Ufungamano Initiative would want to isolate itself when the government looked willing. At 
the end of the day, Ombok argued, ‗the government had the responsibility to take over. 
Where was Ombaka‘s draft going to be taken anyway?  For us, it was as question of looking 
at the strategies and seeing we were better off together. 18  Therefore, a number of the 
constituencies thought that the decision to merge was a good one‘ (Wandati, interview 
17/09/2009). For Wandati, the movement was not sure, if it continued to collect views of 
Kenyans and indeed write a constitution, at what time would they become legally binding 
‗unless we dispose of the government totally and come up with a people‘s parliament to ratify 
it? We did not see that happening.  So this in fact had shortened the process for us.‘ This 
suggests some pragmatism in this group.   
 
Further pragmatism on the part of this group was dictated by some of the reactions of the 
state to the Ufungamano Initiative‘s actions. The Moi/KANU Government together with its 
                                                 
18
 This argument is further supported by a former Commissioner in the Peoples‘ Commission of Kenya and later 
the merged Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, Isaac Lenaola who indicated that ‗the Ufungamano 
Initiative had always been for inclusivity. The moment Ghai overtures came, we agreed to them because this 
was in tandem with our own stand on inclusivity. It was only KANU and NDP who had a problem with it. There 
was however internal opposition within the Ufungamano Initiative fronted by NCEC‘ (interview, 03/10/2009). 
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NDP allies were quite hostile to the Ufungamano Initiative. They continued to publicly 
condemn the Ufungamano Initiative as busy bodies out to cause chaos in the country. The 
state continued to threaten and mete out violence on groups associated with the Ufungamano 
Initiative (Mutua, 2008; Dolan, 2011b; Gachoka, 06/02/2000; Muungano wa Mageuzi, 
18/12/2000; interviews: Ghai, 23/10/2009; Wandati, 17/09/2009; Hassan, 16/10/2009).  
 
The incessant pressure and continued harassment from the state was therefore another of the 
reasons that forced this group to agree to explore the possibility of a merger with the state led 
process after more than one year of existence. There were fears that if the two processes 
continued separately, there would have been a bigger crisis in the country because of the 
legitimacy challenges that the Ufungamano Initiative had managed to create. Ghai (interview, 
23/10/2009) for instance indicated that even on the weekend he had come to get a feel of the 
environment on the ground after being wooed by Wako, 
People were being shot at in the streets... and shortly before even while we were negotiating, 
petrol bombs were thrown at the Ufungamano Initiative meeting in Kisumu. I was very 
worried. A lot of people who were sort of politically neutral, told me they were really worried 
and this could be a chance to avert a disaster. Maybe we were exaggerating what we could do, 
but we were really worried about that.
19
   
As such, when it became apparent that the state-led process through Ghai, was willing to 
negotiate with the Ufungamano Initiative, the clergy came in handy to convince the other 
actors within the movement that this was for the good of the country. This suggests that 
means-ends rationality also guided this group of the Ufungamano Initiative leadership who 
agreed to a merger as a strategic way to continue being involved in the reform process. 
 
Even then, as already pointed out, it took Ghai‘s charm to convince the clergy and give them 
some confidence and a sense of direction. Ghai (interview, 23/10/2009) stated that he was 
‗able to persuade the religious group. They said they were people of peace and if your 
[Ghai‘s] intervention can stop these killings then we will support it, we want unity.‘ 
Reflecting on this, Gitari (interview, 21/09/2009) stated:  
Ghai convinced us that the merger was the right way to go. After all, we were not the ones in 
power. It was the president and the politicians and therefore we must engage them, and work 
together with them to bring about change. I do not think we wanted to make our own 
                                                 
19
 This is supported by a letter from the Muungano wa Mageuzi dated 18
th
 December 2000 addressed to the state 
minister in charge of internal security, the Attorney General and Chief Cabinet Secretary that decried continued 
use of violence by the state agencies as well as KANU and NDP ‗goons‘ to break their national-wide rallies that 
agitated against the short charging of the Kenyan people by the Parliamentary Select Committee.  
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constitution and leave it there. Even if we did it, to become relevant, it had to go through 
Parliament.... So, Ghai did a good job, he brought us on board and we accepted and we felt 
that we were represented even though as a minority in the Commission that was appointed.  
 
This suggests that for the clergy, the decision to negotiate a merger was strategic. It was also 
not lost to civil society that politicians in this group were openly afraid of losing out 
altogether should the Ufungamano Initiative continue being obstinate. Indeed, the 
experiences of NCEC and its refusal to engage with the IPPG had served as warning to civil 
society that politicians may abandon them yet again, given a chance. The merger proposal 
clearly presented such an opportunity. Kibwana (interview, 21/10/2009) offered explanations 
for this when he argued that ‗civil society was the first actor to articulate the kind of 
constitution Kenya deserves. Overtime, opposition political parties decided that they would 
work with civil society because of the kind of synergy that existed between them.‘ This 
suggests that the transformative values and beliefs of some civil society organisations had 
diffused more broadly. Additionally, it could also signal, in the Gramscian sense, a ‗war of 
position‘ in attempts to capture civil society to serve the interests of the political opposition 
parties. In this regard, Kibwana (interview, 21/10/2009) argues that the merger proposal 
seemed to follow an earlier IPPG script. Once again, as had happened through the IPPG, with 
the merger carrot dangled by Ghai, politicians were keen to ensure that civil society‘s 
continued hegemony over the reform project through the Ufungamano Initiative was 
destroyed.  
 
As such, the pro-merger group did not share similar reasons for the merger across the board. 
For some, there was a clear counter-hegemonic strategy by some politicians who feared that 
the Ufungamano Initiative might become so powerful that it could dictate which direction the 
country would go. This would be a threat to their collective political interests. This explains 
why ‗they played very pivotal roles behind the curtains, to negotiate and offer themselves 
operative opportunities‘ by agreeing to work with KANU and NDP-run Parliamentary Select 
Committee on the Constitution (interviews: Khairallah, 26/09/2009; Churchill, 02/10/2009).  
 
Moreover, there were also fears on the part of politicians borne out of the perception that the 
spokesperson of the Ufungamano Initiative was eyeing the presidency.
20
 This perception was 
heightened as the donor community began toying with the idea of selling a compromise 
                                                 
20
 These fears may not have been unfounded as Rev. Mutava Musyimi has since joined politics and has declared 
his intention to run for the presidency in 2012. 
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presidential candidate and even went further to suggest that Mutava Musyimi should be that 
candidate. This ‗sent the political class [sic] scampering and spelt a lot of doom for the 
Ufungamano Initiative‘ (Churchill, interview 02/10/2009). This suggests that even within the 
movement, different groups were busy trying to outdo each other and become the dominant 
force.  
 
Reflecting on the reactions of this group to the positive outcome of a vote in support of a 
merger, Musyimi (interview, 09/10/2009) said: ‗everybody was relieved, happy and full of 
admiration for how much we had been able to gain in a peaceful and stable way. That had 
never happened before. NGOs, religious sector and politicians had not come together before 
for a cause. But leading it was not a piece of cake. It had enormous challenges.‘  
 
That said, Ghai indicated that it still took longer to convince politicians to join the clergy in 
supporting the merger and some feared being seen as sell-outs. Ghai stated that he was 
constantly under high pressure: 
Television cameras were following me everywhere and even when people came to see me 
some had to make sure there were no press people around to know they had come. Some like 
James Orengo, Kiraitu Murungi, Charity Ngilu and Beth Mugo, came at eleven o‘clock at 
night and we would have long meetings (Ghai, interview 23/10/2009). 
This suggests that for politicians, their position was one of playing safe and only aligning 
with the group that seemed more likely to win the internal Ufungamano Initiative contest in 
terms of where to take the movement, rather than a principled opposition to, or support for 
the merger. Nonetheless, Ghai was able to convince some of them that it was in the interests 
of the country that they supported the merger of the two processes. The converted politicians 
threw their weight behind Ghai‘s efforts at mediating the merger negotiations. 
The ‘principled’ middle ground group 
The second group was in between two extremes (pro and against the merger). It was made up 
of organisations traditionally allied to NCEC. These included secular civil society groups, 
especially those working on human rights issues such as Kenya Human Rights Commission, 
the Law Society of Kenya, but also youth movements such as the National Youth Movement. 
These were not very excited by the merger proposal though not totally opposed to it at the 
beginning. They were cautious of government‘s intentions and only gave qualified support 
(interviews: Khairallah, 26/09/2009; Kuria, 26/09/2009; Minute 2/2001 of the Ufungamano 
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Negotiating Team meeting of 30
th
 January 2001).
21
 They called for thorough principled 
engagements and outcomes that had fidelity to the very principles that the Ufungamano 
Initiative stood for.
22
 In essence, what this group was advocating is similar to what Downey 
and Rohlinger (2008: 4) call ‗strategic tradeoffs‘ (see also Jasper, 2006). It is members of this 
group that brought the key negotiation issues on the table. These included: 
The powers of the CKRC, its independence from the Executive and its relationship to the 
PSC, the number of Commissioners, and the manner of their appointment, a National 
Referendum on the Constitution, the scope of the Review Process, the mandate and 
composition of the National Constitutional Conference and the legal status of the CKRC in 
the Constitution‘ (Mutua 2008: 121).    
 
In an effort to appease this group, Ghai who acted as the mediator between the Ufungamano 
Initiative and the Parliamentary Select Committee processes wrote a lengthy reflection piece 
titled ‘Proposals for a Common Process of Constitution Review’ on December 25, 2000 that 
sought to provide a way forward in dealing with the issues raised by this group. In so doing, 
he offered the dissenting voices something to work with. Ghai‘s proposals identified the key 
point of convergence between the two processes as an agreement to overhaul the constitution 
in a process that would be acceptable to majority of Kenyans. This point of convergence, 
Ghai argued, should be utilised to unite Kenyans and to give them a constitution they desired. 
He argued for a need to encourage a consensual and cooperative political process. This was a 
clear departure from the then winner-takes-it-all system that KANU and NDP were trying to 
                                                 
21
 Ochieng Khairallah (interview, 26/09/2009), one of the youth representative in the Ufungamano Initiative 
articulated the position of the youth stating: ‗youth constituency came out strongly against the merger. Our 
argument then largely was that the youth are actually the victims of a bad constitutional dispensation. The 
emerging clamour for constitutional reform was necessitated by the difficult conditions the youths were finding 
themselves in. For us, it was about ourselves, about our life, and about our future. We wanted this constitution 
to be the best, to be looked at and processed in the best manner possible and we were not convinced then that 
the merger could easily yield those intentions. That is why we came out strongly against it.  Because we were 
saying that the people who are pushing for the merger have either benefited or they have kept quiet all this time 
they did not see the reason for a new constitution. They were either part of the system, or beneficiaries of the 
system, or they had in a manner, helped in growing the systems to the levels that it was then. We were therefore 
calling ourselves the greatest stakeholder in the constitution Review Process.‘ This suggests that the cleavages 
around the merger and the entire constitutional reform project had a generational angle. 
22
 Khairallah (ibid) argued that the stance taken by NCEC and Muungano wa Mageuzi, was legitimate because 
‗constitutional making takes principled dialogue and not the zero-sum game that KANU was playing with the 
process.‘ He further indicated that ‗genuine constitutional making is about articulation of the collective interest 
of all. At the time, the KANU power elite was not yielding any space for the effective articulation and effective 
dialogue. As such, we felt that at some levels, manipulative tendencies would surface and eventually we might 
not even get a new constitution. The other point was that the merger would sweep the process from the 
stronghold of the people. It would really take away, slip off the process from the people. And once you lose 
peoples support in the constitution making process, then you have given way to the intrigues of vested interests.  
Such vested interest could only be checked if KANU felt that somebody had the capacity to effectively respond 
through protests. We felt that the merger would really take away the people‘s interest and the people‘s 
confidence in the process. And this, it did substantially.‘   
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apply. Ghai argued that the main contentions between the two competing processes were 
based on two sets of laws. While the Ufungamano Initiative stuck to the agreements of the 
Safari Park Process as enshrined in the 1998 Constitution of Kenya Review Commission 
Amendments Act, the Parliamentary Select Committee had made further amendments in 
2000 to the 1997 Review Act from whence the CKRC had been formulated.  
 
To merge the two processes, there was therefore a need to harmonise the legal basis for the 
two processes, clearly spelling out the role of the Commission in a new legal framework. 
Ghai argued for the Commission‘s role to depart from the prevailing (mis)conception that the 
Commission was an organ for negotiating a new Constitution, to inculcating a role of the 
Commission as one for facilitating consultations between Kenyans to determine the 
Constitution that they wanted. The negotiations, Ghai argued, should be left to a National 
Constitutional Conference and a draft from the same be subjected to a National Referendum. 
This would ensure the process would remain faithful to the ultimate sovereignty of the 
Kenyan people.  
 
Ghai also argued that this model would ensure full participation of the people of Kenya. To 
do so, there was a need to provide an enabling environment, including guaranteed peace for 
genuine, open, and transparent consultations between the people, state and the organs of the 
review. There was also a need for well-defined accountabilities between the organs of the 
review and comprehensive civic education. For Ghai, public participation would: 
a) educate the public in constitutional theory; national values; governance, the legitimacy of 
public power, and the uses and the fair and equitable exercise of state power; b) impress upon 
them [people]  the value of peaceful means to solve disputes, by discussion rather than force, 
within a framework of national values and national unity; c) elicit opinions on what has gone 
wrong in the past, what their aspirations are for the future, and recommendations for 
constitutional change; d) make them [citizens] aware of their rights, and obligations as 
citizens, and thus empower them and encourage them to be responsible; e) prepare them to 
seek accountability from their representatives and the government; and f) confer legitimacy 
on the new constitution thorough their endorsement and sense of ownership (25/12/2000).   
 
Ghai proposed the key organs of the review to be the Commission, Constituency Forums, the 
National Constitutional Conference, Parliament, and Kenyan people acting throughout the 
process as well as specifically in a National Referendum. His proposal also spelt out what the 
role of each of the organs was to be. As the role of Parliament had been the most contentious, 
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Ghai proposed a compromise in which Parliament would be required to enact the draft 
constitution that the National Constitutional Conference would come up with.   
 
This second constellation (those in favour of a principled engagement) was to later join a 
third group of those totally opposed to the merger when they realised that the state was not 
making much concession in the negotiations. This happened after the first group had agreed 
to a merger that left parliamentary and presidential powers in the Review Process intact. For 
this group, this would leave the process and the Commission vulnerable to parliamentary and 
presidential manipulation. NCEC, the most visible actor in this group, wanted the process 
immunised from such manipulation (interviews: Kuria, 26/09/2009; Khairallah, 26/09/2009; 
Waruku, 29/09/2009). Attempts to decentre the process from parliament and the presidency 
were nonetheless frustrated by what some participants argue was the clergy‘s and a section of 
politicians‘ willingness to accept compromises that did not change the fundamental character 
of the process (interviews: Kuria, 26/09/2009; Khairallah, 26/09/2009; Waruku, 29/09/2009; 
Kibwana, 21/10/2009; Hassan, 16/10/2009; Musau, 24/09/2009; Churchill, 02/10/2009; 
Odhiambo M., 01/04/2010; Wandati, 17/09/2009; Ndubi, 24/09/2009; Lamba, 23/10/2009; 
Njoya, 29/09/2009).   
 
Activists allied to NCEC and part of the Ufungamano Negotiating Team read betrayal on the 
part of the clergy. Kamau Kuria, for instance argued:  
In January 2001 the Ufungamano Initiative selected a number of people to negotiate with the 
Parliamentary Selective Committee. I was one of them.... Then the Parliamentary Select 
Committee became arrogant and refused to meet us indicating that the only person it was 
prepared to have a meeting with was Prof. Yash Ghai. We had negotiated and reached a stage 
where we saw it necessary to have a face-to-face meeting but the PSC refused. The clergy 
caved in and were prepared to accept some compromises from the Parliamentary Select 
Committee.
23
 
Group totally opposed to the merger proposal 
A third pole, which some of the NCEC allied groups later joined on the day of the merger 
because of the failure of what was dubbed principled negotiations and outcomes, was led by 
                                                 
23
 Indeed, the clergy gave a lot of ground to KANU-NDP PSC. For instance, an email exchange between Ghai 
and Musyimi on the 5
th
 of February 2001, pointed out their frustrations that the Parliamentary Select Committee 
was resistant to meet the Ufungamano Negotiating Team. Minute 29.6 of the Ufungamano Negotiating Team 
held on January 26, 2001 pointed to a desire for face-to-face meeting with the PSC but which Ghai reported they 
were not keen on. Even with the KANU-NDP refusal to meet the Ufungamano Initiative Negotiating Team, the 
clergy continued to have faith and pushed other actors in the movement to agree to a joint process.  
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Muungano wa Mageuzi.  This group was totally opposed to the merger. However, it did not 
offer any concrete alternatives for a way forward.  Its opposition was based on a fear that the 
merger would end up as co-option, and in the process subordinate the popular will of the 
Kenyan people. Moreover, they feared that a merger would lead to loss of identity for the 
Ufungamano Initiative. They also argued that the movement would lose its most potent 
weapon – the people of Kenya, a majority who seemed to be on the side of the Ufungamano 
Initiative. This, they argued, would result to dwindling influence of not just the Ufungamano 
Initiative, but of the people of Kenya too (interviews: Kibara, 15/10/2009; Khairallah, 
26/09/2009; Minute 2/2001 of the Ufungamano Negotiating Team of January 30, 2001). 
Some people in this group fought vehemently against the merger. Others, like Apollo Njonjo, 
the then Secretary General of the Social Democratic Party wrote complaint letters that Ghai 
considered petty and libellous. This opposition put Ghai under a lot of pressure from both 
sides of the contention (Ghai, interview 23/10/2009). 
 
To this group, the merger remains to date, non-principled and detested. This group branded 
Rev. Mutava Musyimi who led the negotiations, a traitor (interviews: Ndubi, 24/09/2009; 
Njoya, 29/09/2009; Khairallah, 26/09/2009). But a former Commissioner in the People‘s 
Commission of Kenya and later in the merged Constitution of Kenya Review Commission 
Isaac Lenaola countered the argument regarding the principality of the merger process. In 
supporting the case for a merger, Lenaola stated: 
NCEC seemed to have an agenda which none of the other actors understood. They argued that 
the moment we would be ‗swallowed‘ by the KANU-NDP process the good will of the 
people would dissipate. In fact they were so vehemently opposed to the merger that Kibwana 
walked out after losing the merger vote. At a personal level, I think the main activists in 
NCEC and Muungano wa Mageuzi had been rendered irrelevant and they saw in the merger, 
something that would result in cutting off their donor funds and thus the resistance (interview, 
03/10/2009).  
 
Ombok argued along the same lines when he said that the constitution-making politics had its 
own dynamics even within civil society:  
For a long time NCEC was the power base of the civil society struggles. They were now 
losing ground of civil society leadership. I do not think they liked that…. Kibwana mobilised 
the more youthful organisations where he sat in their boards, or had a lot of influence in them 
to oppose the merger. For him, if Ghai took over the process, what would be the role of 
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NCEC thereafter?  And indeed you realise this since after that time NCEC has just remained a 
skeleton (interview, 24/09/2009).  
 
The above analysis of the three different positions suggests that different interests within the 
movement were responsible for these cleavages. While for some, especially the clergy, 
decisions were based on the risk calculations – that is, on whether they embraced a common 
peaceful process as opposed to a divisive and confrontational approach (Imanyara, interview 
28/08/2009) whereas others were led by the political economy exigencies. However, 
whatever the source of the divisions, the key point here is that these divisions signalled the 
earliest serious and visible cracks within the Ufungamano Initiative that later brewed a potent 
storm that disintegrated the movement (Ndubi, interview 24/09/2009).   
 
These cleavages also reflected ‗conflicting visions‘ both within the Ufungamano Initiative 
actors and the wider constitutional reform struggles in Kenya (Mutua, 2008: 120).  The 
cleavages were even more pronounced because the Ufungamano Initiative ‗brought together 
people of extreme characteristics – university students who were demanding a return to mass 
action and the conservative but pragmatic religious leaders who were for dialogue and 
consultation‘ (Zein, 07/10/2009). But the divisions were not limited to the Ufungamano 
alone. Raiji for instance observed that there were healthy and open debates but a lot of 
tensions and confusions too. This, he argued, pointed to ‗multiple groups and interests that 
were in negotiation both within the government and within Ufungamano Initiative‘ 
(interview, 14/10/2009). 
 
The cleavages also suggest that it was really not possible for a movement with such diverse 
representations to always agree on everything. Similarly, generating consensus and laying 
down the principles upon which the merger would have to occur was never going to be an 
easy process. The multi-stakeholder nature of the Ufungamano Initiative suggests that social 
movements, unless they are single-issue and identity based are seldom, coherent entities of 
long unitary collective actions. Rather, they are ‗populations of collective actions with 
statistical distributions of properties‘ (Oliver and Myers, 2003: 2). In such populations and 
multiple properties, internal cleavages are bound to occur. This makes the analysis of 
strategic interactions between movements and the state difficult. Indeed, as Oliver and Myers 
(2003: 2) note: 
Theorists have long insisted that movements be studied not in isolation, but in strategic 
interaction with their opponents and bystanders, but it has been difficult to do this without 
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treating each of the ―sides‖ as if it were a coherent decision-making entity. In fact, neither 
movements nor states are necessarily coherent: both are collections of actors with different 
agendas and ideas. Nevertheless, these actors are bound to each other through some kind of 
common identification, and what they do affects each other. The degree of coherence varies, 
of course, but even those movements and states, which are hierarchical and fairly unified, 
have internal struggles and conflicts.  
 
Challenges that emerged from the Ufungamano Initiative cleavages were therefore not just 
analytical but also empirical as far as taking the merger negotiations forward was concerned. 
As pointed out in chapter six, there were multiple nodes of authority in the Ufungamano 
Initiative. In such a situation, leadership was difficult to define. Indeed, Kibwana (interview, 
21/10/2009) argues that the leadership within the Ufungamano was so diffused that it was 
difficult to ascertain where the ‗true leadership‘ resided. Such dispersal resulted from the 
widespread diffusion of contention. The dispersal also enabled the Ufungamano Initiative to 
acquire multiple assets like followers and other resources crucial for its mobilisation. But the 
Ufungamano Initiative case also suggests that such dispersal may also pose challenges 
especially around strategic interactions for such movements and their adversaries.  
 
The first such challenge for the merger negotiations, treated here as strategic interactions, was 
structural. This affected the Ufungamano Initiative more than the government, which had a 
‗pretty clear line of command in terms of who made decisions: It was Moi, it was Raila, the 
two key persons [besides] the Parliamentary Select Committee, who theoretically were 
negotiating on the government side. It was much less clear on the other side‘ (Ghai, interview 
23/10/2009). In theory, the Plenary of Stakeholders was the supreme decision-making organ 
in the Ufungamano Initiative. Considering its diversity (ideological, theological, intellectual, 
and generational) it would have been impractical to approach an entire Plenary of over 50 
different organisations with a merger proposal especially due to anticipated differences of 
opinion.  
 
It was in an effort to circumvent such structural challenges, as well as the sensitivity of the 
merger issue, that Ghai opted to reach out first to the group of clerics led by Mutava 
Musyimi, the Convenor of the Ufungamano Initiative whom he perceived as key in the 
movement and more open to negotiation. He initially built rapport with religious leaders 
before reaching out to leaders of political parties allied to the Ufungamano Initiative for 
audience (interviews: Wandati, 17/09/2009; Ghai, 23/10/2009; Kibwana, 21/10/2009).  For 
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Ghai, this was because the bifurcated nature of authority within the Ufungamano Initiative 
meant there were no clear lines regarding whom to talk to.  
 
Internally, the Ufungamano Initiative dealt with the fact that it was not coherent and unitary 
but rather a multi-stakeholder entity, by establishing a new structure —Ufungamano 
Negotiating Team- to negotiate the merger. This structure was made up of representatives 
from the three key constituencies within the Ufungamano Initiative: secular civil society, 
religious organisations and political parties as well as representations from the People‘s 
Commission of Kenya. The Ufungamano Negotiating Team gave both legal and political 
directions to the movement in these negotiations. 
 
The negotiations took a couple of months as Ghai shuttled between the Ufungamano House, 
whence the Ufungamano Negotiating Team met, and Parliament buildings where the PSC 
met. Ghai slowly made some progress. He pressured each side to agree to the proposals he 
had made on December 25, 2000 until he was able to get some broader understanding from 
both sides (Ghai, interview 23/10/2009).  Part of the reason for the slow progress was that the 
negotiations did not take a formal face-to-face interaction format (interviews: Ghai, 
23/10/2009; Raiji, 14/10/2009; Ong‘wen, 09/10/2009). This was because the KANU-NDP 
side refused to meet the Ufungamano Negotiating Team face-to-face. But the discussions 
especially in the Ufungamano Negotiating Team, as the minutes of the numerous meetings 
they held confirm, took a structured form, dealing with each of the issues as Ghai had 
proposed (interviews: Ghai, 23/10/2009; Musyimi, 09/10/2009). By the 25
th
 January 2001, 
there had been substantive agreements on the following issues: 
1) That the scope and nature of the exercise be described as ―Comprehensive Constitutional 
Review‖; 2) That the constituency forums replace the district forum as one of the Organs of 
Review; 3) That the Referendum be an Organ of the Review; 4) That there be two additional 
Vice-Chairs of the enlarged Commission with Ufungamano providing one, and the second 
one being women; 5) That the decisions of the Commission shall be by consensus, failing 
which they shall be by 65% vote; 6) That the decisions of the National Constitutional 
Conference shall be by consensus, failing which they shall be by 65% vote; 7) That the 
ratification by Referendum shall be by a majority vote, with a minimum of 25% vote in at 
least 5 [of the 8 Kenyan] provinces; 8) That the political environment supportive of the 
review be guaranteed through strict observance of the Public Order Act and the Code of 
Conduct in the Presidential and National Assembly Elections Act; 9) That there be absolute 
freedom for civic education activities requiring no licensing; 10) That the Kenya Constitution 
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Review Act be amended to reflect the proposed agreement; and 11) That the amended Kenya 
Constitution Review Act be entrenched in the constitution (Ufungamano Initiative 
Negotiating Team Press Statement 25/01/ 2001).   
 
As the negotiations continued, they reached a point where backing off was not an option. 
Several factors played out in this. First, Ghai believing that there was a sufficient 
groundswell towards a common process, agreed to be sworn into office on January 26, 2001 
(Minute 30/2001 of the Ufungamano Negotiating Team of January 26, 2001; Mutua, 2008).
24
  
This had the effect of adding more pressure to those opposed to the merger to acquiesce. But 
it also served as a source of a bigger dispute between those who were clearly pro-merger and 
those pushing for the so-called principled negotiations and outcomes (Mutua, 2008; Minute 
31/2001 of the Ufungamano Negotiating Team meeting of January 26, 2001; Minute 2/2001 
of the Ufungamano Negotiating Team meeting of January 30, 2001). Those opposed to the 
merger saw negotiations as simply the cajoling of the Ufungamano Initiative as there was 
little that the other side had offered. Indeed, barely four days after Ghai‘s swearing in, a 
storm was clearly brewing within the movement (Minutes of January 30, 2001 meeting of 
Ufungamano Initiative Negotiating Team).  
 
The brewing storm was based on what remained unresolved in the negotiations, which 
included: ‗a) the mandate and composition of the National Constitutional Conference; b) the 
desirability of giving the Commission the power to request minimum constitutional 
amendments; c) the role, if any, of Parliamentary Select Committee; d) the number of 
Commissioners‘ (Ufungamano Initiative Negotiating Team Press Statement, 25/01/2001). 
Also outstanding were the modalities for nominating the Ufungamano Initiative 
Commissioners who would join the CKRC. This hinged on whether government would have 
a veto on the Ufungamano Initiative nominated members. The procedure in the earlier 
nominations had been PSC to nominate the Commissioners and the President to officially 
appoint them. Ghai convinced the PSC on the need to accept the right of parties to nominate 
                                                 
24
 Mutua (2008: 120) documents the swearing in as ‗mid February.‘ However, I was able to establish that the 
swearing actually happened on January 26, 2001. Minute 30/2001 of the Ufungamano Negotiating Team 
meeting of January 26, 2001, which Ghai had attended as part of his mediating efforts documents Ghai‘s 
disclosure that he was under pressure from the statutory Commission as well as the government to swear in and 
have the process take off. Ghai explained that since he had delayed his swearing in because he wanted to secure 
an agreement between the two processes to merge into one Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, he felt 
that because this had in principle been agreed upon, he saw no need not to swear in. The same minute records 
‗Ghai then left the meeting to go for the swearing in ceremony and for the press conference scheduled for 7.00 
pm the same evening.‘ An exchange of emails between Ghai and Musyimi dated February 2 2001, indeed 
confirms the swearing in as Musyimi congratulates Ghai on being sworn in. This confirms that Ghai‘s swearing 
in had already happened by the date of those emails. 
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their own people without interference or else there would be no progress. As a confidence 
building measure, Ghai even offered to deputise Oki Ombaka as the chair of the merged 
CKRC (Ghai, interview 23/10/2009).  
 
Ghai‘s swearing in, and the press conference he held after that, left some members of the 
Ufungamano Negotiating Team bitter with the turn of events. Some complained of being kept 
in the dark while others suggested that there might already have been a secret deal between 
some people in the Ufungamano Initiative and the PSC and demanded full disclosure (Mutua, 
2008). Members of the Ufungamano Negotiating Team made it clear in a meeting held on 
January 31, 2001 that neither the Convenor, nor the Chair of PCK had the mandate to 
negotiate on behalf of the Ufungamano Negotiating Team and any informal contacts between 
them or any other Ufungamano Negotiating Team member would not be binding as far as the 
negotiations were concerned (minute 35/2001 of the Ufungamano Initiative Negotiating 
Team). Mutua (2008: 121) concludes that ‗suspicion, distrust, and divergent political and 
personal agendas had once again come to haunt the search for a national consensus on the 
reform. But for the first time, Kenyans were close to some agreement on a broadly acceptable 
Review Process.‘  
 
But the new developments pointed to fundamental limitations, if not impossibility, of the 
movement in keeping everyone informed and happy with what was happening. Minute 
35/2001 of the same January 31, 2001 meeting indeed acknowledged that inadequate 
information had been flowing from the Secretariat and that most Ufungamano Negotiating 
Team members had not been brought up to speed on the progress. Clearly, this represented a 
paradox. How would members of the Ufungamano Negotiating Team be in the dark yet they 
had been mandated to negotiate? Fundamental differences were now clearly emerging within 
the movement. Non-mandated forces seem to have taken over the negotiations. These 
differences continued to manifest.
25
  
 
These developments notwithstanding, a fundamental observation here was that all along, the 
main decision-making body of the Ufungamano Initiative, the Plenary of Stakeholders, was 
yet to be involved in the deliberations for the merger. The discourse around a possible merger 
as well as the on-going negotiations, were still limited to a few elite leaders within the 
                                                 
25
 These differences later led to eventual breakup of the Ufungamano Initiative when initially secular civil 
society, and later Muslims, walked out in protest of the dominance of Christian groups. This was especially after 
Christian groups embraced the Christian evangelicals back to their fold to oppose the inclusion of the Islamic 
Kadhi courts in the proposed draft constitution later in 2005.    
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movement, who clearly differed with each other on a number of viewpoints. Musyimi argued 
that the reason for leaving the Plenary out was that it met once every three months, and the 
initial negotiations were executive responsibilities, handled by the Steering Council, which 
had in turn nominated the Negotiating team to do the work on behalf of the Ufungamano 
Initiative (Musyimi, interview 09/10/2009). There were however, dissenting voices to this 
procedure. For example, Minute 31/2001 of the January 26, 2001 Ufungamano Negotiating 
Team meeting documents strong opposition from Kibwana of NCEC and a member of the 
Ufungamano Negotiating Team to a decision to establish a drafting team of four (two from 
the Ufungamano and two from the PSC) to harmonize the 1998 and 2000 Review Acts. 
Kibwana had argued that this should wait until there were agreements on all issues and until 
the Plenary of Stakeholders had ratified the same. This serves to explain the acrimony with 
which the decision to merge was taken on March 21, 2001. But one wonders what might have 
been the outcome of such negotiations had the Plenary of Stakeholders discussed and stated 
their conditions for the Negotiating Team to follow in their work.   
 
On March 21 2001, the Plenary of Stakeholders —the ultimate decision-making organ in the 
Ufungamano Initiative  convened to discuss the merger proposal and to take a decision on 
whether to support or reject it (interviews: Athman, 12/10/2009; Raiji, 14/10/2009).  Prior to 
the meeting, given the opposition to the merger within some quarters of the movement, there 
had been efforts at serious public education to justify merits of the merger to the public 
(Kibara, interview 15/10/2009). The debates of the day were impassioned and acrimonious. 
According to Athman (interview, 12/10/2009), there were a lot of emotions especially 
because secular civil society was opposed to the merger. There were many conspiracy 
theories not just against the Government, but also within the Ufungamano Initiative. 
Nonetheless, according to Athman (ibid), the religious and Peoples‘ Commission leadership 
became very pragmatic, and saw the folly of continued obstinacy, as it was most likely to 
plunge the country into turmoil. Faced with choices between a hypothetical victory by 
continued opposition to the state, or a merger, the religious leadership of the Ufungamano 
took a hard decision to save the country from the brink of chaos. For Athman (ibid) the net 
result of these internal contentions was that the Ufungamano Initiative seemed to appear to be 
both ‗pro-reform, and against reform at the same time. This undermined the movement, as it 
was unable to clearly identify allies and adversaries. This is basically what led to 
disintegration, which started soon after the merger.‘  
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The debates during the March 21, 2001 Plenary of Stakeholders forum were also 
confrontational. Mwai Kibaki, then leader of the official opposition in Parliament was 
disparaged by some participants for a previous remark he had made during the clamour for 
political pluralism in early 1990 when he was still in KANU. Kibaki had then likened those 
thinking of dislodging KANU as daydreamers trying to fell a mugumo (fig) tree with a razor 
blade (Mutua, 2008; interviews: Njoya, 29/09/2009; Muihia, 29/09/2009; Churchill, 
02/10/2009). His critics wondered whether Kibaki, who led a group of older and more 
conservative and reactionary politicians advocating a merger, was not selling out to KANU 
because he believed it was unbeatable (Imanyara, interview 28/10/2009). An outraged Kibaki 
declared that ‗there is no one in Kenya who wants the review to be scuttled or delayed... we 
cannot go back to a parallel process and those who think so are daydreaming‘ (Mutua, 2008: 
122; Daily Nation 22/03/2001).    
 
Despite fierce opposition to the merger, a vote was called. NCEC boycotted the vote on 
sensing defeat. Violence erupted in the Plenary hall as University of Nairobi students said to 
be supportive of the NCEC‘s position and on its payroll, accosted opposition politicians and 
religious leaders who supported the merger process in the hope of disrupting the vote 
(interviews: Ombok, 24/09/2009; Njoya, 29/09/2009; Wandati, 17/09/2009; Athman, 
12/10/2009).  In this regard, Wandati argued that these students identified with NCEC‘s 
Kivutha Kibwana who ‗somehow had a way of moving the young people. When he 
[Kibwana] did not want these elections to happen, he mobilised them to oppose the merger. 
But we had people on our side, whose voices would not be neglected‘ (interview, 
17/09/2009).  Students‘ violence was countered by the youths from Chemi Chemi ya Ukweli, 
who had been providing security to the People‘s Commission of Kenya Commissioners. They 
protected the ballot exercise (interviews: Ombok, 24/09/2009; Lethome, 02/10/2009; Zein, 
07/10/2009).  
 
Despite the cleavages, the group supporting the merger was able to marshal sufficient 
numbers to have the merger proposal ratified (Raiji, interview 14/10/2009). The success of 
the merger vote however acrimonious, demonstrates a triumph of the more moderate to 
conservative over radical groups in the Ufungamano Initiative. This is the group that assumed 
a hegemonic status in these struggles (Imanyara, interview 28/10/2009). It also illuminates 
Najam‘s (2000) congruence of means and ends as a determining factor in cooperation 
between civil society and government – in this case, between the triumphant group in 
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Ufungamano Initiative and their KANU and NDP counterparts who controlled the 
parliamentary Review Process. The paradox of this however, is that it frustrated the radical 
transformations that the Ufungamano Initiative had supposedly been seeking all along.  
 
The merger process and its outcome suggest that strategic interactions between a social 
movement and the state are not always transformative. Sometimes, they result, as the 
Ufungamano Initiative‘s merger with the state process shows, in cooperation and co-optation. 
Both the Ufungamano Initiative and the state got what they wanted in the new arrangement 
and this was the basis for cooperation. In this regard, Kuria captures the sense of frustration 
from the happenings on the day the merger vote was taken by the Plenary of Stakeholders:  
I remember March 21, 2001 because for me, it brought some major significance.  I was at 
Ufungamano and I saw the clergy selling out. I have never been to church since then because 
I found that there was no integrity. The clergy needed not to be perfect.  But at least I 
expected sincerity and what I saw was dishonesty of the worst kind by religious leaders 
(interview, 26/09/2009.   
 
Likewise, Rev. Njoya captured the tragedy that had befallen those opposed to the merger 
when he stated that they had been hoodwinked by a few conservative and reactionary 
religious leaders because NCEC just like many other secular civil society and political 
organisations had joined the Ufungamano Initiative with the faith it would be progressive 
because it opposed Moi and KANU. Thus, for such groups, progressiveness was equated with 
opposition to Moi. Njoya specifically stated:  
We would have joined anything that was anti-KANU and Moi. Little did we know that 
Musyimi would in fact, be bribed and deliver us hook, line and sinker to the ‗enemy.‘ 
Musyimi was in cahoots with Kibaki. Both sold the Ufungamano Initiative, which had a 
promising future in delivering the people of Kenya from the bondage of political class [sic]. 
The merger was voted and it turned out to be a disastrous venture, and Kenya never realised a 
new Constitution (interview, 29/09/2009). 
 
The view that those who agreed to the merger were sell-outs is widespread among 
participants in the Ufungamano Initiative constituency groups that opposed the merger. For 
instance, Onyango of Citizens Coalition for Constitutional Change (interview, 07/10/2009) 
stated: 
The merger was chaotic; there was total split. To this day there are those of us who believe 
that those who joined the CKRC betrayed the initial support and principles under which this 
reform struggle had been based. And in a way, that began the journey of the dwindling of the 
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impact or effect of the Initiative itself to a point that later on, it became a pale shadow of 
itself.  
 
But Peter Ocholla, an employee of the Kenya Women Political Caucus whose leader Phoebe 
Asiyo who was accused of double-dealing and short-changing the Ufungamano Initiative by 
accepting appointment as a Commissioner with the Parliamentary Review Committee, argued 
that compromises on either side were bound to happen at some point so as to move the 
process forward (Ocholla, interview 06/10/2009). For Ocholla, the merger offered a win for 
both sides of the contention. Zein (interview, 07/10/2009), corroborates this position arguing 
that ‗it was not the intention of the people who came together under Ufungamano Initiative to 
rip the country apart, or to have two constitutional processes. They always saw value in a 
process that would unify the country‘ instead of one that would plunge the country into 
chaos. This doomsday scenario of violent bloodshed if the merger had been resisted, remains 
difficult to prove. Nonetheless, with Moi/KANU and Raila/NDP playing a destructive zero-
sum game with the Review Process, it is not improbable to predict how far they would have 
gone in ensuring that they got their way or no way at all.  
   
Ndubi (interview, 24/09/2009) and Wandati (interview, 17/09/2009) offered further 
explanations of what was happening. For them, it was an ideological battle within the 
movement. The formation that supported the merger was bereft of ideologues. This was not 
the case in the Youth and student movement, Muungano wa Mageuzi and NCEC which had 
many ideologues:  
... and believed in some ideology and they wanted everything premised on theological or a 
political theory framework and if it did not fit within the theory, they argued you cannot use 
it. There were pragmatists and these are the ones who said let us take the chance and merge 
(Ndubi, interview 24/09/2009).  
 
But there were also genuine fears that the merger would further alienate some of the players 
in the Ufungamano Initiative given that not every PCK Commissioner would be 
accommodated in the CKRC (interviews: Kibara, 15/10/2009; Ghai, 23/10/2009). The 
Steering Council who had been the initial appointing authority for the People‘s Commission 
of Kenya Commissioners developed what they referred to as ‗objective criteria‘ for 
determining who to nominate to the CKRC (Minutes of Ufungamano Initiative Steering 
Council meeting 29/03/2001). The criteria included active participation in the Peoples‘ 
Commission of Kenya, fair representation of different stakeholders, provincial/regional 
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diversity, and a clear articulation of the vision and values that the People‘s Commission of 
Kenya would bring into the common process (Ibid). Those who made it to the merged 
Constitution of Kenya Review Commission in a way reflected the diversity of Kenyans 
(interviews: Athman12/10/2009; Lenaola, 03/10/2009; Raiji, 14/10/2009).  
 
All the same, the criteria elicited some strong reactions specifically from some religious 
leaders who were part of the Steering Council. The fact that the new merged Commission 
could not absorb all the Commissioners from Peoples‘ Commission of Kenya, served as the 
first major fault line within the Ufungamano Initiative (interviews: Wandati, 17/09/2009; 
Kibara, 15/10/2009). There were oppositions to the selection criteria. One such opposition 
was by Rev. S.M. Muchuga who, in a letter addressed to the Steering Council and copied to 
the Ufungamano Initiative Stakeholders on April 4
th
 2001, expressed serious reservations in 
limiting the nominations of People‘s Commission of Kenya Commissioners to join the 
CKRC. Muchuga argued that there was need to look beyond the then People‘s Commission 
of Kenya to nominate the best-qualified Kenyans who had been part of the Ufungamano 
Initiative. He argued that it was ‗important that we [Steering Council] allow democracy, 
fairness, transparency to start with us if we are going to serve as beacons for the way we want 
affairs of this nation to be conducted in the future.‘ Muchuga‘s pleas fell on deaf ears. This 
opened new cleavages within religious leaders in the movement. In this sense, the 
Ufungamano Initiative demonstrates that its weakness was its internal deficiencies for 
democratic participation.  
 
In the long run, the merger vote turned out to be a classic case of putting the cart before the 
horse for the Ufungamano Initiative. According to Mutua (2008: 124), the merger vote 
affected the Ufungamano Initiative‘s continued 
…ability to seriously influence the nature of the actual merger [...because it had] voted to 
approve the joint process before the completion of the negotiations. From that moment 
forward, the terrain for the contest over the nature of the Review Process shifted to 
parliament, a development that surrendered control over negotiations to the opposition 
political parties. Religious organizations and civil society had extracted concessions from the 
state, only to cede them to the opposition parties and Parliament.    
 
After further negations between political parties in parliament, an amendment to the 
Constitution of the Kenya Review Commission Act was introduced in Parliament and passed 
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on May 8, 2001 to formally seal the merger.
26
 The merged CKRC ‗was a product of 
protracted negotiations. The CKRC‘s mandate was predicated upon the object of the Review 
Act, which the enabling law, clearly spelt out as delivering a constitution acceptable to all 
Kenyans.
27
 Subsequently, on June 11, 2001, ten members from the People‘s Commission of 
Kenya were gazetted to join the merged Constitution of Kenyan Review Commission.
28
 At 
the same time, two more Commissioners were also nominated by the Parliamentary Select 
Committee, and gazetted.
29
 These joined the 15 Commissioners
30
 from the government side 
who had been gazetted earlier on November 10, 2000 to form a new 27 member Commission. 
After the formal gazetting, the Chair of the Ufungamano Initiative‘s Peoples‘ Commission of 
Kenya, Dr. Oki Ombaka and his Deputy, Abida Ali-Aroni were appointed to the positions of 
First and Second Deputy Chair of the new CKRC respectively (Kihoro, interview 
23/09/2009. See also Mutua, 2008: 130). 
 
Several commentators have offered reflections on the character of the resultant Commission. 
Cottrell and Ghai (2007: 19) for instance, write of 15 who were initially appointed in 2000: 
...Moi‘s spoiling tactics go ... to the setting up of the CKRC.... The body seems to have been 
designed to be ineffective and compliant. It was appointed through an ostensibly open process; 
                                                 
26
 Some opposition Members of Parliament allied to NCEC including Paul Muite, Njeru Kathangu, and Shem 
Ochuodho opposed the Bill (Mutua, 2008). This shows that NCEC was still opposed to the merger. 
27
 The CKRC was expected to lead and facilitate Kenyans in coming up with a constitution that would guarantee 
peace, national unity and integrity of the Republic of Kenya in order to safeguard the well-being of the people of 
Kenya; provide for the establishing a free and democratic system of government that enshrines good governance, 
and constitutionalism, the rule of law, human rights and gender equity; recognise and demarcate divisions of 
responsibility among the various State Organs including the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary so as to 
create checks and balances between them and to ensure accountability of Government and its offices to the 
people of Kenya; to promote the people‘s participation in the governance of the country through democratic, 
free and fair elections and the devolution and exercise of power; ensure respect for ethnic and regional diversity 
and communal rights including the rights of communities to organise and participate in cultural activities and 
the expression of their identities; and facilitating regional and international cooperation to ensure economic 
development, peace and stability and support democracy and human rights; to strengthen national integration 
and unity; create conditions conducive to a free exchange of ideas; to ensure the full participation of citizens in 
the management of public affairs; and enable Kenyans to resolve national issues based on consensus. Coming 
from a climate of heightened mistrust between tribes and political parties, this seemed really a good way to 
capture the spirit that the new constitution should deliver (Lumumba, 2008: 46-7). On its own, this was also 
quite progressive and if achieved, would offer Kenya, a clean break from a predatory state dominated by 
political and economic elite. The language of rights was firmly imprinted in this statute. 
28
 The ten were: Dr. Oki Ooko-Ombaka; Mrs. Abida Ali-Aroni; Dr. Charles M. Bagwasi; Ms. Nancy M. Baraza; 
Mr Isaac Lenaola; Dr. Wanjiku M. Kabira; Mr Ibrahim A. Lethome; Ms. Salome W. Muigai; Mr Abubakar Zein 
Abubakar; and Mr Riunga L. Raiji (CKRC, 2002).  
29 
These were Dr. Mosonik arap Korir and Dr. Abdirizak A. Nunow. These were seen as having been brought in 
to swell the KANU-NDP numbers in the Commission.  
30 
The initial fifteen Commissioners were: Prof. Yash P. Ghai; Ms. Kavetsa Adagala; Mrs. Phoebe M. Asiyo; 
Pastor Zablon F. Ayonga; Mr Ahmed I. Hassan; Mr John M. Kangu; Bishop Bernard N. Kariuki; Mr. Githu 
Muigai; Prof. H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo; Mr. Domiziano M. Ratanya; Prof. Ahmed I. Salim; Dr. Mohamed 
Swazuri; Mr. Keriako Tobiko; Mr. Paul M. Wambua; Mrs. Alice Yano; The Attorney General (ex officio); and 
Mr. Arthur O. Owiro (Ex-officio member & Secretary) (CKRC, 2002). 
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with two members from each province (except Northeast Province) and by a system of 
application by those interested in serving. But many people who would have been genuinely 
good appointees did not apply, and many who did apply were nonentities, and few had any 
knowledge of constitutions. Many of those appointed to the original Commission were clients 
of powerful politicians. And there was an expectation that they would do the bidding of their 
patrons – whether that bidding was the making of a particular recommendation, or applying the 
brakes.
31
 
 
Both Lumumba (2008) and Mutua (2008), agree with the position above. Lumumba (2008:  
35) for instance writes:  
Indeed, many of the original fifteen commissioners, although enjoying necessary paper 
qualification, could be associated with certain political affiliation within the political 
dispensation of the day. It must be remembered that a mix of criteria, namely; Kenya‘s ethnic, 
geographical, cultural, political, social and economic diversity, and the principle of gender 
equity, informed the statutory mode of representation, hence the mix of technical ‗knowhow‘ 
and ‗know who‘ in the appointments. 
 
It was precisely this mix that exposed the process to political interference and also led to a 
credibility deficit for some of the Commissioners (Lumumba, 2008; interviews: Ghai, 
23/10/2009; Lenaola, 03/10/2009). Mutua (2008: 129) argues that the merged Commission 
was a ‗hodgepodge, although it was diverse in terms of gender, religion, region, race, 
ethnicity and profession... it was difficult to justify why...accomplished individuals were left 
out.‘ 32   
 
The composition of the CKRC also opened a new frontier for contention between the 
different actors in the Kenyan political power games. The Commission was really not about 
the ordinary Kenyan public, and confirms what Ghai, during the merger negotiation process 
had labelled as misconception that the Commission was an organ for negotiating a new 
constitution. This view is further lent credence by the way sections of the Commission itself 
served to frustrate the popular will (Lumumba, 2008). As Mutua argues, 
CKRC was a political, not a technical body. Its large size betrayed the political calculations of 
                                                 
31
 Ghai repeated similar sentiments in my interview with him on October 23, 2009 arguing that there were many 
qualified and good people who did not want to apply because they did not want to be tied to Moi‘s regime 
before the merger while they had also refused to participate in the Ufungamano‘s PCK side, because they felt 
they could earn any good money. 
32
 Mutua‘s position seems to mirror (Bates, 1999: 91), observations ‗that political elites in many African 
countries have managed to silence the technocratic managerial bourgeoisie and divide loyalties that are subject 
to political manipulation [and in the process have] factionalised the ranks of the political opposition.‘  
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its authors. Rather than create a nonpartisan technical body, the politicians crafted a loose 
receptacle that would advocate their interests from within. The fact that most commissioners 
enjoyed political patronage made the CKRC a ground for the negotiation of partisan political 
interests.... Many of the crises that engulfed the CKRC were a result of its composition (2008: 
129).  
 
To conclude the discussion on the merger process and outcome, I argue here that dynamics of 
collective action can result in a combination of contagion, exhaustion, and even 
accommodation between movements and their targets. Given the fact that Ufungamano 
Initiative was a veritable bag of contradictions, competing interests and multiple 
vulnerabilities, the movement did not have a choice but to look for ways to ensure it 
remained relevant. This came through an opportunity for a merger with the state-led process. 
Indeed it needs mention that Ghai triumphed on his merger project because of a confluence of 
factors that included fatigue, resource constraints, the hegemonic capture of the movement by 
a conservative leadership, and Ghai‘s own ingenuity, perseverance, and persuasiveness. 
Ghai‘s influence in the direction the contentions took was so profound that one respondent 
argued that it was unimaginable if not impossible, to build consensus between the two 
processes had Ghai not been appointed to the Commission (Hassan, interview 16/10/2009).  
But in the end, the Ufungamano Initiative demonstrated that civil society can provide 
alternatives and that it is possible for citizens, diverse as they may be, to coalesce around 
shared ideals and outside of state instituted structures to force change. Its challenge to the 
state and in holding the government to account was a great achievement in this regard.  
 
But as already shown, consensus building and the merger negotiations were not easy. Even as 
Ghai assured the Ufungamano Initiative that the state was serious about the merger, he had to 
continue ignoring loud calls from senior cabinet Ministers in the Moi/KANU regime 
‗including Julius Sunkuli, the minister for internal security...Raila Odinga, the Chair of the 
Parliamentary Select Committee [for him] to ignore the Ufungamano and impose his terms 
on them‘ in order to continue with the negotiations and effectively seal the merger deal 
(Mutua, 2008: 119). Mutua (2008: 128) further notes that Ghai‘s challenges in facilitating 
merger negotiations were compounded by 
Little integrity in Kenyan politics [as] political actors from both the left and right often acted 
in narrow or partisan interests. Ghai realized that political elites had virtually no concept or 
commitment to any national interests. Public discourse was coarse and vitriolic. Schemes, 
vendettas, pettiness, and crass greed dominated the lives of key actors. Above all, the KANU 
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elite was determined to do whatever it took to manipulate the constitutional Review Process 
to its narrow advantages. Moi, the long-term autocrat, was the master tactician and puppeteer, 
the grand old man around whom the pro-establishment figures genuflected and in whose court 
devious schemes were hatched.  
 
Many participants of this study corroborated the above views by Mutua. Oduor Ong‘wen, a 
former chair of the National Council of NGOs of Kenya for instance stated that the State was 
convinced that the Ufungamano Initiative was a group of malcontents who had no business 
talking to the state (interview, 09/10/2009). As such, despite the indirect negotiations, this is 
an attitude the Moi/KANU Government maintained throughout their reign. Even after the 
merger had been achieved, Moi continued to undermine the Chair of the Commission 
(Mutua, 2008; Lumumba, 2008; Ghai, interview 23/10/2009). For Oduor Ong‘wen, such 
challenges were expected as any negotiation always starts from the extremes:  
From the Ufungamano Initiative side, we were convinced that the State was not committed to 
the review. So we developed our position based on that. But due to Ghai‘s shuttle diplomacy, 
with every session the differences began narrowing to the point we appointed four people 
who were now doing the actual negotiations. From Ufungamano it was Dr. Ombaka, Abida 
Ali, and from KANU‘s side there was Prof. Ogendo and Mutakha Kangu.33  The group of 
four are the ones that kept on dealing with the technical issues and reporting back to both 
sides in ironing out the finer details, until an agreement was finally hammered after more than 
20 sessions of meetings (interview, 09/10/2009). 
 
But challenges to the merger were not just from those who opposed it or from the 
Government‘s refusal to deal directly with the Ufungamano Initiative. As Mutua (2008: 129) 
reveals, the character of the opposition and religious leaders also frustrated Ghai‘s efforts to a 
merger: 
The opposition leadership, with whom Ghai sometimes openly sympathised, could also show 
a remarkable political and moral bankruptcy. Civil society, Ghai‘s natural ally, was also beset 
with its own pathologies, and its most progressive wing was sceptical of his ability to 
navigate Moi‘s labyrinthine world. To complicate matters, the increasingly vocal religious 
organisations were not always driven by the public good. Kenya‘s political terrain was thus 
treacherous and complex....  
                                                 
33
 While Oduor Ong‘wen refers to these as the actual people who did the negotiations, records from the Office 
of the Attorney General indicate that these were known as the Drafting Committee tasked with drafting 
‗proposal for amending the Constitution of Kenya Review Act 2000 in accordance with the ―Principles of the 
Common Review Process agreed by the Parliamentary Select Committee and the Ufungamano Negotiating 
Team‖‘  (Amos Wako (Attorney General) 06/02/2001).  
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Mutua continues to argue that Raila Odinga also created further complications because of his 
utilitarian interests in Ghai, i.e. ‗seeing the Review Process as an avenue to ascend to the 
pinnacle of state power‘ (2008: 129). But Ghai was able to navigate through this labyrinth 
and secure a merger between the two processes. 
 
It is instructive to note that Ufungamano Initiative did not windup after the absorption of 
PCK into the CKRC. It continued to be a critical voice and force in the review process. Pinto 
(2008) writes that arguably no single movement in Kenya‘s recent history challenged the 
State in the constitutional review, as did the Ufungamano Initiative (Pinto, 2008). At this 
point, a critical question emerges: what were the key exports of the Ufungamano Initiative to 
the merged Constitution of Kenya Review Commission? What happened after the merger? I 
now turn to address these questions.   
The post-merger developments 
Besides ‗forcing‘ the state to acquiescence to demands for people‘s participation, Lumumba 
(interview, 01/10/2009) stated that the Ufungamano Initiative did not lose, as all the work 
they had done fed into the new structure. Specifically, the views that the People‘s 
Commission of Kenya had collected from Kenyans were passed over to the CKRC after 
copies were made and archived by the National Council of Churches of Kenya (interviews: 
Musyimi, 09/10/2009; Odhiambo D., 13/10/2009; Ghai, 23/10/2009; Lumumba, 01/10/2009).   
 
There were also many more exports of the Ufungamano Initiative to the merged process. 
Chief among these was the structure and style of working through committees and a Plenary 
(Lumumba, 2008). The new CKRC had five major committees and a Plenary.
34
 The Plenary 
was the central deliberation and decision-making organ of the CKRC and comprised only the 
Commissioners. The Secretariat staff only attended as ex-officials unlike the Ufungamano 
Initiative where the Plenary involved all stakeholders. Similar to Ufungamano Initiative, the 
Plenary was the supreme policy and decision-making organ of the Commission and was 
chaired by the Chair of the Commission or the Deputy Chair in case of the Chair‘s absence.  
                                                 
34 
These Committees included: A Steering Committee: Somewhat similar to the Steering Council within the 
Ufungamano Initiative, composed of the Chair of the Commission, Chairs Of Standing Committees, a few 
Commissioners and the Secretary. Similar to the Ufungamano Initiative Steering Council, it had a collegiate 
way of making decisions; Resource Development and Budget Committee (supported by a Deputy Secretary in 
charge of Finance and Administration; Mobilization and Outreach Committee: responsible for organising 
collection of views and holding public meetings; Research, Drafting and Technical Support; Civic Education, 
Publicity, Information and Communications Committee (Lumumba, 2008). 
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According to Lumumba (2008: 37) ‗the Plenary superintended the work of the Commission 
and when need arose, appointed ad hoc Working Committees and Task Forces.‘ The 
Secretary to the Commission also attended such plenaries and when need arose, the Deputy 
Secretaries would be invited too.  This ensured that the leadership style was collegiate, just as 
was the case in the Ufungamano Initiative (Lumumba, 2008: 43). This way of working had 
emerged as a product of ‗the mistrust that characterised the struggle for constitution making, 
which dictated that nothing be left to chance‘ (Lumumba, 2008: 37). As such, an elaborate 
process was necessary to provide an enabling environment for the implementation of the 
2001 Review Act.  As a result of these mistrusts, Lumumba (2008: 39) writes that the 
Plenary meetings were sometimes a pain to sit through. During the KANU era, prior to 2002 
general elections, pro-government Commissioners used the Plenary as a forum to articulate 
views, which were obviously made in the ‗political kitchen‘. This trend continued after [the 
2002] elections when same pro-KANU Commissioners now joined by others whom I had 
thought were above partisan interest switched camps to the new administration. It was 
frustrating and sometimes annoying.  
 
Ghai (interview, 23/10/2009) offered evidence to corroborate Lumumba‘s assertion above. 
Ghai argued that some of the Commissioners who were originally from the Ufungamano 
Initiative and had taken the high moral ground, ‗ironically got corrupted.... Perhaps it was the 
allure of money and the huge salary that we were getting.... But there were two or three 
Commissioners from Ufungamano Initiative who were very honest and stuck to ethical 
principles while the rest got corrupted like crazy.‘ This change of positions posed numerous 
problems for Ghai and the effectiveness of the Commission in carrying out its mandate. 
 
However, a former Commissioner who had transited from the Ufungamano‘s PCK to CKRC, 
Riunga Raiji (interview 14/10/2009), was of the view that the internal problems in the 
Commission were because ‗the Commissions‘ Chair was not equal to the task.‘ But this was a 
minority view. All others who had been part of the CKRC and interviewed for this research 
(for example Isaac Lenaola, Ibrahim Lethome and Abubakar Zein) held the Chair in high 
regard. Indeed, Raiji is one of those mentioned in Lumumba‘s book as having thrown away 
his supposed forthrightness after the 2002 general election: 
I remember Riunga as one of few commissioners who publicly and loudly supported me when 
I took unpopular, but in my view, correct positions ...on many occasions, during the KANU 
era, we lamented with him how some Commissioners were being used as KANU‘s hatchet 
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men to derail the Review Process. However, after the 2002 elections his attitude towards the 
establishment was more sympathetic‘ (Lumumba, 2008: 27).35   
 
Another key outcome of the merger was that the process ceased to be exclusionary as 
elaborate structures and organs were established at all levels of the country i.e. CKRC, the 
Constituency Constitutional Forums, the National Constitutional Conference, the 
Referendum (which came much later though), and the National Assembly.
36
  
 
The Ufungamano Initiative story post-merger demonstrates the typical story of the limits to 
movements in Kenya. Most die without achieving the ultimate goal for which they were 
formed to pursue. Specific reasons for this include their being hijacked for political ends, 
poor development of structures to ensure popular participation, and fundamentally, the donor 
dependency in their funding. This points to agency in the way people got seduced.  
 
Immediately after the merger vote, deeper cracks started threatening the Ufungamano 
Initiative. Parochial ethnic
37
, religious, political, and economic interests precipitated these 
fractures (interviews: Ndubi, 24/09/2009; Ong‘wen, 09/10/2009; Onyango, 07/10/2009). 
Immediately after the merger vote, groups allied to the NCEC withdrew their commitment to 
the Ufungamano Initiative. Many felt betrayed and even stayed away from further 
participation. Even those who continued participation were somewhat outsiders as they 
                                                 
35
 Such changes were not limited to Commissioners only. In 2002 general election many people who had been 
in the leadership of Ufungamano Initiative were elected in Parliament and formed the Government. But soon 
after, many of these people changed or forgot the constitutional reform struggles had not been won yet. 
According to one of the founders of Muungano wa Wanavijiji, Ezekiel Rema (interview, 22/03/10) ‗many even 
opposed any changes to the very Constitution they wanted changed when they were part of the political 
opposition and civil society.  We realised only after a few days of the NARC regime that things were not going 
to change as many people were co-opted and kept quiet. With the benefit of hindsight, I think some of these 
people only came to the masses like us because they had fallen out of favour with the powers that be and wanted 
to use us to squire it out.‘ See also Nyamu-Musembi (2006) for similar articulation of failures of the new regime 
to effect change and enrich a political culture of accountability. 
36
 All these, according to Lumumba (2008: 47) were enjoined to: ‗a) Be accountable to the people of Kenya; b) 
Ensure that the Review Process accommodates the diversity of Kenyan people including socio-economic status, 
race, ethnicity, gender, religious faith, age, occupation, learning, persons with disabilities and the disadvantaged; 
c) Ensure that the Review Process: 1) provides the people of Kenya with an opportunity to actively, freely and 
meaningfully participate in generating and debating proposals to alter the Constitution; 2) is conducted in an 
open manner; and; 3) is guided by respect for universal principles of human rights, gender, equity and 
democracy.‘ 
37
 Ethnicity has been the dominant factor in shaping the different struggles. There are many examples to support 
this claim. For instance, the Kenya People‘s Union of the 1960‘s for instance ended up being a Luo affair while 
Ford of the 1990s disintegrated along tribal lines (Kikuyu and Luo). As a result, ethnic and intra-class rivalries 
have been the bane of many social and political struggles in Kenya especially considering that the Kenyan civil 
society has not been spared these ethnic rivalries either. Ufungamano Initiative emerged with a great promise to 
break with this baggage and it got widespread mass support in such a divisive environment. However, this did 
not last. By 2003, there were clear cracks as ethnic, intra-class and most significantly and for the first time in the 
country, religious conflicts emerged within the movement and ultimately led to its demise. 
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relaxed in the belief that what they had been pushing for was popular participation and it had 
been achieved through the merger (Ndubi, interview 24/09/2009). As a result, some were 
only given observer status in the National Constitutional Conference.  The Ufungamano 
Initiative therefore lost quite some ground, which left the movement deflated. Khairallah 
(interview, 26/09/2009) stated that some in the Ufungamano Initiative  
Felt substantially deflated by the merger. I remember some of our people did not participate 
even in the process very effectively.  I remember we did not participate in the civic education, 
so it had very serious impact in terms of popular participation in the constitution making 
process. 
 
Moreover, the triumph of the conservative and reactionary forces within the Ufungamano 
Initiative also had profound impacts on the Kenyan political scene a year and half later as this 
group was joined by literally everyone who had been part of the Ufungamano Initiative and a 
breakaway group from KANU led by Raila Odinga who had by then fallen out with Moi. The 
group crystallised into a formidable political force dubbed the National Alliance Rainbow 
Coalition that won the 2002 election, effectively routing KANU from power after 37 years at 
the helm.  The net effect of the 2002 general election in Kenya was a mirage of change, a 
transition without transformation, as the popular will of a new constitution was sacrificed by 
the new political elites‘ efforts at self-entrenchment.  Below I offer an analytical explanation 
to support this conclusion. 
The 2002 transition without transformation 
The Ufungamano Initiative has gone through several phases. Each phase has been defined by 
differences in the shades of opinion on the part of the same actors at the heart of the 
contestations. This has mainly been dependent on the prevailing political environment and 
the attendant alignments that take shades of ethnicity, religious and class interests. Many 
actors who initially opposed certain positions in mid 1990s today support the very positions 
that they had opposed. As such, it is difficult to pinpoint who are the real reformers in Kenya. 
The pendulum has swung so much between positions and compositions of actors at any two 
different moments, so much so that it has left many of the so-called reformist activists and 
politicians deeply speckled. Many actors argue that they change opinions and positions 
because facts change.  In the process of these shifts in opinions, the greatest casualty has 
always been the reform agenda itself, a further fragmentation of society, and a resultant sense 
of betrayal of the popular will by the leadership (political, religious, ethnic, class). This has 
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resulted in a scenario where the elite as a collective, reproduces their hegemonic domination 
and further marginalisation of the subaltern.   
 
Arguably, nothing captures such dramatic shift in positions better than the assertion by John 
Michuki who, as an opposition member of parliament, had been one of the most ardent pro-
reform voices in the group of politicians that identified with the Ufungamano Initiative. His 
change of position was especially on the need to clip the powers of the Executive. At the 
height of the acrimonious campaigns on the draft constitution in 2005, he argued that there 
was no longer a need to clip presidential powers as Moi was now out of power. This was 
because situations had changed. Michuki was now a cabinet minister in a government led by 
Kibaki, a fellow ethnic Kikuyu. The great lesson in this case should be that transformation is 
difficult to achieve unless the Kenyan society shuns ethnicity or discovers how to direct its 
positives for the benefit of the majority. Such change was clearly informed by ethnicity 
which has often clouded any objective views of power and its exercise, as a majority of 
Kenyans do not see any ills of the same as long as it is one of their kith in power. As I show 
below, it was the 2002 elections that produced new ethnic configurations into the political 
environment that frustrated transformations.   
 
Oliver and Myers (2003) have argued that the environment determines opportunities and 
even the decline of movements. John W. Harbeson (1999: 53) argues that ‗Kenya ... provides 
one of the clearest examples in Africa of precariousness of undertaking multiparty elections 
as the first step towards democracy before inter-party agreement has been forged and the 
fundamental rules of the game reformed‘.   Indeed this was true even after the 2002 elections. 
A great number of activists and politicians associated with the Ufungamano Initiative were 
now part of the government. This change of environment meant that the common enemy, 
Moi and KANU, had been vanquished. The absence of a common enemy was debilitating for 
the Ufungamano Initiative. Parochial interests surfaced yet again as people retreated to a false 
belief that the new regime would deliver.  
 
The 2002 election was therefore another conjuncture that contributed to a break-up of the 
‗old‘ alliances in the Ufungamano Initiative and the emergence of new ones. Here, four 
groups emerged: a) those who seemed to be committed to reforms and included the Liberal 
Democratic Party arm of NARC; b) those who had seen their ascendancy to power as an end 
in itself and no longer needed reforms and included National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK) 
arm of NARC; c) a third, and perhaps a naïve group, emerged. This group mainly from the 
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civil society and the religious groups gave the benefit of doubt to the government hoping that 
it would deliver. Obviously, the scheming by politicians forestalled reforms; d) a fourth 
group regrouped as the new Ufungamano Initiative as the more radical reform oriented 
champions walked out of it. The new Ufungamano included the Evangelical Christian 
leaders. The Evangelicals were arguably were the final nail to the coffin of Ufungamano 
Initiative‘s unity. They joined other Christians at a critical moment before the 2005 
referendum to oppose the inclusion of Kadhi courts in the constitution.    
 
Mutua (2008: 143) correctly argues that these changes in positions were also ‗driven by the 
fear of losing the political advantages that the concentration of power in the Executive gives 
the incumbent government.‘ Lumumba (2008: 72) saw those unhappy with new 
developments as those who felt ‗threatened by the changes going on around them…. They 
look to traditions and institutions to give them a sense of security. Newness frighten[ed] 
them. They became rigid….‘ However, this could also have been dictated by a congruence of 
values and interests among the political elite, who in most instances appear to be from the 
same socioeconomic class. As Mutua (2008: 143) argues, ‗this tendency of Kenyan political 
parties to withdraw from reformation of the State is… a manifestation of political bankruptcy 
of the ruling elites, which have had trouble envisioning national interests broader than their 
own political survival.‘  
 
Arguably, nothing had as much impact on the Ufungamano Initiative as did the 2002 general 
election. The defeat of KANU came with great optimism as it was viewed as a moment of 
great transformation. However ‗ironically, the elections diminished the importance of the 
National [Constitutional] Conference‘ (Mutua 2008: 143). The opposition coalition – NARC 
– that defeated KANU, was made up of at least fourteen opposition political parties and civil 
society organisations. The organisations forming NARC (except for the Liberal Democratic 
Party, a brigade of former KANU high priests led by Raila Odinga who decamped in huff 
after they felt slighted by Moi in his selection of a successor) had been affiliated to the 
Ufungamano Initiative. 
   
The composition of NARC seemed jinxed and at the same time, was a source of deep 
division within the new Government. It created two distinct groupings around the 
constitutional reform project.  The Liberal Democratic Party wing of NARC regrouped with 
their former colleagues in KANU to push for certain positions that the NAK wing was 
opposed to. This was especially around the clipping of the powers of the Executive. The new 
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positions seemed to be in total contrast to positions that these parties had held before the 
2002 general election. Mutua (2008) offers an opinion of what was happening. For him:  
The group that lost the fervour for new constitution after 2002 elections were neither 
duplicitous nor treacherous. Conversely, altruism cannot be the simple attribution of those 
that still pushed for a new constitution at the National Constitutional Conference. Both groups 
– particularly the political parties – took their respective positions based on their political 
location.  Groups that had taken over the state saw no urgency for change, whereas groups 
that were excluded from the centre of power sought a new constitution that they believed 
would be an ally in their drive for power. Even though there has been a liberal democratic 
consensus among Kenyan elites, different political parties, particularly those in power have 
shown a disdain to the fundamental democratization of the state (Mutua, 2008: 142-3).  
 
Nonetheless, for a great majority of Kenyans, the aura that accompanied the December 2002 
general election was interpreted as a great moment for transformation. Subsequent 
developments demonstrate the possibilities for transformation, while at the same time, 
showing the limits of this promise given the capture and defeat of the popular will. This 
contributed to the defeat of the ‗government sponsored‘ draft constitution in a National 
Referendum in 2005 essentially because of an attempt to subordinate the popular will to the 
will of a few elites. Moreover, arguments from the NAK wing of the Government in favour 
of the proposed constitution were based on comparisons of the new constitution being ‗better 
than the old one‘ without necessarily addressing some of the fundamental issues that Kenyans 
had wanted. The National Constitutional Conference process and outcomes is used below, to 
demonstrate these possibilities and limitations. To demonstrate this, I return to the work of 
the Commission after the merger, with a view to demonstrating the power plays that ensued.  
 
The Commission, immediately after the merger, embarked on massive civic education before 
collection of views of Kenyans was done. It appointed several organisations to help it run the 
civic education throughout the country. The Commission also ensured that Constituency 
Constitutional Forums were in place. The Constituency Constitutional Forums included the 
area Member of Parliament, Councillors, women, youth and persons with disability 
representatives. The Constituency Constitutional Forums were ‗very important organs during 
the collection of views, they helped in mobilising the populace‘ (Lumumba, 2008: 63). But 
even as the Commission went about its work, it was acutely aware of the need to finalise its 
work before the 2002 general election. In an internal memo to the Commissioners on 
November 6, 2001 Ghai wrote: ‗given the polarized state of politics and ethnicity, it is in the 
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national interest that the next general elections and the formation of the next government 
should be based on the new constitution‘ (cited in Lumumba 2008: 57). Ghai continued to 
warn that if Kenya went to the polls in 2002 with the old constitution, new elections would 
produce a lot of uncertainties and the ‗constitutional moment‘ would be lost.  
 
But Moi was weary of uncertain outcomes of the Review Process. Moreover, Moi did not 
trust that his new friend, Raila Odinga, would protect him when he left power. Moi 
manipulated the constitution to ensure that there were elections before a new constitution 
could be enacted. Moreover, ‗elements within the KANU Government and their lackeys in 
the Commission … embarked on their journey to delay and/or defeat the Review Process‘ 
(Lumumba, 2008: 67). Despite the delays created by KANU, the Commission finalised the 
Process of drafting the proposed constitution in September 2002, after comprehensively 
consulting Kenyans from all walks of life and all parts of the country. But President Moi was 
livid, making propagandistic pronouncements that the proposed constitution was very faulty 
as it contained aspects that were very un-African even before he had seen it. His ministers 
emphasised the same. Lumumba (2008: 84) states that ‗this attitude was exemplified by 
Julius Sunkuli, a Minister in Moi‘s government who labelled the draft as very bad even 
before he had read it.‘ This, Lumumba argues was the ‗official way that Moi and his 
Government had dealt with the Review Process: condemn first and verify later‘ (p.84). 
 
By mid-October 2002, it looked as if the Review Process was getting into the next important 
step: the National Constitutional Conference. But the undiluted presidential and 
parliamentary powers over the Review Process returned to haunt it. On Friday 25 October 
2002, the last day of the inaugural week of the National Constitutional Conference, the 
President dissolved Parliament throwing the entire Process in jeopardy (Lumumba, 2008; 
Cottrell and Ghai, 2007).  Reflecting on the impact of the dissolution of Parliament, Cottrell 
and Ghai (2007: 18-9), argued:  
Dissolution had the automatic effect that the Process could not continue: every MP was a 
member of the NCC, and MPs ceased to be such when the writs were issued for the elections, 
which took place a few days after the dissolution. The dissolution could not have come at a 
more dramatic moment: the formal inauguration of the NCC was to be on Monday 28 October 
2002. During the previous week all the non-parliamentarian delegates had assembled for a 
week of pre-conference activities, including ceremonial tree planting (organized by the delegate 
Wangari Maathai), and sessions where discussions of the CKRC Draft were led by 
distinguished academics and others, including those critical of the Draft. The President 
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dissolved Parliament at around 3 p.m. on the last day of this inaugural week, Friday 25 October. 
 
In dissolving Parliament, ‗Moi evidently hoped that his party, KANU, would win the 
elections, and that his chosen successor would slip into his seat‘ (Cottrell and Ghai 2007: 12). 
As this was happening, Raila Odinga, whose party, the National Development Party had 
earlier on March 18, 2002 merged with KANU for Odinga to become the Secretary General, 
led an exodus of the discontented out of KANU. Odinga‘s group formed the Liberal 
Democratic Party that joined hands with a burgeoning opposition unity party under the 
National Alliance Party of Kenya made up of Mwai Kibaki, Kijana Wamalwa and Charity 
Ngilu, who had agreed to field Kibaki as their presidential candidate to compete against 
Moi‘s chosen successor. The union of NAK and LDP formed the National Alliance Rainbow 
Coalition (NARC).   Lumumba argues that reading the signs of the time, the writing was on 
the wall:  
It was obvious that the KANU regime would be sent packing and I assumed that the Kibaki 
administration would be friendly to the Process because within its ranks were men and 
women who had actively and consistently fought for a new constitutional dispensation. Their 
own enthusiasm was palpable. They campaigned on the platform of delivering a new 
constitution within hundred (100) days. I believe others were hopeful too‘ (Lumumba, 2008: 
81).  
This shows that Kenyans had a lot of faith in the incoming regime to deliver a new 
constitution and a better life for them. Indeed, NARC‘s Mwai Kibaki‘s defeat of KANU‘s 
Uhuru Kenyatta with over 63% of the vote was interpreted as a mandate to steer Kenya from 
the ills afflicting her. The reform of the constitution was a key priority. 
 
However, after getting into power, the hundred days passed and instead of the National 
Constitutional Conference being reconvened immediately, NARC, a ‗coalition of 
convenience, united more by what it opposed than by what it actually [stood] for‘ (Barkan, 
2004: 92), started bickering over positions in Government. This paralysed not just 
Government work, but the Review Process as well. This symbolised a struggle between the 
new power elites. The bone of contention was based on the fact that NAK had reneged on a 
secret Memorandum of Understanding on the sharing of power, signed between Kibaki and 
Odinga as part of the merger deal between NAK and Odinga‘s Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP) (Mutua, 2008; interviews: Ong‘wen, 09/10/2009; Wambugu N., 23/10/2009; 
Odhiambo M., 01/04/2010). For Mutua (2008: 143), this caused delays that allowed the 
constitutional ‗moment to lapse [and] rendered the National Constitutional Conference a 
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forum for elite bickering instead of a solemn occasion to remake the State‘ (Mutua, 2008: 
143).  
 
Speed bumps in the Review Process were created by NAK‘s discomfort with the composition 
of the National Constitutional Conference, which they saw as a product of KANU‘s electoral 
gerrymandering. This manipulation had resulted in the National Constitutional Conference 
delegates being skewed in favour of certain places and interests.  This was indeed true, as 
Moi had perfected the gerrymandering of electoral boundaries since the reintroduction of 
multipartism in 1991. Commentators such as Brown (2001) conclude that such 
gerrymandering is what ensured that: 
Moi and KANU [were] re-elected on two occasions. In December 1992 Moi was returned to 
the Presidency with 37% of the popular vote, which was more than the number polled by any 
of the seven other candidates. KANU obtained a majority in Parliament (100 out of 188 
elected seats), despite only receiving 30% of the parliamentary votes cast, made possible by 
the first-past the post system and variations in the size of constituencies. In the December 
1997 poll Moi was re-elected with a slightly higher plurality (40%) than in 1992, but a mere 
four-seat majority in Parliament (Brown, 2001: 726).
38
 
 
Such manipulation was not limited to the elections into Parliament only. It was also applied 
to all other contestations that were alive in the country. The National Constitutional 
Conference was one area that Moi and KANU as well as their erstwhile nemesis-turned-
partner in a national deception plot – Odinga and the National Development Party had 
ensured would be in their favour. It is worth remembering that with Raila in its fold, KANU 
had amended the 1998 Constitution of Kenya Review Commission Act in 2000 to ensure that 
their support bases benefitted in terms of numbers in the National Constitutional Conference 
which, just like the National Parliament, was based on electoral constituencies as an 
important organ of reforms. The 2001 amendment to the Constitution of Kenya Review Act 
did not redress this obvious bias, as three delegates on top of the area Member of Parliament, 
                                                 
38
 Barkan (2004: 89-90) argues along the same line but introduces the idea of a fragmented opposition vote as 
the reason ‗Moi prevailed in Kenya's first two multiparty elections, held in 1992 and 1997, but with only a 
plurality of the vote. KANU won a narrow majority of seats in the National Assembly but not a majority of the 
ballots cast. Both elections were characterized by unprecedented levels of communal violence and foul play. 
Neither could be described as free and fair, despite the presence of domestic and international observers. The 
main reason for the opposition's defeat, however, was its failure to unite behind a single candidate. In both 
elections, the opposition split its vote among three major ethno-regional parties and several smaller ones.‘ This 
seems to suggest that multi-plurality was a bad thing and a two horse race in democracy is better. On the 
contrary, twosome races deny people alternatives as electorates are stuck with whatever is offered. As such, I 
take the view that it was not the failure of democracy Kenyan style, but rather that such analysis has been 
lopsided in their views of change. 
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would represent each of the 210 constituencies. Commenting on these matters, Kuria 
(interview, 26/09/2009) argued:  
The Parliament of the Republic of Kenya is a product of gerrymandering. You will find for 
instance that the last general election [2007] despite the fact that Kibaki had majority of the 
votes, ODM has the majority of seats in Parliament.  The reason is that ODM is a beneficiary 
of gerrymandering.  One way of controlling the country by Moi was to draw up more 
constituencies (electoral districts) in the area where KANU had support and leaving intact, 
areas where he had little support. For instance contrast Embakasi and Ijara constituencies with 
120,000 and 7000 voters respectively. They both elect one MP.  So the vote of one person in 
Ijara is not equivalent to that of a person in Embakasi.  Therefore any law passed by 
Parliament governing the rewriting of the Constitution could not be democratic.   
 
The selection of delegates to the National Constitutional Conference was therefore not 
democratic. Consequently, the National Constitutional Conference did not proportionally 
represent the entirety of Kenya. Even then, the interests of the incumbent regime had shifted 
to consolidation and preservation of its hold on power. The NAK arm of the NARC coalition 
was even toying with the idea of redrawing the list of National Constitutional Conference 
delegates. NAK wanted to redress the National Constitutional Conference from being a ‗staid 
affair calculated and scripted by the departing KANU regime‘ (Mutua 2008: 143). Besides 
the gerrymandering of electoral boundaries, the majority of the appointments to the National 
Constitutional Conference had been done without any clearly defined criteria. Indeed this 
becomes clear when one of the delegates who represented Tharaka Constituency to the 
National Constitutional Conference was asked how he got there. He could not remember the 
selection process followed. Indeed, while the law was clear on how the representations were 
meant to be, it is difficult to sustain a claim that the National Constitutional Conference 
represented Kenyans. It was the same arguments that were used in the Njoya case the 
constitutional challenge against Parliament to force the Draft Constitution through a 
referendum before it could be enacted (Ndubi, interview 24/09/2009).  
 
Given the new pulls and pushes, the National Constitutional Conference process was lengthy 
and punctuated. National Constitutional Conference took place in three phases. Phase one 
was April 28 to June 6, 2003. Phase 2 was August 18 to 25 2003 and was adjourned 
following the death of the then Kenyan Vice President in a London hospital to allow for two 
weeks of national mourning. Phase 3 started on September 6, 2003.  
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By the time the National Constitutional Conference was reconvened, majority of influential 
people in the new Government had lost the revolutionary fervour as the environment had 
changed considerably. Deep divisions had begun appearing ‗within the political class [sic] 
(Lumumba, 2008: 122). According to Lumumba (2008: 92), the National Constitutional 
Conference was ‗convened hot on the heels of spirited attempts to scuttle the Process and the 
early days were difficult with saboteurs from within and without the Commission.‘ Lumumba 
gives an example of this as an attempt to unseat Ghai from chairing the Conference through a 
motion moved by none other than the Rev. Mutava Musyimi at the start of the Bomas 
Conference (Lumumba, 2008). However, the attempt was ‗nipped in the bud‘ (Lumumba, 
2008: 97). At the time, Musyimi was seen as having a soft spot for the NAK side of 
government. After the failure of Musyimi‘s attempt to get elected to the chair of the 
Conference, he left Bomas and never returned (Musyimi, interview 09/10/2009).  Instead, he 
mobilised what remained of the Ufungamano to produce a rival Draft of the proposed 
Constitution dubbed the Ufungamano Initiative Draft.  
 
Meanwhile, there were also other attempts by the new regime to subvert the will of the 
people. They used some of the Commissioners from the Ufungamano Initiative side as well 
as others who had metamorphosed to be supportive of the conservative tendencies of the 
NAK wing of the new regime. Lumumba notes that,  ‗as cracks begun to emerge, 
Commissioners Abida Ali, Charles Maranga, Njoroge Kariuki, Hassan Issack, Pastor Zablon 
Ayonga, Wanjiku Kabira, Mohammed Swazuri, Domiziano Ratanya, Keraiko Tobiko were 
invited to a dinner hosted by Minister Kiraitu Murungi‘ (Lumumba, 2008: 131). Thereafter, 
these Commissioners stopped rising above partisan interests in the National Constitutional 
Conference process (Lumumba, 2008). Similar co-optations were happening for civil society 
operatives. Some of the prominent people in the Ufungamano Initiative got plum State 
appointments (e.g. Musyimi was appointed to National Anti-Corruption Campaign Steering 
Committee).  Mutua argues that ultimately, the unwillingness of the new power elite had let 
the constitutional ‗moments to lapse‘ and it was now difficult to ‗reform the Constitution 
under a ―democratic‖ government‘ (Mutua, 2008: 143).  
 
The National Constitutional Conference met at the Bomas of Kenya from whence it got its 
name. It had 629 delegates drawn from  
Members of Parliament, District Representatives, Trade Union Representatives, Non-
Governmental Organisations, Professional Organisations, Women‘s Organisations, Religious 
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Organisations, Political Party Representatives, Commissioners of the Constitution of Kenya 
Review Commission (ex- officio delegates without a vote) and special interest groups. In 
addition, the Commission accredited thousands of observers from all sectors of the society 
and the diplomatic community (Lumumba, 2008: 92). 
 
As the Conference continued, so did fragmentations among the power elite. The following 
were sources as well as effects of such fragmentations. First, ethnicity re-emerged, and as 
severally mentioned in this study, yet again contributed to frustrate transformatory change. 
Second were disagreements over the content of the proposed draft constitution. For instance, 
some actors, especially the NGO types within the Ufungamano Initiative fiercely argued for 
the scrapping of the Provincial Administration a Public Administration system inherited 
from the colonial administration and a key instrument of the State in oppressing citizens. But 
by 2004, those who had crossed over to politics were opposed to this. Moreover, the 
inclusion of the Islamic Kadhi courts in the draft constitution led to further fractures between 
the Christians who opposed it, and the Muslims who supported it. In the end, Muslims 
walked out of the Ufungamano Initiative. Muslims felt insulted by the fact that Christian 
groups that had been in the Ufungamano Initiative ganged with those who had been 
supporting the Moi/KANU State, i.e. the Evangelicals in opposing the inclusion of the Kadhi 
courts in the draft constitution (Karanja, 2008; Namwaya, 2006; Wandati, interview 
17/09/2009). 
  
Third, leadership failures/limitations and personality power plays as well as subversion by the 
power elites of the day played a role. Indeed, the Moi and subsequent Kibaki administrations, 
while appearing facilitative, feared an outcome that would see them lose their social, 
economic and political hegemonic statuses. The loose nature of the Ufungamano Initiative 
also played a role in this. As already mention in the analysis of the mediations for the merger, 
despite clear reporting and accountability lines between the different structures, some within 
the Steering Committee were too overbearing on the other actors and structures. This had the 
effect of creating further fractures in the movement as a few assumed they knew what was 
good for the movement and Kenyans in general. This confirms Bourdieu‘s observations as 
cited in the Michael Burawoy lecture series: Conversations with Bourdieu, on the ‗mythology 
of the organic intellectual… whose habitus is formed by skholé, [and] can never appreciate 
the condition of the working class, whose habitus is shaped by the endless and precarious 
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pursuit of the necessary means of existence‘ (Burawoy 2008a: 14). This is because, Burawoy 
(2008a: 15) continues, 
If the organic intellectual gets too close to the under-class or any other class […s/he] risk 
being contaminated by its misrecognitions. [At the same time], because their habitus is so 
different from the [under] class, organic intellectuals – understanding neither themselves nor 
those they engage – suffer from the temptation of dictatorship of ideas, and liable to 
manipulate the working class…. Bourdieu extends this criticism to political leaders in general 
who are governed by the logic of the political field, the field in which representatives of 
organizations compete with one another, manipulating representations of their followers for 
their own ends. 
The merger negotiations process analysed earlier in this chapter demonstrates this arrogation 
of representation. 
 
A key outcome of the contentions in the content of the proposed constitution was a 
constitutional interpretation case filed by Njoya and others. In the views of some of the 
people involved in the National Constitutional Conference process, the Government had been 
working in cahoots with some former members of the Ufungamano Initiative who filed a 
constitutional interpretation case on the rights of Kenyans to make the constitution, and 
specifically on the need for a referendum. Given the high polarisation of nature of the Reform 
politics some critics trashed the ruling by Justices Aaron Ringera, Benjamin Kubo and Mary 
Kasango on March 25, 2004 as ill motivated.  However, the ruling also received support from 
the likes of Philip Kichana of International Commission of Jurists who wrote of it:  
The power to make and enact a new constitution exclusively belongs to the people and 
therefore no amendments to the constitution can give parliament that power. In addition, the 
court reasoned that since Kenya is a multi-party democratic State, its people have an implied 
but mandatory right to ratify a new constitution (2004: 1). 
 
But the contentions within the Ufungamano Initiative were not the only thing that made the 
National Constitutional Conference process chaotic. According to Lumumba (2008) during 
the life of the National Constitutional Conference, a number of prominent Kenyans at the 
heart of the constitutional reform project died in office. This further polarised the process in 
fundamental ways. The most notable were the deaths of Dr. Oki Ooko Ombaka on June 15, 
2002; Michael Christopher Wamalwa (the Vice President) in a London Hospital on August 
25, 2003; and finally, the alleged assassination of Dr. Chrispin Odhiambo Mbai, the convenor 
of the contentious technical Committee on Devolution on September 14, 2003. The former 
319 
 
CKRC Secretary, PLO Lumumba, writes of the effects of each of these deaths to the 
constitutional reform train: 
Oki‘s death was a big blow to the Review Process. He had been a fearless crusader for a 
people-driven Constitution and a voice of reason and honesty within the Commission. With 
him and Yash we had constituted a formidable bulwark against the shenanigans of state-
friendly commissioners whose subterranean machinations were designed to torpedo the 
process (Lumumba 2008: 69. Original underlined). 
 
Regarding Wamalwa‘s death, Lumumba (2008: 112) noted: 
Diviners could easily say that Bomas II was jinxed.... No sooner had the dust settled on the 
Plenary debate than the Conference was hit with news of death in what the Rapporteur 
General of the Conference, Prof H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo called in his report ‗interruptions in 
mortis causae‘. Delegate No.2 Kijana Michael Christopher Wamalwa, then Member of 
Parliament for Saboti and Vice President and Minister for Regional Development passed 
away in a London Hospital on August 25 2003. President Kibaki declared two weeks of 
National mourning to be observed between August 25 and September 6, 2003.  
 
Kijana Wamalwa was no ordinary mortal in the then Kenyan politics. Wamalwa had been 
instrumental in the reform movement.  Since early 1990s he had been part of a younger group 
of politicians known as the ‗Young Turks‘ who had teamed up with the older generation of 
opposition politicians to push for the return of political pluralism in the country. Yash Ghai 
the chair of the Bomas Conference eulogised Wamalwa as ‗a much admired and loved 
person, he listened to all and he had the ability to inspire and to reconcile [...] and a 
peacemaker [who] built bridges across different sectors of our society and of politics‘ (CKRC 
National Constitutional Conference - Plenary Proceedings on Adjournment of the 
Conference- 25.08.03: 6; Lumumba, 2008: 113).  Ghai continued to point out that Wamalwa  
…was a person of great integrity and reliability…steadfast…sharp intellect and he spoke with 
great eloquence and conviction, and had great sense of humour...a champion of political and 
constitutional reform, a true democrat. His role in the reform movement, which preceded and 
gave birth to this Review Process, was truly monumental. He helped define the movement for 
Reform and to define the agenda that found its way into the Review Act and which has 
animated the work of the different Organs of Review (ibid).  
 
Wamalwa had been a giant among the constitutional and political reform stalwarts in Kenya. 
Wamalwa had earlier in the year (April 30 2003), inspired the Delegates on the occasion of 
the official opening of the National Constitution Conference with these words:  
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Distinguished Delegates, this is a momentous occasion in the life of the Kenyan nation. For 
today we are gathered here to redefine our political, cultural and social economic future 
through the process of crafting a new constitution. In the whole history of mankind, only a 
few generations have been given the privilege of rewriting the laws of their country and we 
are among them. Today we are ranged alongside Thomas Jefferson, Napoleon Bonaparte and 
other people who have made it their duty to define laws that would serve their countries for 
posterity.  Constitution making in Kenya has been a long and rocky process. We have gone 
through hell and back, and to be here finally, we must thank the Almighty to have kept us 
alive and having given us this privilege. Ladies and gentlemen, we in this nation are of many 
tribes and many religions and many cultures. This is not a weakness. This is the strength of 
this Republic. In our efforts to write the supreme law of the land, we must go the extra mile to 
cater for every community however small, (applause) for every religious sect however small, 
for every Kenyan, who has a view. For the constitution is the defender of the weak, the 
protector of the mighty and the not so mighty, and the modern defender of the faiths in plural 
(Michael Christopher Wamalwa April 30, 2003 on the occasion of the official opening of the 
National Constitutional Conference). 
 
The absence of Wamalwa‘s uniting and sobering influence on the Kenyan political scene was 
soon felt in the Constitutional Review Process as cabinet members of the ruling coalition 
started pulling in different directions, resulting in major conflicts over the content of the 
proposed constitution. Moreover, the state now seemed determined to renege on the promise 
of giving Kenyans a new constitution, a promise that the NARC Administration had been 
elected on.  
 
The third death on the September 14 2003, six days after National Constitutional Conference 
had reconvened on its third session, shocked the country. This time, it was the murder of Dr. 
Chrispin Odhiambo Mbai at his home on a Sunday morning. Mbai had been elected the 
convenor of the contentious Technical Committee on Devolution. Mbai was a key intellectual 
protagonist who attacked the CKRC devolution proposal as well as another proposal on 
devolution proposed by Kibaki‘s Government. The key contention on devolution was that the 
Government wanted to retain the controversial centralised Provincial Administration which 
most delegates as well as views from the Kenyan public had wanted scrapped.  Dr. Mbai had 
been advocating a quasi-federal model and his proposals found favour with most delegates. 
Lumumba writes that, 
Owing to the significance that Devolution had taken, when Mbai was gunned down, 
accusations of murder and assassination flew about. Two people were arrested and charged 
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with murder but later acquitted. With his murder unresolved, Dr. Mbai became a martyr for 
the constitution. The impact of Dr. Mbai‘s death was enormous. It heightened tension and 
even raised ethnic sensibilities (Lumumba, 2008: 118).  
 
With these polarities, the Ufungamano Initiative by the 2005 Referendum was no longer 
united and differed on the substance of the new constitution. It also no longer commanded a 
mass following. Ombok (interview, 24/10/2009) stated that ‗the church had lost the moral 
legitimacy when they started identifying with the system.‘ Reflecting on this change of 
fortunes, Cottrell and Ghai (2007) argue that despite civil society‘s prominence in pushing 
for change and the political currency and popular support it enjoyed, there was limited 
success because of the co-optations and resource and structural constraints and manipulations 
by state and other vested interests. The observation by Cottrell and Ghai (2007) is particularly 
telling. It raises the question: what conditions allowed this promising case to turn into a 
classic story of limitations to social movements when they are absorbed into rigid power 
structures?  
 
The discussion above has shown that one of the key reasons for the demise of the movement 
was that the merger was essentially co-optive. Ufungamano seemed to have treated the 
merger as an end in itself. Moreover, in the period post-2002 general election, different 
sections of civil society that had hitherto been united against Moi took different positions in 
their dealings with the state. The faultlines were predictably along ethnic lines (interviews: 
Ombok, 24/09/2009; Gitari, 21/09/2009; Omtatah, 31/03/2010). The opportunistic political 
vultures in political parties preyed on everyone else and blocked the realisation of a new 
constitution. The National Council of NGOs of Kenya was not spared of these deep tribal 
divisions. The NCCK and the Catholic Church also seemed to be imploding with different 
church leaders taking contradictory positions.   
 
By the end of the National Constitutional Conference, these divisions had been so manifest 
that the NAK side of government supported by what remained of the Ufungamano Initiative 
(mainly clergy from the central region of the country) staged a boycott against the March 15 
2004 final vote for the adoption of the draft constitution (interviews: Kaimba, 19/09/2009; 
Gitari, 21/09/2009; Njoya, 29/09/2009; Mwanyumba, 07/04/2010; Runguma, 13/03/2010; 
Odhiambo M., 01/04/2010; Athman, 12/10/2009). The final adoption of the proposed 
constitution was done only with the Attorney General as the representative of the 
Government.  
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The NAK faction of the Government was obviously unhappy with these developments.  
Thereafter, they attempted to introduce a separate constitution from the National 
Constitutional Conference Draft by asking the Attorney General, Amos Wako, to issue a 
contentious Draft to be subjected to a Referendum on November 21 2005 (Nyinguro and 
Otenyo, 2007).  This further polarised the country into ‗Kibaki‘s pro-constitution 
Government on the one hand and a loose coalition of elements in the NARC Government 
(from the partner Liberal Democratic Party) and former ruling party-Kenya African National 
Union on the other‘ (ibid) opposed to the draft constitution. In the months prior to the 
November 21, 2005 referendum, divisions within Kenyan society and specifically within the 
ruling coalition had rendered the NARC Government inoperative. The campaigns for or 
against the draft constitution were no longer based on the substance of the constitution but on 
personalities, broken promises of an MoU, to even outright lies on issues of land tenure,
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position of the Islamic Kadhi courts and on issues of sexual and reproductive rights. 
  
The rallying point for the NAK side of the NARC Coalition in the support for the constitution 
was that the proposed constitution, which had been adulterated by Members of Parliament 
and the Attorney General, was better than the one existing and therefore, Kenyans should 
support it. In so many ways, the words of the opening paragraph of one of the most famous 
Victorian authors, Charles Dickens in A Tale of the Two Cities (1859) captures the hyperbole 
of that moment:  
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of 
foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of 
Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, 
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 The same issue of land ownership was also contentions during the 2010 Constitutional Referendum. 
Committee of Experts that shepherded the realisation of the new constitution in August 2010 wrote in its report: 
‗Opposition to some of the provisions in the land ...was not unexpected. This is so particularly in respect to the 
provisions relating to illegally acquired property in the Bill of Rights (read grabbed land) and those authorizing 
the setting up of a maximum acreage for land holdings. Such opposition was to be expected from the owners of 
obscenely vast tracts of land and the beneficiaries of land acquired fraudulently and corruptly through abuse of 
office by previous regimes. The Committee will however never forget the unedifying and pitiable images of 
some of the poor and the landless Kenyans vigorously opposing these provisions based on distorted information 
peddled by some prominent opponents of the Proposed Constitution of Kenya. This spectacle clearly portrayed 
the kind of stranglehold, which the powerful have over the weak and how this relationship is exploited and 
abused. This particular deadlock was surprisingly resolved by enlightened land owners and entrepreneurs with 
the benefit of understanding that it is the delicate relationship between labour and capital which is the 
foundation of national stability. This understanding dictates that the better endowed members of our society 
must be allowed to create capital and wealth. However, their privileged survival is pegged on ensuring that the 
poor and the under privileged have the opportunity to mitigate their plight by being given a chance and through 
the provision of basic welfare facilities. In common analogy, this is the point, which Queen Marie Antoinette is 
said to have missed in provoking the French Revolution. In reality the survival of modern civilizations is 
grounded on this foundation‘ (CoE, 2010: 9-10). 
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we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to heaven, 
we were all going direct the other way - in short, the period was so far like the present period, 
that some of its noisiest authorities insisted on its being received, for good or for evil, in the 
superlative degree of comparison only.  
As Nyinguro and Otenyo (2007: 18) assert that while those opposed to the new Draft  
‗mobilized successfully to defeat the Kibaki-led supporters of the draft constitution…the No 
group framed their cause in terms of Kibaki, attempting to create a constitution that would 
give him (the President) excessive powers.‘ But none of the sides had national interests at 
heart as parochial partisan political and ethnic interests had once again taken centre stage.  
A dream deferred?  
In 1951, the famous Africa American poet, Langston Hughes in his famous poem, A Dream 
Deferred wrote:  
What happens to a dream deferred?  
Does it dry up  
Like a raisin in the sun?  
Or fester like a sore--  
And then run?  
Does it stink like rotten meat?  
Or crust and sugar over--  
like a syrupy sweet?  
Maybe it just sags  
like a heavy load.  
Or does it explode? 
 
The poem helps frame the debate on whether, as a result of the abortion of the popular will, 
the Ufungamano Initiative as initially constituted ought to have regrouped. While this 
remains a debatable question, what is clear is that even as ethnic-political crocodiles with a 
monstrous appetite for power consumed both the Ufungamano Initiative and the realisation of 
a new constitution, their demise laid the ground for new waves of contention. The issues at 
the heart of the generation of the Ufungamano Initiative were now widely diffused among the 
Kenyan population.  This helped to shift the hegemonic anti-reform ideology as more 
Kenyans outside elite formations kept on agitating for the need to change the constitution. 
That is why the entire constitutional reform process did not die (Lumumba, interview 
01/10/2009).  
  
According to Nyinguro and Otenyo (2007: 18), the first among these new waves of 
contention originated during the National Constitutional Conference deliberations  through 
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A series of meetings early in April 2004 at the National Constitutional Conference [that] 
resulted in the formation of an informal caucus, dubbed the Katiba Watch. Delegates and 
observers unhappy with the pace at which NARC was managing the constitutional Process 
formed a Coalition for Commonsense Constitution (CCC), later renamed Katiba Watch.... By 
the end of 2004 [it] had begun calling for mass action.... Katiba Watch activists denounced 
the government‘s tactics of reneging on the promise to deliver a new constitution to Kenya 
during its first year in power. Katiba Watch also challenged the government to implement 
other major political reforms to improve on the quality of life for Kenyans. The pressure 
group articulated the relationship between a new constitutional order and fair distribution of 
the country‘s wealth, thereby giving the pro-democracy movement much-needed appeal. 
 
Another development was the formation of a new civil society coalition, the National Civil 
Society Congress as a platform for civil society organizations involved in pushing for social 
change (interviews: Odhiambo M., 01/04/2010; Churchill, 02/10/2009). The National Civil 
Society Congress through its Katiba sasa (constitution now) campaign, kept vigil and pushed 
for the realisation of a new constitution. Significantly, this new coalition drew most of its 
membership from the secular civil society groups who had been at the forefront of the 
constitutional reform struggles and were part of the Ufungamano Initiative (interviews: 
Odhiambo M., 01/04/2010; Wambua, 13/10/2009; Nduta, 08/04/2010; Apiyo, 21/03/2010; 
Mwachofi, 28/03/2010; Nyokabi, 31/03/2010; Omtatah, 31/03/2010). 
 
The country did go back into mass action. But the ethnic polarisation of the country was a 
sure recipe for the vortex whose explosion into murderous protests and revolts after a 
disputed presidential vote in 2007 was the final wake-up call to the elites on the need to at 
least transform the State or the entire Kenya would implode. This was possible because 
ordinary citizens refused to let go off their struggles for transformation of the State. As the 
violence raged, the international community under the auspices of a Panel of Eminent 
Africans led by Dr. Kofi Annan intervened and brokered a peace deal. A retinue of conditions 
including comprehensive constitutional reforms were set for the ruling elites and especially 
for the new Coalition Government to meet. A clear timetable for the implementation of this 
was drawn and the Panel of Eminent African Persons continued monitoring progress towards 
its achievement.   
   
Martin Luther King junior once said that, ‗the arc of history is long, but it bends toward 
justice.‘ On august 4, 2010, Kenyans, in a constitutional referendum, finally overwhelmingly 
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voted by 67.25% in favour of the proposed constitution. This was a culmination of a two 
decade long struggle for a new constitution. The adoption of the new constitution in 2010 
suggests that for the Kenyan constitutional reform struggles the ultimate success only came 
after the confluence of means and ends within the different elite formations. A key question 
then is, how can the reform struggles narrative inform the strategies for ensuring the new 
constitution is implemented in Kenya?  The answer to this and many other questions are 
critical. They nonetheless should form the subject matter of a different research project 
because they are beyond the remit of the current one. 
Conclusion 
The discussion in this chapter has critically analysed the merger motivation, process and 
outcomes. It has shown that the movement resulted in a merger, though it was contested, 
because the most influential leadership saw opportunities for strategic interactions with the 
state led process, which was Ufungamano Initiative‘s primary competitor in the constitutional 
reform contention. The chapter has demonstrated that in this contention, the Ufungamano 
Initiative had managed to create some substantive challenge to the state-led process. The 
political power elites were somewhat forced to find a credible person to steer the process so 
that it would win Kenyans back to their side. This explains the search for and entry of Yash 
Pal Ghai as a new and trustworthy player in the process whose idea to push for a merger, 
became an attractive option for the most powerful element of the Ufungamano Initiative 
leadership as well as the state-led process. These leaders, identified as mainly from religious 
institutions, politicians, and the PCK became Ghai‘s allies in pushing for a merger, which 
though acrimonious, was achieved.  
 
The chapter has shown that acrimony was a product of the multiplicity and diversity of actors 
in the movement, which, while a great source of strength, was also responsible for multiple 
fault lines.  The chapter has discussed how, with so many fundamental differences, the 
movement ceased to be viable and ultimately disintegrated. In the process of the internal 
contentions as well as the strategic interactions between the movement leadership and the 
state, the chapter revealed that the different contenders in the Kenyan constitutional reform 
struggle managed to turn popular democratic demands into a terrain of intra-elite struggles, 
which somewhat frustrated the transformation of the state in the 2005 constitutional 
referendum. Nonetheless, it remained a contested terrain as the idea of a better constitution to 
serve all Kenyan‘s was widely diffused and new waves of contention started to build up. Its 
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high tide, the chapter argued, was the 2008 post-election violence, which forced a confluence 
of forces that compelled political elites to listen to Kenyans and deliver a new constitution in 
August of 2010. It was nonetheless not a tide without many barriers on the way.  At this 
point, the critical questions are: what can we learn from the Ufungamano Initiative? Did the 
movement bequeath anything positive or negative to the constitutional reform project? These 
are the key questions addressed in the concluding chapter.  
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Chapter Eight 
 
A Turning Point When History Failed to Turn? A Conclusion 
 
Every so often, societies come to critical moments when their history could turn. Those who have 
seized the moment have transformed the destiny of their nations for the better. Those who let the 
moment to pass have lived to pass on to future generations narratives of missed opportunities. These 
are narratives of false dawns that did not blossom into mornings of salvation and fulfillment. The 
Kenyan nation has had its fair share of missed boats. […]In Kenya, we … steadily got it wrong from 
the moment we began meddling with the Independence Constitution in 1964. […] By 1991, the 
Constitution, Parliament and the Judiciary were instruments of command and control by the 
Executive. We have since been going through instalments of reform, when we have attempted to 
reverse the negations that our leaders sank us into in the first three decades of independence. But we 
have become adept at making one step forward and two steps backwards. Because of this, our 
history never turns, when it should be turning. We missed the boat in 1992, with the first multiparty 
elections since independence. We missed it again in 2003, after bringing a new regime to power the 
previous year. We repeated this in 2005, when we attempted to give the country a flawed new 
Constitution. Then in 2008 we set the country on fire (Barrack Muluka, June 10, 2011). 
 
Introduction 
For the better part of the last two decades, the Kenyan socio-economic and political 
landscape has been a tumultuous one. There have been many political and social struggles 
centred on embedding a new constitutional order to check excessive political and economic 
encroachment on society by avaricious political and economic elites. Much of the scholarship 
on these struggles, with a few notable exceptions, pays little attention to the role of the 
encroachment of market forces on the lives of Kenyans as the fuel behind the discontent that 
led to the emergence of the various constitutional reform struggles. This thesis has attempted 
to address this gap by using an integrated analysis of the political, economic, and social 
factors behind the emergence of the constitutional reform struggles in Kenya. Specifically, it 
has addressed the question of why and how at least fifty-four different secular and religious 
civil society organisations and opposition political parties, with potentially conflicting 
interests, successfully joined hands, despite several past failed attempts, in a ‗movement of 
movements‘ known as the Ufungamano Initiative to write a new constitution that would 
redefine the relationship between the Kenyan people and their rulers. The Ufungamano 
Initiative is an interesting case because it amplifies both the power and limits of social 
movements in challenging and re-ordering an African State.  
 
This concluding chapter asks: what can we learn from the Ufungamano Initiative? Did the 
movement bequeath anything positive or negative for the constitutional reform project?  Most 
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importantly, what can this movement bequeath contemporary scholarship of social 
movements especially on the African continent?   
 
In an attempt to answer these questions, the chapter is divided into three main sections. The 
first section offers conclusions on forces that led to the emergence of the Ufungamano 
Initiative. The next section offers insights into what the Ufungamano Initiative was able to 
achieve. The section also speaks to what this study offers as a contribution to the study of 
social movements. The thesis concludes that the Ufungamano Initiative demonstrates that 
citizens acting collectively can create alternatives especially in situations of crises engineered 
by political elites. Moreover, it shows that change does not necessarily have to rely on the 
political elites for leadership. In particular, the thesis has shown that it is possible for citizens 
of socioeconomically and politically diverse backgrounds, to overcome existing societal 
cleavages (especially ethnicity, class, gender and generation) and collectively act in response 
to events and matters of national importance, outside of formal state instituted structures and 
force concessions from powerful elites. This collective action, I argue, is what resulted 
creation of counter-hegemony that allowed for direct citizen participation in making the 
constitution.  
 
The thesis has also shown that the Ufungamano Initiative‘s merger with the State-run Process 
reflects strategic interactions that had consequences for the trajectory of the movement as 
well as the outcome of the constitutional reform struggles. This chapter also offers 
conclusions on the potency of the movement in establishing and building legitimacy and 
political currency for mass support through effective framing, to successfully challenge the 
state in a context of acute constraints. 
 
Nonetheless, the thesis has also demonstrated that the Ufungamano Initiative manifested a 
familiar story of the limits to social struggles in Kenya where most movements die without 
achieving the aims and goals that inspire their formation. The study demonstrates that 
notwithstanding its promise, and success in creating sufficient challenges to force the 
Moi/KANU regime to seek ways to salvage itself in the face of a growing legitimacy crisis, 
the movement was beset with multiple contradictions that played out to arrest the 
transformations it had sought. The contradictions in the Ufungamano Initiative were 
nonetheless reflections of cleavages in the wider Kenyan society. Because of these cleavages, 
Cottrell and Ghai (2007: 1) observe that ‗although civil society, with much popular support, 
was prominent in pushing for change … vested interests … frustrated a quick outcome.‘ 
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More specifically, the idea of a new constitution miscarried because the Ufungamano 
Initiative‘s merger with the state-led process was essentially an exclusive elite bargain that 
conspired to subordinate popular will.  
 
This elite bargain, as the merger demonstrates, was possible because the religious, political 
and secular civil society elites at the leadership of the movement had deliberately ensured 
that structures for popular involvement of the under classes were stifled and critical decision-
making roles remained in the hands of a few who wielded the levers to manipulate or 
determine outcomes. Furthermore, the donor dependency in the funding of this struggle, as 
shown in chapters six and seven, meant that the movement was also vulnerable to the whims 
(manipulative or strategic) of those who funded it. The implications of this are, I argue, that 
in the face of such contradictions, African social movements seeking radical transformations 
need to reconcile the cleavages that external funding brings by providing effective structures 
to broaden the breadth of public support from the various sections of society if they are to 
achieve transformations. Failing this, they remain oligarchical appendages of whoever pays 
them, and ultimately, this subordinates popular will.    
Generative factors for the Ufungamano Initiative 
In his dissertation, Establishing a Culture of Resistance: The Struggle for Human Rights and 
Democracy in Authoritarian Kenya 1987-2002, Robert Maxwell Press (2004: 50-51) revisits 
a classic sociological question of structure and agency in social action by asking the question 
whether ‗social movements are more the result of structural circumstances or agency.‘ 
Introduced in sociology by Emile Durkheim, the structure and agency debate revolves around 
the determination of social action as a dynamic interplay of individual autonomous decisions 
to act (agency) and how such actions are also shaped by social environment (structure). In 
this regard, Press asks: ‗is [wo]man basically at the mercy of larger forces surrounding 
[her/]him such as the economy, international relations, class structure, etc. Or is [wo]man 
able to rise up against the immediate repression [s/]he sees and challenge it in some way, 
either as an individual or as part of a group?‘ I borrow these questions from Press in an effort 
to offer conclusions on the motivations for the emergence of the Ufungamano Initiative. 
Some of my conclusions contest those offered by Press.
1
 I argue that the Ufungamano 
                                                 
1
 Press‘s dissertation is concerned with the question of how protests started and established a culture of 
resistance in Kenya‘s generic democratization struggles while the current thesis is concerned with in-depth 
understanding of one of the most influential social movements to have pushed for constitutional reforms in 
Kenya. Press generates six key conclusions responding to these questions some of which require greater scrutiny. 
Press argues: (1) Contrary to the dominant social movement theories on political process, activism does not 
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Initiative as social action was a product of both agency and structure in both Kenyan 
domestic and international arena. For, as Giddens (2006: 78) points out, ‗unlike objects in 
nature, humans are self-aware beings and confer sense and purpose on what they do.‘ In the 
discussion below, I offer evidence for this conclusion.   
Political opportunities and leadership nexus  
The Ufungamano Initiative, this thesis demonstrates, was a response to existing conditions 
and political opportunities. Specifically, chapters four and five highlight the fact that 
struggles emerged to apply pressure on the State. The State capitulated after a protracted 
confrontation. This capitulation then created new political opportunities around which new 
waves of struggles were built. It is also true, as Press (2004) argues, that individual activists 
and the organisations they belonged to or led, also created and utilised their own political 
opportunities.  
 
With regard to the question of what specific opportunities and resources allowed the nascent 
pro-reform movements to flourish in a constrained environment, chapter four showed that 
there were a multiplicity of political opportunities and constraints provided by political and 
socio-economic developments in the country.  The first of such opportunities and constraints 
highlighted in this thesis was the deteriorating socioeconomic and political conditions in the 
country. This was largely a result of at least four factors that included:  
1) Changes in the global political economy after the end of the Cold War;  
2) Rampant corruption by the ruling political and economic elites that led to increased 
dispossession of the poor specifically through land evictions especially in urban slum 
areas;  
3) Excessive encroachment on society by neoliberal economic forces as a result of the 
forced implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programmes that led to massive loss 
of livelihood and decreasing state ability to meet basic economic and social services 
needs for the majority of the population;  
                                                                                                                                                       
largely happen in response to external political opportunities; activists can make their own opportunities. The 
resistance in Kenya began with no discernable changes in adverse societal or international circumstances.... (2) 
Contrary to much of the literature on democratic transitions, a transition occurred without negotiations or pacts 
between elites in the regime and in the reform movement. (3) Individual activists, an under-studied force, not 
organizational activists started the resistance. (4) Informal organizations and networks are as important as 
formal ones, especially in the initial phases of resistance. (5) Principled ideas (e.g., justice, freedom) offer a 
better explanation of motivations than rational choice/self-interest for early activists, who took risks that far 
outweighed any personal benefits from their activism; (6) international donors played only a secondary role in 
helping bring about reforms; the primary pressure was domestic-based (Press, 2004: xv-xvi). 
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4) Increasing political intolerance and reneging on reforms promises by the Moi/KANU 
regime.   
 
The above factors explain the motivations for the participation of the various socioeconomic 
formations, elite or otherwise, in contesting the state of socioeconomic and political 
governance, which had an impact on the daily lives of ordinary people. For instance, this 
thesis has revealed that runaway corruption in the country made things worse for poor slum 
dwellers as a culture of grabbing of public land had been bred and perfected by the economic 
and political elites in collusion with State bureaucracy. The elites used the State security 
agencies and hired thugs to evict people and demolish their shacks in the slums. Such 
evictions and demolitions had by mid-1990s, become a common occurrence in the slums 
(Wamucii and Idwasi, 2011; Kloop, 2008; Katumanga, 2005; Katumanga with Cliffe, 2005; 
Manundu, 1997; Exodus-Kutoka Network, 2005). As a result, Katumanga (2005: 510) 
concludes that ‗for most urban lumpen elements, direct resistance was a function of the fact 
that they had no fall-back position and everything to lose‘ (see also Anderson, 2002; Kobiah, 
1978).  
 
The runaway corruption as highlighted in chapter four, did not spare even middle class 
professionals such as lawyers and their legal practice. Justice was commoditised. Besides, 
lawyers pursing any social justice cases were increasingly harassed. It was this encroachment 
on society by market forces through the Structural Adjustments as well as corruption that 
made people in the slums start organising, initially to protest against economic injustices and 
evictions. One such effort led to the birth of Muungano wa Wanavijiji cited in chapter four. 
Economic necessity was therefore a factor in explaining the outpouring of protest by citizens 
to wrestle themselves out of an avaricious state and the conditions it had created. This 
explains the strong participation of the urban middle class as well as the working class in the 
Ufungamano Initiative.  
   
But also central to the emergence and operations of such protest movements, as argued in 
chapter six, was the role of leadership. To be specific, without looking at leadership as both 
agency as well as structure, it is difficult to understand how individual and collective 
grievances were channelled into collective action. It required agency on the part of activists 
to recognise, utilise as well as push the frontiers of existing opportunities for mobilisation. 
This thesis has also shown that it took courage, blood, persecution, and organisation for this 
to happen. This suggests that individual agency was an important variable in translating 
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grievances into social movement organisations to confront collective and individual 
oppression. This, as argued in chapter five corroborates McCarthy and Zald‘s (1977) 
argument that social movements emerge when individuals with grievances are able to 
mobilise sufficient resources (i.e. leadership, money, knowledge, political influence, access 
to media, labour, solidarity, legitimacy, and internal and external support from powerful elite) 
to take action.  
 
Further, the Ufungamano Initiative narrative reveals that it is leadership by movement 
entrepreneurs, combining both agency and structure, which explains why discontented 
citizens were able to organise. This is because leaders, as Tilly (1977) and McAdam (1982) 
observe, catalysed and transformed collective discontent into social movements. Such 
‗entrepreneurs‘ were critical in bringing the disparate pro-reform groups including civil 
society, religious organisations, and opposition political parties together under the 
Ufungamano Initiative to push for constitutional reforms.  
 
To reinforce the role of leadership, chapters five and six demonstrated that incubating and 
building of the movement was not an easy job especially in the context of competing interests 
and initiatives. Bringing the divergence actors together took more than the existence of a 
common adversary in the name of the Moi/KANU regime. There was deliberate horse-
trading that resulted in certain positions of leadership in the movement being surrendered to 
certain leaders and their groups. One such group and its leader was the National Council of 
Churches of Kenya who were the last to join the Ufungamano Initiative only after being 
assured of a role in its stewardship.  Here we clearly discern that the participation of NCCK 
and its General Secretary was pegged on his control of the process. This notwithstanding, the 
NCCK‘s General Secretary later became the engine that brought the movement to life and 
steered it during its most visible moment in the struggle. This suggests the centrality of 
leadership as a crucial variable in the emergence and operation of social movements. Further, 
it confirms that different leaders performed different leadership roles.  
 
The thesis has also problematised the role of religious leaders in these struggles. The 
emergence of the Ufungamano Initiative was a reaction from religious leaders‘ own fears that 
the radical hard line stance adopted by some secular civil society groups, specifically by the 
NCEC, though promising greater transformations might plunge the country into turmoil. This 
was especially so as the Moi/KANU state was obstinately unwilling to deal with NCEC. In 
the face of high power games that Moi/KANU was playing, coupled with NCEC‘s own 
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stubbornness, it is not unimaginable that such violence was possible. In acting to avert such a 
crisis, the religious leaders‘ role in the Ufungamano Initiative was one of pacification. In 
classic Gramscian sense, by design or accident, the Ufungamano Initiative stabilised the 
situation and ensured popular consent to the hegemonic forces. This is specifically amplified 
in chapter seven where the thesis shows how part of the Ufungamano Initiative leadership 
(specifically the religious leadership) delivered the movement to its competitors through an 
acrimonious merger.   
Role of elite pacts and fragmentations  
In his study, Press (2004) concluded that the 2002 Kenyan political transition occurred 
without negotiations or pacts between elites in the regime and in the reform movement. This 
can only be true in the context of the actual 2002 general election and its outcomes. This 
conclusion ignores the elite bargains that happened immediately prior to the 2002 general 
election when a section of top KANU leadership left in a huff and formed the Liberal 
Democratic Party to join the opposition through the infamous Memorandum of 
Understanding to form the NARC that defeated KANU.  
 
Moreover, Press‘s conclusion fails to see other forms of pacts between different elite 
formations especially those opposed to Moi as a great source of energy that drove the 
constitutional reform struggles. This thesis has shown that in the Ufungamano Initiative, an 
elite pact existed between secular civil society leaders, religious leaders, and opposition 
political parties. Indeed, the merger between the Ufungamano Initiative and the Parliament-
led Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, as was the IPPG deal of 1997, as this study 
has shown, were also in many ways manifestations of elite bargains.   
 
The historiography of social protests in Kenya in chapter four traced the key waves in the 
constitutional reform struggles that by 1990 had galvanised a majority of Kenyans in forcing 
political concessions through the repeal of Section 2A that had criminalised political 
opposition. The repeal of section 2A of the Kenyan constitution opened up some democratic 
space. However, the thesis has also argued that this did not necessarily translate into fair 
democratic political competition. This sowed the seeds for new forms of struggles especially 
in light of continued repression by the state.  
 
Like Katumanga (1999: 8) I submit here that the Moi/KANU regime‘s response to 
contestations for an open associational space determined the nature of emergent social 
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movements and also the strategies they applied in their struggles against the state. In this 
regard, chapter four showed how for instance, from 1991, the Moi/KANU regime, in a 
desperate effort to remain in power, unleashed systematic violence on pro-opposition groups 
in many regions of the country (Kagwanja, 2003; 2006; Wamucii and Idwasi, 2011; Murunga 
1999). As a result, some of the targeted ethnic groups resorted to establishing violent 
underground movements such as Mungiki, Kamjesh, Taliban, and Baghdad Boys among 
many others, to counter state violence. This violence effectively allowed the state ‗not only 
[to] maintain control over the reins of power, but also sustain its nature.  Consequently ... the 
state remained a contested space, [with a] leadership and captured institutions ... incapable of 
responding positively to social processes‘ (Katumanga, 1999: 8). Because of such 
contestation over the legitimacy of the state and its institutions, Wamucii and Idwasi (2011: 
196) observe that some of the emergent violent underground groups ‗became a preferred 
option to ineffective‘ state. But emergence of such vigilante groups must also be seen as a 
response to the infamous ruling party militia (KANU youth wingers) who used violence and 
intimidation to ensure KANU's continued hold on power.  
 
Such confrontational relationships between the state and civil society have been theorised by 
Adil Najam (2000; 1996), Anthony Bebbington and John Farrington (1993), Jenny Pearce 
(1997), and Denis R. Young (2000), as resulting from situations in which both the state and 
civil society consider each other‘s goals and strategies to be antithetical. Such a relationship 
remained the hallmark of the Moi/KANU regime and precipitated several citizens‘ collective 
action responses to the state. One such response, the thesis has argued, was the Ufungamano 
Initiative.     
 
Chapter five traced political developments from 1997 a milestone year, that ultimately led 
to the emergence of the Ufungamano Initiative as cumulative pressures from citizen groups 
for comprehensive constitutional review spearheaded by burgeoning human rights NGOs, 
religious organisations and opposition parties, climaxed in the mass protests of 1997 that 
threatened to derail the general election. A reluctant President Moi conceded to minimum 
electoral law reforms through the infamous IPPG Agreements of 1997 between KANU and 
the opposition political parties.  Instructively, the IPPG agreed to set up a Commission to 
review the constitution and subsequently, enacted the 1997 Constitution of Kenya Review 
Act formally ushering in the Review Process.   
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The IPPG deal deflated the vibrancy of the then largest constitutional reform movement, the 
National Convention Executive Council (NCEC). This laid the foundation for disagreements 
within opposition ranks as many secular civil society activists felt betrayed by the apparent 
closing of ranks of political elites to take charge, if not to arrest, the tide of reforms. The 
effects of these divisions as shown in chapter four were many. On the one hand, they gave 
rise to new contenders in these struggles. But it also shifted the support of an important 
component driving these struggles. Specifically, donor support shifted from the NCEC to the 
IPPG and the resultant 1997 Constitution of Kenya Review Act. State‘s intransigence in 
implementing the 1997 Review Act ultimately led to conditions for the emergence of a 
cooperation based on a mirage of congruence of means and ends between secular civil 
society, religious organisations and opposition political parties, making the emergence of the 
Ufungamano Initiative possible.  
 
The specific triggers for the Ufungamano Initiative were revealed in chapter five to be 
responses to the post 1997 general election developments. In particular, a new alliance 
between the Moi/KANU regime and Raila Odinga‘s National Development Party (then the 
third largest political party), served as a wakeup call to those opposed to Moi and KANU. 
There was a sense of collective outrage and a common target that acted as a shared ‗systems 
of reference‘ (Melucci, 1989) that enabled collective organising to confront shared problems 
because, as Aristotle once said, ‗a common danger unites even the bitterest enemies.‘ The 
opposition therefore realised that if things were to change, unity of purpose was at least 
needed. The result of such awakening was the birth of a movement uniting different groups 
opposed to the Moi/KANU regime: a movement brought together by their opposition to 
Moi‘s rule. This corroborates Oliver and Meryer‘s (2003) postulation of co-evolution of 
movements and their antagonists, as each learns and adjusts in response to each other‘s 
actions and strategies.  
 
To understand how this co-evolution occurred, chapter five showed how the enactment of the 
1997 Review Act did not result in any agreement by different stakeholders on the 
Constitution Review Process. Religious groups and secular civil society organisations felt 
that the 1997 Review Act did not effectively encompass the diversity of interest groups, and 
that the process was captive to the narrow interests of the political class to the exclusion of 
the Kenyan people. However, Moi and Odinga‘s newfound unity, offered a rallying point for 
unity in opposing the regimes‘ opposition to change and therefore, an opportunity for the 
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emergence of the Ufungamano Initiative. This thesis has highlighted the fact that the 
Moi/KANU regime‘s attempt to eliminate the provisions for direct citizens‘ involvement in 
the process through amendments to 1997 Review Act and the 1998 Constitution of Kenya 
Review Commission Amendment Act, was the alarm that forced different cadres of 
oppositional activists to talk to each other and build consensus on the need to press for a 
people-centred process. These talks resulted in the birth of the Ufungamano Initiative on 
December 15, 1999 and subsequently the political movement of 2002 that routed KANU out 
of power.  
 
The analysis in this thesis reveals that while the Ufungamano Initiative‘s language of reforms 
called for fundamental changes in the architecture of the state and its relationship with the 
people of Kenya, this was not fully achieved because of the fragmented nature of the 
struggles, and secondly, due to the dialectic nature of the elite fragmentation.  Together, these 
factors created conditions favourable for elite pacts in the course of the various cycles of 
contention in these struggles.  
 
The narrative in this thesis articulates how these factors have played out. Up to the end of the 
1980s, the pro-reform voices were few and more or less, voices in the wilderness. The 
subaltern classes were rarely engaged. The prominent struggles mainly comprised of voices 
historically termed in Kenyan struggle scholarship as ‗Left leaning‘ – intelligentsia, students, 
politicians, and to some degree, trade unions. These struggles were highly elitist and in many 
instances, clandestine. This is not to say that the under classes did not have their own 
struggles. Rather, their struggles were centred on bread and butter issues. They were also 
disorganised as much as they were uncoordinated. Many lacked connections with the on-
going struggles at the national level.  
 
The 1990s witnessed the coming together of the different struggles for changes in the Kenyan 
constitution. But these struggles were still elite-led, specifically by the political elite that had 
fallen out of favour with the then one party state. These elites were mainly seeking alternative 
avenues for their own political relevance. NGOs, social movements, and the new opposition 
parties were such avenues.  Limited involvement of under classes in the nascent opposition 
political and social movements meant that no strong organisational bonds existed between 
elite and subaltern struggles. Even where efforts were made to accommodate popular 
participation as in the Ufungamano Initiative, such struggles failed to establish sufficient 
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structures for participation and mobilisation. This led to further cleavages as well as 
limitations in the Ufungamano Initiative. 
 
The new vulnerabilities of the Moi/KANU regime resulted in new opportunities, not just for 
the pro-reform groups, but also for the conservative political and economic elites to 
reinvigorate their identity and remain relevant. A clear example of this is how some wealthy 
old conservative politicians decamped from KANU and formed the Democratic Party whose 
change agenda was never radical. This suggests that in forming opposition political parties, 
these leaders were concerned with preservation of the collective self-interest of the ruling 
elite, because, as Michels (1911: 98) observes, leadership ensures continued stay in office: 
With the institution of leadership there simultaneously begins, owing to the long tenure of 
office, the transformation of the leaders into a closed caste. Unless ... extreme individualism 
and fanatical political dogmatism stand in the way, the old leaders present themselves to the 
masses as a compact phalanx—at any rate whenever the masses are so much aroused as to 
endanger the position of the leaders. 
For the Kenyan case, there has been little interrogation of the leadership and how close-knit 
the group has been despite the occasional portrayal of cleavages.  
 
However occasional they were, such elite fragmentations played an important role in pushing 
the frontiers of reforms especially in mainstreaming constitutional reform struggles into the 
Kenyan socioeconomic and political struggles. But elite fragmentations had a dialectic effect 
on the effectiveness of these movements. Clearly, while elite fragmentation has offered 
vanguards to these struggles, further fragmentation within those elite vanguards has often 
been a cause for the derailing of the reform train. This is because change required sufficient 
unity of forces to sustain the push. Such unity within the Ufungamano Initiative was short 
lived. The Ufungamano Initiative, despite its great promise to break with the baggage of 
ethnicity and intra-class rivalries, and a widespread mass support in such a divisive 
environment, caved in due to the weight of the same diversity (including ethnic, religious, 
class, gender and generational) that had been the source of its strength. But the greatest 
contributing factor to the demise of the movement was ethnic and intra-elite rivalries. This is 
highlighted by the differences within the movement over the merger process and outcome. 
This made most secular civil society groups leave the movement. Further, after the 2002 
general election, mistrust and contention between the different actors especially between the 
Christian and Muslim faith groups over the content of the proposed constitution forced the 
final breakup of the movement.  
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It is interesting to note that while some of the Ufungamano Initiative actors supported the 
proposed constitution, others ganged up with a section of the political elite and campaigned 
against it. The opposition to the draft constitution, as highlighted in chapter seven was based 
on a misinterpretation of contentious issues of reproductive health/rights (abortion) and the 
inclusion of the Kadhi courts in the Draft. This suggests that the position of religious leaders 
in these reforms changed depending on the balance of social forces. This validates Olukoshi‘s 
(1995: 246) argument that ‗depending on the social context, the historical conjuncture and the 
intensity of class struggle, bourgeois social movements…could also join forces with other 
social groups for democratisation.‘ Nonetheless, the contradictions highlighted above, 
corroborate Gramsci‘s (1971) postulation that religious groups and their leadership are 
conservative forces that ensure the status quo. The limits of the Ufungamano Initiative 
therefore suggests that radical reforms in a multicultural secular society cannot be 
successfully steered by religious leaders and especially when, those who stand to lose most as 
a result of such changes, are key sponsors of the agitation.  
The changing global political economy 
It is not known how far the forces of change and specifically the Ufungamano Initiative 
would have gone without external support. The thesis has shown that changes in the global 
political economy played a role and especially with the end of the Cold War that was 
instrumental in the stifling support for authoritarian regimes world over.  With aid priorities 
shifting to human rights work, pro-reform civil society and democratisation movements 
received a major boost. In this regard, Gitari‘s response to why Moi gave in, offers 
concluding insights when he stated:  
Moi and his people were against all that we were doing. But circumstances forced them to 
change. Like Saitoti [then finance minister] going to the Paris club and coming back empty 
handed and being told to change. International as well as internal pressure, contributed to 
making Moi challengeable. The economy had run down and a lot of projects he had started 
the so-called Nyayo projects, had all become white elephants. I think a time came when he 
himself was convinced that he could not continue like that. He had to change (Gitari, 
interview 21/09/2009). 
A participant from Tharaka, Kaimba (interview, 19/09/2009) gave a similar view indicating 
that Ufungamano Initiative succeeded because ‗there was a lot of pressure, pressure from 
Ufungamano, pressure from the civil society, pressure from the world over.‘   
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The Bretton Woods imposed Structural Adjustment Programmes that pushed for the 
embedding of neo-liberal fiscal austerity measures in the Kenyan economy therefore played a 
role. As part of these austerities, donors cut funding to the state while at the same time 
pushing the state to reduce expenditure on basic services and instead, introduce user fees and 
privatise public enterprises and services, and also cut down on the state wage bill. The 
reduced support, the thesis has shown, had numerous effects: the collapse of state‘s ability to 
deliver essential services; the erosion of basic social solidarity; increasing inequality, and 
massive labour layoff, which pushed many people out of employment. A majority of these 
unemployed working class and urban poor, ended up in the slums. The resulting 
socioeconomic and political malaise, the thesis has demonstrated, bred widespread Polanyi 
type responses against the Moi/KANU regime.  
 
As studies of the effects of Structural Adjustment Programmes in Africa and the developing 
world attest, adverse effects and their responses were reported in many parts of the globe (see 
for example Stiglitz (2002) who gives examples of regime changes in Indonesia, Zambia, 
Malawi, Zaire, among other countries as motivated by impacts of SAPs). The game changer 
in Kenya, as was in most of these dictatorial regimes was that Structural Adjustment 
Programme stifled Moi‘s ability to continue his patronage system. This led to further political 
elite fragmentation in a political environment charged with high intolerance. The point here is 
that while internal pressures played a role, external forces especially driven by impacts of 
SAPs on society, were decisive in triggering Polanyi type double movement societal 
responses aimed at freeing society from the stranglehold of the economic and political forces.  
Rational choice, principled ideas, or structural causes? 
The Ufungamano Initiative case also sheds light on how diverse actors unite in the face of 
collective threats. The Ufungamano Initiative arose out of the confluence of interests and 
frustrations from betrayals by the political elites in the country.  Chapter four of this thesis 
showed that the emergence of the Kenyan constitutional reform struggles, and the 
Ufungamano Initiative in particular, were part of the broader democratisation struggles and 
cannot be sufficiently explained by a single factor. As such, the analysis used a bridging 
approach building on the convergence of Karl Polanyi‘s ‗double movement‘ and the political 
process model in explaining the emergence of the Ufungamano Initiative.  
 
It is clear that the deleterious effects of a market economy played a central role in generating 
discontents that were channelled into collective actions and struggles against political and 
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economic neo-liberal elite. Taking cue from this, the thesis suggests that economic necessity 
was therefore, a factor in explaining the strong and protracted participation of the urban 
middle class as well as the working class in the Ufungamano Initiative. Indeed it was mainly 
those who had fallen out of favour with Moi and KANU who were at the heart of these 
struggles. While this suggests political reasons, when one looks at what economic impacts 
this had on these individuals, a clear picture of economic self-interests comes to the fore as 
motivators for protests against a State that rather than protecting society, was busy violating 
it. A leading figure in these struggles, Kivutha Kibwana, a constitutional law professor and 
leader of the then influential National Convention Executive Council that later became a 
constituent part of the Ufungamano Initiative, provided evidence for this when he argued:  
For quite some time people were abducted, many people were killed… colleagues died, 
others were imprisoned, and we suffered a lot. As lawyers, we got involved because there was 
no more law to practice. You could not practice any more in the courts. Your kids could not 
go to school - we had kids that dropped out of school. When the universities went on strike, 
they kicked you out of the house because it was rented. If you had loans especially from 
public banks they would take you in. In fact, you would be very vulnerable. So you decide to 
have another system where you would make a livelihood and free from this culture of both 
political and economic oppression (interview, 21/10/2009).  
  
Along the same lines, a leading figure in one of the many subaltern struggles in the slums of 
Kenya (Muungano Wa Wanavijiji), showed why the urban poor joined the middle class 
formations in a common struggle for constitutional changes because of personal tribulations 
meted on them by state brutality and neoliberal free market fundamentals. Ong‘ong‘a 
(interview, 26/03/2010) affiliated to a Kisumu based Voice of Slum Dwellers Federation, for 
instance stated that the key concern that slum dwellers pushed for in the constitutional reform 
struggles was land reforms. This is essentially because slum dwellers do not have rights over 
the land they live on.
2
 As such, slum dwellers have always been taken for granted and people 
are continuously evicted by a collusion of state and private interests. Another Kisumu 
resident, a tout who is a secondary school dropout, pointed to his being a victim of bad 
policies in the country that forced him to drop out of school because his parents could not 
afford school fees as a key motivation for taking part in these struggles in the hope that a new 
constitution would redeem him and such other people from the material conditions they 
faced. As such, while Press (2004: xvi) argues that ‗principled ideas offer a better explanation 
                                                 
2
 As already highlighted, similar reasons (land dispossession) were given as motivations for involvement in 
protests actions in Taita Taveta where majority of residents are squatters.  
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of motivations than rational choice/self-interest‘ for the activism towards change, chapters 
four and five of this thesis showed that the emergence of the Ufungamano Initiative was 
driven by a combination of both self-interest (i.e. rational choice) and principled ideas. 
Specifically, it was a new wave of contention from earlier contentions for democratic change 
in Kenya, which emerged out of frustrations with KANU‘s refusal to agree on a people-
centred and people-led process.  
 
Considering all the above factors, it is clear that a mix of both structural and agency factors 
contributed to the emergence of the Ufungamano Initiative. Arguably, the words of Mwai 
Kibaki the Kenyan President on April 30, 2003 during the official opening of the National 
Constitutional Conference clearly denote the confluence of forces that pushed the country to 
seeking a new constitutional order:  
This Conference is the culmination of a long struggle by the people of Kenya. A struggle for 
justice and the recovery of their rights. A struggle for fair and efficient governance. A 
struggle for the reaffirmation of our destiny as the common political community of Kenyans. 
Over the last two decades, the freedom, which the people of Kenya fought and died for, was 
snatched from them. The people were deprived of their property and many were denied the 
opportunity to earn a livelihood. Corruption by leaders became commonplace. More than half 
of the entire population was condemned to absolute poverty. It was against this corruption 
and tyranny that many brave and patriotic Kenyans fought for their rights. Through their 
efforts, we came out of the dark days of one party rule. Detention without trial is no more. 
The Nyayo House torture chambers have been closed forever. Let us, today, remember those 
Kenyans who gave their lives, careers, and suffered torture so that we might, again, be free. 
And let us be proud of the indomitable spirit of the freedom fighters. It is, indeed, the 
unbwogable
3
 spirit of Kenyans. I should…pay special tribute to civil society organisations, 
which played a leading role to bring us to this stage, in our Review Process. Their vigilance 
and research were essential. The Ufungamano Initiative has provided inspired leadership, and 
kept our hopes alive in difficult moments. By their own example of unity, in diversity, they 
showed Kenyans, the path to the future (cited in Lumumba, 2008: 93).  
 
At this point, I turn to address the critical question: what exactly did Ufungamano Initiative 
achieve to deserve such special mention by the Head of State on such an important occasion, 
the state‘s opening of the National Constitutional Conference in April 2003?  
                                                 
3
 Unbowgable is a colloquial word of Dholuo origin that entered Kenyan political lexicon in 2002 after it was 
popularised by a famous Kenyan hip-hop group, Gidi Gidi Maji Maji in a song with the same title that became 
the signature tune of the NARC political rallies in the campaigns for the 2002 general election. It means 
immovable or cannot be swayed or intimidated.   
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Impacts of the Ufungamano Initiative to the reform process  
Arguably, no single movement in Kenya‘s recent history achieved as much success in the 
constitution reform project, as did the Ufungamano Initiative. The mere emergence of the 
Ufungamano Initiative as a unified movement was itself, an achievement. Unity had eluded 
many socio-political struggles in Kenya because of the politics of ethnicity, religious and 
class interests. The Ufungamano Initiative emerged with great promise, epitomising a 
countermovement of multi-ethnic, religious, generational and class power politics that 
generated widespread mass support. It was also an amplification of a long history of counter 
hegemonic struggles and political contentions on unjust modes of Kenya‘s governance and 
dynamics of national wealth creation and distribution. It crystallised from recurrent episodes 
of protests against social, economic, and political marginalisation and suppression of citizens 
by political and economic elites. This countermovement posed a crisis of legitimacy to the 
political leadership, further fragmented elite political consensus, and, in turn, led to the 
decline of the state‘s capacity to suppress dissent, thereby widening political opportunities for 
the countermovement groups.  
 
The Ufungamano Initiative had several impacts on the constitutional reform struggles. First, 
that it managed to bring together a great majority of forces fighting for constitutional change 
in Kenya, was a feat that preceding movements had failed to achieve for reasons of ethnic, 
political, ideological, and religious divisions in the country. A participant in this study, Zein 
(interview, 07/10/2009) gives credit for this success to the leadership of ‗three different 
sectors: religious leaders; the People‘s Commission and the intellectuals around Ufungamano 
who managed to run a movement that allowed for interrogation of ideas and allowing for 
space for people who had very divergent views.‘  
 
Moreover, it managed to build a sense of ‗one nation‘ and a faith in a better Kenya that 
overrode all diversities as the glue that held the various pro-reform struggles together. The 
Ufungamano Initiative‘s emergence challenges the prevailing social movement scholarship‘s 
emphasis on identity-based consciousness (culture, social status, ideology, generalised 
beliefs, values, ethnicity, gender, sexuality of actors) as the glue in the mobilisation of 
collectives. Specifically, it suggests that unity can be forged when vision or ideology 
resonates with different social forces in society or speaks to a majority because of effective 
framing, ultimately creating a (counter)hegemonic ideology.   
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The Ufungamano Initiative further suggests, in the words of Oduor Ong‘wen (interview 
09/10/2009), that Kenyans‘ ‗polarization is only skin deep.‘ Ong‘wen continued to argue that 
it is the political leadership in Kenya that has failed Kenya by ‗appealing to negative 
emotions to achieve very narrow interests.‘ He cited the fact that the Ufungamano Initiative 
brought on board different groups and there was very little issue if any, of religious animosity 
at the start: 
We had Christians, we had Muslims, we had Hindus and they worked very well. We had 
almost all ethnic groups in this country and I never witnessed any serious ethnic 
manifestations of ethnic bigotry. It was when the process started in earnest especially in 
Bomas that politicians started manipulating people such that it began taking ethnic 
dimensions.  
 
Second, the Ufungamano Initiative case is also a demonstration of the fact that an autocratic 
state is not omnipotent when the right external and internal conditions of both structure and 
agency converge at the right moment in time.  Change happens with the right conditions. The 
fact that the Ufungamano Initiative managed to ‗push‘ the government to start negotiations 
towards a merger, without decline into chaos as witnessed in 1997 under the NCEC led mass 
actions, is in itself telling of the power of a different kind of repertoire of contention-direct 
action by citizen groups to write a constitution they wished to have. It is such action that 
according to Cottrell and Ghai (2007: 12), dragged the ‗Moi Government into a review that it 
did not want.‘ Nonetheless, I also submit here that the merger of the Ufungamano with the 
state was also inevitable because up to that point the constitutional reforms were firmly 
located within the state and as several participants indicated, the state, through Parliament 
would have to be involved in ratifying a Ufungamano Initiative drafted constitution if chaos 
was to be avoided. But this inevitability suggests structural limitations of a social movement 
to peacefully write and promulgate a constitution without overthrowing the regime in power. 
It may also point to limits of imagination on the part of the Ufungamano Initiative on what to 
do beyond the drafting process.     
 
Third, the Ufungamano Initiative demonstrates how active citizenship shapes democracy. 
This is because through civic education, the Ufungamano Initiative managed to demystify the 
Constitution of Kenya Review Process. Such civic education contributed to citizens rising up 
to question the State on issues they did not agree to. Before the Ufungamano Initiative came 
into being to facilitate massive civic education, the Review Process had remained what 
Lumumba (2008: 52) describes though referring to CKRC, as ‗an arcane science known by 
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its name and understood by a few.‘ However, the Ufungamano Initiative heightened public 
awareness and the linkages between the existing constitution and the material conditions in 
which people lived.  
  
Most participants agreed that Ufungamano Initiative did indeed achieve much even if it never 
managed to deliver a new constitution for Kenyans. Reflecting on the question of the failure 
of the movement to remain united until the achievement of a new constitution, some 
participants of this study argued that the Ufungamano Initiative was not meant to be 
permanent. It had been designed to fill a void emanating from the failure of the government 
to appreciate that the constitution making process not only required but also demanded, that 
the citizens be intimately involved. For instance, Ndubi (interview, 24/09/2009) stated that 
The Ufungamano Initiative was not a movement that was supposed to be perpetual.... Even by 
the first basic notion we were looking for a new constitution, this presupposed that when we 
got that new constitution, it would then inherently redefine our relationships and our 
expectations later on. So that when the process for inclusive delivery of a new constitution 
came into place, many people who were in Ufungamano Initiative subsequently became 
actors in the delivery and midwifery of the constitution and therefore would not be on the part 
of agitation. Therefore, those who felt they were already represented stepped down their 
desires and demands for agitation.  
 
This suggests, as shown in this thesis, that movements respond to the stimulus in their own 
environment.  Such response can lead to new heightened tensions, diffusion, or even to the 
demise of a movement. The Ufungamano Initiative was one such movement that emerged out 
of heightened tensions and was therefore an agent of necessity whose mandate, some 
participants argued, was exhausted when what they were demanding – people‘s participation 
– was realised. The point then is that Ufungamano Initiative emerged to push for the 
Moi/KANU regime to remain faithful to the 1997 Review Act.  
 
The Ufungamano Initiative through its opposition to the state, managed to put the Kenyan 
citizen in the driver‘s seat in the push and realisation of a democratic constitution making 
Process. Possibly, this was one of the most important contributions of the Ufungamano 
Initiative to the constitutional reform struggles in Kenya. Indeed, it was widely 
acknowledged by those interviewed that the Ufungamano Initiative managed to bring on 
board many ordinary people‘s groups into the constitution making process. This suggests that 
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democracy even in politically constricted environments is achievable if citizens partake of 
roles in pushing for what they desire.   
 
But the proposition of the impermanence of this specific movement nonetheless raises a 
critical question: would it not be fair to say that Ufungamano Initiative was a failure because 
a new constitution was not achieved then? If the declared objective of the Ufungamano 
Initiative was to lead the people of Kenya into writing a constitution that would be people- 
driven, and yield widely acceptable results, was regrouping after the 2005 referendum, 
perhaps not a natural response? Lumumba (2008) does not think that it would have been 
natural to regroup especially given that ethnic political shenanigans and entrepreneurs had by 
then, gone into an overdrive to ensure that Kenya would not have a new constitution 
mirroring popular will. For Lumumba, after the merger of the two processes, 
Ufungamano Initiative became a victim of political shenanigans born out of mistrust because 
ethnicity and vested political interests played a part in it. Ultimately, when the Bomas Draft 
was produced and seemed to reflect largely the people‘s views, and had been subjected to 
debate at the National Constitution Conference, political elites took over and mutilated it in a 
manner that the people of Kenya did not like.  Ultimately, the New Draft died at the altar of 
political wars (Lumumba, interview 01/10/2009).  
 
The referendum itself was largely a victim of these political shenanigans, even though for 
some, the content of the proposed constitution may have contributed to its rejection. As such, 
the Ufungamano Initiative is also a reminder of the limitations of social movements in 
effecting fundamental changes in society.  
 
While the Ufungamano Initiative reveals that religious leadership as well as other civil 
society groups can be custodians of people‘s confidence and trust, they can only remain so, as 
long as they are true to the calling and are sympathetic to the popular will. The moment 
actors within the Ufungamano Initiative started fighting among themselves, turned ethnic, 
and jostled for political power, they lost that conscience and instead turned to be the nerve 
centres of social political contentions and conflicts that in effect deferred the dream of a new 
constitution in 2005. As Dolan (2011a) observes, while religious leadership played 
significant roles in these struggles through inspiring, committed and courageous leadership, 
its failure to make the giant leap into the 21st century has seen justice being relegated to a 
sideshow in the ecclesiastical agenda. A participant from Kisumu seemed to echo this when 
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he dismissed the Ufungamano Initiative‘s impacts on the constitution making process 
arguing, 
Even without Ufungamano Initiative, Kenya would have reached where it is today. I would in 
fact blame the Ufungamano Initiative for taking sides. The NCCK became tribal because 
when Kibaki took over power they started supporting him and this is what cost us a new 
constitution. They also supported him to vie for a second term despite the fact that he had 
promised Kenyans that he would not do so. Then the Catholics and especially Njue has been 
misleading the public. Today churches are full of double-speak and only fighting for their 
own interests (Basole, interview 27/03/2010).   
 
The thesis has also shown how, while some actors kept guard and new alliances emerged to 
keep the tide of contention high in the midst of the disintegration of older ones, a greater 
majority of actors especially those who joined the government through the 2002 general 
election, became turncoats and started opposing the very things they stood for prior to getting 
into government. This is what frustrated the realisation of a new constitution in 2005. But the 
failure to deliver a new constitution through the 2005 Constitutional Referendum did not 
necessarily lead to the death of the dreams for a new constitution. On the contrary, new 
alliances emerged from the ashes of the old ones to keep vigil in new waves or ‗cycles of 
contention‘ (Tarrow, 1998) resulting in the realisation of a new constitution through the 
August 4, 2010 referendum. A leading alliance that continued the push for a new constitution 
was the Katiba Sasa Coalition, which was essentially composed of some of the former 
members of the Ufungamano Initiative who remained steadfast in pushing for a new 
constitution.  
 
But an analysis of the constitutional Review Process post 2008 violence reveals that the 
realisation of a new constitution is a testament of the congruence of means and ends among 
the most powerful political elites in Kenya, particularly the forced marriage between the 
Orange Democratic Party (ODM) and the Party of National Unity. This forced some 
agreements among the elites to deliver a new constitution by these forces. Moreover, leaders 
allowed the 2007 violence to stop only when they realised that ordinary people were 
beginning to say: ‗we are now done with fighting for our ethnic barons. Now we want to fight 
for ourselves, we want to go and get food.‘  
 
The realisation of a new constitution after the 2008 wave of violence suggests a couple of 
things. One, confluence of means and ends within the different elite formations are a sine qua 
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non for transforming the power relations in a polity. Two, the same elite cleavages that had 
fuelled ethnic tensions were critical in delivering a new constitution because the collective 
threat they faced from this violence especially through loss of property as a class, triggered 
bargains and concessions among themselves, and Kenyans in general. Three, the international 
community played a critical role, especially in mediating a truce by forming a government of 
national unity and imposing constitutional reforms as a key condition. Four, all these were 
only possible because of sustained pressures for reforms from civil society. Vigilance will 
therefore be instrumental in informing the strategies for ensuring that a new constitution is 
implemented in Kenya so that the old order can ultimately die.  
 
It is also important to point out that the limitations of the Ufungamano Initiative also 
emanated from the contradictions that external funding and support gave it. Essentially, 
external funding dictated that its agenda would never be radical enough while it depended on 
funds from those posing as friends of Kenyan society, but who stood to lose should the 
current structures of society be transformed. The Ufungamano Initiative story suggests that 
such an agenda needed to be tempered.  This is because the leadership of the movement as 
well as its Western donors were, in the words of one of the respondents, the same people with 
an ‗interest in the neo-colony‘. This suggests that a movement that is trying to radically 
redefine the relationship between the people and their governors as well as their relationship 
with external capital, cannot achieve its objectives while entangled in the intricate funding 
webs that dictate what use money can be put to. It is for this reasons that we have seen 
western ambassadors come out to warn the Kenyan state every time radical agendas that 
touch on land ownership and capital are broached. Some of the respondents argued that in 
fact, foreign funding waters down the radical agenda of these movements. As such, while the 
Ufungamano Initiative, just like many other pro-reform civil society initiatives in Kenya saw 
its role as rewriting the Kenyan people‘s relationship with their political leaders, it was 
riddled with many contradictions that fundamentally challenged its standing as a true mass 
movement.  
 
The main contradiction in the Ufungamano Initiative as identified in this thesis was the gulf 
between stated objectives and strategies. Undeniably, the Ufungamano Initiative captured the 
popular Kenyan imagination and managed to challenge the state through a combination of 
strategies such as demonstrations, civic education, and collection of views from Kenyan 
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citizens. Its influence ultimately forced the state to concessions in light of a growing 
legitimacy crisis.  
 
Key to the success of the Ufungamano Initiative was the way it framed constitution making. 
As shown in chapters five and six, the Ufungamano Initiative initially styled itself as a 
pressure group to force the state to acquiesce to what it framed as a people‘s fundamental and 
sovereign right to write their own constitution. In doing this, the movement first carried out 
massive civic education and sensitisation in the country, especially among the masses, in an 
effort to win the masses to their side. As a participant in this study indicated: 
In most villages in Kenya, people did not necessarily have the consciousness to have any 
issues with KANU and Moi. The local KANU leadership seemed to be good people in the 
eyes of the local person. The only issues they had with this leadership was when they would, 
together with the provincial administration, and using the notorious KANU Youth Wingers, 
go to people‘s homes demanding things that amounted to illegal taxes in the so called 
Harambee spirit. This is what made KANU a threat to people. Consequently, many people 
came to hate KANU without really hating the institutions and the system that allowed this to 
flourish. It was elites in the Ufungamano Initiative who made sense of such and framed things 
in perspectives as systemic problems with KANU and its leader Moi.  In doing this, those in 
political opposition and in struggles such as the Ufungamano Initiative fashioned themselves 
as alternatives to transform the state to be of service to the masses (Runguma, interview 
13/03/2010).  
 
Second, the movement engaged in alternative analysis and interpretation of the law. It is 
through such analysis of the 1997 Constitution of Kenya Review Act that it identified 
political and legal opportunities it utilised as well as the ‗flaws‘ it contested. Third, 
Ufungamano Initiative‘s key messaging capitalised on the anxieties created by Moi‘s refusal 
to accommodate other stakeholders‘ participation in the constitutional reforms. The 
Ufungamano Initiative argued that Kenyans had placed immense value on the envisaged 
process and in the event, the reneging on earlier promises by Moi and KANU would ignite 
chaos. Indeed, some participants, for example Mwalulu (interview, 01/04/2010) saw 
Ufungamano Initiative as having ‗averted a political crisis in Kenya because, were it not for 
their challenge, it was likely that the regime would have instigated civil instability to keep 
themselves in power. But people were with the Ufungamano.‘ Fourth, the Ufungamano 
Initiative framed the constitution as a sacred covenant between the people and their rulers. As 
a covenant, it required input from both the ruled and the rulers.  Fifth, the Ufungamano 
349 
 
Initiative formed The People‘s Commission of Kenya (PCK) in 1999 to lead the Kenyan 
People in writing their own constitution when it became apparent that KANU was never 
going to allow people‘s participation.  
 
The PCK was the most potent of the movement‘s strategies and politics. The launch of the 
parallel Reform Process at a time when KANU‘s fidelity to the 1997 CKRA was in question, 
forced the greatest credibility and legitimacy challenge on the Parliamentary-led Process. 
Consequently, the Moi/KANU regime was forced to seek a more independent person Yash 
Pal Ghai to lead the process.  Ghai‘s influence in the process, as chapter seven has shown, 
was immense especially in pushing for a merger between the state-led process and that of the 
Ufungamano Initiative. The merger as argued in chapter seven was influenced by a number 
of factors. Chiefly, it was possible because Ufungamano Initiative managed to mobilise 
significant numbers of citizens to its side.  As such, while Ufungamano Initiative arguably 
failed to create the necessary structures to enable popular participation, the movement 
sensitised and mobilised sufficient support for its cause.  
 
This demonstrates the alternate power that the Ufungamano Initiative had over the state-led 
process. PLO Lumumba, who became the Secretary of the Constitution of Kenya Review 
Commission in the post-merger period, expressed the power that the Ufungamano Initiative 
wielded:  
When Prof. Ghai was appointed, sense really dictated that anybody who wanted to have a 
successful process must broker a merger of the two processes. Ghai, having been an outsider 
who had observed the goings on, it was quite clear to him that if he wanted to lead a process 
that would lead to something, it was only sensible that the two processes be merged. 
Otherwise, the activities of the CKRC would have been hamstrung at a certain stage so that 
even if it delivered a document, which had legislative and legal backing, it would lack the 
moral authority that was necessary, which did not rest with it. I think that in a sense is what 
must have persuaded him to broker this merger (interview, 01/10/2009). 
 
In essence, as argued in chapter six, the Ufungamano Initiative and initiatives of a similar 
nature demonstrate that change happens due to constant struggle that enables citizens to 
collectively create a counter-hegemony ideology. Furthermore, State‘s opposition to popular 
demands by taking refuge in legal underpinnings, in and of itself, cannot immunize it. 
Moreover, Ufungamano Initiative shows that when a movement has moral authority on its 
side, the government ignores such at its own peril (Lumumba, interview, 01/10/2009). For as 
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Warah (2011), citing the Nigerian author, Chinua Achebe notes, should the ruling elite 
continue being ‗incredibly blind‘ as to not bring about the required changes, or if they do not 
move, they shall be moved. This seems to have been the case in Kenya where constant 
struggle ultimately moved the state.  
 
Despite the evidence of effective framing of contention, clear contradictions abounded in the 
movement. As argued in chapter six, the Ufungamano Initiative failed to establish elaborate 
participatory and emancipatory system and structures to ensure the general masses would 
participate effectively. Structures, strategies and resources are the levers that aid movements‘ 
work. As Tilly argues, a social struggle qualifies as a social movement if it has ‗some degree 
of organisation...and active participation on the part of the followers or members‘ (Tilly 1978: 
7).  The choice of a movement‘s mobilising structure depends on the issue(s) as well as the 
diversity of its constituent parts.  
 
The Ufungamano Initiative sought to utilise the infrastructure offered by religious institutions 
that spread across all parts of Kenya. This way, the Ufungamano Initiative was able to 
substantially rival the state‘s structures. But as chapter six showed, there were many problems 
with this strategy. This led to a disconnect between the rhetoric of a people-centred and 
people-led process and its internal practices, because existing structures were led and 
dominated by a conservative clergy and citizens‘ direct participation was not guaranteed. This 
in effect, led to further constraints especially on ordinary citizens to influence the direction of 
the movement. This is not to suggest that direct citizen participation would have yielded 
different results. Indeed, as Cottrell and Ghai (2007: 12) have argued, there are several 
countries in Africa including Kenya especially after the merger, whose constitution making 
have been highly participatory but their resultant constitutions have been ‗frustrated, by 
governmental recalcitrance and obstruction, corruption and manipulation.‘  
 
The deficiencies of the structures utilised by the Ufungamano Initiative, were compounded 
by the looseness of its formal structure. Despite the presence of clear accountability lines 
between the different structures, some personalities were too overbearing. This resulted in 
contradictions between the rhetoric of a people-led process and the intra-elite contestation 
that the constitutional reform process became. While ordinary people‘s struggles were part of 
the Ufungamano Initiative, their token visibility betrayed the claim that the Ufungamano 
Initiative was a ‗people‘s‘ struggle.  
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A reading of the Ufungamano Initiative must also be understood within the competition 
around class and ethnicity. The Ufungamano Initiative was by and large, an elite project and 
manifested itself as an intra-elite class struggle for the control of the minds and support of the 
masses. The project though, resonated well with public good. It is this broad appeal that 
enabled the movement to mobilise for support. This corroborates Downey, and Rohlinger‘s 
(2008: 4) observation that the breadth of appeal is a strategic dimension that helps social 
movement actors mobilise and cultivate a ‗base of support (material and human).‘  
 
The question then is: how did Ufungamano Initiative benefit the general masses of the 
Kenyan people to gain their support? The answer lies in the fact that when the elites fought 
among themselves for the control of ideas, the subaltern was awakened through civic 
education. As such, the greater the mobilisations, the more the other sections of society were 
getting enlightened and in the process, also came to actively participate in that space. 
Moreover, there is need to appreciate the fact that the Ufungamano Initiative gave people the 
confidence to envisage an alternative. The question that remains is whether the purpose was 
really to awaken the people or the awakening was just one of the many unplanned outcomes 
of these struggles.  
 
In the view of the Muungano wa Wanavijiji Convention president (Ezekiel Rema), it was also 
empowering to be with all the elites in these struggles for change. Another participant, 
Runguma stated that the collective harassments the masses suffered together with some 
middle class people epitomised by Rev. Timothy Njoya among others, as mentioned in 
chapter four, served to demystify the aura around the leadership. It became a right to 
demonstrate and an honour to suffer in the process, and this way, many people identified with 
the cause.  Thus there was some awakening and even gluing of masses to these struggles. In 
effect, the Ufungamano Initiative seems to have given a voice to the other voiceless groups 
even though some participants may still have viewed that as a way of the elite mobilizing for 
support of what appeared to be a popular cause. Nonetheless, there is also evidence from the 
interviews and documents analysed, that ordinary citizens identified with the Ufungamano 
Initiative by romanticising its ability to challenge the State. Many of the respondents also saw 
the Ufungamano Initiative as a key driver responsible for the defeat of KANU in 2002.  
 
Having said that, the strong centralisation of the movement in Nairobi left it essentially as a 
vehicle serving to win the control of the under classes as it was only the leadership of local 
grassroots movements who found a seat at the decision-making table.  One is left with the 
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conclusion that the Ufungamano Initiative‘s key stakeholders were essentially advocating 
their own position at the table of the processes and decision-making in the constitutional 
reform agenda while arrogating themselves the representation of the Kenyan masses without 
any clear mandate from them. As Wandati (interview 17/09/2009) concludes, some of the 
contestations within the movement were therefore just between the elites and struggle for 
power and had nothing to do with the constitution.    
 
This arrogation concurs with Tilly‘s (2004: 13) observations as highlighted in chapter six that 
representative claim making by social movement leadership is not necessarily a reflection of 
democratic practices in movements. As such, notwithstanding the claims that many of the 
actors within the Ufungamano Initiative had representations or a presence in all parts of the 
country and that this meant that it had people‘s legitimacy, this arrogation, as shown in 
chapter six, played a role in undermining the legitimacy of the Ufungamano Initiative in the 
eyes of even some of its supporters.  
 
The Ufungamano Initiative therefore also highlights a major contradiction of how elite 
formations can masquerade as representing people. This confirms Downey and Rohlinger‘s 
(2008: 12) observations about the breadth of appeal as an important strategic dimension for 
constituting the support base because while 
Core activists are an essential component to any movement group [and make] the highest 
levels of commitment and … greatest sacrifices for the movement …movements also depend 
on members who have lower levels of involvement in and identification with a cause, 
including those who only intermittently participate and those who are members on paper 
alone.… It is also important for collective actors to appeal to supportive outsiders who are 
conceptualized as bystanders, conscience constituents…third parties … and the audiences 
who collectively comprise public opinion…. 
 
Clearly, the Ufungamano Initiative‘s lack of engagement with grassroots leadership robbed it 
of such third party support in some parts of the country.  Nonetheless, even with these 
limitations, the Ufungamano Initiative did however establish the principles for transparent 
operations and engagement. These principles: openness and transparency, inclusivity, 
accessibility and non-discrimination, accountability, and cumulativeness and self-correction, 
were some of its enduring contributions to the constitution reform project in Kenya. 
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The third contradiction emanates from the role played by religious leaders at the helm of the 
Ufungamano Initiative. First, different Christian denominations‘ leadership has, at various 
times embodied different positions. For instance, while the mainstream churches (Catholics, 
Methodist, Anglicans, and Presbyterians) leadership were at the heart of struggles for change, 
the Evangelical Fellowship of Kenya affiliated churches supported Moi (Karanja, 2008). 
Muslims and the Hindus later joined the mainstream church groups in the Ufungamano 
Initiative. But despite apparent divisions within the clergy, there was still naïve faith that a 
religious leadership of the Ufungamano Initiative struggles was the best arrangement due to 
what some saw as their neutrality and objectivity.  This explains the reasons why, despite 
protestations from some civil society groups (mainly NCEC and the National Youth 
Movement), the majority of Kenyans saw no problem with religious groups leading the 
process.  
Looking forward  
Despite these cleavages and the abortion of the popular will in 2005, pressures for change 
continued building up. These climaxed in another constitutional referendum on August 4, 
2010. This time around, Kenyans overwhelmingly voted in favour of a proposed constitution. 
Finally, after two-decade long struggle punctuated by bitter and deep political, ethnic and 
religious divisions Kenyans got a new constitution. These divisions resulted as this study has 
shown, from a multiplicity of actors with competing interests in capturing, managing and 
utilising the post-colonial state.  
 
The Ufungamano Initiative struggles and the abortion of the realisation of a new constitution 
in 2005 the thesis has argued, helps us understand the why Kenya imploded in 2008. 
Specifically, the pent-up anger with the NARC regime‘s failure to deliver a new constitution 
and redress multiple long standing issues that had driven the desire for a new constitution 
such as legal and institutional reforms, land reforms, unemployment particularly among the 
youth, poverty, inequity and regional development imbalances – found expression through 
ethnic demagogy that predetermined the trajectory of the 2007 electioneering.
4
 The 2008 
post-election ethnic bloodbath only stopped after a forced political marriage between the 
Orange Democratic Party Movement (ODM) and the Party of National Unity. This ethnic 
                                                 
4
 These were indeed the raft of issues identified as needing urgent attention under agenda 4 of February 2008 
Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation pact that ended the ethnic blood bath in the country. The total 
overhaul of the constitution was a key agreement of this pact. 
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bloodletting served as a wake-up call that forced different elite formations to agree to give 
Kenyans a new constitution.  
 
Contrary to popular orthodoxy, therefore, pressure from social movements and other civil 
society formations was just one of the key ingredient to the achievement of a new 
constitution. The reform struggles narrative suggests, as pointed out in chapter seven, that a 
confluence of means and ends within the different elite formations were the sine qua non for 
transforming the power relations in a polity and it took a collective threat on the political and 
economic elite to agree to a new constitution as a form of concessions.  
 
Nonetheless, the Ufungamano Initiative‘s contribution to the constitutional reform process in 
Kenya is undeniable. The Kenyan constitutional reform struggles case confirms Gramsci‘s 
(1971) conception of civil society as a sphere for (counter)hegemonic wars. Whoever wins 
this battle controls the country. From the explanations in the empirical chapters, this study 
concludes that these counter-hegemonic battles for the control of civil society essentially 
explain the paralysis of the society, state and civil society in Kenya as there has not been a 
clear winner in this war in the country. Analysis of the Ufungamano Initiative helps us 
understand the balance of power relations that need to be managed within Kenyan society‘s 
cleavages to ensure the new constitution is implemented. To ensure a new order spelt out in 
the new constitution matures, continued vigilance is necessary, because, as Muluka (2011a) 
(cited at the beginning of this chapter) observes, ‗the Kenyan nation has had its fair share of 
missed boats.‘ The first of such missed transitions was at independence, which buried the 
independence fighters‘ dreams for the transformation of the post-colonial State (Currie & 
Ray, 1986; Lamb, 1982). 
 
The second missed transition was the Nyayo era, which started with the death of Kenyatta in 
office and the ascendancy of Moi who continued the systematic assault of the constitution. 
According to Zein (interview, 07/10/2009), Moi made things so worse that by in early 1990s a 
wave of the so-called second liberation struggles emerged. But these struggles though 
managing to get section 2A repealed in 1991 did not translate into state transformations as 
Kenya missed the boat again in 1992, multiparty general election. It soon, became very clear 
to people that Kenya had undergone a transition without a transformation (Zein, interview 
07/10/2009). Such was what led to a discourse as well as a push for a radical constitutional 
reform that the Ufungamano Initiative was at some point, its leading light.   
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But as highlighted in chapter seven, a merger between the Ufungamano Initiative and the 
state-led process based on a mirage of state‘s acquiescence to the Ufungamano Initiative‘s 
demands for popular democratic participation, resulted in the arrest of the realisation of a new 
constitution. Moreover, it led to neutering of the power of social movements, especially the 
key players within the Ufungamano Initiative after the 2002 general elections. This paralysis 
was further aided by the birth of the Third Republic in 2002, which had offered so much 
hope, resulting in the dropping of guard and co-optation of the leaders of these struggles into 
the new Government. The net effect, was the abortion of the popular will as the new elite in 
power began to entrench themselves at the expense of reforms, on whose banner they had 
been elected.  The reasons for this, Nyinguro and Otenyo (2007: 5) observe, was because the 
window of opportunity that ‗depended on elite responses to the opportunity pendulum‘ had 
been lost as the new power elite turned out to be opportunistic and exploitative. In the end, 
the promise of the Ufungamano Initiative was condemned into the basket of missed 
opportunities to transform the Kenyan State and the nature of its relations with the citizens.  
 
I close this thesis with the words of American Slavery abolitionist Frederick Douglass (1857: 
204) who wrote:  
...The whole history of the progress of human liberty shows that all concessions ...made ... 
have been born of earnest struggle. The conflict has been exciting, agitating, all-absorbing, 
and for the time being, putting all other tumults to silence. It must do this or it does nothing. If 
there is no struggle there is no progress. Those who profess to favor freedom and yet 
depreciate agitation, are men who want crops without ploughing up the ground, they want 
rain without thunder and lightning. They want the ocean without the awful roar of its many 
waters...Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and it never will.... The 
limits of tyrants are prescribed by the endurance of those whom they oppress.... Men may not 
get all they pay for in this world; but they must certainly pay for all they get. If we ever get 
free from the oppressions and wrongs heaped upon us, we must pay for their removal. We 
must do this by labor, by suffering, by sacrifice, and if needs be, by our lives and the lives of 
others.  
Constant agitation is therefore needed, or otherwise, the new constitution will be, to borrow 
the words of George Macaulay Trevelyan (1923: 292) ‗a turning point at which, modern 
history failed to turn.‘  
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Appendix I: 
 
Participant list and categories  
 
Participant 
Name 
Category of interviewee  Date of interview 
 
Place of interview 
 
Lawrence Apiyo Grassroots organiser/mobiliser; 
civil society activist  
16/09/2009: 
21/03/2010 
Java house café, 
Adams/Kibera Nairobi 
Abdiraham 
Wandati 
Bomas constitutional conference 
delegate 
17/09/2009 Jamia Mosque, Nairobi 
Bruno Kaimba Businessman/ODM party activist/ 
Bomas constitutional conference 
delegate 
19/09/2009 Mukothima, Tharaka 
Rev. Dr. David 
Gitari 
Bomas constitutional conference 
delegate 
21/09/2009 Philadelphia, 
Kirinyaga.   
Gideon Ochada Political analyst and consultant to 
NCCK, KEC and Ufungamano 
Initiative  
22/09/2009 Fredrick Herbert 
Stiftung Nairobi 
Wambui Ngugi Civil servant 23/09/2009 Office of President, 
Nairobi 
Hon. Wanyiri 
Kihoro 
Ex-MP/ activist/ex-political 
prisoner 
23/09/2009 Parliament Buildings, 
Nairobi 
Haron Ndubi Activist/ human rights lawyer 24/09/2009 Heron Court Hotel, 
Nairobi 
Otieno Ombok Activist/ex-student leader 24/09/2009 Waumini House, 
Nairobi 
Stephen Musau Activist/ex-student leader 24/09/2009 680 Hotel, Nairobi 
Ochieng M. 
Khairallah 
Activist/ex-student leader 26/09/2009 Young Muslim 
Alliance, Ngong Road, 
Nairobi 
Dr. Kamau Kuria Human activist/constitutional 
lawyer 
26/09/2009 Chai House, Nairobi 
Hon. Mashengu 
wa Mwachofi 
Ex-MP/ Activist/community 
organiser 
27/09/2009; 
28/03/20010 
Voi 
Rev. Jeptha wa 
Gathaka 
Activist/religious leader 29/09/2009 Ufungamano House, 
Nairobi 
Boaz Waruku Activist/ex student leader 29/09/2009 Madaraka, Nairobi 
Hon. Moses 
Muihia 
Ex-MP, activist/ex-political 
prisoner 
29/09/2009 Waumini House, 
Nairobi 
Rev. Dr. 
Timothy Njoya 
Activist/religious leader 29/09/2009 Ngong 
Ms. Beatrice CSO/religious organisation 
employee  
30/09/2009 Waumini House, 
Nairobi 
Dr. PLO 
Lumumba 
Activist/ex-student 
leader/secretary CKRC 
01/10/2009 ACK Gardens, Nairobi 
Ibrahim Lethome Activist/religious leader/Islamic 
law expert 
02/10/2009 Jamia Mosque, Nairobi 
Suba Churchill Activist/ex-student leader  02/10/2009 KNHRC, Nairobi 
Justice Isaac 
Lenaola 
PCK and later CKRC 
commissioner/ex-activist/ judge of 
the high court 
03/10/2009 Karen Blixen, Nairobi 
Peter Ocholla CSO employee 06/10/2009 Mbaruk Road, Nairobi 
Lumumba 
Odenda 
Activist/former political prisoner 07/10/2009 Red Sea Restaurant, 
Nairobi 
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Abubakar Zein PCK and later CKRC 
commissioner/activist/ 
07/10/2009 Uraia, Nairobi 
Paddy Onyango  Activist 07/10/2009 4C, Nairobi 
Charles 
Wambugu 
Activist/ secretary of the 
Ufungamano multisectoral forum 
09/10/2009 Ufungamano House, 
Nairobi 
Oduor Ong‘wen Activist/ex-political prisoner 09/10/2009 MCK, Nairobi 
Hon. Rev. Dr. 
Mutava Musyimi 
Ufungamano Initiative co-
convenor, ex-NCCK General 
secretary  
09/10/2009 Nairobi via Phone  
Dr. Rev. Peter 
Gichure 
Advisor to the KEC 12/10/2009 CUEA, Nairobi 
Said Athman Ex-activist/PCK 
commissioner/Culture secretary 
(State employee) 
12/10/2009 Ministry of Culture, 
Jogoo House A Nairobi  
Rev. Jesse 
Kamau 
Religious leader (former PCEA 
moderator) 
13/10/2009 Jumuia, Limuru  
Daniel 
Odhiambo 
NCCK employee 13/10/2009 Limuru 
Kawive Wambua Activist 13/10/2009 CRECO, Upper hill 
Nairobi 
Riunga Raiji PCK and later CKRC 
commissioner/ex-activist/ lawyer 
14/10/2009 Bharati House, Nairobi 
Gichira Kibara Ex-activist/ ex-chair of the NGO 
council, 
commissioner/constitutional 
affairs secretary (State employee) 
15/10/2009 Ministry of Justice, 
Coop House, Nairobi 
Commissioner 
Omar Hassan  
Activist/ex-student leader 16/10/2009 KNHRC, Nairobi 
Dr. Ekuru Aukot Ex-activist (CSO leader/Director 
CoE (state employee) 
19/10/2009 CoE, Delta House, 
Nairobi 
Rashmin Chitnis Chair of the Hindu Council of 
Kenya 
20/10/2009 Parklands, Nairobi 
Prof. Kivutha 
Kibwana 
Ex-Activist/Ex-MP/advisor to the 
president/constitutional law 
scholar/expert 
21/10/2009 Office of the president, 
Nairobi  
Prof. Yash Pal 
Ghai  
Law scholar/expert Chair of 
CKRC 
23/10/2009 Muthaiga, Nairobi 
Ngunjiri 
Wambugu 
Activist 23/10/2009 Nairobi  
Dr. Davinder 
Lamba 
Activist 23/10/2009 Mazingira Institute, 
Westlands, Nairobi 
Evanson Kariuki Ordinary citizen 24/10/2009 Nairobi 
Mutegi John  Ordinary citizen 24/10/2009 Ongata Rongai 
Hon. Gitobu 
Imanyara 
Activist, MP. Ex-political detainee 28/10/2009 Gallagher Estate, 
Midlands, South Africa 
Sebastian 
Runguma 
CSO employee 13/03/2010 Auckland Park, 
Johannesburg, South 
Africa  
Alloys  Grassroots community organiser 21/03/2010 Kibera 
Ezekiel Rema Informal trader/evictee/Activist 22/03/2010 Toy market, Kibera, 
Nairobi 
Clr. Samuel 
Nyabinda 
Former councillor, ODM party 
activist 
25/03/2010 Kisumu 
Audi Oganda Activist/ former head of a militia 
group 
26/03/2010 Kisumu Bus park, 
Kisumu 
Kwache Anthony Informal trader/community 
organiser/Activist 
26/03/2010 Kisumu 
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Beatrice 
Achieng‘ 
Informal trader 26/03/2010 Kisumu 
Daniel Owino Informal trader 26/03/2010 Kisumu Bus park, 
Kisumu 
Felix Odero 
Ongona 
Community organiser/Activist  26/03/2010 Kisumu 
Eba Eban Businessman/PR 
consultant/Activist 
26/03/2010 Kisumu Railways Club 
Kisumu 
Ben Basole Tout/ODM party Youth leaders 
and grassroots activist 
27/03/2010 Kisumu Bus Park 
Kisumu 
Okiya Omtatah Political and civil society activist 31/03/2010 ACK Gardens, Nairobi 
Priscilla Nyokabi Civil society activist 31/03/2010 Mt. Kenya Safari Club, 
Nairobi 
Morris 
Odhiambo 
Civil society activist/journalist 01/04/2010 Nairobi 
John Njiru Civil society activist 01/04/2010 Nairobi 
Hon Jackson 
Mwalulu 
Former MP, Journalist, Activist 01/04/2010 Nairobi 
Felix Mwagesha 
Mwanyumba 
Grassroots organiser/Civil society 
activist 
07/04/2010 Voi  
Alfred Shereta Grassroots community organiser 07/04/2010 Voi 
Constantine 
Mwakio 
Grassroots organiser 07/04/2010 Voi 
Donald Maganga Grassroots organiser 07/04/2010 Voi 
Salome Nduta 
Gachie 
Activist/community organiser  08/04/2010 Nairobi 
Hezekiah 
Odongo 
Ordinary citizen/Youth 08/04/2010 Kibera, Nairobi 
Joshua Ochieng Ordinary citizen/Youth 08/04/2010 Kibera 
Caleb Wanga Ordinary citizen 08/04/2010 Kibera 
Julius Wadenya Ordinary citizen 09/04/2010 Kibera 
Owino Kotieno Political activist/student 09/04/2010 Kibera 
Dandora  Dandora Muungano wa Wanavijiji 
public forum on the proposed 
constitution 
24/03/2010 Nairobi 
Serena Hotel Katiba Sasa media briefing 28/03/2010 Nairobi 
Kibera Lindi 
Community 
Centre 
Committee of Experts Civic 
education public forum 
07/04/2010 Nairobi 
Institute for 
Policy Analysis 
and Research 
(IPAR) 
A presentation of preliminary 
findings of round one of data 
collection to IPAR staff 
21/10/2009 Nairobi 
ISTANBUL A paper presentation at the 
Democracy and Governance in 
Africa: (Dis)enabling the public 
sphere (A ISTR/Trust Africa 
workshop)  
07/07/2010 Istanbul, Turkey 
Note: Most of participants interviewed had multiple identities. 
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Appendix II 
 
Introduction and information about the researcher and the 
project 
 
 
Dear _____________________ 
My name is Jacob Mwathi Mati, a PhD candidate at the School of Social Sciences of the 
University of Witwatersrand. As part of my studies, I am researching social movement in the 
political and constitutional reform process in Kenya. I am specifically looking at the role of 
the Ufungamano Initiative and its relationships and interactions with other actors in the 
constitutional reforms in Kenya.  
I am interviewing religious, civil society, political leaders, members of parliament, and 
activists involved in these constitutional reforms in Kenya. I am also interviewing people, 
who were part of civil service and dealt directly with the constitutional reform activists, 
delegates of the constitutional conference (Bomas), members of Parliamentary Select 
Committee on the Constitutional Review, commissioners in the Constitution of Kenya 
Review Commission and members of Ufungamano Initiative‘s Peoples Commission of 
Kenya. While aware that Ufungamano Initiative formally started in late 1990‘s, the study also 
delves into the period preceding 1999 as it informs the issues at the heart of the Ufungamano 
Initiative. As such, I would be very grateful if you also offered your reflections on the 
constitutional reform struggles in Kenya prior to 1999.  
 
I am aware that you were involved in the constitutional change process and/or struggles and 
therefore kindly seek your voluntary participation in this study through an interview that 
should take about 45 minutes. As this is an academic exercise, there are no commercial gains 
expected from such voluntary participation in this research and you may chose decline to 
participate in this study or withdraw at any time, without such a decision having any adverse 
consequences on your being and status in society.  
 
For accuracy and reliability reasons, I will, with your consent, tape record the interview. 
Please feel free to decline to answer any questions that you may be uncomfortable with. You 
do not risk job loss or other institutional sanctions by participating in this study as all the 
information you provide to me will be treated confidentially and only used for the purposes 
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of this research. All field notes and taped records will be retained and safely stored using 
pseudonyms and will not be accessible to other parties. A transcript of the interview will be 
sent to you via email for clarification, at which point you may request to add or adjust the 
information to better reflect your view as well as aid this research.   
 
Should you require any clarifications please feel free to contact my supervisor Prof. Michelle 
Williams on telephone number +27-11-717-4433 or on email: michelle.williams@wits.ac.za. 
You can also contact the University of the Witwatersrand Research Ethics Committee at +27-
11-717-71234 if you have questions about your rights as a participant in this research. My 
own contact details are as follows: Telephone number: (Kenya) +254-0-710572838 (South 
Africa) + 27-76677243; Email: Jacobmati@gmail.com     
 
If you voluntarily agree to participate in this study, please indicate to by signing the attached 
consent declaration forms. 
 
Thank you very much!  
Jacob Mwathi Mati 
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Appendix III: 
 
Research study participant consent declaration 
 
Project Topic: The power and limits of social movements in promoting fundamental 
political and constitutional change in Kenya: The case of the Ufungamano Initiative 
(1999-2005).   
BY Jacob M. Mati  
  
This research study, including the above information has been explained to me orally. I do 
understand what my involvement in the research means and I voluntarily agree to participate. 
I understand the procedures and I can choose to withdraw at any time or refuse to answer 
particular questions.  I am willing to provide my experience and knowledge pertaining to this 
research through an in-depth interview, which will be tape-recorded and thereafter 
transcribed for purposes of accuracy and reliability of this study. I have also been assured by 
the researcher that all the information will be treated and kept confidentially.  
 
I do not mind the thesis from this research using my real name/ I do not want the thesis from 
this research to use using my real name (Please cross whichever does not apply).  
 
Name: ______________________________ 
Signature of the participant___________  Date__________ 
Researcher’s signature ______________  Date __________ 
Place_________________________ 
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Appendix IV:  
 
Participant’s consent for tape-recording of the interview 
 
Research topic: The power and limits of social movements in promoting fundamental 
political and constitutional change in Kenya: The case of the Ufungamano Initiative 
(1999-2005).   
BY Jacob M. Mati  
 
I ___________________________, hereby consent to be interviewed and tape-recorded.  I 
have been informed that the purposes of tape-recording the interview are for accuracy and 
reliability reasons of this study. I have also been informed that the tape records will be 
retained and kept securely in the custody of the researcher and the information will remain 
confidential. 
 
Participant’s signature _____________________ Date __________ 
 
Participant’s email: _______________________________ 
 
Researcher’s signature _____________________ Date __________ 
 
Place_________________________ 
 
 
 
  
388 
 
Appendix V 
 
Interview Guide/schedule  
 
(NB: Given the different biographies of the participants for this study, this is only a guide 
with a set of possible questions for different types of participants. Some of the questions in 
this interview guide will only apply to select type of participants. As such, the interview 
guide is organised into themes pursued in the interviews. All italicised question are probe 
questions and are adaptable depending on the amount of information the participants shall 
provide). 
 
I: PARTICIPANT BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
Please provide the following details about yourself: 
1. Name (Optional): 
2. Age: 
3. Sex: 
4. Educational Background: 
5. Professional Background: 
6. Present Work: 
7. Please indicate the name of the organization you work for. 
 
II: PARTICIPATION IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM PROCESS 
1. In what capacity were you involved or interact with the constitutional reform processes 
in Kenya? (Capture all that apply) 
Employee of a Civil society organisation 
(name/specify)…………………………. 
 
Grassroots mobiliser 
 
Convenor of the Ufungamano Initiative 
 
Member of the Ufungamano Initiative 
Activist Member of CKRC (specify position)  
 
Member of PCK (Specify Position) 
 
Member of PCK and later CKRC (specify Position 
 
Member of Parliament 
 
Member of Parliamentary select committee on the 
constitutional review (from 1998).  
 
Member of the Bomas Conference Religious leader 
State employee (specify) Other (specify) 
 
2. In what capacity were you involved with the Ufungamano Initiative? 
3. What were the main reasons why you joined the Ufungamano Initiative constitutional 
review struggles/activities?  
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III: EMERGENCE OF THE UFUNGAMANO INITIATIVE 
1) Why was the Ufungamano Initiative formed? 
-Why was it formed in 1999 when the issues it set to address had  been a part of 
Kenya for a long time?  
-Why did the Ufungamano Initiative get involved in the constitutional Review Process 
while there were so many groups and organisations pushing for the same process to 
be inclusive?  
2) What were the existing political conditions at the time of the emergence of the 
Ufungamano Initiative?  
-What political opportunities allowed the Ufungamano Initiative to emerge?  
-What new political opportunities did the Ufungamano Initiative create and utilise in 
the course of its activities?  
3) Who specifically were the main drivers (actors) behind the establishment of the 
Ufungamano Initiative?  
-What was common among the different actors involved in the formation of the 
Ufungamano initiative?  
-How did the different actors in the Ufungamano Initiative relate to one another? 
- How did Ufungamano Initiative relate to other pro-democracy and constitutional 
reform movements and activist groups in Kenya? What determined the nature of these 
relationships? 
 -How did the Ufungamano Initiative go about shaping a collective identity among the 
various organisations that were/are its members/ what type of framing did it use to 
appeal to a wide range of actors?  
4) What type of response/reactions did the Ufungamano Initiative elicit from the ordinary 
members of society?  
 -Who was the Ufungamano Initiative representing?  What  were the social bases of 
the  Ufungamano Initiative?  
5) At the time of its formation, what did Ufungamano Initiative envision to do for the 
country?  
 
IV: UFUNGAMANO INITIATIVE’S ARCHITECTURE AND RESOURCES  
1) What institutional/organisational structures (architecture) were established to ensure that 
Ufungamano Initiative achieved what it set itself to do?  
-How have these structures changed/evolved overtime? 
 -If there are any changes, what has been the determinant of the changes in 
structures? 
2) How have these structures related to one another to ensure upward, horizontal and 
downward accountability between Ufungamano Initiative members/constituent groups?  
-How have these structures contributed to, or hindered Ufungamano Initiative’s 
work?  
 
3) What capacities and resources were necessary to lead/steer Ufungamano Initiative in its 
pro-democracy and pro-constitution reform struggles in Kenya?  
4) How did/has Ufungamano Initiative mobilized resources and capacities (human, 
financial, organisational) needed to undertake its work?  
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V: UFUNGAMANO INITIATIVE’S ACTIVITIES AND STRATEGIES  
  
1) Who were Ufungamano Initiative‘s key allies (domestic and international)? 
2) Who were Ufungamano Initiative‘s key targets and adversaries?  
3) What strategies did the Ufungamano Initiative use in its engagement with its 
targets/adversaries or in the pursuit of its objectives?  
-What determined the nature of the interactions and strategies between the 
Ufungamano Initiative and its antagonists?  
-Did the strategies, targets and organizational forms of Ufungamano Initiative differ 
from  those of previous pro-democracy and constitutional reform groups in Kenya?  
If so, what informed these changes in strategy? 
4) What was the nature of the relationships between Ufungamano Initiative and the state on 
the constitutional reform struggles in Kenya pre and post 2002?  
5) What were the outcomes of different types of engagements?  
6) How did the state respond to the pressures from the Ufungamano Initiative?  
7) What was the nature of the relationships between Ufungamano Initiative with other non-
state actors in constitutional reform struggles in Kenya pre and post 2002?  
8) What have been Ufungamano Initiative‘s main challenges (strategic as well as 
organizational i.e. internal) in their work?  
-How has Ufungamano Initiative dealt with such challenges? 
9) Why did the Ufungamano Initiative resort to a rare form of direct social movement 
action (forming the Peoples Commission of Kenya) to mobilise, organise, and lead the 
people of Kenya to write the constitution they wanted instead of using the more orthodox 
actions and reactions like demonstrations, campaigns, strikes, petitions, or submissions to 
the relevant state institutions)?  
-From where did the Ufungamano Initiative borrow this model?  
-Was it possible for the Ufungamano Initiative to go on and come up with a 
constitution  that would be  acceptable to Kenyans?   
10) How did the Ufungamano Initiative design its engagement strategy with the masses?  
11) What trade-offs, tensions and challenges, has the Ufungamano Initiative experienced in 
mobilizing citizen action?  
-How have such tensions and challenges been managed?  
 
VI: OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS TO THE UFUNGAMANO INITIATIVE 
1) What have been the main dynamics in the rise, the politics, the operations, and the 
challenges of the Ufungamano Initiative in the context of the constitutional Review 
Process in Kenya?   
2) Some of the reactions of the state to the Ufungamano Initiative‘s actions to form a 
commission to write the Constitution that Kenyans wanted outside of the state 
established structures was for Moi‘s government as well as his allies in NPD to publicly 
condemn their activities and even threatening violence. Were there any other covert 
reactions/responses from the state and other players?  
3) What were the Ufungamano Initiative‘s responses to state‘s continued repression?  
4) What was the rationale for the Ufungamano Initiative to disband its PCK and merge with 
the CKRC while some groups within it e.g. Muungano wa Mageuzi were opposed to this 
fearing co-optation?  
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5) One of the main outcomes of the merger for the PCK and the CKRC for the Review 
Process was the dissolution of the PCK. What effects did this have on the Ufungamano 
initiative?  
-Was the merger, part of the reason for the Ufungamano Initiative’s loss of its mass 
appeal? 
- Did the state continue undermining the Ufungamano Initiative after the merger?  
 
6) What role, if any, did the heterogeneity of the actors (religious, ethnic, generational, 
class), in the Ufungamano Initiative contribute to its change of fortunes?  
 
VII: UFUNGAMANO INITIATIVE’S IMPACT AND INFLUENCE ON THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM PROCESS IN KENYA  
1) Generally, what have been the impacts of the Ufungamano Initiative on the constitutional 
making process and democratisation process in Kenya?  
-In your opinion, how effective do you think Ufungamano Initiative has been in what 
is set to do?  
2) Did the Ufungamano Initiative have any significant influence on the state led process 
when the two bodies merged?  
3) What were the main factors for the success or failure of Ufungamano Initiatives‘ work? 
4) Did the Ufungamano Initiative create any substantive challenge to the constitutional 
making process that forced the Ghai led process to start merger processes?  
 
VIII: LESSONS FROM THE UFUNGAMANO INITIATIVE EXPERIENCE 
 
1) What lessons can be drawn on mass support social movement like the Ufungamano 
Initiative on the nature of mobilisations in social movements? 
2) What important lessons can one derive from the efforts by state authorities to repress 
Ufungamano Initiative on its organisation and mobilisation?  
3) What lessons can be drawn from the experience of the merger of the Ufungamano 
Initiative‘s PCK with the CKRC?  
4) Some analysts argue that social movements and other civil society groups have been the 
nerve centres of contemporary social political contentions and conflicts in Kenya. What 
is you view on this?  
5) Some analysts argue that the civil society and social movements undermine nascent 
democracy in many parts of the world. What is your view on the claim that Kenya‘s 
unfinished constitutional reforms as well as the current constitutional review stalemates 
are, in part, attributable to the intrusive activities of such groups as the Ufungamano 
Initiative?  
 
-End- 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for your time! 
 
 
